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Combining agency theory and the resource-dependence perspective as well as signalling 
theory, this thesis examines the role venture capitalists (VCs) and founders play with 
respect to both structural board characteristics and board capital in terms of experience and 
prestige and whether these are linked to performance.  
It claims that VCs and founders shape the governance system of the firms going public and 
are influential in the professionalisation of the ventures especially in terms of human and 
social capital of its board of directors. It also argues that the board of directors represents a 
signal of firm quality in the initial public offering (IPO) market and should thus be linked 
to performance. Similarly, according to the venture capital certification hypothesis, being 
funded by VCs signals a firm’s quality and potential. 
In order to assess these claims, this thesis employs a unique sample of matched venture-
capital-backed and non-venture-capital-backed entrepreneurial IPOs that floated either on 
the London Stock Exchange’s Official List or the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). 
Extending previous research this thesis employs more fine-grained measures and introduces 
new conceptually relevant variables in the analysis. 
The findings indicate that VCs and founders are influential in shaping corporate governance 
of IPO-stage ventures both from an agency and resource-provision perspective. Findings 
from the examination of governance and professionalisation characteristics with respect to 
IPO short-run performance (underpricing) indicate that it may the involvement of 
prestigious auditors that signal firm quality while a founder bias discount seems to exist. 
While evidence is found that VC involvement (and to a lesser extent director/board 
characteristics) is related to post-IPO market performance, this seems to depend on the time 
period following the IPO examined, whereas auditor prestige shows a positive association 
in all of these time periods. 
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This chapter provides an overview of this study, adducts to the importance of extant 
research and also gaps in the literature, leading to formulation of research objectives for 
the study. Subsequently, the potential for the contribution of this thesis will be presented 
followed by an outline of the thesis structure.  
 
1.1 Background 
While there is a long research tradition relating to the implications of agency problems 
for the governance of listed corporations in organisation theory literature (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Hoskisson et al., 2002) and although there is 
growing recognition of the importance IPOs among both the academic and business 
communities, the transition from a privately held to a publicly traded company is not 
well understood. While various studies have examined the determinants of the decision 
to go public (e.g. Roëll, 1996; Pagano et al., 1998; Maug, 2001) and post-issue 
performance (e.g. Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Ritter, 1991; Drake and Vetsuypens, 1993), 
research on the related but equally important issue of what influences a firm’s corporate 
governance mechanism at the IPO stage and how the specific characteristics of this 
mechanism may affect the IPO firm’s performance is just emerging. 
 
The existence of information asymmetry between the IPO team, investors and 
underwriters is a key underlying assumption of this research. Information asymmetry 
may create agency costs and lead to underpricing1, the difference between the IPO 
                                                 
1
 The terms underpricing, initial returns as well as first-day returns are used interchangeably by 
researchers and also throughout this thesis  
 
 2 
firm’s offer price of stock and the first-day closing price (e.g. Michaely and Shaw, 
1994; Certo et al., 2001a). This ‘money left on the table’ represents a direct wealth 
transfer from existing shareholders to new investors, but the extent of underpricing can 
be decreased by sending signals to the market about the value of the venture prior to the 
firm’s stock being floated. 
 
While most research regarded governance factors to be exogenous firm characteristics, 
scholars have increasingly recognised that the governance system may be an outcome of 
the IPO’s strategic decisions (e.g. Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Filatotchev and Bishop, 
2002), respectively directors’ characteristics and distribution of power within the firm 
(e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). 
Since existing shareholders bear the cost of suboptimal governance, it is more likely 
that board structure is chosen optimally at IPO (Baker and Gompers, 2003). According 
to organisational life cycle theory (Clifford, 1975; Hanks, 1990), at the beginning of a 
venture the founders (or founder) naturally take on the leadership position in their ‘own’ 
company. Since typically they are not only the sole shareholders at that time, and small 
businesses are usually built on the founders’ talents, they are the driving force in the 
early stage(s). With the growth of the venture often going along with the arrival of 
external shareholders, founders become limited in their decision-making power. Several 
scholars have stressed the governance role which large external shareholders in general 
(Mello and Parsons, 1998; Pagano and Roëll, 1998) and venture capitalists (VCs) in 
special (e.g. Barry et al., 1990; Lerner, 1995) play in restraining the self-serving 
behaviour of decision makers (like executive directors but also founders). 
Since VCs as active investors and repeated players in the IPO market bring more to 
their portfolio companies than money, founders together with VCs can be regarded as 
the most influential players in a venture’s early stages including the IPO stage. While 
both have power and incentives to influence e.g. the venture’s corporate governance, the 
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interplay between founders and VCs is not entirely clear, especially when it comes to 
more specific governance/board characteristics. With respect to the latter, the literature 
holds anecdotal evidence ready, with empirical evidence in this respect being scant.  
 
As documented in the IPO literature, a much earlier and larger scholarly interest 
compared to that of VCs’ role on specific governance characteristics, is that of 
organisational outcomes of venture-backing per se. Above all, effects of VC-backing 
with respect to the certification of the portfolio firms’ quality which is proposed to be 
linked to underpricing (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lin, 1996; Lee and Wahal, 2004), 
and although to a lesser extent, to post-IPO long-run performance (e.g. Jain and Kini, 
1995; Brav and Gompers, 1997) raised researchers’ interest.  
Research on the related meaningful issues of what influences a venture’s corporate 
governance mechanism at the flotation stage and how the particular characteristics of 
this mechanism may affect the IPO firm’s performance is just coming forward. 
(For an overview of entrepreneurial activity in a UK context and an outline of VC 
investments and the involvement of VCs in their portfolio firms see Appendix 1.) 
 
The outline just provided leads to the research objective of this thesis, presented in the 
following section. 
 
1.2 Research objective 
In line with the outline in the previous section which stressed the importance of the IPO 
context in various respects including that of the transition from privately held to 
publicly traded company which typically goes along with changes in the governance 
mechanism, the focus of this research will be on IPOs.  
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While the literature referring to organisational life-cycle theory (Clifford, 1975; Hanks, 
1990) suggests that founders play a vital role in the early stages of a venture’s life, with 
the provision of finance from external sources, large shareholders, such as VCs, play a 
governance role as well in such ventures (e.g. Barry et al., 1990; Lerner, 1995). By 
focusing on founders and VCs as the driving forces in IPO-stage ventures, this thesis is 
going to tie in with the so far limited existing research in an attempt to narrow the gap 
in the literature with respect to VCs’ and founders’ role in corporate governance, 
especially the characteristics of the board of directors. 
 
The purpose of this research is therefore to examine the governance role which VCs and 
founders play, focusing on the board of directors. Since the board of directors basically 
fulfils two functions, that of monitoring/controlling and that of strategy/provision of 
resources (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), VCs’ and founders’ role is studied from both a 
monitoring and a resource provision perspective. 
Since in the IPO context board structures and characteristics have recently been 
theorised to represent important non-financial information influencing IPO investors’ 
decision making (Certo, 2003), this thesis additionally examines relations between these 
characteristics and IPO performance both in the short- and long-run. Since VC-backing 
per se is proposed to certify ventures, a direct association between VC-backing and IPO 
performance is also studied next to a direct link between founder-management and IPO 
performance.  
Put differently, in one step, this study examines the role VCs and founders play with 
respect to corporate governance and professionalisation of IPO stage firms and, in a 




After having addressed this study’s objective, an outline of the contribution to 
knowledge this research aims to achieve will be presented. 
 
1.3 Significance of study 
This thesis extends previous work in a number of ways. First, research has mostly 
examined governance-related issues in mature and well established organisations. By 
moving away from those companies to IPO stage ventures making an important 
transition in which the board is considered to be of high importance, it contributes to 
research on threshold firms. It moves the analysis of the process of board formation 
beyond, as indicated by Pettigrew (1992), the typically examined board size and 
composition. 
Next, this research examines theoretically significant contextual factors like VC-
backing on board characteristics in the specific context of the IPO. The literature on the 
VC-entrepreneur relationship deals with agency issues culminating in the VCs’ and 
founders’ involvement with respect to the board’s structural characteristics. Yet 
previous research has mostly neglected more specific board characteristics especially 
from a strategic/resource point of view.  
Moreover, building on agency theory and the resource-dependence perspective, the 
thesis suggests an integrated theoretical framework to analyse VCs’ and entrepreneurs’ 
involvement, not only regarding the structural independence of the board but also its 
experience and legitimacy. 
Building on the suggestion that managers play a symbolic role (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978) and Certo’s (2003) extension that board structures and characteristics may 
influence investors’ decision-making process, this study also contributes to signalling 
research by moving away from financial signals. Moreover, unlike most other studies 
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the author examines whether such signals are associated with substantive benefits over 
the long-run as well.  
Furthermore, most studies to date on venture capital have employed US data and thus 
focused on the US VC market. Yet, projecting findings from those studies to other 
regions is problematic since it was pointed out that the VC industry takes different 
forms in different countries due to differences, e.g. in economic and legal environments 
(Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). Compared to the VCs in the US, UK VCs tend to invest 
in later stages/less risky companies. Among the UK studies on venture capital, at least 
with regard to data this study stands out as it derives its sample from a corroborated list 
of IPOs floated on both the Official List as well as AIM in which founders as well as 
VCs are present, relying on more sources than a list published by the British Venture 
Capital Association (BVCA) frequently used by many UK researchers to identify VC-
backed IPO firms. The chosen sample period also allows the splitting into normal and 
hot IPO periods. 
 
The outcomes from the research will have relevance to a number of key audiences. It is 
hoped that the results will be of interest to academics working on the VC–entrepreneur 
relationship, on governance and professonalisation, as well as IPO performance. In 
addition, entrepreneurs are keen to understand whether VCs actually add value and what 
role they play with respect to governance and professionalisation of their portfolio firms 
and whether these are associated with lower ‘money left on the table’ at IPO 
respectively with superior long-run market performance. 
Shareholder activists and policy makers keen on the protection of shareholder interests 
may be interested in examinations of whether protective measures are related to 
organisational performance (which in turn is in the interests of shareholders) and 




The following section is going outline delimitations. 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
In the following, theories that are discussed in the literature but are not the focus of this 
thesis (and will therefore not be subject to further development or testing) and rather 
unconventional ways of looking at the VC-entrepreneur relationship respectively are 
briefly outlined. 
 
At the heart of the vast majority of papers on (corporate) governance related topics lies 
agency theory (Section 2.1.1.1) that however is built on rather strong assumptions. 
Stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) which is based on psychological and 
sociological approaches to governance relaxes agency theory’s assumptions and argues 
that managers can be intrinsically motivated and their needs can be based on 
achievement and self-actualisation. From this perspective, managers may yield greater 
utility by managing organisational rather than personal agendas. 
 
The resource-based view has its origins in the work of Penrose (1959) while the term 
‘resource-base’ was introduced by Wernerfelt (1984). Penrose conceptualised the firm 
as a collection of productive resources, viewing firm growth as a process of employing 
these resources to exploit productive opportunities and also increasing a firm’s resource 
base. Firm growth is limited by the existing resource base and management’s 
competence with respect to exploiting the resource base. 
The resource-dependence perspective (Section 2.1.1.2) similarly focuses on the 
importance of resources for firms, more specifically on firms’ dependence on external 
resources since not all required resources can be generated internally and on how 
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dependencies can be overcome. The resource dependence perspective is deemed more 
appropriate for the purpose of this piece of research bearing in mind the stage of the 
organisational and corporate governance life-cycle entrepreneurial IPOs (the focus of 
this thesis) typically find themselves in, being (arguably) more concerned with 
overcoming resource dependencies rather than exploiting (an already existing) resource 
base.  
 
In venture capital research, agency theory has typically been used in investigations into 
the relationship between the entrepreneur as agent for the principal (the venture 
capitalist). However, the relationship between VCs and entrepreneurs can also be 
viewed from a different angle in considering the VC as an agent providing value-added 
services for entrepreneurs, who in this case are principals (Fiet, 1991; Cable and Shane, 
1997; Smith, 1998, 2001). While this view is valid and interesting, this thesis follows 
the conventional view. 
 
Before proceding to the next chapter outlining the theoretical framework, delimitations 
with respect to methodological aspects will be outlined. 
 
In line with influential research in this vein that focuses on the IPO, this project also 
collects and examines cross-sectional data of interest (for the time of the IPO). 
However, since the IPO represents (only) one (though important) point in the corporate 
governance life-cycle, examining governance developments within several years 
following the IPO using panel data may be very interesting e.g. since a decrease in 
founders’ importance to the firm and (gradual) VC exits are to be expected.  
While examining governance developments post-IPO would clearly be interesting, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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While some authors call for more advanced econometric methods that allow to examine 
corporate governance mechanisms through systems of simultaneous equations (Bhagat 
and Black, 2002), the relevant entrepreneurship/strategy literature has, even in recent 
years, vastly employed conventional methods2, perhaps since “…specification and 
estimation of such a system of simultaneous equations is non-trivial“ (Bhagat and 
Jeffries, 2002: iii). 
 
After the introduction to the thesis in the previous sections, the following part moves on 
to outlining the content of each of the remaining chapters.  
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature 
starting with an outline of the key theoretical perspectives on which this thesis is based. 
In that sub-section, theories on board roles are discussed along with a power model of 
board formation. Finally, another key theory this research builds on, since it provides a 
link to IPO performance, signalling theory, is presented. The literature on board roles, 
including the relevant corporate governance literature respectively the literature on 
resource provision is presented while also relating both to the VC-entrepreneur-context. 
The final sub-section of Chapter 2 presents the literature on IPO anomalies: IPO 
underpricing, IPO long-run underperformance and hot-issue markets, including the key 
explanations for them. It also reviews the literature on board roles and performance. 
In Chapter 3, hypotheses are developed based on the literature review of Chapter 2. 
While in the first sub-section, hypotheses are formulated with respect to venture 
capitalists, founders and board roles, the second sub-section relates the latter to IPO 
performance.  
                                                 
2
 and so does this thesis 
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Chapter 4 presents the methodology underpinning this study. Next to philosophical and 
methodological considerations, the author gives an overview of the data employed 
including a discussion of their validity and reliability. Additionally, sampling and data 
collection procedures are presented. Following that, variables and econometrical 
methods chosen to deal with the set of research hypotheses are outlined.  
Following the analysis of the data, Chapter 5 presents empirical findings split into two 
results sections covering findings from univariate and multivariate analysis.  
In Chapter 6, differentiated by the respective hypotheses findings are critically 
evaluated by relating them to similar research.  
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises key insights gained from the analysis of the thesis to 
assist in providing a better understanding of the implications to the groups for which 
this research might be most relevant, namely researchers, policy makers and 
entrepreneurs/managers/directors alike. In addition, a critical evaluation of the 
limitations of this thesis is given. Finally, the chapter also presents areas for future 
research and closes with an outline of the study’s contributions. 
 
An overview of the thesis structure is provided in Figure 1 overleaf. 
 11
Figure 1: Thesis structure 
Chapter 1: Introduction
Introduction to study, research objective, significance of study, thesis structure
Chapter 3: Hypotheses development
Development of hypotheses 
Chapter 4: Methodology
Philosophical and methodological considerations, data collection and sampling,
variables and methods
Chapter 5: Results
Description of results from univariate and multivariate analysis
Chapter 6: Discussion
Discussion and evaluation of results
Chapter 7: Conclusion
Summary of key findings, implications of findings, limitations of study, recommendations
for future research, contributions of study
Chapter 2: Literature review
Overview and assessment of theories, review of literature on board roles and IPO 
literature
 
After having outlined the research objectives of this study also highlighted its 




2 Literature Review 
 
This chapter begins with an outline and discussion of the theoretical underpinning (2.1) 
with respect to the two key roles the board of directors fulfil. These roles are largely 
based on agency theory, as well as the resource-dependence perspective (e.g. Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In addition, the bargaining model (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1998) conceptualises interplay of founders’ and VCs’ with respect to the 
main board roles. Especially when examining IPO performance, signalling theory 
(Leland and Pyle, 1977), which is based on the existence of informational asymmetries, 
becomes important, not least because signalling was (recently) linked to board structure 
and characteristics, which in turn reflect the main functions of the board of directors.   
The second sub-section of this chapter reviews the board roles literature while the final 
sub-section presents key aspects of the IPO performance literature, presenting IPO 
anomalies and explanations for their occurrence, followed by an outline of the literature 
on board roles and IPO performance which is to a great extent based on signalling 
theory. 
 
In Figure 2, the author documents the links that are going to be reviewed in this chapter.  
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2.1 Theoretical framework 
Agency theory as well as the resource-dependence perspective propose the board of 
directors to be an important mechanism in dealing with agency problems (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983), and also a mechanism for managing external resource 
dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). While these perspectives have normative 
implications for board formation, the interplay between founders/chief executives 
(CEOs) and outside shareholders (like VCs) with regard to board formation is theorised 
in a bargaining model (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). More recently, the board of 
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directors has been conceptualised as a means of communicating organisational 
legitimacy, thus additionally linking the board to signalling theory. The latter theory 
builds on the concept of asymmetric information, which is also an element of agency 
theory, and will therefore be discussd in this section as well. 
 
Since corporate boards are the centre of the author’s attention, the following section 
provides an overview of the theories which capture the different roles of the board as 
distinguished in the relevant literature. 
 
2.1.1 Theories on board roles 
Theoretical perspectives most relevant to the context of entrepreneurial IPOs (with and 
without VC-backing) are agency theory and the resource-dependence perspective, 
accompanied by the bargaining model of board formation as well as asymmetric 
information and signalling. 
 
2.1.1.1 Agency theory and monitoring role 
Agency theory dates back to as early as 1776, when Adam Smith described that 
managers of firms which were owned by others cannot be expected to manage the 
company as well as if they themselves were the owners (Smith, 1776). 
The incentive problems which arise between managers not owning a stake in companies 
were raised in the classic paper by Berle and Means (1932). Decades later, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) consider external finance to a company as a principal-agent problem, 
thus introducing agency theory to modern corporations. They define an agency 
relationship (1976: 308) 
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“… as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties 
are utility maximizers there is good reason to believe that the agent will not 
always act in the best interest of the principal.” 
Agency theory thus describes the potential for conflicts of interest arising from the 
separation of ownership and control. It is based on the assumptions of self-interested, 
rational, and risk-averse principals and agents (Eisenhardt, 1989). The objectives of 
principals and agents might not align perfectly, and asymmetric information places the 
principal in an unfavourable position regarding the choice and monitoring of the agent. 
Adverse selection and moral hazard problems may arise due to information asymmetry 
and incongruent goals (Barney and Ouchi, 1986; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Agency problems implicate agency costs which consist of 1) monitoring expenses of the 
principal, 2) bonding expenditures by the agent, as well as 3) residual loss. 
Monitoring expenses refer to the costs borne by the principal in establishing effective 
incentives and monitoring the agent’s performance. Bonding costs are costs to the agent 
in situations where the agent is required to guarantee the principal that he will not take 
certain, harmful actions towards the principal or to assure the principal that he will be 
compensated if the agent pursues such actions. Residual loss refers to the decline in the 
principal’s welfare caused by divergence in the agent’s decision and the decisions which 
would have maximised the principal’s welfare (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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2.1.1.1.1 Related applications of agency theory 
This theory is the dominant theoretical lense through which relationships between VCs 
and entrepreneurs are examined, and corporate governance mechanisms especially the 
board’s control role is studied.  
 
Monitoring role and agency theory: 
The board’s control respectively monitoring function (e.g. Mace, 1971; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Boyd, 1990; Johnson et al., 1996) has caught the attention of corporate 
governance scholars from a variety of disciplines. Academic perspectives relevant to 
control are especially extensive, containing legal, finance and management literatures. 
The monitoring role refers directly to the directors’ responsibility to monitor managers 
on behalf of owners (shareholders). The board’s monitoring function is theoretically 
derived from agency theory which regards the key function of boards as monitoring the 
actions of agents (managers) to protect the owners’ (shareholders’) interests (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Mizruchi, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The responsibility to ensure that management acts in the interest of shareholders is the 
primary driver for specific activities associated with the monitoring function, like 
monitoring the CEO, planning CEO succession and evaluating and determining 
compensation as well as monitoring strategy implementation (Boyd, 1995; Daily and 
Schwenk, 1996; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Rindova, 1999; Pitcher et al., 2000). 
 
It is acknowledged by agency theory that boards and directors vary in terms of 
incentives to monitor and protect shareholders’ interests, thus incentives are antecedents 
for effective monitoring. According to agency theorists, boards will be more effective 
monitors and firm performance will improve when incentives are aligned with 
shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). The most widely 
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employed proxies in agency research for board incentives are board independence and 
director compensation.  
Generally, scholars examining the monitoring role prefer boards to be dominated by 
independent directors (e.g. Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Weisbach, 1988; Barnhart et al., 
1994). Researchers in the agency tradition contend that dependence on the current CEO 
or organisation generates a disincentive for inside and dependent outside directors to 
take the side of the shareholders when their interests oppose those of the 
CEO/management. This view’s main proposition is that dependent boards are less 
effective as monitors of management and negatively related with firm performance.  
The other monitoring incentive widely employed in agency research is equity 
compensation (Jensen, 1993). The latter aligns the interests of shareholders and 
directors, thus motivating directors to better monitoring. Without equity compensation, 
the board’s incentives to pursue shareholders’ interests are diminished (Daily et al., 
2003). The key proposition here is that the board’s equity compensation will be 
positively associated with firm performance due to improved monitoring.  
 
Application to VC/entrepreneur context: 
In venture capital research, agency theory has typically been used in investigations into 
the relationship between the entrepreneur as agent for the principal (the venture 
capitalist). However, the relationship between VCs and entrepreneurs can also be 
viewed from a different angle in considering the VC as an agent providing value-added 
services for entrepreneurs, who in this case are principals (Fiet, 1991; Cable and Shane, 
1997; Smith, 1998, 2001). In the relationship between founders and investors, 
entrepreneurs may face agency problems due to information asymmetry in the forms of 
moral hazard and adverse selection risks when ‘hiring’ VCs to invest in the venture and 
to perform value added services (Smith 1998). Yet the overwhelming majority of 
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papers, following Sahlman’s (1990) lead, operates with the ‘classic’ assumption of VCs 
being the principals, and so does this study. 
Since VCs typically hold considerable equity positions in their portfolio firms, agency 
issues arise here as well due to the separation of ownership and control, with monitoring 
being one of the key issues in VC research. Yet, the VCs’ equity position in the 
portfolio firm is an incentive to engage in monitoring regardless of whether the VC 
actually takes a board seat or not (VCs usually hold contractual rights in addition to 
ownership which do not necessarily require VCs to hold board positions for monitoring 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003)).  
Since monitoring is costly and cannot be done continuously, VCs will check portfolio 
companies periodically and reserve the right to abandon projects which do not meet 
certain targets (Gompers, 1995). This so-called staging of funds means that VCs 
provide capital in separate financing rounds, where funds in the next round are only 
provided if the project meets predetermined milestones. This is done to prevent 
entrepreneurs from continuing to invest in failing projects (Sahlman, 1990).  
 
2.1.1.1.2 Evaluation of agency theory 
Criticism of the agency theory typically refers to its strict assumptions and applicability. 
The most criticised feature is the assumption that both agent and principal are self-
interested and opportunistic (Granovetter, 1985; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). Rationality 
and risk-aversion are also presumed by agency theory. Moreover, it is criticised for 
being static (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003) and that the hierarchical setting in principal-
agent relationships (e.g. Armstrong, 1991) has been found to be hardly applicable to 
real life (Larson, 1992; Cable and Shane, 1997; Uzzi, 1997), since the relationship 
between entrepreneurs and VCs is not always a hierarchical one between unequal 
parties (Amit et al., 1990b; Sahlman, 1990), as assumed by agency theory. Papers which 
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do use agency theory in a VC-entrepreneur relationship have to deal with the 
problematic assumption of goal incongruence. The important social relationships 
between the parties and the potential for mutual gain in cooperation is overlooked 
(Cable and Shane, 1997). Alternatively, stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991) which is based on psychological and sociological approaches to governance 
relaxes agency theory’s assumptions and argues that managers can be intrinsically 
motivated and their needs can be based on achievement and self-actualisation. These 
managers may yield greater utility by managing organisational rather than personal 
agendas.  
While agency theory has its validity in the pre-investment stage, it loses power once the 
VC has invested in the firm, because by then the VC will have taken steps to mitigate 
agency problems (Williamson, 1988). Yet one objective of this thesis is to examine 
these steps, and moreover in the context of the IPO which is surrounded by problems of 
information asymmetry, with new investors taking equity positions and thus changes in 
ownership occuring, agency theory becomes dominant again and is therefore widely 
applied in IPO research.  
However, results of empirical tests of agency theory’s incentives hypothesis are not 
unambiguous. For example a meta-analytic review of studies of structural board 
characteristics and performance showed no statistically significant relationship between 
the proxy of board incentives (board composition and leadership structure) to monitor 
and firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998).  
Additionally, it is suggested that agency problems not only arise due to managerial 
opportunism but may also arise from a lack of agent ability (Walsh and Seward, 1990). 
Research applying agency theory frequently implicitly assumes that all agents are 
equally qualified, yet the literature on the impact of executive leadership on firm 
performance would discount this (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1990).  
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Due to the relatively narrow boundaries of agency theory, scholars increasingly suggest 
that the agency framework should be used in conjunction with complementary theories 
in examining issues of corporate governance (Pettigrew, 1992; Daily et al., 2003; 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) suggest that research on the 
post-investment VC-entrepreneur relationship should be examined from a 
complementary perspective. 
 
Besides monitoring management on behalf of shareholders the board of directors (and 
VCs as well) also fulfils the function of resource provision as postulated by resource-
dependence theory. The latter theoretical perspective will therefore be presented in the 
following section. 
 
2.1.1.2 Resource-dependence perspective and resource provision role 
 
Thompson (1967), Jacobs (1974) and most importantly, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
introduced with the resource-dependence perspective another approach which highlights 
the importance of resources for firms and their ability to act rather than merely react. 
The resource-dependence perspective focuses on firms’ dependence on external 
resources, and hence their environment, and how these dependencies can be overcome. 
According to this perspective, no organisation can survive on its own. It is presupposed 
that firms have to enter into inter-organisational relationships because not all required 
resources can be generated internally (Jacobs, 1974; Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978).  
When conditions of competition and exchange are uncertain and problematic, 
organisations try to establish ties with elements in their environment and use those 
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linkages for gaining access to resources, stabilising outcomes and for averting 
environmental control.  
The consequence for the use of external ties as a means of accessing resources makes 
firms dependent on the environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Boyd, 1990). 
According to Blau (1964), Emerson (1962), Jacobs (1974), and Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) organisations avoid environmental uncertainty, seek to decrease their 
dependence on the environment, and anticipate reciprocity in relationships in which 
resources are exchanged.  
Gaining access to and controlling critical resources and minimising dependence on 
others are the main challenges in managing inter-organisational relationships (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). As suggested by Pfeffer (1981b), companies can manage their 
resource-dependence by 1) gaining control over resources to minimise their 
dependence, and 2) gaining control of resources which make other firms more 
dependent on them. 
 
2.1.1.2.1 Related applications of resource-dependence perspective 
 
Resource provision role and resource-dependency: 
Besides their monitoring role, another role directors play is that of providing vital 
resources or securing those resources by developing linkages to the external 
environment (Boyd, 1990). 
It should be noted that in two existing board review papers (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Johnson et al., 1996), the authors discuss additional board roles (without mentioning the 
theoretical basis), like the strategy and service roles, subsumed in this thesis in the 
resource provision function (see Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, for a similar application), 
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since these roles can be summarised into the array of board resources originally 
theorised by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). 
 
Resource-dependence theory posits that corporate boards are a means of managing 
external dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), decreasing uncertainties regarding 
firms’ environments (Pfeffer, 1972), and reducing transaction costs which arise with 
environmental interdependencies (Williamson, 1988), thus suggesting a direct link from 
the board’s provision of resources to firm performance.  
 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), boards of directors can inherit four main 
benefits:, 1) provision of specific resources like advice and expertise from individuals 
with a wide set of experiences, 2) communication channels between the firm and 
external organisations, 3) assistance in reaching support and commitment from 
important extra-organisational parties, as well as 4) legitimacy.  
The board’s role as a resource provider contains various specific activities such as 
enabling access to resources like capital (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988), expertise 
provision (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990), strategy formulation (Lorsch and MacIver, 
1989; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992), creating external relations (Haunschild and Beckman, 
1998), linking the firm to stakeholders (Burt, 1980) and providing legitimacy (Selznick, 
1949). 
 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) introduce the term ‘board capital’ to the board roles 
literature which summarises previous discussions of board attributes which are regarded 
as the main antecedent for the board of directors’ provision of resources. Board capital 
subsumes both human capital (Becker, 1964; Coleman, 1988), like experience, 
expertise, and reputation, and relational capital, also called social capital, like network 
ties to other external contingencies (White, 1961, 1963; Jacobs, 1965).  
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Board capital has been positively associated with the provision of Pfeffer and Salancik’s 
(1978) four benefits as described above. Boards with specific relational capital have 
been found to be capable of providing better advice and counsel (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001), which in turn is related to subsequent performance (Westphal, 1999). 
Board capital has also been associated with improved credibility and reputation 
(Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1992; Daily and Schwenk, 1996; Certo et al., 2001b; Certo, 
2003). The provision of channels of communication and interlocking directorates have 
been found to have a positive effect on firm performance (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 
1996; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Hillman et al., 1999). Board capital, finally, 
can help securing access to resources, like financial capital, and to more favourable 
terms, which is linked to subsequent performance (Zald, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972; D'Aveni, 
1990; Boeker and Goodstein, 1991).  
Especially in young, fast-growing ventures, the board of directors constitutes a critical 
resource to the firm (Daily and Dalton, 1992b), since these firms struggle with the 
liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and smallness (Aldrich and Auster, 1986).  
Similarly, at the IPO, the firm going public faces the liability of market newness (Certo, 
2003). Moreover, since the transition to IPO is often complex, managerial skills and 
abilities which enabled the survival of a start-up become increasingly inadequate to 
meet the requirements of the next stage in the life-cycle (Ensley et al., 2002). 
Consequently, possessing or having access to resources, skills and knowledge becomes 
vital for the long-term survival of a venture (Carpenter, 2002). By externally appointing 
(non-)executive directors, access to such resources may be facilitated and used 
strategically by the IPO firm to overcome its liability of market newness (Certo, 2003) 





Application to VC/entrepreneur context: 
While many papers examining VCs activities and value added services are atheoretical 
(Sapienza et al., 1995), they show that VCs provide resources and benefits described by 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). 
The board of directors in young ventures often consists of VC directors, presumably not 
only for access to capital rather than for their expertise and for gaining legitimacy (Fried 
and Hisrich, 1995; Fried et al., 1998). VCs assist their portfolio firms in recruiting 
management or arranging financing from complementary sources. Furthermore, VCs 
serve as a sounding board for the entrepreneurial management team, providing access to 
networks, auditors, lawyers, and banks, and setting company policies (Gorman and 
Sahlman, 1989; MacMillan et al., 1989; Rosenstein et al., 1993; Fried and Hisrich, 
1995; Sapienza et al., 1996). VCs also increase the probability for alliance building 
within their pool of portfolio firms (Lindsey, 2002). 
Recent empirical studies show that venture capital is related to various measures of 
professionalisation of the board and beyond, including hiring outside CEOs and creating 
new positions further down the organisation (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). Furthermore, 
IPOs with high levels of VC-backing displayed on average better educated and more 
experienced TMTs than IPO firms without VC-backing (Florin, 2003).  
 
2.1.1.2.2 Evaluation of resource-dependence perspective 
The resource-dependence perspective has been facing a number of challenges and 
critiques to date. It has been argued that actions and strategic choices described in 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) are no longer important or relevenant in today’s world due 
to the power of financial markets and the evermore boundaryless production (Davis and 
McAdam, 2000).  
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Moreover, it is argued that the resource-dependence perspective concentrates on 
resource needs as a motivation for engaging in interorganisational relationships, largely 
neglecting the opportunities and factors enabling the development of successful, value-
creating interorganisational relationships (Gulati, 1998). But it is also pointed out that 
this perspective does not necessarily always harm organisations when considering value 
creation in such relationships (Yli-Renko et al., 2001).  
Furthermore, resource-dependency scholars emphasise board capital and its relations to 
resource provision and organisational performance, without regarding how incentives 
(agency theory) to resource provision may affect this relationship (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003).  
 
The two theories, agency theory and the resource-dependence perspective, outlined 
above have normative implications with respect to board composition and board 
formation. Yet not all actors are rational and act in the best interest of the organisation. 
The author therefore outlines a model acknowledging entrenchment effects and power 
struggles with regard to board formation in the following section. 
 
2.1.1.3 Bargaining model of board formation 
Rationally, founders should select experienced directors who complement founders’ 
increasing inadequate knowledge. Commonly, a significant proportion of the firm’s 
equity is held by founders. Due to founders’ incentives, it is suggested that founders are 
likely to look for directors whose skills expand and complement their own. 
Additionally, when ownership and control are separated, which typically is the case 
even pre-IPO, directors should be appointed who monitor the firm’s management on 
behalf of shareholders. 
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Yet it is suggested by agency and behaviour theories that founders do not always act in 
the best interest of the organisation. Research on board dynamics indicates that founders 
continue occupying an important role in their threshold companies, coming into conflict 
with investors but also with other managers (Jayaraman et al., 2000; Carpenter et al., 
2003). Founders’ entrenchment in the organisation can have a negative impact on the 
selection of experienced directors as well as the proportion of outsiders on the board. 
Therefore board selection may be best viewed as a product of the conflicting objectives 
founders have, meaning retaining power and control vs. building the firm’s resource 
base by appointing experienced directors with networks. 
In addition, since external shareholders have an interest in enhancing monitoring, advice 
and counsel of the board (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), they may act as a remedy to 
incumbents’ entrenchment and support the creation of more independent and 
experienced boards. Research on VCs has acknowledged that VCs may have 
considerable impact on their portfolio firms’ governance because of their specific 
knowledge and substantial decision-making rights (e.g. Barry et al., 1990; Sapienza and 
Gupta, 1994; Jain, 2001; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). Since the peculiar rights 
typically end at the time of IPO (Black and Gilson, 1998), investors may balance this 
relative loss of conrol by enhancing other governance mechanisms. 
In line with these considerations, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) propose a formal 
bargaining model which assumes that the board and the CEO negotiate regarding the 
appointment and identity of new directors. The CEO aspires to a role which enables 
him/her to govern the selection of board members (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; 
Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Yet the introduction of 
external financing goes along with an exchange of power shifting from founders/CEOs 
towards the financiers. With respect to forming the board, these two groups of actors 
can be regarded as most prominent, and hence most likely to influence board 
composition. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998: 112) explicitly bring entrepreneurs and 
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VCs into play, especially in the context of threshold firms, by noting that their model 
“… could also be extended to investigate the transition from an entrepreneurial firm to a 
managerial firm”.  
 
Findings in a variety of papers examining board composition lend support to the 
bargaining model. Board independence was found to decrease with founders’/CEO’s 
power and increase with institutional investors’ influence (e.g. Baker and Gompers, 
2003; Boone et al., 2007). 
 
Next to the theoretical perspectives outlined so far, asymmetric information and 
signalling theory will be outlined in the following section, since the latter was linked to 
the two roles already outlined. The board of directors has quite recently been 
conceptualised to embody vital (non-financial) information especially at the time of 
flotation (Certo, 2003), which may enable a decrease of informational asymmetries and 
uncertainties which in turn is linked to IPO performance.  
Therefore, asymmetric information and signalling theory will be outlined emphasising 
the relevant context in the following separate sub-section. 
  
2.1.2 Asymmetric information and signalling 
Asymmetric information refers to market information which certain economic actors 
possess but others do not. Akerlof’s (1970) paper is often cited as the starting point in 
any analysis of information which is not evenly distributed.  
He showed how quality uncertainty can cause a market failure. In the market for used 
cars, and several generalisations of it, buyers face difficulties in verifying the quality of 
the cars they intend to buy from previous owners with an accurate understanding on the 
actual quality of the cars. 
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However, owners of good quality cars cannot convey their quality information reliably 
to the buyers. The owners of cars of inferior quality will claim their cars to be of good 
quality because they know it is impossible for buyers to distinguish good cars from bad 
ones. Since all rational sellers claim to have cars of good quality for sale, the 
equilibrium price should be uniform across the market. Yet, because informational 
asymmetries prevent the buyers from distinguishing ‘lemons’, a discount is required by 
buyers to offset their risk of adverse selection based on the average quality of cars in the 
market. Sellers would only be willing to place ‘lemons’ for sale at that price. This 
causes the market to collapse with no transactions taking place at any price. 
In addition to the car market, Akerlof (1970) suggested several applications for his 
theory, which has also served as a basis for further theories, including signalling theory. 
 
Signalling theory focuses on the process used by decision makers in situations of 
information asymmetry (Spence, 1973). As one such example, the labour market was 
employed in Spence’s (1973) seminal paper. Potential employers are faced with 
asymmetric information when trying to differentiate candidates regarding their quality. 
Education serves as a signal in the labour market which helps to decrease information 
asymmetry. It is assumed that high-quality candidates prove their quality by having 
successfully managed the rigours of higher education, and this signal permits employers 
to select high-quality applicants. 
 
Thus, signalling theory suggests that in the presence of information asymmetry between 
two parties, one party can send signals which provide indications of its quality to the 
other party (Spence, 1973, 1974). Yet, two important criteria have to be fulfilled for a 
signal to be effective: 1) the signal must be observable and 2) costly to imitate (see 
Ross, 1977, for a discussion of the criteria).  
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To carry on with the labour market example, first, employers can verify degrees earned 
in higher education. Second, degrees are costly and difficult to imitate since candidates 
of inferior quality do not possess the abilities or skills needed to earn themselves a 
degree from a higher education institution.  
 
Leland and Pyle (1977) put the theory of asymmetric information into the context of 
corporate finance. These authors presented a signalling model in which the initial value 
of unseasoned common shares is positively associated with the proportion ownership 
retained by the entrepreneur. They assumed that the entrepreneur knows the expected 
cash flows which the firm will generate in the future but potential investors do not. 
Retaining significant ownership in the firm is associated with considerable costs to the 
entrepreneur since he forgoes the possibility of diversifying his personal portfolio. The 
entrepreneur will therefore only be willing to retain a significant ownership interest if he 
expects future cash flows to be high compared to the current firm value. The fraction of 
equity retained by the entrepreneur is according to theses authors considered by rational 
investors as a signal of firm value. 
  
2.1.2.1 Related applications of asymmetric information and signalling 
Since the early paper by Leland and Pyle (1977), other scholars have used the peculiar 
IPO context for analysing information asymmetries to advance signalling theory, which 
continues to be an important part of research on IPOs. Signalling theory is based on the 
need to resolve information asymmetry problems, suggesting that certain indicators 
send signals to potential investors about the firm’s quality and future value. Investors’ 
evaluation of the latter will impact on the price at which they are willing to purchase 
shares. By sending signals, the need to discount the price in order to attract investors, 
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specifically less informed ones, is reduced (e.g. Beatty, 1989; Carter and Manaster, 
1990).  
 
Since firm owners are motivated to demonstrate the quality of their firm (e.g. Keasey 
and Short, 1997), they will engage in signalling. Yet most information received by 
investors is controlled by current owners who have incentives to misrepresent their firm 
to potential investors (Downes and Heinkel, 1982). The latter therefore tend to ignore 
certain information issued (Spence, 1976). Consequently investors would be expected to 
be vigilant with respect to claims associated with the IPO, and would be particularly 
responsive to valid signals of value (Spence, 1976; Downes and Heinkel, 1982).  
Investors will rely on signals of economic value they deem as more authentic, and 
neglect factors considered manipulable or suspicious. In the mind of investors, the 
validity of a signal depends on the inbuilt credibility of that signal. It has to be 
unprofitable for the seller of a low quality product to imitate the signal, that is, high 
quality sellers have to have lower costs for signalling activities (Spence, 1976).  
 
Finance research has recently suggested that financial information, like book values, 
earnings or cash flow, has steadily diminished in importance over the past two decades 
regarding equity valuations (Lev and Zarowin, 1999). Similarly, Kim and Ritter (1999) 
show in the IPO context that financial information has only modest predictive power in 
valuing equity. The declining magnitude of financial data has stimulated a stream of 
research which indicates the rise in importance of non-financial information when 
equity is valued (e.g. Amir and Lev, 1996; Trueman et al., 2000). 
Investors who are not able to recognise the firm’s quality from economic disclosure turn 
to more social indicators of value (Podolny, 1994). Hence, in the IPO context, investors 
are likely to centre their attention on indicators such as legitimacy (Zimmerman and 
 31
Zeitz, 2002), status of the exchange partner (Podolny, 1994), strategic alliance partners 
(Stuart et al., 1999) and managerial prestige (D'Aveni, 1990).  
 
Firms whose shares are floated publicly for the first time have not had the chance of 
establishing consistent performance records in public markets. They therefore suffer 
from a lack of organisational legitimacy which their already publicly traded peers 
frequently hold.  
The challenging task of legitimacy building lies in the notion of convincing investors or 
the wider public to lend support to the firm when none previously existed. IPO firms 
may gain organisational legitimacy required to attract potential investors by conforming 
to institutional elements respectively the environment within which they choose to run 
their business. Pursuing a conformist strategy signals adherence to the existing order. 
Firms conforming to ongoing patterns of scripts, rules, norms, values and models 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002) may get accepted from the elements in their environment. 
Organisations conforming in uncertain environments do so by decreasing mainly 
normative and cognitive pressures from institutional elements, which act as barriers to 
their being perceived as legitimate. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), 
organisations respond to institutional pressures by resembling other organisations facing 
the same set of environmental circumstances. This process of homogenisation, also 
known as ‘isomorphism’ (Hawley, 1968), was found to have an effect on organisational 
characteristics like structures and practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1983). Adopting practices and procedures prevailing in similar companies in 
similar situations leads to a rise in organisational legitimacy, which helps firms to attain 
resources and survive (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983).  
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Next to institutional forms of legitimacy, strategic forms also exist. Researchers 
focusing on strategic legitimacy generally assume a high level of managerial control 
over the legitimation process, explicitly contrasting the nearly infinite flexibility of 
symbols and rituals against the exogenously limited recalcitrance of tangible, real 
outcomes, like measures of operating or market performance (Pfeffer, 1981a).  
While in terms of the monitoring role the author acknowledges the institutional 
approach (e.g. conformist strategy regarding board independence), with respect to the 
resource provision function the focus lies on the strategic rather than the institutional 
approach to organisational legitimacy. 
 
Recent research suggests that firms signal non-financial information like organisational 
legitimacy to interested parties.  
Director’s current/previous employment may signal the availability of knowledge and 
experience, in line with definitions of human capital (Becker, 1964; Coleman, 1988). 
Additionally, directors’ affiliations should also signal the availability of social capital, 
since the latter refers to both actual and potential resources which flow through ties 
(Bourdieu, 1983).  
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), legitimate or prestigious individuals or 
organisations appointed to the focal firm’s board provide confirmation of the value and 
worth of the organisation. Similarly, Bazerman and Schoorman (1983) contend that 
organisational reputation can be affected by who serves on the board and to whom the 
organisation is seen to have ties. Useem (1979) noted that contact with elite individuals 
may enhance the focal organisation’s legitimacy, similar to Blau (1964) who suggested 
that ties to higher-prestige firms enhance the prestige with which the focal firm is 
perceived, whereas ties to lower-prestige firms detract from it. Status and legitimacy of 
having interlocks is said to be conferred to the director’s home organisation 
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(Galaskiewicz, 1985), thus receiving interlocks may also improve the profile of the 
receiving director’s firm.  
 
The relevant theoretical literature can be distinguished into the stream of research which 
focuses on characteristics of the board of directors with respect to signalling and 
certification due to the endorsement by prominent affiliations. 
 
Certification: 
This stream of research examines the role of involved third parties (intermediaries) 
which ‘certify’ the value of enterprises, focusing on the role of prominent third parties 
in reducing asymmetric information between informed (inside) and uninformed 
(outside) investors. The certification hypothesis which was established by Booth and 
Smith (1986) predicts the role of prestigious underwriters in resolving information 
asymmetries in IPOs. Further studies in this stream of research have examined how 
investment banks and auditors can assist in reducing asymmetric information around 
their client companies’ IPOs (e.g. Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Titman and Trueman, 1986; 
Beatty, 1989; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Carter et al., 1998). 
With respect to venture capital, Chan (1983) formed a model on how VCs, which 
through their involvement in their portfolio companies are informed intermediaries, may 
mitigate problems arising through asymmetric information. Empirical research on VC 
certification in an IPO setting was conducted by Barry et al. (1990), Megginson and 
Weiss (1991), Hamao et al. (2000), Francis and Hasan (2001) and Lee and Wahal 
(2004), among others. 





Signalling with board/director characteristics: 
Only quite recently a number of conceptual and empirical papers have emerged 
examining the role of the board regarding its potential for signalling legitimacy.  
It is suggested that board/director prestige acts as a signal of organisational legitimacy 
in two ways: 1) by attracting the attention of other prestigious affiliations (Higgins and 
Gulati, 2003), and 2) by mitigating concerns other actors might have regarding 
legitimacy of the focal firm (Hannan and Carroll, 1992).  
Investors cannot really know the true competence or trustworthiness of founders and/or 
management (Barnea et al., 1985), and may therefore rely on management’s prestige as 
an element for their judgement. From within social psychological research, it is 
proposed by status characteristics theory that people rely on ‘diffuse’ status 
characteristics (like membership of a social group, such as elite social, economic or 
political circles) when making attributions about managers’ competence, performance 
and trustworthiness (Berger et al., 1966, 1972).  
Despite the fact that prestige may not be representative of true managerial competence, 
prestigious individuals are assumed to have higher levels of skill and to be more 
trustworthy. This is facilitated because prestigious people are held in high esteem and 
because they possess an ‘aura’ of morality and legitimacy (e.g. Berger et al., 1966; 
Katz, 1980; Giordano, 1983). 
 
Studying top management prestige and organisational bankruptcy, D’Aveni (1990: 121) 
noted the crucial role of prestige as a signal: “… prestige is taken as an indication that a 
manager is competent, credible and trustworthy”. 
More recently, Certo et al. (2001b) proposed that the reputation of outside board 
members may be an additional factor in investors’ evaluation of firm quality. Similar 
suggestions stem from Deutsch and Ross (2003) who developed an analytical model 
showing that appointing reputable outside directors is a convincing signalling device. 
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Papers employing the certification hypothesis and papers studying the board as a signal 
respectively, are based on the logic of certifying agents (here directors) having 
reputational capital at stake.  
According to Megginson and Weiss (1991), the following conditions must be met in 
order for third-party certification to be credible for outside investors: The certifying 
agent needs to have reputational capital at stake which would be sacrificed by false 
certification. Furthermore, the value of the agent’s reputational capital needs to be 
greater than the largest possible one-time wealth transfer attained due to false 
certification. Additionally, employing the services (reputational capital) of the certifying 
agent needs to be costly for the issuing firm. This cost needs to be an increasing 
function of the scope and potential importance of the information asymmetry with 
respect to intrinsic firm value.  
Directors build up reputational capital throughout their career, and through the nature of 
their job are typically involved repeatedly with the financial markets but also with the 
labour market (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). According to Fama and Jensen (1983), 
non-executive directors accept appointments to signal to labour markets that they are 
expert decision makers. Presumably directors would be hesitant to accept a seat on the 
board of a low quality firm, since directors who are represented on the board of a poorly 
performing firm may threaten their own position in the elite (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1996). This view has been supported empirically, e.g. by Gilson (1990) who showed 
that additional directorships held by directors sitting on the board of financially 
distressed firms declined each year for three years following financial distress. 
Similarly, Fich (2005) shows that when the firms they head perform well, these CEOs 
are rewarded with outside directorships and that stock-price reactions are significantly 
higher for appointees who are CEOs of other firms relative to others.  
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Also, firms preparing a flotation have to issue a prospectus which among others 
includes biographical information about directors as well as information about other 
involved parties, like underwriters, auditors and VCs. Road shows represent an 
additional source of information and a form of communicating a firm’s potential, its 
directors’ backgrounds and so on. Therefore, potential investors are enabled to observe 
the signal. Furthermore, it is costly to imitate board signals, since outside directors have 
to protect their reputation as expert decision makers as outlined above, and thus the 
board of directors fulfils the requirements for being a signal (Certo et al., 2001b).  
 
2.1.2.2 Evaluation of asymmetric information and signalling theory 
As with other theories, weaknesses in asymmetric information may lie in the strong 
assumptions on which this theory is built. It is assumed that insiders are always better 
informed than outsiders. This might not hold true in some cases, e.g. it might be 
difficult for entrepreneurs to know the potential of their ventures, whereas e.g. 
underwriters and venture capitalists might have a better understanding of a venture’s 
value through their market knowledge.  
Moreover, signalling theory has yielded inconsistent results in empirical research. 
Results investigating signalling through ownership or certification by third parties have 
been mixed.  
As mentioned earlier, another emerging stream of research examining the role of the 
board, its potential for signalling and its effect on organisational outcomes, is a key 




By outlining the key theories most relevant to this research, it becomes clear that a 
single theory in isolation cannot sufficiently explain the complex relationships between 
founders, VCs, governance and performance of IPO companies. Moreover, it became 
evident that the theories have overlaps and can be used in a complementary manner. 
Due to these issues, scholars have recently suggested applying a multi-faceted, multi-
theoretic approach, as this procedure seems to be more adequate in analysing these 
complex relationships, since it may assist in shedding light with respect to the current 
mixed empirical findings (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).   
 
After the presentation of the key theoretical perspectives, the next sub-section turns to 
the literature on board roles. 
 
2.2 Board roles literature 
The following section outlines the two main board roles, focusing on the preconditions 
for the board to be able to fulfil its two main functions as well as the role which VCs 
and founders play in this respect.  
 
2.2.1 Monitoring literature 
According to agency logic, the key antecedent of the monitoring function is board 
incentives. The author therefore outlines two prominent proxies of board incentives 
employed in the agency theory literature, board independence (split into board structure 
and CEO duality) as well as board equity compensation.  
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2.2.1.1 Board structure 
As indicated in the agency theory section (2.1.1.1), the board’s ability to fulfil its 
control responsibilities is proposed to be dependent on the individual director’s 
independence of the CEO. Scholars therefore searched for indicators of relationships 
between the CEO and directors which may affect directors’ ability or willingness to 
meet their duties responsibly as a fiduciary (e.g. Fizel and Louie, 1990; Pearce and 
Zahra, 1992). Directors may be less effective monitors if they are potentially influenced 
by the CEO through personal, professional and/or economic relationships (e.g. 
Baysinger and Butler, 1985). Since board decisions are usually decided by majority 
rule, boards comprised mainly of independent directors are expected to be more 
effective monitors of management self-interest than those with a higher proportions of 
dependent directors.  
It has been questioned for a variety of reasons whether it is suitable to have inside 
directors serving on the board, the main reason being ineffective monitoring. Inside 
directors may find themselves in an uncomfortable position with respect to their main 
task of periodic evaluation of the TMT’s and especially the CEO’s performance (e.g. 
Patton and Baker, 1987; Weisbach, 1988). The ability to provide fair and objective 
assessment may be weakened by inside directors’ loyalty to the CEO, in addition to 
their concern for subsequent retaliation for treating the CEO in a rough way (Kesner and 
Dalton, 1986; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Furthermore, conflicts of interests may 
arise for inside directors when dealing with various important issues. Nevertheless, 
inside directors’ input regarding the CEO’s activities and performance may be valuable.  
If no insiders were appointed to the board, the CEO might benefit from information 
asymmetries. Therefore agency theorists promote the inclusion of a few inside directors 
to the board next to the CEO (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and Butler, 1985). 
Agency theorists also insist on a protection of inside directors from CEO sanctions, 
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mainly by empowering only the board to fire TMT directors. Given the political 
realities of corporate life, this view might be too simplistic (Pfeffer, 1981b). Although it 
is questionable whether inside directors are independent of the CEO or the firm, 
opinions exist that a balance of inside and outside directors might be most appropriate 
in terms of board configuration (Baysinger and Butler, 1985).  
 
While by means of outside directors monitoring is enabled, the proportion of them is not 
necessarily a sign of effective monitoring. Researchers argue that knowledge and power 
to influence board decisions can be attained through seniority on the board (Singh and 
Harianto, 1989; Kosnik, 1990; Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy et al., 1996). 
Since quite recently appointed independent directors may be less confident on the focal 




Additionally, the board’s intensity to oversee and monitor management is decreased as a 
result of the lack of independence and conflict of interest (e.g. Daynton, 1984; Lorsch 
and MacIver, 1989; Fizel and Louie, 1990; Millstein, 1992) which may also arise due to 
CEO duality. CEO duality refers to the organisational structure wherein the CEO also 
serves as the chairman of the same firm’s board of directors. When firms practice CEO 
duality, the issue of who monitors management arises. In cases in which the decision 
process is dominated by an individual manager, according to Fama and Jensen (1983: 
314), this “… signals the absence of separation of the decision management and the 
decision control…”.  
Similarly, it is claimed that when one person dominates a corporation, the role of 
independent outside directors becomes ‘hypothetical’ (Daynton, 1984; Rechner, 1989). 
The Cadbury Committee (1992) as well as the more recent Higgs Report (2003) have 
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also addressed the issue of separating the two posts, and put forward a recommendation 
for splitting the roles of board chairman and CEO.  
Although the literature, coming from an agency perspective, seems to considerably 
propose that a separation of the posts of CEO and chairman leads to a better corporate 
governance system, the actual issue is whether the non-duality leads the board to 
monitor more effectively and consequently is capable of increasing firm value. Yet, 
according to organisation theory, CEO duality establishes strong, unambiguous 
leadership, and is likely to lead to faster decision making and more effective 
management (Massie, 1965). Similarly, from the perspective of stewardship theory a 
unified leadership structure would ultimately lead to superior firm performance (Boyd, 
1995).  
 
Yet, since it is commonly argued that CEO duality is not a significant agency problem 
because outsiders are appointed to nominating and compensation committees (Coles et 
al., 2001), the author focuses on board composition in the sense of the fraction of 
independent directors on the board in the following.  
 
The second prominent antecedent of the monitoring role, board equity compensation, 
will be outlined in the next section. 
 
2.2.1.2 Ownership 
The rationale for improved performance when managers’ interests are aligned with 
those of shareholders is provided by agency theory. In particular, the proportion of 
equity held by the manager was identified as fundamental to ownership structure 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Stock ownership causes managements’ wealth to vary 
directly with firm performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Without having an equity 
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stake in the firm, management is more likely to behave opportunistically, attempting to 
follow their own agenda at the expense of shareholders (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Himmelberg et al., 1999). 
The alignment rationale was more recently applied to the board of directors in general 
(see e.g. Jensen, 1993), since board members are subject to the same alignment 
incentives as the management. Various empirical studies rely on manager and director 
equity to capture insider equity stakes. Agency theory’s alignment perspective proposes 
a positive relationship between insider equity and firm performance, regardless of 
whether equity holders are CEOs, executives or directors. Thus board equity 
compensation is expected to be positively related to performance according to the 
incentive alignment proposition (see 2.1.1.1 for more details). 
 
Yet a number of scholars suggest that high levels of insider ownership may result in 
entrenchment and poor performance. Stulz (1988) constructed a model of firm valuation 
to explain how large ownership stakes help managers to be entrenched and decrease the 
monitoring by external mechanisms of control. Taken together with incentive alignment 
arguments, the relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership should 
be non-monotonic. There is empirical evidence supporting this employing parametric 
(Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999) and semi-
parametric methods (Florackis et al., 2009).  
In addition to providing evidence of a non-monotonic (cubic) relationship between 
executive ownership and firm performance (but failing to detect a (linear) relationship 
between non-executive shareholdings and firm performance) Florackis (2005) reports 
evidence of the relationship between executive shareholdings and corporate 
performance becoming stronger as the ratio of non-executives on the board increases.  
Similarly, while Mura (2007) tests for a significant non-monotonic relationship between 
firm performance and share ownership by executive and non-executives, a significant 
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non-monotonic (cubic) relationship for the former but no significant relationship 
(neither linear nor quadratic nor cubic) is found for the latter.  
 
The studies support the view of a positive interest-alignment effect at lower levels of 
managerial ownership and a negative entrenchment effect at higher levels. Since it 
seems that at higher levels the possibility of expropriation is higher, this may generate a 
demand for increased monitoring by independent directors (Peasnell et al., 2003).  
 
After having outlined the antecedents for fulfilling the control role, the author reviews 
the literature regarding the role VCs and founders play in this respect. 
 
2.2.1.3 Venture capitalists, founders and monitoring role 
The bargaining model (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) already outlined in section 
3.1.1.3, proposes that the CEO/founders and the board negotiate with respect to the 
appointment and identity of directors, thereby determining board independence. While 
the CEO/founders aim at governing the selection, a power shift from them to investors 
occurs when external finance is introduced. 
The bargaining model received support in papers without (e.g. Arthur, 2001; Ryan and 
Wiggins, 2004; Roosenboom, 2005) and with considering VC involvement. The latter 
papers will be presented in more detail. 
Baker and Gompers (2003) regard board composition as the outcome of a bargain 
between the CEO and outside shareholders, namely VCs. Specifically focusing on the 
IPO context, these authors report for their sample of 1,116 firms floated between 1978 
and 1987 that younger and smaller firms with greater CEO ownership and founder 
involvement tend to have less independent directors, while VCs seem to tilt board 
composition away from insiders towards independent directors. The proportion of inside 
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directors is found to rise with CEO tenure and is lower for VC-backed IPOs. Among the 
VC-backed IPOs, the authors show that the proportion of insiders falls with the 
reputation of the VC firm involved, and rises with proxies for CEO power (voting 
control, tenure).  
In a sample of 1,019 IPOs floated in the US between 1988 and 1992, Boone et al. 
(2007) report a negative relationship between measures of CEO influence, like CEO 
tenure and ownership, and the fraction of independent directors, and a positive one 
between the latter and constraints on CEO influence like ownership of outside directors, 
VC-backing and investment bank’s reputation. Moreover, the authors document that the 
CEO’s bargaining power at the IPO helps explain board composition even several years 
post-IPO. While they did not specifically study founders’ involvement, they note that at 
the IPO in 43% of the sample firms the CEO is a founder. 
 
Since VCs provide finance to their portfolio firms, existing shareholders have to 
compensate VCs with an equity stake in ‘their’ company. It is therefore natural that the 
proportion of ownership retained by insiders will typically be lower in VC-backed firms 
than in firms which are financed with loans. However, results documented by Hellmann 
and Puri (2002) indicate that VC-backing is associated with the adoption of stock option 
plans. Moreover, VC-backed firms were found to be more likely to employ a greater 
proportion of equity-based compensation for top executives (Campbell and Frye, 2005), 
thus aligning interests of managers and shareholders. 
 
After having reviewed the literature on antecedents of monitoring and the VCs’ and 
founders’ role, the author now outlines the literature on resource provision. 
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2.2.2 Resource provision literature 
As the author has indicated previously, while agency theory is focused on the board as a 
monitoring and control mechanism, both entrepreneurship (e.g. Ensley et al., 2002; 
Srivastava and Lee, 2005) and strategy research (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; 
Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Carpenter et al., 2004)) have recognised that directors 
also constitute a resource which might be critical to the firm, especially when it is 
young and fast-growing (Daily and Dalton, 1992a).  
 
The key antecedent with respect to resource provision is what Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) call ‘board capital’. Board capital has been associated with the supply of all the 
benefits which were discussed in Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) seminal work, namely 1) 
the provision of specific resources, 2) channels for communicating information between 
external organisations, 3) assistance in attaining commitment or support from important 
elements outside the firm, and 4) legitimacy and reputation.  
 
It is widely expressed that the modern world is becoming a ’knowledge society’, with 
authors discussing the importance of firm-level human and also social capital for 
organisational performance and survival (e.g. Bates, 1990; Brüderl et al., 1992; Uzzi, 
1996) as well as corporate governance (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). Moreover, since 
legitimacy and reputation are especially important in the IPO context, the author will 
focus on the latter as well as on human and social capital. In the final sub-section, the 
role of VCs and founders with respect to resource provision will be outlined. 
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2.2.2.1 Human and social capital 
 
Human capital: 
Human capital is defined as a person’s knowledge, experience, expertise, skills, talent, 
age, level of educational attainment, behaviour, job tenure, reasoning, decision-making 
abilities, and even personality (Becker, 1964; Boxman et al., 1991; Farjoun, 1994; 
Meyerson, 1994; Gimeno et al., 1997; Grant, 1998; Davenport, 1999). 
Theorists of human capital contend that knowledge increases the cognitive ability of an 
individual, resulting in more efficient and effective behaviour (Becker, 1964). 
Entrepreneurs, managers and directors require both a basis of knowledge and the 
understanding of how to utilise that knowledge (Hayek, 1945). This knowledge can 
stem from a variety of sources such as formal education and previous start-up, 
managerial, or industry experience (Ronstadt, 1988; Cooper et al., 1989; Cooper et al., 
1994). 
Human capital has been related to the provision of advice and counsel, which has been 
linked to subsequent firm performance (Westphal, 1999). Boards are typically 
composed of top management of other firms, lawyers, financial representatives and 
other experts and officials, who bring important skills, experience and expertise to 
enable advice and counsel (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Gales and Kesner, 1994).  
 
Directors’ human capital is considered to be important also with respect to fulfilling the 
monitoring role since the board’s knowledge base, set of skills, expertise and experience 
is also likely to have an impact on the effectiveness of monitoring. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976: 354) argued that they “… would expect monitoring activities to become 
specialized to those institutions and individuals who possess comparative advantages in 
these activities”. Yet Jensen (1986b) later assumed board directors may be an 
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ineffective mechanism of governance due to the inability of (non-executive) directors to 
evaluate the information given to them, to recognise a firm’s problem or to penalise 
management.  
Although research in the agency tradition has employed structural measures of board 
independence to capture effective monitoring, it has hardly explicitly discussed the 
heterogeneity of monitoring ability. In the ‘Higgs Report’ on the role and effectiveness 
of non-executives, Higgs (2003) notes that with respect to recruiting and selection of 
such directors, the pool of candidates was quite narrow. The report therefore argues that 
the board should look beyond ‘usual suspects’, particularly reasoning that accountants, 
consultants and lawyers may be well equipped to serve as non-executive directors, 
bringing a variety of skills useful to the board. It is increasingly recognised that 
members of the board are required to possess a minimum knowledge of, for example 
accountancy (Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Since Hunter and Hunter (1984) suggest, 
ability was the single most important determinant of task performance, having directors 
with a professional accounting background should be able to perform the monitoring 
role more effectively. 
 
Social capital: 
While human capital resides in individuals, social capital resides in relationships (Burt, 
1992; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). A variety of definitions of social capital have been 
offered by social scientists (an unexclusive list of definitions can be found in Adler and 
Kwon, 2002). For the purpose of this study, the author will lean on Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal’s (1998: 234) definition of social capital being  
“… the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available 
through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an 
individual or social unit. Social capital thus comprises both the network and the 
assets that may be mobilised through that network”.  
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Building on work examining relational capital embedded in social ties (White, 1961, 
1963; Jacobs, 1965) the resource-dependency literature has also discussed the role of 
directors’ ties to external entities.  
Several researchers have recognised the importance of having a diversity of external 
experience. In addition to business links, a wide range of social and political ties may 
shape the efficacy of the board functions (see Pettigrew, 1992, for a detailed 
discussion). 
Social capital has also been linked to the supply of advice and counsel which is 
considered to be important to the IPO firm. It was shown by Carpenter and Westphal 
(2001) that boards whose members have ties to strategically-related organisations were 
able to provide better advice and counsel, which in turn, as outlined earlier, is related to 
firm performance (Westphal, 1999). 
 
One frequently used proxy of director’s external ties is interlocks. An interlocking 
directorate occurs, as Mizruchi (1996) puts it in his review paper, when an individual 
affiliated with one organisation is appointed on the board of directors of another. 
Interlocks are suggested to be an important channel for the exchange of resources and 
strategic information on an inter-organisational level (Pfeffer, 1972; Provan, 1980; 
Kesner, 1988; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001), and 
they are a source of legitimacy (Selznick, 1957; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Since interlocks are ties to other organisations, they represent social capital. In addition, 
external ties also reflect human capital. Experience and knowledge may partially stem 
from prior managerial duties, but are usually viewed as originated from director’s 
membership on other company boards (Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild and Beckman, 
1998). Since directors’ are typically invited to the board of other firms if they are 
(already) experienced and since via external ties directors gain additional experience 
(Useem, 1984), interlocks provide a chance for enhancing directors’ human capital. 
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2.2.2.2 Legitimacy 
In their review paper, Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) conclude that theory suggests 
legitimacy to be specifically important in new ventures since it is vital to possess the 
ability to acquire or get access to other resources. Since legitimacy is important in the 
context of entrepreneurial IPOs, the author outlines two forms of legitimacy associated 
with board capital, role legitimacy and prestige. 
 
2.2.2.2.1 Role legitimacy 
One possibility for firms of gaining legitimacy may be through the ability of their top 
managers and directors to competently fulfil the roles of key leadership positions. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggested that leaders also fulfil a symbolic function with 
respect to personifying the organisation in its activities and outcomes. One means for 
managers of personifying a firm’s activities is to hold positions corresponding to their 
background. Such matching enhances the predictability of organisational actions, 
reduces uncertainty and therefore provides legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Higgins and 
Gulati (2006) refer to the matching of previous experiences to current roles as ‘role 
legitimacy’. The latter assumes that organisational members have certain prescribed 
roles that are related to their positions in their firms (Merton, 1957). An individual’s 
rights and obligations in organisations have been suggested to derive from role 
relationships (Gross et al., 1958). Expectations others have with respect to legitimate 
obligations one has to fulfil can be affected by roles (Goode, 1960). Research conducted 
on roles suggests that a role defines and signals an individual’s social identity, enabling 
others to classify, understand and anticipate a person (Baker and Faulkner, 1991). 
According to Cohen and Dean (2005: 686) prior experience at the top of a company “… 
suggests both the ability to manage and lead a firm, but also the comfort of knowing the 
firm is being led by those who have done it before”. 
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The literature has to date not specifically addressed the role VCs and founders play with 
respect to role legitimacy. This study attempts closing this gap. 
 




Since organisational legitimacy can be affected by who serves on the board and to 
whom the organisation is seen to have ties (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Bazerman and 
Schoorman, 1983), the author outlines the literature on director prestige as well as 
affiliations with prestigious organisations. 
 
2.2.2.2.2.1 Board prestige 
It was noted long ago that elites possess power through their access and control over 
major institutions (e.g. Warner and Abegglen, 1955), In line with this view, Giddens 
(1972: 348) defines elites as those “… individuals who occupy formally defined 
positions of authority at the head of a social organization or institution”.  
Members of the managerial elite, however, are not all equal. Even among the 
managerial elite, ‘inner circles’ exist (e.g. Warner and Abegglen, 1955; Useem and 
Karabel, 1986). Distinguishing characteristics of the economic elite comprise multiple 
board membership (e.g. Blau and Duncan, 1967), membership of the political elite 
(Dye, 1983), educational level (e.g. Baltzell, 1958) and elite education (Domhoff, 1967; 
Useem and Karabel, 1986), because they are considered as indicators of superior 
individual-level prestige. Personal ties to the well-off class, acceptance in their social 
circles, as well as education at elite institutions are indications that a person has been 
adequately socialised (Useem, 1979).  
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Prestigious education: 
Attendance at educational institutions which are generally considered to be prestigious 
transfer that prestige to the individual. Studying at an elite school provides access to 
other individuals widely regarded as prestigious. It seems that such connections are 
beneficial, since many large firm executives and directors have studied at elite 
educational institutions (Useem, 1979). Elite educational credentials suggest the 
grouping of abundant human capital through the selectivity and education of prestigious 
colleges and universities, as well as social capital through the alumni networks and the 
mark of quality accompanying elite degrees (Useem, 1979; Useem and Karabel, 1986). 
Individuals graduating from prestigious institutions often develop and preserve elite 
social networks which might be a valuable organisational resource because such 
networks may provide access to precious external resources for the focal firm (D'Aveni, 
1989; D'Aveni and Kesner, 1993). 
 
Political prestige: 
Similar to holders of degrees from prestigious educational institutions, members of the 
political elite are attributed high levels of human and social capital. Such persons bring 
problem solving skills to the board, and can open doors by using their network of also 
highly influential people. Having members of the political elite on the board may thus 
signal access to valuable networks, and hence access to resources, thus improving the 
legitimacy of the firm. 
 
Another form of prestige has been named in the literature focusing on the USA, 
membership of the military elite. In the context of the UK, the author does not deem this 
form of prestige as particularly important in the managerial elite, rather the author turns 
to another form of prestige which has not received much scholarly attention but may 
especially be worthwhile investigating in a UK context, directors’ honours and titles. 
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Honours and titles: 
Although awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are omnipresent in 
society, they were largely neglected by economists. Awards are merely studied in areas 
like the economics of reputation and esteem which focus on the consequences of awards 
(Frey, 2005), with economic analyses traditionally being limited to material, mainly 
monetary rewards (Jeffrey, 2004). 
There are two key reasons for the dearth of research in this area: 1) economic theory to 
guide empirical research as to the value or cost of social networks embodied on the 
board of directors is scant, and 2) empirically identifying memberships in prestigious 
social circles is difficult since it is rarely publicised (Kirchmaier and Kollo, 2007). 
 
The UK is peculiar relative to other countries in maintaining a sophisticated system of 
awarding honours to its citizens deemed to be worthy of service in various capacities. 
About 3,000 honours are awarded annually which is less than in other countries, e.g. 
France which produces four times as many awards, not to speak of Italy (House of 
Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2004), or Russia where about one 
in 1,000 Russians received a state award (Phillips, 2004). The quality of an award 
depends on its rarity. Unlike in France and Italy, orders and titles in Britain have been 
able to retain much of their esteem. In Britain, honours enjoy high prestige and respect 
and generally receive solid public support. Candidates for honours about whom there 
are doubts as to their probity are weeded out by a demanding system of vetting. The 
damage to the donor’s and award’s reputation is great if recipients turn out to be 
unworthy, similarly, however to a lesser extent, if the award is not accepted by the 
candidate. Therefore, considerable care is taken to avoid refusals (Phillips, 2004).3  
                                                 
3
 In December 2003 a document leaked to the Sunday Times caused considerable damage to the Britsh 
Honours System, since it listed 300 names of persons who refused an honour, which reads like the Who’s 
Who of Britain’s cultural, literary and scientific elite. In addition, the British Honour System has come 
under pressure in recent years, as could be observed from the media and two official reports (House of 
Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2004; Philipps, 2004) 
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According to surveys conducted in the first half of the twentieth century, companies 
seemed to be keen on appointing individuals with titles and honours to their boards. 
According to Samuel (1933), in 1932, 562 directorships were held by English peers, of 
which there were 654 at that time.  
The motivation for selection of such directors may be the names they bear (Ashworth, 
1925), which may be advantageous for prospectus reasons (May, 1939), since directors 
are sought with a name that appeals to the public and attracts capital.4 Similarly, Sargant 
Florence (1961) notes that directors may be appointed for their drawing power, with 
reputation for honour and honesty being more important for this purpose than actual 
efficiency. Clutterbuck and Waine (1994) note that while aristocracy can still be found 
on company boards, it is increasingly less so. The authors also argue that management 
experience is possessed by only a few, stemming mainly from financial disciplines. 
Directors that are appointed from some misguided sense of status frequently struggle to 
keep up with the demands the job brings with it nowadays.  
Still, Nash’s (1991) survey of non-executive directors revealed that the UK’s 15,000 
directors had an enormous array of honours between them. Heading the table as most 
common is the ‘Commander of the British Empire’ (CBE), which is twice as common 
as the ‘Officer of the British Empire’ (OBE) and six times more common than the 
‘Member of the British Empire’ (MBE), ‘Justice of the peace’, ‘Member of Parliament’ 
(MP), ‘baronet’, ‘Queen’s Counsel’ and privy councillors are also numerously 
represented. Regarding titles, the most common is ‘Sir’, followed by ‘Honourable’, 
‘Dr’, ‘Lord’, ‘Right Honourable’ and ‘Prof’. A few ‘princes’, ‘reverends’ as well as a 
‘duchess’ and a ‘duke’ were also counted.  
 
                                                 
4
 From transcript of judgement re Combined Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd., June 30, 1932, pp. 35-36, taken 
by Corfield & Hersee, London; cf. also opinion of Mr. Justice Romer re City Equitable Insurance Co., 
1925, p. 444. 
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After having outlined director prestige representing a form of legitimacy bestowed to 
the firm they were appointed to, the author provides an outline of the relevant literature 
on endorsement by prominent organisations in the IPO context which has received more 
scholarly attention than individual director respectively board prestige.  
 
2.2.2.2.2.2 Affiliations with prestigious organisations 
Next to legitimacy stemming from directors’ prestige, legitimacy can also be gained 
through endorsement of prominent affiliates. Scholars argued that the affiliation of 
prominent entities, like underwriters (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 
1990), auditors (Titman and Trueman, 1986), VCs (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; 
Gompers, 1996) and strategic alliance partners (Stuart et al., 1999), provide a reliable 
signal of an IPO’s worthiness. 
The author will focus in the following on three prominent entities mentioned first. 
 
Certifying models were developed by Booth and Smith (1986) and Titman and Trueman 
(1986) in which the signal of underwriters and auditors becomes credible by the 
imminent threat to the agent who certifies of losing his reputation when certifying 
falsely.  
Whenever securities are being issued in capital markets where insiders of the IPO firm 
and outside investors possess different information with respect to the value of the 
offering firm, third party certification may be valuable, since insiders have incentives to 
delay or even conceal the disclosure of adverse information, and are thus able to attain 
higher prices when selling securities. Unless rational outside investors are assured that 
the offer price already reflects all relevant private information, they will offer low prices 
for securities. These investors may be convinced that all relevant information has been 
disclosed if a third party with reputational capital at stake has affirmed such and will be 
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severely negatively affected if that affirmation is revealed to be false. The key 
implication of certifying models is that underpricing is a decreasing function of the 
certifying agent’s reputation. 
 
Prestigious auditors and legitimacy: 
Disclosure requirements for privately held companies are limited relative to comparable 
firms listed on a stock exchange. Due to the difference in the regulatory environment, 
auditors may play an important role in the IPO context.  
A signalling model by Titman and Trueman (1986) contains two features which lead to 
signalling of the IPO firm’s value. At first, high quality auditors are those who have a 
comparative advantage in establishing the reported information variable linked to the 
firm’s value. Second, this higher quality audit has to be compensated with a price 
premium. The costs involved in hiring a top auditor exceed the expected benefits of 
misrepresentation for the low value IPO. Since the literature suggests a direct relation 
between ex ante uncertainty and IPO underpricing (Beatty and Ritter, 1986), all firms 
have incentives to disclose low firm ex ante uncertainty, and firms with in fact ‘high’ ex 
ante uncertainty having a greater motivation for misrepresentation. One way of 
lessening the misrepresentation problem is to hire an agent who is able to attest credibly 
to the assertions made in the audited financial statements (Kinney, 1986).  
 
Capital markets also seem to demand an insurance function from auditors providing 
investors with a claim on the auditor in the event of an audit failure (e.g. Dye, 1993; 
Willenborg, 1999). Since besides liability issues, their auditor’s reputational capital will 
be harmed by ex post revelations of misstatements or errors, auditors have an incentive 
to investigate and report deviations in application of accounting principles. Auditing 
firms which invested more in their reputational capital have greater incentives to reduce 
application errors, and disclosed information in accounting reports audited by these 
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firms will be more precise, ceteris paribus. Reductions in measurement errors enable 
potential investors to conduct more precise evaluations with respect to the distribution 
of firm value.  
Yet higher quality audit comes at a cost. Assuming firm owners are value-maximisers, 
they are expected to select the auditing firm with reputation capital equating to the 
marginal cost of a higher quality audit (Titman and Trueman, 1986). 
 
VCs and legitimacy: 
Several early studies (pioneered by Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991) 
have supposed that (the monitoring) activities of VCs improve the credibility of their 
portfolio firms. These assertions are based on the certifying models outlined above. It 
should be noted that while the author acknowledges that starting with Gompers (1996), 
the literature on VC heterogeneity and thus VC reputation is growing, consistent with 
certification arguments (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) VC-backing per se may improve 
organisational legitimacy of the portfolio firm. (Since all IPO firms have firm auditors 
and are floated by investment bankers, prestige plays arguably a more important role for 
these two key players.) 
In the VC context, the certification hypothesis holds that VCs certify the value of 
issuing firms backed by them and the quality of the information disclosed related with 
the company going public. Similar to underwriters and auditors, VCs are able to play a 
role in overcoming information asymmetries between insiders and uninformed outside 
investors. VCs as repeated players in the market can credibly commit themselves to 
information disclosed in terms of accuracy and completeness since false certification 
would have the endager the reputation they hve built up not only with investors but 
underwriters, auditors and other actors in the market over time. Therefore the 
motivation for candid certification relies on the potential losses from cheating 
outweighing its gains.  
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Prestigious underwriters and legitimacy: 
Prior research conducted by scholars of various disciplines suggested that underwriters’ 
reputation plays a certain role in IPOs. Booth and Smith (1986) establish a certification 
hypothesis predicting the role of prestigious underwriters in resolving information 
asymmetries in IPOs. The authors argue that an underwriter can certify project quality 
and advocate that the reputational capital the underwriter has built may act as a bonding 
mechanism which solves the information asymmetry problem, since it may indicate that 
the offer price reflects inside information. According to Beatty and Ritter (1986), 
underwriters’ reputation may serve to enforce the ‘underpricing equilibrium’ in the new 
issue market.  
 
2.2.2.3 Venture capitalists, founders and resource provision role 
 
In this section the author outlines the role of VCs/founders with respect to human and 
social capital as well as their role with respect to legitimacy. 
 
2.2.2.3.1 Venture capitalists, founders and human and social capital 
 
VCs and board in general: 
Next to anecdotal evidence ascribing VCs to be involved in recruiting key individuals 
(e.g. Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 1989; Sahlman, 1990), recent 
empirical evidence presented by Hellmann and Puri (2002) documents that VCs are 
more likely and faster to replace founder-CEOs. Moreover, these authors show that VCs 
are more involved in professionalising their portfolio firms beyond replacing the 
founder-CEO, since obtaining VC-backing was found to be associated with, for 
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example hiring a VP of sales and marketing, the formulation of human resource 
policies, as well as the adoption of stock option plans.  
In line with these authors, with respect to increasing the quality of the management 
team by VCs, the conditions for VCs to play a role in it is presented by Florin (2003). 
Using a sample of 277 ventures which had their IPO in 1996, he analysed founder and 
TMT characteristics of firms receiving VC-backing relative to ones without such 
funding. Regarding these characteristics, the two types of firms do not differ 
significantly. Especially non-venture backed and low-venture backed firms (VC equity 
below 30%) are not found to be significantly different with respect to founder and TMT 
characteristics. However, companies with high-levels of VC-backing demonstrate on 
average better educated and more experienced TMTs than firms without VC backing. 
He concludes that VCs seem to put most of their effort into those firms in which they 
have controlling ownership. 
 
VCs and founder-CEO position: 
Mainly referring to organisational life cycle theory (Clifford, 1975; Hanks, 1990), in the 
beginning, the leadership position in their ‘own’ company is naturally taken by 
founders. As the new venture grows and develops, the job and attention of founders 
alters from personally directing and overseeing many of the firm’s activities to 
providing direction to others who are responsible for actual operations (Kimberly, 
1980). Effectively managing the entrepreneurial challenges of a start-up versus the 
administrative challenges of an established company requires a very different set of 
skills (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). While founders may be very suited for early phases 
in the company’s life-cycle, the transition from entrepreneur to manager cannot be made 
by all founders. Even though it is possible for founders to adapt their style and 
successfully run larger companies, these founders may have neither the interests nor the 
skills required to do so (Jayaraman et al., 2000).  
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It could be beneficial for firms, as they develop, to appoint a professional manager, an 
outsider to the position of CEO. Taking such action can be regarded as an important 
step in the professionalisation of a young venture. 
 
While some founders may appreciate the leadership position being taken over by an 
experienced outsider, for others yielding control to an outsider may be an issue. This 
implies that there may be dissent between investors and founders on the attractiveness 
of employing an outside CEO.  
If the founder can manage to retain sufficient power in the form of ownership (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978), or control over the board of directors (Lansberg, 1988) or when 
there is a lack of appropriate replacement candidates (Kets de Vries, 1970), founders are 
likely to remain with the firm. Thus a founder ‘exit barrier’ may exist in those 
circumstances. Due to VCs’ control rights and their networks, these exit barriers might 
be lower for VC-backed firms. 
Although (founder-)CEO replacements can be associated with the board’s/investor’s 
control role, since (founder-)CEOs are often replaced due to a lack of ability/skills 
required for the growing venture (Bruton et al., 2000), the author regards replacing such 
CEOs as professionalisation of the leadership position and thus as increasing board 
capital.  
 
The author has previously mentioned that there exists empirical evidence from VC 
contracts suggesting that considerable control rights are assigned to VCs. Chan et al. 
(1990) argue that VCs require significant control because the skill level of the 
entrepreneur is unknown at the time of contracting. Control rights may permit the 
replacement of the original CEO by the VC if the original manager turns out to be 
insufficiently skilled.  
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In a formal model of this conflict of interest, Hellmann (1998) shows that efficient 
contracts may allocate control to VCs with regard to the decision to appoint an outside 
CEO as a replacement for the founder manager. More generally put by Kirilenko 
(2001), control allocation at an early stage is suggested to be a function of the 
uncertainty involved in the venture.  
Hellmann and Puri (2002) analyse whether VCs are more likely to assign an outsider to 
the CEO position, verifying that the first CEO replacement event does not precede VC 
backing. Results from a probit regression indicate that firms obtaining VC funding are 
more likely to replace a founder-CEO with an outsider. The authors also employed a 
Cox duration regression to account for the timing of the events. The results suggest that 
companies are more than twice as likely to experience a CEO turnover event once they 
are VC-backed. Hence, VC backing is associated with a higher rate at which companies 
hire an outside CEO. In other words, the likelihood rate is inversely related to the 
expected duration. With VC-backing, the expected time it takes a company to bring in 
an outsider to the position of CEO is decreased. Evidence from both the probit and the 
duration regressions indicate that backing by VCs decreases the chances of an original 
founder to lead the firm. On this evidence Hellmann and Puri conclude that VCs play a 
significant role in professionalising top leadership. As pointed out earlier, the transition 
can either occur smoothly or may be enforced by VCs’ control action. Since this cannot 
be observed directly, the authors employ an empirical proxy. It is assumed that the 
original founder retains a board position either as an executive or non-executive in cases 
of voluntary turnover, while refraining from all positions would indicate an involuntary 
turnover. The presented evidence indicates that VCs play an important role for both 
voluntary and involuntary turnovers. 
 
The literature came up with various reasons which may explain (founder-)CEO 
replacement. It is suggested that poor performance might be one reason why 
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professional management is brought in to replace the entrepreneur (MacMillan et al., 
1989). In this vein, Schefczyk and Gerpott (2001) find in a survey of 37 VCs in 
Germany that VCs seem to replace managers when the performance of portfolio 
companies falls significantly behind expectations in order to create a control mechanism 
for shortcomings of the venture’s management team. Similarly, Hellmann and Puri’s 
(2002) results indicate that VCs play a significant role in attracting professional CEOs 
to the firm, if the firm has neither a product on the market nor an IPO (as proxies for 
firm performance). Moreover, these authors show that on the other hand, if the company 
develops well, and thus some milestones are reached, VCs are not more likely to replace 
the founder with an outside CEO than are other types of investors.  
Bruton et al. (2000) surveyed 51 VC firms regarding the reason for CEO dismissal. 
Overall, the evidence presented by the authors shows that dismissal related mainly to 
the ability of the CEO.  
 
Employing field research and grounded theory building to study the factors which affect 
founder-CEO succession in a dataset containing the succession histories of 202 Internet 
firms, most of which were VC-backed, Wasserman (2003) finds that the completion of 
product development precipitates founder-CEO succession. This is in contrast to large-
company studies which consistently suggest succession rates to be lower when the 
CEO’s company is performing well, and meeting board expectations (e.g. Jensen, 
1986a; Boeker, 1992; Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993). After the firm raises a round of 
financing the rate of founder-CEO succession increases, and the higher the amount 
raised in the last round, the higher the succession rate. This is in line with the resource-
dependence perspective which predicts that when firms become desperate for capital 
they might compromise more to the demands of outside resource providers (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Also, in studying VC syndication, Wasserman’s (2003) results show 
that the involvement of new VCs in the portfolio firm is related to a lower hazard of 
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founder-CEO turnover. According to Wasserman’s interpretation of this finding, with a 
higher number of investors this might prevent any one investor from having 
disproportionate control over the founder-CEO succession decision. When insider 
equity holdings are greater than 50%, the rate of succession is much lower, which 
Wasserman interprets as being in line with considerations of power in organisations 
(Fredrickson et al., 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).  
 
VCs and specific forms of human and social capital: 
Research relating VC backing to special forms of human capital is scant. Florin (2003) 
showed that IPO firms in which VCs have a considerable amount of ownership have on 
average more experienced and better educated TMTs than ventures with no VC-
backing. This author used years in industry as a proxy for experience and years spent in 
college as a proxy for education.  
Yet research seems to have neglected examinations of VC-backing and more specific 
forms of human capital.  
 
Higgs (2003) argues that with respect to recruiting and selection of directors 
accountants, consultants and lawyers may be well equipped to serve as non-executive 
directors, bringing a selection of skills useful to the board.  
Linking human capital to the monitoring role, the board’s knowledge, experience and 
skills is likely to have an impact on monitoring effectiveness. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976: 354) suggest “… monitoring activities to become specialized to those institutions 
and individuals who possess comparative advantages in these activities”. 
Since Hunter and Hunter (1984) argue that ability is the single most important 
determinant of task performance and due to the heterogeneity of directors’ monitoring 
ability, directors possessing specific skill with respect to monitoring, for example 
 62
professional accounting qualifications, are expected to have (superior) ability to perform 
the monitoring role.  
 
Yet, while research showed that VC-backing is associated with the professionalisation 
of portfolio firms, scholars seem not to have examined whether a relation between VC-
backing and more specific forms of professionalisation, specifically the monitoring 
ability of directors, exist. By specifically addressing VCs’ role with respect to directors’ 
monitoring ability, this research aims at narrowing this gap in the literature. 
 
After having reviewed VCs’ and founders’ role with respect to human and social 
capital, the author turns to reviewing the literature on their role with respect to 
legitimacy. 
 
2.2.2.3.2 Venture capitalists, founders and legitimacy 
This sub-section focuses on both role legitimacy and prestige in the form of board 
prestige as well as affiliations with prestigious organisations, starting with the former. 
 
Role legitimacy: 
While there exists anecdotal evidence that VCs are involved in recruiting key 
individuals (e.g. Sahlman, 1990) and empirical evidence with respect to 
professionalising the board (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Florin, 2003), empirical 
examinations of whether VC-backing is associated with having experienced directors in 
their respective roles as suggested by Higgins and Gulati (2006), seem not to exist as 





Scholars also seem to have neglected examinations of whether VC-backing is related to 
the prestige of the board of directors of their portfolio firms. The omission of 
examinations regarding VC’s involvement with respect to director prestige stemming 
from educational attainment, membership in the political elite and British honours and 
titles represents a gap in the literature which the author now starts to address. 
 
Prominent affiliates: 
Consistent with the notion that prominent individuals or parties involved with a venture 
can attract the attention of other prestigious affiliations, results in various studies 
indicate that VC-backed firms are able to attract more prestigious underwriters 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini, 1995; Francis and Hasan, 2001; Higgins 
and Gulati, 2003). Moreover, next to attracting prestigious investment banks, firms 
backed by VCs were also found to be able to attract more prestigious auditors, 
consistent with certification arguments put forward by Megginson and Weiss (1991). 
 
After the above review of the literature on board roles, in the following sub-section a 
review of the IPO performance literature is presented.  
 
2.3 IPO performance literature 
In this section, the IPO literature will be reviewed, IPO anomalies will be outlined and 
corresponding explanations which the literature put forward will be provided. This is 




2.3.1 IPO anomalies 
With respect to IPOs, three anomalies are well accepted in the finance literature. A 
financial anomaly refers to a documented pattern of price behaviour not consistent with 
predictions of efficient markets. Following a number of early authors (Stoll and Curley, 
1970; Logue, 1973; Reilly, 1973; Ibbotson, 1975), a great number of researchers have 
documented for various countries that IPOs exhibit positive first-day returns on average. 
Additionally, many studies have reported that the shares of new issues are 
underperforming mature IPOs in the long-run (which implies that new IPOs are poor 
investments), and finally that both underpricing and subsequent underperformance are 
more pronounced in hot periods (Ritter, 1984, 1991).  
 
In the following section, the author reviews rationales put forward by the relevant 
literature attempting to explain these anomalies, beginning with rationales for 
underpricing. 
 
2.3.1.1 IPO underpricing 
The phenomenon of new issue underpricing (price change measured from the offering 
price to the price at the end of the first trading day) was detected in every country with a 
stock market, with varying amounts of underpricing from country to country (Ritter, 
1998).  
A number of theories advanced in attempting to explain this phenomenon, which can be 
grouped into asymmetric information theories, theories highlighting the institutional 
environment, as well as corporate control motives and behavioural models. 
Generally, these theories are not mutually exclusive. 
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2.3.1.1.1 Asymmetric information models 
In this section, the author presents models based on information asymmetry present in 
the IPO context. These models assume that one of the key parties involved in the IPO, 
the issuing firm, the investment banker or the investors buying shares in the IPO firm, is 
better informed than the others.  
The assumption that some investors possess superior information relative to all other 
actors, leads to ‘winner’s curse’ arguments. While the assumption that the issuer is 
better informed leads to signalling arguments, the assumption of the underwriters’ 
superior information about demand conditions leads to rent extraction by banks and thus 
to agency arguments. 
 
2.3.1.1.1.1 Principal agent models 
Agency issues arise between the issuing firm (principal) and the investment banker 
mandated to float the company due to information asymmetry when the investment 
banker is assumed to have superior information and moral hazard when the investment 
banker’s selling effort is not observable. 
Baron (1982) assumes in his model that investment bankers are more informed than 
issuers with respect to investors’ demand for the IPO firms’ shares. The underwriter 
may be mandated to the pricing of the issue when the issuer is uncertain about the ‘true’ 
price of its shares, since the former has superior information of the actual state of the 
capital markets. Yet the issuing firm has to compensate the investment banker for this 
superior information by permitting him to offer the shares at a discount from the price 
anticipated in the after-market. The higher the uncertainty about firm value, the greater 
the asymmetry of information between issuer and investment banker, and the more 
precious the underwriter’s service becomes, resulting in larger underpricing. 
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An empirical test of Baron’s model was conducted by Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1989b) on a sample of 38 investment banks which had their IPO between 1970 and 
1987 and marketed their IPOs themselves. As there is no information asymmetry since 
the investment bankers market their own shares, the authors argue that there should not 
be any underpricing. Hence, Baron’s (1982) argument that underwriters tend to 
underprice issues in order to reduce the risk of not selling the amount they committed to 
sell to investors does not hold, since in this case issuers underwrite their own issues. 
Counter to what the authors expect, shares were found to be underpriced even without 
information asymmetry. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989b) therefore conclude that the 
underpricing phenomenon cannot merely be explained by information asymmetry 
between issuers and underwriters. Yet it should be noted that the authors drew this 
conclusion on a small sample. In contrast, Ljunqvist and Wilhelm (2003) report that the 
higher the investment banks’ equity holding in the IPO firm (and thus the lower the 
underwriter’s incentive to underprice should be), the lower are the initial returns. 
 
Similarly, also employing agency logic, some scholars, including Ritter (1984), propose 
that underpricing may be a result of the monopsony power of the investment bankers. 
Due to their superior knowledge of market conditions and their bargaining power over 
the issuer, investment bankers intentionally underprice IPOs, which allows them to 
apply lower marketing effort and ration shares to large clients who regularly require 
investment services from them, and thus to increase their own revenues. 
While Tinic (1988) does not find evidence in support of the proposition that grossly 
underpriced IPOs are rationed to the underwriter’s favoured customers, Aggarwal et al. 
(2002) report a positive relationship between institutional allocation and underpricing 
and also show that underwriters prefer institutional investors and allocate about 75% of 
the shares which experience high first day returns to institutional clients. 
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Quite recently, Hoberg and Seyhun (2006) propose that underwriters and VCs, as repeat 
players in the IPO market, have incentives to collaborate with each other. VCs can 
benefit the underwriter by being more loyal and accept lower IPO prices. To reward 
VCs, underwriters provide marketing support and aggressive analyst forecasts, enabling 
VCs to exit at more favourable prices. In the section on hot issue markets, the author 
outlines similar arguments made by Loughran and Ritter (2004), yet since the latter 
attempt to explain the higher underpricing in hot markets, they (seem to implicitly) 
assume underwriters and VCs team up only in those markets. 
Hoberg and Seyhun (2006), employing a sample of 3,942 IPOs floated in the US 
between 1988 and 2000, interpret their findings as strong support for the collaboration 
hypothesis. With respect to initial returns, they report underwriters with a history of 
high underpricing in the past are more likely to engage in collaboration. VC-backed 
IPOs experience considerably higher underpricing when the underwriter has a history of 
granting upward analyst revisions or long-term marketing support.  
 
Competition in the underwriting business seems not to have been taken into account by 
agency models, since it could be argued that firms may choose the underwriter offering 
the best deal, and thus is not willing to underprice. Moreover, reputational issues giving 
underwriters incentives to produce truthful information have also largely been 
neglected.  
 
2.3.1.1.1.2 Winner’s curse hypothesis 
The basic logic here is that underpricing is a means of compensating uninformed 
investors for quantity rationing induced by adverse selection. 
In an application of Akerlof’s (1970) ‘lemons’ problem, Rock (1986) developed a 
model assuming informed investors (those prepared to incur evaluation costs) and 
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uninformed investors in the IPO market. The former group would be willing to apply 
only for IPOs they expect to be traded at a premium relative to the offering price. 
Uninformed investors are assumed to apply for any new issue. While all investors will 
get only a restricted number of shares of underpriced IPOs, poor market response to a 
flotation effectively guarantees allocation of the whole amount of share applications, if 
any at all. Such issues will probably start trading below the offering price. As a 
consequence, uninformed investors end up holding a disproportionally large fraction of 
overpriced IPOs. The average initial return on a portfolio of IPOs is dependent on the 
after-market price but also on the probability of receiving an allocation of underpriced 
IPOs. Uninformed investors will attempt to buy shares in new issues only if these are 
offered at discounts from their expected after-market prices. Thus, due to the adverse 
selection problem, issuing firms are forced to underprice their shares in order to 
compensate uninformed investors. Informed investors, on the other hand, should be 
sufficiently compensated for the cost of information acquisition by the excess return 
earned from underpriced IPOs.  
While it is difficult to validate whether institutional investors are informed, evidence is 
found that institutions tend to receive a greater allocation of the most underpriced shares 
(Aggarwal et al., 2002).   
Yet, a variety of other explanations regarding the phenomenon of underpricing of new 
issues besides the winner’s curse exist, outlined in the following. 
 
2.3.1.1.1.3 Market feedback hypothesis 
The strict pro-rata allocation rules inducing the winner’s curse problem have in many 
countries given way to bookbuilding methods which give investment bankers extensive 
discretion over allocations. Bookbuilding involves drawing out indications of interest 
from investors which are then used in committing the offer price.  
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According to Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Jegadeesh et al. (1993), investment 
bankers may underprice IPOs to tempt regular investors to reveal their evaluation of this 
stock in the pre-selling period. This information will be useful to the investment bankers 
as it can help pricing the issue. Investment bankers need to underprice issues for which 
favourable information is revealed more than issues for which unfavourable information 
is disclosed in order to induce truthful revelation for a given IPO. The prediction is that 
the offer price will be adjusted only partially in the final prosepectus from that in the 
preliminary one. This means that that of IPOs whose offering price is revised upwards 
will be more underpriced than those whose offering price is revised in the other 
direction.  
Here too, the empirical evidence is mixed. While evidence was found consistent with 
the Benvensite-Spindt model (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001, 2003), contrasting 
evidence was also reported (Jenkinson and Jones, 2004).  
 
2.3.1.1.1.4 Signalling hypothesis 
In the IPO context, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the IPO’s real value due to 
the lack of public information at the time of going public. Signalling models assume 
high-quality issuers underprice their IPO, i.e. set the offering lower than its intrinsic 
value to enable investors to distinguish them from low-quality issuers, thereby 
providing a signal of the IPO’s quality to investors.  
Signalling models assume here is that issuers have private information of whether they 
have high or low values. Another assumption is that such issuers follow a dynamic 
strategy, meaning that the IPO will be followed by future seasoned offerings. While 
high-quality issuers may be able to recoup their losses in the IPO in subsequent 
offerings, low quality firms cannot afford to underprice since they may not be able to 
offset their losses from the IPO later on. Ibbotson (1975: 264) summarised this logic by 
 70
proposing that issures underprice in order to “… leave a good taste in investors’ mouths 
so future underwritings from the same issuer could be sold at attractive prices”. 
 
Following this conjecture, several papers modelled the use of signalling, including 
Welch (1989), Gale and Stiglitz (1989), Allen and Faulhaber (1989), as well as 
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989).  
Welch’s (1989) model is based on the assumptions that the issuer knows more about the 
firm’s value than investors and that low-quality firms incur an imitation cost to appear 
to be a high-quality IPO firm. According to Welch, high-quality firms follow two-stage 
sales. In the first stage, high-quality firms issue only a fraction of the total amount of 
shares they intend to offer to the public. The price of these shares does not reflect the 
real value, since it is underpriced. Remaining shares will be sold in the future in 
seasoned offerings. The true value of the firm’s quality may be revealed after the IPO 
but before a seasoned offering. Yet a low-quality firm may thus not be able to recoup its 
imitation cost in a seasoned offering. Therefore, according to Welch (1989), 
underpricing is a credible signal of quality firms since it is costly for firms of inferior 
quality to imitate. 
Similarly, Gale and Stiglitz (1989) showed that in a two-stage model with the 
possibility of offering equity repeatedly, the issuing firm may not reveal its true value at 
the IPO but may decide to offer shares at a seasoned offering instead. The amount 
retained at the IPO is thus a function of the true value of the firm’s value and the cost of 
waiting.  
Correspondingly, a two-signal model is developed by Grinblatt and Hwang (1989). 
Again, the issuer is assumed to have better information about the true value of the firm 
relative to outside investors. In contrast to the other models, here two signals to 
communicate a firm’s value are employed. In a similar logic to Leland and Pyle (1977), 
outlined in section 3.1.2, issuers signal true firm value by retaining a proportion of the 
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new issue’s equity and also by offering the new shares at the IPO at a discount 
(underpricing).  
Yet all these models assume a two-stage respectively multi-stage sale policy with 
seasoned offerings following the IPO. This strong assumption disregards the many 
firms which consider the IPO as a means of transferring ownership from a private entity 
to a public one. Existing owners often intend to realise a certain amount of cash at the 
IPO and not at subsequent equity offerings. Furthermore, empirical papers examined the 
likelihood of a seasoned offering as a function of underpricing (Jegadeesh et al., 1993) 
as well as whether the likelihood of insider selling in the open market increases as a 
function of underpricing (Garfinkel, 1993). Results of both papers cast doubt on 
signalling by underpricing, similarly to Michaely and Shaw (1994) who document that 
the decision how much to underprice is not significantly related to the reissue decision 
and vice versa. 
 
More recently, alternative explanations from within the signalling framework emerged. 
Signalling theory is based on the need to resolve information asymmetry problems, 
suggesting that certain indicators send signals to potential investors about the firm’s 
quality and future value. While the aforementioned models assumed underpricing itself 
to be such a signal of firm quality, other scholars suggest that by sending other signals 
with regard to firm quality, underpricing can be reduced (see section 3.1.2). Investors’ 
evaluation of firm quality will have an impact on the price at which they are willing to 
purchase shares. By sending signals, the need to discount the price in order to attract 
investors, specifically less informed ones, is reduced (e.g. Beatty, 1989; Carter and 




2.3.1.1.1.5 Reputational hypotheses 
Having outlined certification models based on reputational arguments earlier in the 
theory section (section 3.1.2), the author turns directly to outlining hypotheses based on 
the institutional environment in the following section. 
 
2.3.1.1.2 Institutional environment 
The rationales for underpricing reviewed in this section consist of the legal liability 
hypotheses, price stabilisation, tax arguments, as well as those of ownership and 
control. 
 
2.3.1.1.2.1 Legal liability hypothesis 
The legal liability hypothesis was motivated by the US litigation environment. 
Underwriters and issuers are exposed to considerable risk of litigation by investors for 
misstatements or omissions of material facts in the IPO prospectus. It is documented 
that around 6% of issuers in the US between 1988 and 1995 were sued for violations 
relating to the IPO (Lowry and Shu, 2002). 
It was suggested long ago that through underpricing investment bankers can protect 
themselves against lawsuits from investors (Logue, 1973). In the USA, the Securities 
Act of 1933 makes all parties involved in the offer who sign the listing documents liable 
for any omissions. Underpricing reduces the likelihood of legal action being taken 
against involved parties like investment bankers for promoting issues which perform 
below expectations. 
Again, authors report empirical evidence inconsistent with this hypothesis (Drake and 
Vetsuypens, 1993) and highlight a misleading assumption on which the hypothesis is 
based (Alexander, 1993). The latter author argues that in reality underwriters do not 
bear the full cost of litigation. Since underwriters typically hold insurance from 
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insurance companies, they do not have incentives to insure further by underpricing. 
Furthermore, there seems to be a demand in capital markets for an insurance function 
from auditors, providing investors with a claim on the auditor in the event of an audit 
failure (e.g. Dye, 1993; Willenborg, 1999). 
Contrasting evidence is found by Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) who employ a sample 
of 93 firms which were sued and compare them to 93 firms of similar size which were 
not. Sued firms were found to be as underpriced as the control sample. In a more recent 
paper controlling for endogeneity, Lowry and Shu (2002) find that firms with higher 
litigation risk underprice their IPOs by significantly greater amounts, and that firms 
engaging in more underpricing significantly decrease their litigation risk.  
 
2.3.1.1.2.2 Price stabilisation 
The perception that price stabilisation may be a mechanism that ‘bonds’ underwriters 
and investors (Smith, 1986) was formalised by Benveniste et al. (1996). Investment 
bankers have a natural incentive to raise the offer price since their fees increase with 
gross proceeds from the IPO. Investor interest may be overstated by the underwriter and 
the issue may be priced aggressively following a bookbuilding exercise. Attentive 
investors may spot this adverse incentive and, due to the lack of counteracting force, 
may not engage in bookbuilding in the first place. Underwriters may convince investors 
that the IPO will not be intentionally overpriced by implicitly committing themselves to 
price support intended to reduce price drops in the after-market. Price support is costlier 
the more the offer price goes beyond the ‘true’ value of the share. 
While Benveniste et al. (1996) regard insitutional investors participating in 
bookbuilding as key beneficiaries of price stabilisation, Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) on 
the other hand consider these to be retail investors. 
 74
Findings of Asquith et al. (1998) support research suggesting that underwriters use both 
underpricing and price stabilisation to market IPOs (Benveniste et al., 1996; Chowdhry 
and Nanda, 1996). 
 
2.3.1.1.2.3 Tax arguments 
For tax reasons, underpricing may be advantageous. This possibility is explored in the 
Swedish IPO context by Rydqvist (1997). Since tax on employment income was much 
higher than on capital gains, there were incentives to pay employees by allocating 
appreciating assets in place of salaries. Underpriced stock allocated preferentially by the 
firm going public to its own employees, represents one such appreciating asset. In 1990, 
this incentive was removed, as the Swedish tax authorities introduced income tax on 
underpricing-related gains. Rydqvist (1997) reports a fall in underpricing from an 
average of 41% in 1980 - 1989 to 8% in 1990 -1994. 
Similarly, pecularities of the US tax law may provide incentives to senior managers to 
underprice their firm’s IPO (Taranto, 2003). When holders of managerial or employee 
stock options exercise the option, income tax is due on the difference between the strike 
price and the ‘fair’ market value. Additionally, at the sale of the underlying stock, 
capital gains tax is due on the difference between the ‘fair’ market value and the sale 
price. Managers prefer ‘fair’ market value to be as low as possible, since capital gains 
tax liability is deferred and capital gains tax rates are typically lower than rates of 
income tax. US tax law regards the offer price as ‘fair’ market value for options 
exercised in conjunction with an IPO. If options are exercised at IPO and the IPO is 
underpriced, there can be considerable tax savings. Thus, an incentive to underprice is 
generated. Taranto (2003) finds the more companies are underpriced, the more they rely 
on managerial or employee stock options. Since boards may award stock options to 
protect insiders from wealth-related loss due to underpricing, causation is unclear.  
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2.3.1.1.2.4 Ownership and control 
This hypothesis posits that issuers use underpricing strategically to influence share 
dispersion (Brennan and Franks, 1997). When issuers underprice their shares, excess 
demand is created which usually leads to a large number of shareholders. The 
consequence of a dispersed ownership structure is increased liquidity in the market for 
such shares and exerting control over management is made more difficult for outsiders. 
Brennan and Franks (1997) propose that underpricing gives managers the chance of 
protecting their private benefits by allocating shares strategically when floating their 
firm. Allocating large stakes to investors is avoided through the fear of scrutiny of the 
managers’ (potential) non-value-maximising behaviour. Many small stakes, on the other 
hand, reduce external control, owing to free-rider problems (Grossman and Hart, 1980; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
Brennan and Franks (1997) show that underpricing is used to ensure oversubscription 
and rationing when allocating shares in a way to enable issuers to discriminate among 
applicants and to decrease the block size of new shareholdings. Brau and Fawcett 
(2006) present field evidence of a study of CFOs who either took their firms public or 
attempted to do so. Around 41% of the CFOs responded that ensuring a wide ownership 
base was an important or very important determinant of expected underpricing.  
Yet the change of control was found to be twice as likely in newly floated firms 
compared to unlisted companies (Pagano et al., 1998). The finding that a majority of US 
IPOs deploy takeover defences (Field and Karpoff, 2002) suggests that underpricing 
may not be the only way of protecting managers’ private benefits of control. 
 
Yet counter to Brennan and Frank’s (1997) assumption that management attempts to 
avoid control by outside shareholders, managers may actually seek to minimise the 
scope for extracting private benefits of control, since agency costs are eventually borne 
by the firm’s owners, with managers often being part-owners. Assuming a large enough 
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stake so that agency costs outweigh the gains from private benefits, it is in managers’ 
interest to decrease their discretion. Stoughton and Zechner (1998) observe, based on 
this notion, that allocating shares to large outside investors able to monitor may be 
value-enhancing. Whether or not they contribute to its provision, all shareholders 
benefit from monitoring. Large shareholdes will only engage in monitoring in so far as 
this is optimal, which depends on the size of their stake. Managers may attempt 
allocating a particularly large stake to an investor to encourage better monitoring. Yet, if 
the stake is sub-optimally large from the investor’s point of view, an added incentive 
may be given by way of underpricing. Since by absence of monitoring the firm would 
have been floated at a lower price in the first place, due to investors expecting higher 
agency costs, underpricing may not even embody an opportunity cost. 
 
Studying the ownership and control dimension with respect to underpricing may be 
promising, yet more empirical evidence is needed to evaluate the validity of its 
theoretical contributions.  
 
In the next section, the author outlines hypotheses based on behavioural arguments. 
 
2.3.1.1.3 Behavioural models 
In the extant literature, behavioural explanations of underpricing can be found, such as 
the bandwagon, speculative bubble, as well as prospect theory and mental accounting 
hypotheses which will all be reviewed in this section. 
 
2.3.1.1.3.1 Bandwagon hypothesis 
It is argued by Welch (1992) that potential investors, in addition to paying attention to 
their own information, also consider whether other investors purchase shares in the new 
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issue. This may lead to the development of bandwagon effects. If an investor observes 
that others do not want to make purchases, the investor may refrain from buying, even if 
there is favourable information. In order to attract the first few investors the investment 
banker will underprice the issue, thereby inducing a bandwagon effect in which all 
subsequent investors want to purchase regardless of their own information. 
 
2.3.1.1.3.2 Speculative bubble hypothesis 
According to the hypothesis labelled by Ritter (1984) as the speculative bubble 
hypothesis, IPO underpricing is attributed to speculations of investors who could not get 
share allocations of the oversubscribed new issues at the offering price. That implies 
that the offering prices of the new issues are consistent with their underlying economic 
values but after-market speculation drives prices temporarily well above their intrinsic 
worth. Another implication is that the positive initial return should go along with 
subsequent negative returns when the bubble bursts some time later.  
In a sample of small, highly speculative issues Ritter (1984) finds no evidence that 
would support the implication of a speculative bubble. 
 
2.3.1.1.3.3 Prospect theory and mental accounting 
It is suggested by Loughran and Ritter (2002) that behavioural biases among the IPO 
firm’s decision-makers, rather than among investors, explain IPO underpricing. 
Bringing together prospect theory with mental accounting, the authors propose that 
issuers rarely ‘get upset’ by leaving money on the table in the form of large initial 
returns since they tend to balance their wealth loss due to underpricing by frequently 
larger wealth gains due to retained ownership as share prices jump in the after-market. 
The decision makers’ initial valuation beliefs are assumed to be reflected in the mean of 
the price range reported in the listing documents, serving as a reference point against 
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which the loss or gain from the outcome of the flotation can be evaluated. Typically, 
offer prices differ from this reference point due to reflection of revealed information 
during marketing efforts targeted at institutional investors or investment bankers’ 
‘manipulation’ of decision-makers’ expectation by understating the price range. Offer 
prices seem to only partially adjust, as outlined earlier, in the sense that large upward 
revisions from the reference point are related to large initial price increases from the 
offer price during the first trading day. A positive revision from the reference point is 
regarded as a wealth gain by the decision-maker, while positive initial returns are 
considered a wealth loss, assuming the IPO could have floated at a higher first-day 
trading price. In cases of the perceived gain outweighing the underpricing loss, the 
decision-makers are satisfied with the investment banker’s performance at IPO. 
Following Loughran and Ritter’s logic, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) present 
evidence that IPO firms are less likely to switch underwriters when they regard 
underwriter performance as satisfactorily. Additionally, underwriters seem to benefit 
from behavioural biases since they extract higher fees for follow-on transactions 
involving ‘satisfied’ decision-makers. 




To sum up, the large bulk of theoretical and empirical work on IPO underpricing seems 
to point out and support the notion that information asymmetries including agency 
problems between the issuer and its investment bank have first-order effects on 
underpricing. Moreover, underpricing increases in the ex-ante uncertainty surrounding a 
firm’s evaluation. There is also evidence that some investors are informed and the 
investment banks price setting is influenced by informed investors’ information. 
Finally, gains due to underpricing seem to accrue to informed investors. 
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The next section focuses on another IPO anomaly, the long-run underperformance of 
newly listed firms, and possible explanations of why this pattern occurs. 
 
2.3.1.2 IPO long-term underperformance 
The second pattern associated with IPOs is their poor market-based performance in the 
long-run. A number of studies have exhibited with different magnitude that IPOs 
underperform the market (reference portfolios or the market index). For US evidence, 
see for example Ritter (1991) and Loughran (1993) or, for the UK, Levis (1993) and 
Espenlaub et al. (2000), yet the long-run underperformance phenomenon was reported 
in various other countries as well. 
 
A number of explanations for long-run underperformance have been offered which will 
be outlined in the following. 
 
2.3.1.2.1 Divergence of opinion hypothesis 
According to Miller (1977), uncertainty and risk imply divergence of opinion among 
investors ranging from optimistic to pessimistic. The demand for shares of a particular 
IPO will come from those investors who are most optimistic about the IPO, since their 
valuations will be much higher than that of pessimistic investors. Since shares tend to be 
purchased by investors who are optimistic, the offering price will be above the ‘fair’ 
price. As time passes and more information becomes available, the gap in opinion 
between optimistic and pessimistic investors will narrow. As a consequence, the market 
price will decrease.  
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Assuming that analysts drive investors’ expectation, Rajan and Servaes (1997) 
demonstrate that higher underpricing leads to greater analyst following. Analysts are 
overoptimistic regarding earnings potential and growth prospects of firms recently 
floated. More firms are taken public when analysts are particularly overoptimistic. 
When analysts attribute low growth rather than high growth potential, IPOs have better 
long-run market performance. These authors’ results therefore suggest that the long-run 
underperformance anomaly may partially be driven by overoptimism.  
 
2.3.1.2.2 Impresario hypothesis 
Shiller (1990) suggested that the IPO market is subject to fads and that investment 
banks act as ‘impresarios’ promoting the IPO. In order to create the appearance of 
excess demand, investment banks underprice the IPO. As with Miller’s (1977) model, 
the impresario hypothesis predicts that IPOs will underperform in the long-run, with the 
size of underperformance expected to be positively related to underpricing.  
There is some evidence in support of this relation (e.g. Ritter, 1991).  
 
2.3.1.2.3 Window of opportunity hypothesis 
The window of opportunity framework was advanced by Ritter (1991) and Loughran 
and Ritter (1995). This framework’s assertion is that when a firm is considerably 
overvalued it is likely to issue equity, taking advantage of the swing in investor 
sentiment. Investors are periodically overoptimistic about the earnings potential of 
young companies, including new IPOs. It is the investors’ correction of unjustifiably 
optimistic expectations of future prospects which causes newly listed firms to 
underperform the market in the long-run.  
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There is evidence in support of the window of opportunity hypothesis (e.g. Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995; Pagano et al., 1998).  
 
Finally, the author turns to outlining a third anomalous IPO pattern detected by finance 
literature, that of the existence of hot issue markets. 
 
2.3.1.3 Hot issue markets 
Next to the underpricing and long-run underperformance phenomena, another pattern 
can be observed. That is that cycles exist regarding both the average initial returns and 
the volume of IPOs. It is argued that there are periods in which initial returns seem to be 
systematically larger than in others, and empirical evidence was found in support of the 
view that hot issue markets for IPOs exist. In such periods, many low quality IPOs are 
floated, taking advantage of fads (Shiller, 1990) respectively of market overoptimism 
(Ritter, 1991). Ritter (1984) develops an implication of Rock’s (1986) explanation for 
underpricing (that is, the riskier the issuing firm, the more the IPO will be 
underpriced5), suggesting that hot issue markets come into existence during periods 
where there are higher proportions of high-risk ventures in the going-public market. The 
latter author’s results exhibit a significant relationship between the IPO’s risk and its 
initial return.  
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) introduced the realignment of incentives hypothesis, 
which posits that the issuing firm’s managers endure underpricing during the bubble 
period 1999 to 2000. Increased ownership fragmentation, reduced CEO ownership, 
fewer IPOs containing secondary shares, and increased allocation of shares to ‘family 
and friends’ are hypothesised reasons. Changes in average underpricing are thus related 
to changes in the characteristics of ownership rather than nonstationarities in the pricing 
                                                 
5
 This model was first developed in Rock’s thesis in 1982 
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relations. Little support was found in subsequent empirical work by Loughran and Ritter 
(2004) as an explanation for substantial changes in underpricing put forward by 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003).  
 
Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) changing issuer objective function hypothesis consists of 
the spinning and analyst lust hypotheses. The spinning hypothesis proposes a teaming 
up of VCs and prestigious underwriters in the hot period with the consequence of 
deliberately underpricing IPOs while recouping VCs’ money left on the table by having 
favourable allocation of other hot IPOs by the focal underwriter. The analyst lust 
hypothesis is based on the proposition that issuers have increasingly chosen their 
underwriters largely on expected analyst coverage. In the case of higher market prices 
resulting in favourable analyst coverage, all pre-issue shareholders benefit. 
There is some empirical evidence in line with Loughran and Ritter’s view. An 
interaction term multiplying the prestigious underwriter dummy by the dummy for VC 
funding is used by Flagg (2005) on a US sample (not only covering bubble years, and 
therefore rather focusing on the collaboration hypothesis) to capture the spinning 
hypothesis. The corruption variable is positive and significant, indicating an additional 
10.8% underpricing for VC-backed flotations with prestigious underwriters, thus 
supporting the spinning hypothesis. Since in the American press a certain prestigious 
investment bank (Goldman Sachs) was suspected to engage in spinning, Flagg includes 
an interaction variable multiplying the dummy for this underwriter and the VC dummy. 
He finds VC-backed IPOs floated by Goldman Sachs to have an additional 18.4% 
underpricing. He also claims the results to hold when controlling for the endogeneity of 
venture-backing. Coakley et al. (2006) present UK evidence that for the bubble years a 
combination of reputable VCs and underwriters is associated with substantially larger 
levels of underpricing and interpret this as indirect support for the spinning hypothesis 
of Loughran and Ritter (2004). 
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After having reviewed the literature on IPO anomalies and key explanations put forward 
in an attempt to explain these anomalies, an outline of the two board roles and their link 
to performance in both the short and long-run is provided. 
 
2.3.2 Board roles and IPO performance 
It was argued earlier that in the IPO firm corporate governance and professionalisation 
characteristics are determined endogenously, e.g. they depend on VCs and founders. In 
this section, the author outlines the literature relating to the relationship between the two 
board roles and IPO performance.  
However, based on signalling and certification hypotheses, the literature suggests that 
there are direct effects of VCs and founders on performance, as well. Since, above all, 
the VC certification hypothesis is very prominent in the VC literature, the author will 
also include an outline of the latter in this section.  
 
2.3.2.1 Monitoring role and performance 
Examinations of the effect of board composition on organisational performance 
typically adopt one of two approaches. Studying how, for example board composition 
affects the board’s behaviour on tasks like CEO replacements, engaging in Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A), etc. is one approach. Yet this does not reveal how board 
composition affects overall performance of firms. The second approach directly studies 
the relationship between, for example board composition and organisational 
performance (Bhagat and Black, 2002) and is the approach adopted in this study. 
 
Also, in Jensen and Mecklings’ (1976) framework, the interests of agent-managers are 
not always aligned with those of the principal-owners. Managers with partial ownership 
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do not bear the full consequences of their actions and have incentives to pursue actions 
other than maximising shareholder value. As a consequence, firm value will be less than 
it would be if the manager had full ownership. Yet there is a purpose in separating 
ownership from control, since wealth endowment and managerial competence are 
frequently mutually exclusive. Diffuse ownership also permits risks to be shared (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). Research on the effect of corporate governance on firm value 
attempts to address whether the monitoring mechanisms in place are sufficient. 
 
2.3.2.1.1 Board independence and performance 
The conceptual literature seems to coincide in its suggestion that effective boards will 
have greater levels of board independence (Mizruchi, 1983; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989), not to speak of shareholder activists and institutional 
investors. Favouring boards comprised of a greater proportion of independent directors 
is largely based on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), holding that the 
separation of ownership and control potentially leads to self-interested behaviour by the 
managers in control. Therefore, mechanisms designed to protect shareholders are 
required. Serving this monitoring function is one of the essential duties of the board of 
directors. Agency theory proposes that effective boards will be comprised of outside 
directors. Due to their independence from firm management, such directors are believed 
to provide (superior) benefits to the firm. 
The literature dealing with the association between board composition and performance 
has also addressed the issue of direction of causation. While, in calendar time, board 
composition may affect organisational performance, the latter may also influence board 
composition (e.g. Baker and Gompers, 2003). However, unlike most research on 
corporate governance this thesis is organised around the IPO as a corporate event rather 
than in calendar time. Nevertheless, the literature is not conclusive about the importance 
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of an endogenous relationship between board composition and performance. For 
example, using large firm data, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Weisbach (1988) 
document that the fraction of independent directors increases when the firm has shown 
poor performance. While the effect is statistically significant, it is numerically very 
small (less than 1% increase in the proportion of independent directors in firms of the 
bottom performance decile) and has led Weisbach (1988: 454) to conclude that “… it is 
unlikely that the potential endogeneity of the board composition is a serious problem.” 
 
While agency theory suggests a positive correlation between board independence and 
performance, findings in previous research do not indicate a clear positive association 
between the two. In early work by Vance (1964), a positive association between the 
fraction of insiders and several performance measures is documented; in research by 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) a positive association between outside director 
representation and industry-adjusted firm performance is reported; yet other researchers 
report no significant relationship between the composition of the board and measures of 
organisational performance, employing US data (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat and Black, 2002) as well as data from other countries 
including the UK (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Faccio and Lasfer, 2000). There are 
even hints of a negative correlation between board independence and performance (e.g. 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996).  
Studying the event of the appointment of an additional outside director, Rosenstein and 
Wyatt (1990) report that stock prices rise by about 0.2% on average (adding an insider 
to the board neither increases nor decreases stock prices on average). Yet the 
statistically significant increase in stock prices may reflect signalling effects, since such 
an appointment may signal that the firm attempts to address its business problems, even 
if board composition does not affect the firm’s ability to address them. 
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Treating the Cadbury Report (1992) as an exogenous shock, Dahya and McConnell 
(2005) report that compliance of UK companies with the Cadbury recommendation (e.g. 
having at least three non-executive directors) is followed by an economically significant 
increase in operating performance independent of the benchmark employed. 
Announcements of appointing additional outside directors in order to reach the 
recommendation for having at least three non-executives, go along with an average two-
day abnormal return of 0.44%, while announcement effects of appointing additional 
inside directors is 0.17%, with the difference being statistically significant. It seems that 
investors’ reaction to the announcement of complying with the Cadbury 
recommendation is consistent with their expectation that this decision will lead to an 
increase in performance.  
 
While important to the literature on the link between board composition and 
performance, the studies mentioned above have mostly used Tobin’s Q or measures of 
operating performance as performance measure (except for event studies), with the 
focus on rather mature firms as compared to smaller firms. Moreover, they have 
neglected the IPO context, especially examinations of IPO underpricing and post-IPO 
market performance in the long-run. 
 
Underpricing: 
Only quite recently, scholars have started relating board composition to underpricing. In 
a signalling framework, Certo et al. (2001b) examine the relationship between IPO 
underpricing and board characteristics, including board structure, in a sample of 748 
IPO firms having had their flotation between 1990 and 1998 in the US. These authors 
develop the role of board structure as a signal to investors suggesting that firms with an 
appropriate board structure (meaning an independent board structure according to 
agency logic) should be evaluated more favourably and consequently experience lower 
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underpricing. The results were inconsistent with their hypothesis that outside directors 
are negatively related to underpricing; in fact, the authors report a significant positive 
relationship. 
On the other hand, using UK data of IPOs floated between 1 December 1999 and 31 
December 2000, Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) found their dummy indicating that more 
than a third of directors are non-executives was negatively and significantly related to 
underpricing.  
Focusing on valuation of Internet firm IPOs, Sanders and Boivie (2004) hypothesise but 
did not find a significant positive relationship between the board structure (fraction of 
outsiders) and IPO valuation. 
Thus, this issue merits further examination not only in a UK context. 
 
Post-IPO long-run performance: 
Only a few studies relate board composition to IPO long-run performance. Mak and 
Ong (1999) examine board changes in IPO firms in Singapore and find that boards 
become larger and include more outsiders to the board as the IPO firms mature. 
Crutchley et al. (2002) document on a sample of US IPOs that those with poorer initial 
performance experience higher levels of board instability and that greater board stability 
is linked with subsequent improvement in performance. Bhagat and Black (2002) 
examine whether the level of board independence correlates with various measures of 
long-run performance (including stock market returns) of large US companies and 
report that firms with more independent boards do not perform better than other 
companies. Using UK data, Buckland (2001) reports that there is little evidence that 
board independence is linked with firm performance (in this case survival). 
 
The studies just mentioned did not however examine whether board independence is 
linked to post-IPO market performance in the long-run. In their sample of internet IPOs, 
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Sanders and Boivie (2004) hypothesised a significant positive relationship between 
board structure (fraction of outsiders) and firm market valuation post-IPO, but found a 
negative and significant one. 
 
2.3.2.1.2 Retained ownership and performance 
The link between ownership structure and firm performance has been debated in the 
finance literature. The origins of this debate can be traced back to Berle and Means’ 
(1932) contention that the diffuseness of shareholdings should be inversely correlated 
with organisational performance. In this vein, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that 
as insiders’ ownership increases, managers are less inclined to divert resources away 
from shareholder value maximisation, and firm performance increases uniformly. 
However, other scholars argued differently and made a differentiation in such a way that 
high levels of insider ownership may result in entrenchment and poor performance. 
Stulz (1988) built a model of firm valuation to explain how large equity stakes help 
managers to be entrenched and decrease the monitoring of external mechanisms of 
control. Managerial entrenchment implies an inverse association between managerial 
ownership and firm performance. 
 
Empirical findings exist which document that the relationship between firm 
performance and managerial ownership is non-monotonic (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999; Faccio and Lasfer, 2000). 
Although these studies do not agree on detailed results, they all document that firm 
performance is positively related to performance in some ranges of managerial 
ownership and negatively related in others. The studies support the view of a positive 
interest-alignment effect at lower levels of managerial ownership and a negative 
entrenchment effect at higher levels.  
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According to Demsetz (1983), ownership structure should be thought of as an 
endogenous outcome of a profit-maximising process which reflects the influence of 
shareholders and of trading on the market for shares balanced to reach an equilibrium 
structure of the firm.  
An unsuccessful attempt at estimating a linear relation between profit range and 
ownership by large shareholders was conducted by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), which 
they regard as evidence to support that firms’ ownership structure is optimally 
determined to accommodate the principle of profit maximisation.  
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) take an integrated approach in which managerial 
ownership is considered as one of seven corporate governance mechanisms. Employing 
a sample of large US firms, the authors present evidence of interdependence among 
these mechanisms. When mechanisms were examined separately, a positive effect of 
insider ownership on firm performance was detected, which disappeared in the 
integrated model, supporting the Demsetz (1983) theory of the optimal use of control 
mechanisms.  
Using a fixed effects panel data model to test for endogeneity of managerial ownership 
and firm performance, Himmelberg et al. (1999) conclude that managerial ownership 
does not affect firm performance to an extent that is econometrically observable. 
Moreover, most variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. Accounting for endogeneity in their UK sample, Davies et al. (2005) find 
evidence of a quintic structure as well as evidence that the relationship between 
managerial ownership and corporate value is co-deterministic, the latter being consistent 
with Himmelberg et al. (1999). 
 
More recently, another branch evolved investigating the effects of family control. 
Family ownership has mostly been regarded as a special case of insider ownership 
making the family business literature relevant to the insider ownership issue. Employing 
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US data, Anderson and Reeb (2003) document that in one third of S&P 500 companies 
family ownership is present. Moreover, family firms perform better than non-family 
firms, suggesting that family ownership is an effective organisational structure. Kaserer 
and Moldenhauer (2007) propose that family ownership is stickier than ownership of 
agent-managers, since it is quite impractical to assume that family ownership 
continuously adjusts depending on market conditions. Thus, these authors contend it 
may be improbable that family ownership is endogenously determined (excluding the 
long-run). 
Similarly, the above contention may also hold for founder-ownership. Since by 
definition the sample requires founders to be involved at board level (see also section 
5.2.4), considerable levels of founder ownership, which is thus likely to mark a 
significant proportion of insider ownership, will also be present in most of the sample 
firms. 
In the IPO context, firms may communicate their expected value to potential investors 
and underwriters, employing signals that are observable and difficult/costly to imitate 
for low quality firms (Michaely and Shaw, 1994). The author has already outlined that 
one such signal may be retained share ownership of insiders. In their seminal paper, 
Leland and Pyle (1977) draw a model showing that entrepreneurs can signal the value of 
their ventures by the percentage of equity they retained. Entrepreneurs with higher 
ownership stakes in their firms will have lower levels of wealth diversification, 
increasing their personal risk. Entrepreneurs will only do so if they are confident of the 
firm’s future cash flows, and thus communicate private favourable information to 
investors. The latter, in turn, may interpret the percentage of ownership retained as a 
sign of the venture’s value. In the IPO context, managers of quality firms will attempt to 
retain shares, because when the private information is fully reflected in the after-market 
share price, they can recoup their loss associated with underpricing at a later stage.  
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The link between ownership and firm performance, proposed by the interest alignment 
and signalling hypotheses, has been tested in a variety of papers, focusing both on firm 
value and on underpricing. Yet results are mixed. In the UK context, for example 
Espenlaub and Tonks (1998), as well as Filatotchev and Bishop (2002), find no 
evidence in support of the notion that retained ownership serves as an IPO signal 
reducing underpricing. 
 
While a number of papers have analysed the relationship between retained ownership 
and performance based on Tobin’s Q or operating performance, examinations of a 
possible relationship between retained ownership and IPO long-run market performance 
have largely been neglected. An exception is the study by Sanders and Boivie (2004) 
who examine a number of governance variables and their relation to market value in the 
long-run in a sample of Internet firms floated in the US. They present evidence in line 
with their hypothesis of a positive relationship between executive ownership and post-
IPO market valuation.  
 
Following the review of the monitoring role and performance, the author focuses on the 
literature on resource provision and performance in the following sub-section. 
 
2.3.2.2 Resource provision role and performance 
 
The author differentiates this section in reviews of the literature on human/social capital 




2.3.2.2.1 Human and social capital and performance 
As outlined earlier, board capital, including human and social capital, are antecedents of 
the board’s provision of resources, which in turn, according to the resource-dependence 
perspective, is directly related to performance.  
It is expected that a wide variation exists across firms in terms of the strength of the 
management team that they have been able to build up by the time they go public. 
Higher quality managers/directors may be able to choose/agree on projects promising 
higher net present values for any given scale. Firms with larger board capital probably 
have a larger equilibrium scale of investment and higher offer sizes as a result. Due to 
the higher board capital, it is also likely that projects are implemented more ably, 
leading to better post-IPO performance. 
Strategy and entrepreneurship research examining the link between firm performance 
and characteristics of the TMT/board have mostly concluded that a positive relationship 
exists between organisational performance and human capital, such as education (Bantel 
and Jackson, 1989; Bhide, 2000), TMT functional heterogeneity (Weinzimmer, 1997), 
and previous joint work experience (Roure and Maidique, 1986; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1990).  
With respect to education, entrepreneurship research generally found this form of 
human capital to be positively related to one measure of long-run performance, the 
likelihood of firm survival (Bates, 1990; Brüderl et al., 1992; Gimeno et al., 1997; 
Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005). 
 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggest that the board also fulfils a symbolic function. It 
was discussed earlier that board capital has the potential to serve a certifying function, 
meaning that better and more able directors may convey the firm’s intrinsic value more 
credibly to investors, thereby decreasing information asymmetry of the firms they serve. 
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The implication is that board capital will affect various aspects of firms’ IPO 
performance (valuation and underpricing, as argued earlier) and also post-IPO 
performance.  
Research in this vein applied signalling theory to the board of directors, proposing that 
board capital confers organisational legitimacy to the firm (Certo et al., 2001b; Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003), representing a signal of the value of the firm. Since the greater the 
ex ante uncertainty about firm value, the greater is (the expected) underpricing (Beatty 
and Ritter, 1986), and the board capital signal is expected to reduce uncertainty 
surrounding the IPO and thus reduce underpricing (Certo et al., 2001b). 
Building their research on a signalling framework, Cohen and Dean (2005) show that 
prior experience in the industry and at TMT level, as well as age (number of top 
managers aged 40 years or more), were significantly negatively related to underpricing, 
while education (at Master’s level) was not. Lester et al. (2006) report that investors 
take note of educational attainments of the TMT since they found the latter to be 
significantly positively related to IPO valuations.  
Additionally, it was shown by Carpenter and Westphal (2001) that boards whose 
members have ties to strategically-related organisations were able to provide better 
advice and counsel, which in turn is, as noted earlier, related to firm performance 
(Westphal, 1999). Building on a signalling framework, Certo et al. (2001b) present US 
evidence of a significant negative relationship between outside directors’ interlocks and 
underpricing. Relatedly, Filatotchev and Bishop (2002), employing UK data, document 
a negative relationship between the average number of non-executive director interlocks 
and underpricing. Also in the UK, yet not focusing on underpricing, Reber et al. (2005) 
document a positive relationship between the board’s total number of interlocks and 
IPO valuation. 
Arguing that management’s quality and reputation can have a certifying effect similar to 
that of VCs, Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) show in their sample of 1,446 firms which 
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went public between 1993 and 1996 in the US that management quality in terms of both 
the percentage of managers with an MBA degree as well as that of the management 
team with previous experience at least at VP-level before joining the IPO firm are 
significantly positively related to IPO offer size. Management quality in terms of the 
percentage of management who previously served at VP-level or above, as well as the 
percentage who previously held positions of partner in a law or accounting firm is 
significantly negatively related to underpricing. These authors additionally focus on 
long-run market performance, basing their argumentation on Miller’s (1977) divergence 
of opinion hypothesis. The latter holds that long-run underperformance of IPOs occurs 
because the expectations about the IPO firm’s future cash flows differ among investors. 
To the extent that firms with higher levels of board capital are able to attract greater 
interest from institutional investors which are less likely to be subject to overoptimism, 
these firms are expected to face a smaller dispersion in investors’ beliefs, which implies 
a smaller (downward) price adjustment in the after-market as more information 
becomes available. Thus, IPO firms whose board of directors is characterisied by higher 
levels of board capital are expected to exhibit better long-run performance relative to 
those IPOs with lower quality boards. Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) present evidence 
of a positive relationship between management quality and long-run market 
performance. 
 
In the following, the thesis focuses on reviewing two distinct characteristics of 
human/social capital, namely founder leadership and professional accounting 





2.3.2.2.1.1 Founder leadership and performance 
The notion that education and experience of the board of directors are important can be 
extended to arguably the most influential individual in the firm, the CEO. Especially in 
the IPO context in which the firm attempts to raise money from investors, having the 
‘right’ CEO may influence investor perception and firm performance. Academic 
discussions have emerged regarding the impact CEOs have on corporate performance. 
A small stream of research has evolved relatively recently, examining a related and 
more important question in this context, that of whether firms managed by founder-
CEOs perform differently from firms managed by professional CEOs.  
Scholars have suggested organisational life-cycle models involving a transition from an 
initial entrepreneurial phase to a later more bureaucratic managerial phase. 
Organisational life cycle theory proposes that across organisational phases of existence, 
different demands are made of managers (Clifford, 1975; Hanks, 1990). While suitable 
in the early stages of a company’s life-cycle in which entrepreneurial challenges have to 
be handled, founders might not be adequate firm leaders later on, since a different set of 
skills is needed in more established companies in which administrative challenges 
prevail (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). Jayaraman et al. (2000) note that founders may 
have neither the skills required nor an interest in running larger companies. Based on 
interviews with VCs, Tashakori (1980) suggested that the majority of firm founders do 
not make the transition to a professional style of management. Conventional wisdom 
and much of the entrepreneurship literature hold that new ventures quickly outgrow the 
founder’s managerial capacity (Willard et al., 1992), expecting the founder to eventually 
become a liability to their firm.  
 
Several papers have started examining whether firms headed by a founder-CEO perform 
differently from firms with a professional CEO.  
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In a small firm sample, Daily and Dalton (1992a) document no difference in financial 
performance (measured by return on assets and return on equity) between founder-
managed and non-founder-managed firms. Similarly, Willard et al. (1992), employing 
various market- and accounting-based measures, report no significant differences in 
performance between quickly growing firms led by founders relative to those firms 
headed by individuals other than a founder. According to Begley (1995), founder-
managed firms tend to have higher return on assets relative to other firms. Using a 
sample of 47 founder-managed firms and an industry-matched control sample of 47 
non-founder managed firms, Jayaraman et al. (2000) report no main effect of founder 
management on stock returns of large firms over a three year holding period.  
Yet some founder-CEOs seem to be able to create value even long after the IPO, as 
indicated by recent evidence found in studies on large and mature firms (e.g. Demsetz 
and Villalonga, 2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Fahlenbrach, 2005). However, these 
studies examine founders in already successful large firms, suggesting those founders 
have an established track record and therefore reputation. 
 
Only a few papers in this vein focus on the IPO context itself. In a sample of 157 US 
firms floated in 1991, Nelson (2003) documents that firms led by founder-CEOs go 
public with a higher price-premium [(share price – book value per share) / share price]. 
Yet, evidence with respect to underpricing is sparse. Certo et al. (2001a) show in a 
sample of 368 IPO firms not older than 10 years, that founder-CEO status has a positive 
impact on underpricing, meaning a significant positive relationship, in line with 
organisational life-cycle explanations.  
While as just indicated studies exist relating founder-CEOs to long-run performance of 
IPO firms (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Fahlenbrach, 
2005) they examine large and mature IPOs. Examinations of the founder-CEO’s role 
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with respect to performance 1, 2 or 3 years following flotation seems to have been 
neglected to date. 
 
2.3.2.2.1.2 Professional accounting qualifications and performance 
As outlined earlier, although agency theorists have employed measures of board 
independence to capture effective monitoring, they have not specifically discussed the 
heterogeneity of monitoring ability. As suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
monitoring activities may be expected to become specialised to those individuals and 
institutions which have advantages in respect to these activities. A board that is unable 
to evaluate information received and recognise problems of the firm is considered to be 
an ineffective mechanism of governance (Jensen, 1986b). 
Scholars and regulating bodies (e.g. Higgs, 2003; Berghe and Levrau, 2004) suggest 
that directors should possess, for example, knowledge of accountancy. It was pointed 
out that the single most important determinant of task performance is ability (Hunter 
and Hunter, 1984). Directors who have earned professional accounting qualifications 
may be considered to have superior ability to perform at least the monitoring role as 
outlined earlier. 
Yet, while research on IPO stage ventures has recently started to examine the board’s 
role with respect to IPO performance from a signalling perspective, it has so far by and 
large neglected the ability of directors to fulfil at least monitoring services.  
A recent study by van der Zahn et al. (2006) suggests that independent directors holding 
academic and professional credentials in accounting, auditing or finance appointed to 
the audit committee send a favourable signal of the firm’s quality to investors. While 
these authors focus rather narrowly on audit committees, the literature does not seem to 
provide a broader view encompassing the whole board of directors with respect to 
directors’ professional accounting qualifications.  
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This research attempts to address this gap in the literature which next to underpricing 
extends to long-run post-IPO market performance. 
 
In the following, the author turns to the literature examining organisational legitimacy 
and its link to performance. 
 
2.3.2.2.2 Legitimacy and performance 
Legitimacy is mentioned as one of the benefits the board of directors can bring to the 
firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). As outlined earlier, the provision of resources, and 
thus legitimacy, is theorised to be positively related to firm performance (see section 
3.1.2). 
The review of extant research with respect to legitimacy and performance is split into 
two sections, capturing role legitimacy as well as board prestige, respectively. 
Since scholarly attention to the link between legitimacy and long-run post-IPO 
performance has been sparse, the review regarding role legitimacy and board prestige, 
respectively, and long-run performance will naturally be brief. 
 
2.3.2.2.2.1 Role legitimacy and performance 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), managers also play a symbolic role, 
personifying the organisation they serve. Holding positions corresponding to their 
respective backgrounds provides legitimacy to the organisation since this enables others 
to understand, classify and anticipate a person (Baker and Faulkner, 1991), thus 
reducing uncertainties due to the predictability of organisational actions (Suchman, 
1995). 
Recently, Higgins and Gulati (2006) introduced the concept of role legitimacy to the 
IPO signalling literature and test whether it affects investor decisions. It is hypothesised 
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by the authors that the greater the match between top management backgrounds and the 
roles served by key members of the TMT, the greater the role legitimacy signalled to 
potential investors. These in turn should affect investor decisions in terms of number 
and quality of institutional investors investing in the IPO firm. While these authors’ 
results indicate support for role legitimacy serving as a signal (at least for the chief 
scientific officer position in their sample of bio-technology IPOs) they did not examine 
IPO performance effects.  
Due to the fact that the concept of role legitimacy has only recently been applied to the 
IPO context (see Higgins and Gulati, 2006), whether role legitimacy affects 
underpricing and performance in the long-run has not been examined before. Thus, 
while conceptually appealing, it is an open empirical question whether role legitimacy is 
related to short- and long-run IPO performance. This study starts to address this gap in 
the literature. 
 
A second and, in the literature, more established possibility of gaining legitimacy is by 
having prestigious directors serving on the company’s board and also by endorsement 
by prominent entities. The literature examining the link between board prestige and 
performance is therefore reviewed in the following. 
 
2.3.2.2.2.2 Prestige and performance 
In this section, the literature is reviewed with respect to the prestige of the board and 
prominent affiliations, respectively, and their association with firm performance. 
 
2.3.2.2.2.2.1 Board prestige and performance 
As outlined earlier, according to the resource-dependence perspective, the provision of 
resources, also in the form of legitimacy, is related to firm performance. Empirical 
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evidence in line with this proposition was presented, for example, by D’Aveni (1990) 
and D’Aveni and Kesner (1993), who found the prestige of executives to be positively 
associated with outcomes in larger firms.  
Signalling theory holds that the possession of organisational legitimacy is a means of 
conveying firm quality, therefore reducing uncertainties surrounding the IPO, and thus 
lower underpricing is expected as outlined previously.  
Page and Spira (2000) argue that UK companies signal that they have trustworthy non-
executive directors on their boards (and more specifically on their remuneration and 
audit committees) with titles and honours received by their non-executive directors. In a 
study of 40 Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 companies and 40 smaller 
listed companies the authors found strong support for their hypothesis that non-
executives hold more, and more senior, honours than executives. A non-executive 
director is six times as likely to hold an honour as compared to an executive director.   
In a signalling framework, Lester et al. (2006) document that educational prestige is 
positively related to the IPO firm’s valuation, yet membership in the political elite 
seems not to be influential in improving IPO valuations. 
Recently, Kirchmaier and Kollo (2007) study the role of prestige in non-executive 
director appointments of the largest (public) non-financial firms in the UK, yet not in 
the context of going public. Controlling for business experience and ability, they 
observe a positive and weakly significant announcement effect when members of the 
political elite are appointed to firm boards.  
In the aforementioned paper, Kirchmaier and Kollo (2007) also examine announcement 
effects with respect to appointments of titled directors. They find no significant effect 
on firm value when examining announcement effects. In interactions with board size 
indicators the authors report positive and significant announcement effects of 
appointing directors with a knighthood, but for large boards only. 
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Not only is there dearth of published research examining the link between board 
prestige and performance in general, but also only a few papers centre their attention on 
the IPO setting, studying valuation but not underpricing and long-run performance, 
respectively. 
Examination of the relationship between directors’ prestigious educational attainment or 
membership in the political elite and underpricing as well as long-run (market) 
performance seems to have been neglected in the literature. Moreover, while a few 
papers exist studying director prestige in the form of British honours and titles from a 
signalling point of view in public firms, none of these studies focuses on the IPO itself.  
 
While recently a few papers have started to examine the link between 
management/director quality/prestige and IPO valuation respectively underpricing, only 
the paper by Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) seems to have extended the analysis to 
post-IPO long-run performance, basing their argumentation on Miller’s (1977) 
divergence of opinion hypothesis. These authors conclude that management quality and 
reputation explain some of the cross-sectional variation in IPO stock returns as well as 
operating performance in the long-run.  
Yet the aforementioned paper focuses on management rather than any board member 
and does not employ ‘classic’ prestige variables in the vein of D’Aveni (1990) and 
followers, and thus focuses on management quality rather than management prestige. 
This thesis aims at extending the works of Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). 
 
The omission respectively the dearth of examinations with respect to prestige stemming 
from British honours and titles as well as other forms of prestige (educational 
attainment and membership in the political elite) and underpricing/long-run 
performance in extant IPO research represents a gap in the literature. The existence of 
this gap is surprising, since especially in the IPO context information asymmetries are 
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more pronounced and signalling with prestige is expected to be important and might 
have effects on underpricing but also long-run performance. In this research, the author 
attempts starting to address the issues mentioned above. 
 
In the next section the literature examining endorsement by prominent organisations and 
the link to firm performance is outlined. 
 
2.3.2.2.2.2.2 Affiliations with prestigious organisations and performance 
This sub-section reviews the literature on auditor prestige and performance and VCs and 
performance, respectively, starting with the former. 
 
2.3.2.2.2.2.2.1 Prestigious auditor and performance 
Prior research has indicated that reputation is an important driver for auditor choice and 
that there is demand for high quality auditing in the IPO setting since auditors are 
suggested to be able to improve the credibility of their client firms.  
Disclosure requirements for privately held companies are limited relative to comparable 
firms listed on a stock exchange. Due to the difference in the regulatory environment, 
auditors may play an important role in the IPO context. Dye (1993) suggests auditing to 
consist of two components, information and insurance, and documents the conditions 
under which an accounting firm’s wealth is bound for audit quality. The prevailing 
perception holds that more prestigious auditors have larger incentives not to perform 
low-quality audit at a premium-quality price. Research in the IPO setting builds on the 
notion that certain audit firms provide high-quality services, thereby offering existing 
owners a means to reveal favorable information. Titman and Trueman (1986) develop a 
signalling model documenting that the quality of the auditor may provide useful 
information regarding the assessment of the IPO firm’s value (see also Simunic and 
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Stein (1987) and Datar et al. (1991)). Whenever securities are being issued in capital 
markets where insiders of the IPO firm and outside investors possess different 
information with respect to the value of the offering firm, third party certification may 
be valuable, since insiders have incentives to delay or even conceal the disclosure of 
adverse information, and are thus able to attain higher prices when selling securities. 
Unless rational outside investors are assured that the offer price already reflects all 
relevant private information, they will offer low prices for securities. These investors 
may be convinced that all relevant information has been disclosed, if a third party with 
reputational capital at stake has affirmed such and will be severely negatively affected if 
that affirmation emerges to be false.  
 
The auditor’s attestation of the financial information contained in the listing documents 
reduces information asymmetry between existing owners and potential investors. Since, 
as outlined earlier, the literature advocates a direct relation between ex ante uncertainty 
and IPO underpricing, IPO firms have incentives to disclose low firm ex ante 
uncertainty. Firms with high ex ante uncertainty have motivation for misrepresentation. 
Hiring an agent which can credibly attest financial statements may be restricting the 
misrepresentation problem. Reports audited by prestigious audit firms are expected to 
be more precise, since such auditors have incentives (reputational capital at stake) to 
reduce errors. High quality auditors may thus assist in reducing underpricing (Balvers et 
al., 1988; Beatty, 1989).  
In addition, prestigious auditors are regarded to supply increased coverage in the event 
of litigation, providing users of financial statements with a form of insurance. Due to 
their ‘deeper pockets’, prestigious auditors are more vulnerable to lawsuits and face 
more severe consequences from damaged reputation (Dye, 1993).  
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The likelihood of a lawsuit is not only a function of immediate performance of IPO 
firms audited but also of the performance during several years from flotation. Michaely 
and Shaw (1995) argue that prestigious auditors therefore have an incentive to associate 
themselves with IPO firms with a lower likelihood of performing poorly in the long-run. 
These authors present tentative evidence that auditor prestige is positively related to 
long-run performance. 
 
2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2 Venture capital and performance 
Up to this point, the author has argued that in the IPO firm corporate governance and 
professionalisation characteristics are determined endogenously, e.g. they depend on 
founders and VCs. Yet the finance literature developed the certification hypothesis 
proposing that there is a direct VC effect on performance (this research, however, 
largely neglected governance and professionalisation parameters).  
 
Underpricing: 
Several early studies (pioneered by Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991) 
have supposed that (the monitoring) activities of VCs improve the credibility of their 
portfolio firms. This is based on certifying models developed by Booth and Smith 
(1986) and Titman and Trueman (1986) in which the signal of underwriters and auditors 
becomes credible by the imminent threat to the agent who certifies of losing reputation 
when certifying falsely.  
In the VC context, the certification hypothesis holds that VCs, similar to underwriters 
and auditors, enable the reduction of information asymmetries between insiders and 
uninformed outside investors by certifying the value of their portfolio firms and the 
quality of the information disclosed associated with the IPO. Furthermore, the VCs’ 
ability to reduce information asymmetry surrounding a firm’s IPO should result in a 
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decrease in costs associated with the IPO (expenses for underwriters, auditors, lawyers, 
and others) as well as a decrease in underpricing. It has already been outlined in detail 
in the theory section that VCs meet the criteria for being a signal. 
VC certification has been tested in analyses of IPOs proposing lower underpricing for 
IPOs in VC-backed firms compared to those without VC-funding. Underpricing is here 
considered as a cost which arises due to asymmetric information between 
entrepreneurs/VCs and new investors. 
In their study of 433 VC-backed and non-VC backed IPOs during the years 1978 to 
1987, Barry et al. (1990) found no significant difference in performance of the two 
groups. However, as expected, the quality of monitoring by VCs was negatively related 
to underpricing in the IPO. Using a matched sample of 320 VC-backed and non-VC 
backed IPOs, Megginson and Weiss (1991) came across differences in underpricing in 
their sub-samples, with VC-backed firms experiencing lower underpricing, as 
hypothesised. In contrast to Barry et al. (1990), Megginson and Weiss’s results are 
statistically significant, which they attribute to the better methodology, namely the 
usage of matched-pairs.  
A UK study on matched IPOs for the period 1992 to 1996 found lower underpricing for 
VC-backed IPOs floated in the UK between 1992 and 1996 compared to their matched 
counterparts (Belghitar, 2003).  
 
Yet research on the influence of VC-backing on initial returns, proposing a VC-
certification effect, was put into question by a number of papers, since evidence was 
found counter to the certification hypothesis. 
While several papers did not find a significant negative relationship between VC-
backing and underpricing in US samples (Lin, 1996; Bradley and Jordan, 2002; Brau et 
al., 2004) and UK ones (Chahine et al., 2005; Jelic et al., 2005), others even found a 
significant positive relationship (e.g. Francis and Hasan, 2001; Smart and Zutter, 2003; 
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Lee and Wahal, 2004; Chemmanur and Loutskina, 2006). Research using data from 
outside the US or UK also shows at best mixed support for the certification hypothesis 
as documented in findings from France (Chahine and Filatotchev, 2005), Germany 
(Schertler, 2002; Franzke, 2003; Bessler and Kurth, 2005; Tykvová and Walz, 2007), 
the Netherlands (van der Geest and van Frederikslust, 2001), European ‘New Markets’ 
(de Maeseneire and Manigart, 2002), Korea (Lee, 2004) and Australia (da Silva Rosa et 
al., 2002).  
Possible explanations based on the timeframe analysed and incentives to reduce 
underpricing were put forward, e.g. by Gompers and Lerner (1997) and Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001). The former authors show that the relationship between VC-backing 
and underpricing is not constant over time and was positive during the period five years 
preceding Megginson and Weiss’s (1991) sample. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001)6 argue 
that underpricing is not the entrepreneurs’ focal concern, as they (and their backers, if 
any) will care only about issue costs, choice of underwriter, and consequently pricing of 
an issue, to the degree that such choices affect their wealth. If entrepreneurs can take 
some costly action which reduces underpricing, they will do so only if the marginal 
benefit outweighs the marginal cost. The reduction in underpricing per se does not 
represent the marginal benefit, but the decrease in underpricing-induced wealth losses, 
which increase with the number of shares sold in the offering. Thus the more an 
entrepreneur participates in the offering and the size of any capital increase, the more 
he/she will benefit from optimising pricing, hence research should control for incentives 
to reduce underpricing. Megginson and Weiss’s (1991) data was re-examined by 
Ljungqvist (1999), proposing that the differences in initial returns per se are 
uninformative and possibly misleading when not controlled for variations in the 
entrepreneur’s incentives to control underpricing. Replicating the Megginson and Weiss 
                                                 
6
 A working paper on which this article is based on was available in 1998, whereas the initial idea for the 
article was in Ljungqvist’s (1995) doctoral dissertation. 
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sample found support for the certification hypothesis which predicts lower underpricing 
for VC-backed IPOs. This finding is robust for taking into account incentives to reduce 
underpricing. For a 1990s sample, however, certification could not be confirmed, with 
VC-backing being associated, if anything, to higher underpricing, with or without 
controlling for incentives to reduce underpricing. 
Finally, the author presents studies differing from the previously mentioned ones in 
terms of the discipline from which they were studied and the methodology employed. 
Unlike previous studies which largely stem from finance research, Certo et al. (2001b) 
analyse signalling in IPOs from a strategy research point of view. In their sample of 748 
firms floated between 1990 and 1998, they find that with or without the inclusion of 
board variables (board composition, CEO duality, board reputation), the VC-dummy 
was always positively (and significantly) related to underpricing.  
Since there are divergent findings apparent in extant research, Daily et al. (2003) used 
meta-analytic techniques to analyse correlates of underpricing including VC equity. 
While meta-analysis reveals a significant relationship, it is opposite to the direction 
hypothesised. As a possible explanation, the authors take a non-linear relationship 
between VC equity holdings and underpricing into consideration, which based on 
agency theory could capture aligning of interest and entrenchment issues.  
 
Long-term performance: 
The literature names a variety of reasons why the impact of VC-backing should be 
reflected in the portfolio firm’s long-term performance. 
The particular financing role VCs play is of high importance. With their equity 
financing, VCs overcome the financing constraints which plague many young ventures. 
Particularly high-tech ventures have great difficulties in obtaining traditional sources of 
external finance. Because of their risky nature and sparse tangible assets, information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is high, which makes traditional finance 
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prohibitively expensive if not unavailable. VC-backed firms are then enabled to fund 
growth options when they arise, and to make the necessary investments which will 
potentially drive the long-run performance of the venture, whereas non-VC backed 
firms, due to a lack of immediate (or permanent) financing capabilities, have to 
postpone, under-fund or even cancel necessary key investments.  
To overcome information asymmetries VCs have applied various techniques ranging 
from thoroughly screening the candidate firms, staging their investments, to tying 
founder’s or managers’ compensation to the performance of the firm. Moreover, the 
firm’s development is monitored closely, thus allowing VCs to finance firms with high 
growth potential which otherwise would have financial constraints (e.g. Sahlman, 
1990). This monitoring and active involvement of the VCs seems to be the distinct 
characteristics differentiating VCs from other suppliers of capital. Although extent and 
nature of their involvement varies, the venture capitalist typically is active in roles such 
as director, adviser or manager of the company (Kortum and Lerner, 2000). According 
to Hellmann (2000), who refers to VCs as ‘coaches’ they assist in shaping the firm’s 
strategy, in recruiting key employees and in helping with regulatory issues as well as 
marketing and bookkeeping. For the early development of the firm, the VCs provide 
guidance, advice and access to resources combined with monitoring. Moreover, VCs 
have influence in shaping boards and management teams and add credibility to the 
venture. Hellmann and Puri (2000) find that VC-backing reduces the time it takes for 
companies to bring a product to market. Furthermore, the same authors (2002) suggest 
that VC-backed start-ups have a more fully developed internal organisation as compared 
to non-VC backed ones. 
 
While the literature argues that VCs are involved in setting the course, particularly 
before and around the IPO, this will have an ongoing effect on the venture. It has been 
pointed out previously that VCs are, for example, actively involved in setting up 
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governance structures including the recruitment of TMT members and directors. Yet 
once governance structures and the identity of the TMT and directors have been chosen, 
changes do not occur frequently; they are thus expected to be path-dependent and were 
found to persist for some time following the IPO (Campbell and Frye, 2005), and are 
expected to help the venture perform better in the long-run (Brav and Gompers, 1997). 
Gompers and Lerner (2001) therefore point out that VC-backing might provide the 
essential competitive advantage which improves the chances of succeeding in the 
marketplace. 
Moreover, evidence is also provided that VCs usually do not cease their involvement at 
the IPO. VCs retain (parts of their) equity stakes and remain actively involved in their 
portfolio firms even post IPO, and in 89% of the cases the lead VC continues board 
presence at least up to one year after the going public (Barry et al., 1990). This might be 
‘enforced’ by lock-in agreements, which is a formal contract between original 
shareholders and the underwriters/sponsor to prevent these shareholders from selling 
their original shares for a certain period of time after the IPO. This period usually 
comprises 180 days in the US (Field and Hanka, 2001), the time span in the UK being 
much less standardised (Espenlaub et al., 2001; Espenlaub et al., 2002). Although the 
VC’s influence might have a longer-term nature, it is in the very nature of the VC to 
exit sooner or later (Wright and Robbie, 1998). Consequently, it should be likely that 
VC effects decrease over time.  
A further possible explanation for superior long-term performance of VC-backed IPOs 
is VCs’ concerns for their reputation. Reputational concerns were shown by Gompers 
(1996) to affect decisions VCs make when they take portfolio firms public. If VCs who 
are repeatedly involved in IPOs become associated with failures in the public market, it 
may harm their reputation and thus their ability to float portfolio firms and successfully 
raise funds in the future.  
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On the other hand, however, there exist reasonable arguments in the relevant literature 
which suggest that VC involvement might be derogatory to company performance. 
VCs only invest in promising ventures if the entrepreneurs give up a substantial amount 
of ownership as well as control over the companies’ future directions. According to 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), this might lead to entrepreneurs’ incentives 
to be less closely aligned to firm success. There also might arise conflicts between the 
entrepreneur and the VC which can certainly be harmful to the progress of the firm 
(Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). Firm performance may suffer, particularly if the 
entrepreneur and his/her human/social capital leave the company (Bamford et al., 2006). 
Moreover, depending on circumstances entrepreneurs might be obliged to spend a great 
amount of time on VCs’ monitoring, thus involving considerable costs (Hellmann and 
Puri, 2000). If VCs are too focused on short-run returns, long-run performance may be 
negatively affected. Although VCs typically do not sell out in the IPO, they naturally 
have to exit within a few years of their portfolio company going public. Thus the VC 
might encourage funded firms indirectly to have a favourable balance sheet at the time 
of VC exit by postponing or abandoning investment projects. While this could have a 
positive effect for the stock price, the long-run performance might be negatively 
affected.  
Similarly, VCs (particularly younger ones) might engage in what ‘grandstanding’ by 
rushing a firm to become public (Gompers, 1996). VCs might have incentives to take 
their portfolio firms public earlier than optimal for the venture. Most of the VCs’ 
revenues stem from portfolio companies which ultimately have an IPO. Additionally, 
having successfully taken a funded company public may be highly valuable for VCs 
with respect to raising additional funds. Having an IPO prematurely could be risky and 
costly for the venture, finally leading to decreasing growth rate of the company. 
Evidence was found that companies taken public by young VCs are considerably 
younger, raise less money from the IPO and face more underpricing than firms taken 
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public by more mature VCs (Gompers, 1996). For the UK, Barnes and McCarthy 
(2002) also report that younger VCs take their portfolio companies public at a younger 
age. 
Ultimately, differences in performance might also occur because VCs select which 
firms they finance, and some non-VC backed companies may have explicitly decided 
not to seek this source of funding. VCs only fund a tiny proportion of the entrepreneurs 
who sent their business plans. These providers of equity developed careful screening 
methods to determine which firms they will back (Sahlman, 1990). It is reasonable to 
assume that venture capitalists will identify and back a high fraction of the most 
promising new opportunities, thus selection may be an important reason why VC-
backed firms outperform non-VC backed ones. On the other hand, it is also probable 
that some of the most promising firms will abandon venture capital (Amit et al., 1990a) 
because of its very high cost with respect to giving up ownership and control. Assuming 
the best firms can use internal finance or other sources of external finance, and are able 
to go public without VC funds, firms of lower quality will seek VC-backing (adverse 
selection). Due to the VC’s difficulty in accurately assessing the entrepreneur’s ability, 
the most able entrepreneurs will not regard the VC’s conditions offered as attractive. 
This implies that lower qualified entrepreneurs may accept the VC’s terms, yet those 
entrepreneurs are less likely to succeed due to their lower ability. Therefore, firms 
receiving venture financing might underperform over time. 
 
Roughly two decades ago, the first analyses focusing on the role of VCs with respect to 
long-run performance emerged, starting with Cherin and Hergert (1988). Yet only in the 
mid 1990s has research on the long-run performance of IPOs backed by VCs been 
published in major journals. Similar to research on short-run returns, findings with 
respect to VCs and long-run performance also yielded mixed results. 
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The author begins with an outline of research findings on superior performance of VC-
backed companies.  
The value added potential of VC monitoring in IPOs is examined by Jain and Kini 
(1995) in a US sample of VC-backed IPOs matched by non-VC backed issues. They 
suggest that the market appears to value VCs’ monitoring and present evidence showing 
relatively superior post-issue operating performance for VC-backed IPOs compared to 
non-VC backed.  
In related research, Mikkelson et al. (1997) show for their sample of 283 IPOs floated 
during the years 1980 to 1983 that VC-backing is positively and marginally 
significantly related to the industry-adjusted change in operating return from year -1 to 
year 1, thus confirming results found in Jain and Kini’s (1995) matched-sample for that 
period. (However, for the period 1 year to 5 years after the IPO no significant 
relationship between VC-backing and changes in operating returns could be found.) 
In a sample of 402 IPOs floated in the US in 1993, Cyr et al. (2000) employed 
hierarchical OLS regression analysis and found their dummy for VC-backing to be 
positively and significantly related to the absolute stock price at year-end 1996. In a US 
sample of VC-backed IPOs matched with non-venture funded IPOs, Morsfield and Tan 
(2003) find evidence that IPOs backed by VCs show significantly higher long-run 
returns. 
Brown (2004) carefully matches a sample of 366 hi-tech IPOs floated between 1980 and 
1989 in the US, and observes them for at least a decade. Examining relative growth, 
Brown finds evidence suggesting that VC-backed firms grow much faster for almost a 
decade following the IPO. Growth rates for both types of firms, however, converge over 
time. Throughout the sample period annual rates of growth in market value and R&D 
investments are much faster for companies which received VC funding. Furthermore it 
is found that the median VC-backed IPO had consistently higher gross operating return 
on assets through at least the tenth post-IPO year. Brown therefore concludes that the 
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legacy of VC finance extends well beyond the IPO, probably because of the important 
role VC equity finance plays pre-IPO. Due to this sort of funding, VC-backed 
companies are able to attain greater intellectual capital early on, which may provide 
them with a distinct competitive advantage over the long-run.  
Evidence from a large US sample is presented by Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) 
suggesting that VC-backed IPOs have superior operating performance compared to their 
non-venture funded peers. The former group of flotations is found to have higher sales 
growth as well as R&D and capital expenditures than the latter group consistent for all 
years. VC-backed IPOs also have higher returns on assets, profit margins and sales 
margins in their IPO year and two years subsequent to going public.  
There is some European evidence suggesting VC-backing to be associated with superior 
performance in the long-run. Van Frederikslust and van der Geest (2001) show on a 
Dutch sample that VC-backing seems to be associated with better long-run performance 
three years following the flotation. For a sample of IPOs floated on the Neuer Markt 
(Germany) Tykvová and Walz (2007) find superior two-year post-IPO stock 
performance of VC-backed firms compared to other IPOs.  
Other papers found the positive effect of VC-backing to be dependent on the measure of 
performance used, the time-span post-IPO examined, and IPO market conditions.  
In a sample of 934 VC-backed and 3,407 non-venture backed IPOs, Brav and Gompers 
(1997) found evidence that VC-backed IPOs outperform IPOs not backed by VCs using 
equal weighted five-year buy-and-hold returns (but this does not hold if value weighting 
is employed).  
Belghitar (2003) studies long-run performance in a UK sample of IPOs floated between 
1992 and 1996. The author yields mixed results when comparing VC-backed and other 
IPOs, depending on the method used to compute average returns. Using cumulative 
average returns, he finds VC-backed IPOs underperforming market portfolios at the end 
of the 36th month after going public with non-VC-backed IPOs performing better than 
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the market. In contrast, employing buy-and-hold abnormal returns, he finds VC-backed 
and non-VC-backed IPOs to outperform market portfolios, though it is only significant 
(10%-level) for months 27 to 32.  
In terms of long-run operating performance, Coakley et al. (2007) find VC-backed IPOs 
in their UK sample to have better operating performance five years post-IPO than the 
non-VC backed ones for the years 1985 to 1997 and 2001 to 2003, yet it does not hold 
for bubble years (1998-2000). 
Other papers found no VC effect with respect to long-run performance, as documented 
for US (Florin, 2003; Brau et al., 2004), German (Bessler and Kurth, 2005), as well as 
Australian (da Silva Rosa et al., 2002) and Asian samples (Hamao et al., 2000; Wang et 
al., 2003; Lee, 2004).  
 
Taken together, the reviewed literature consists of conflicting evidence regarding VC 
effects in the long-run. Yet the mixed findings may be due to differences in terms of the 
measure of long-run performance, the length of time from IPO incorporated in the 
calculation, examined IPO sample years or examined industries (in respective 
countries).  
 
2.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the key theories on which this research project is built. 
Moreover, a review of the literature on the two key board roles is provided. Throughout 
the first part of the review the author documented that VCs and founders influence 
corporate governance mechanisms and the professionalisation of ‘their’ firms. This can 
be achieved directly by taking board position(s) themselves or indirectly by having 
directors appointed to the board in a way to fulfil the board’s control and resource 
provision functions.  
 115
Board independence was identified as the main focus of researchers examining the 
control function. According to agency theory, independent directors are better able to 
fulfil their control role and monitoring is therefore expected to be stronger. This theory 
thus offers insights of how board composition should look like, while the bargaining 
model indicates that power struggles between the CEO and shareholders respectively 
between the entrepreneur and other pre-IPO shareholders (like VCs) actually determine 
board composition. While founders and CEOs are expected to use their power to oppose 
increases in board independence and thus a loss of their control, VCs are expected to be 
willing to increase board independence and the power of independent directors and thus 
to have higher levels of monitoring of their investment in place.  
 
The next review block is associated with the role of VCs and founders with respect to 
professionalisation and thus the resource provision function. Based on organisational 
life-cycle theory, it is suggested that while being the engine of the young venture, with 
the growth of the firm founders eventually become less adequate as firm leaders and 
eventually professional managers are more effective. Arguments from the literature are 
presented suggesting founders attempt to resist a loss of control in ‘their’ firms, while 
on the other hand VC-backing per se respectively VC-power is proposed to be inversely 
related to the likelihood of a founder holding CEO position (at the time of IPO). The 
literature on human capital also indicates that experts in accounting and finance are 
likely to be more able to provide proper monitoring services than other non-executive 
directors, which may make such experts especially valuable for VCs. As documented 
earlier, the literature also attributes value to experience in general and the CEO’s prior 
experience as head of a (another) company in special. Again, this type of experience in 
particular may be appealing to VCs.  
Similarly, the literature was reviewed with respect to the VCs’ and founders’ role 
regarding prestige of the board of directors as well as endorsement of the IPO firm by 
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prominent affiliates, documenting that attracting prestigious affiliates to the venture will 
be easier if VCs are involved, according to the VC certification hypothesis. 
 
In the second part of the review, the author outlined the literature on IPO anomalies in 
respect of IPO performance including the link between the latter and mechanisms of 
corporate governance and professionalisation, which as suggested earlier both bear links 
with founder(-power) and VC(-power), as well as direct founder and VC-effects on IPO 
performance. 
 
Especially regarding the role of VCs and founders with respect to the resource provision 
function as well as the link between the latter and IPO performance, the review detected 
a number of gaps in the literature which will be briefly summarised in the following. 
 
Gaps in the literature and intended contribution: 
 
While the role which VCs and founders play with respect to the monitoring function 
attracted noticeable attention, empirical research in a UK context is scant. Similarly, 
there is quite a number of prior work which examined the link between the board’s 
structural characteristics and firm performance. Tobin’s Q is used as a performance 
measure in most of the studies referred to often in conjunction with accounting 
measures of performance, but with regard to IPO underpricing and long-run post-IPO 
market performance, there is limited evidence to date, especially in a UK context. This 
project aims at contributing to the literature by trying to narrow the identified gaps. 
Although Hunter and Hunter (1984) found ability to be the single most important 
determinant of task performance, the corporate governance literature seems to have 
largely neglected the important point these authors made. While most prior research has 
focused on structural characteristics of the board, this thesis extends more recent 
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research coming from a resource provision perspective which typically studied director 
characteristics like directors’ interlocks, by examining more specific human and social 
capital of the board of directors. Such characteristics are directors’ professional 
accounting qualifications which may be an important prerequisite for providing proper 
monitoring services, as well as CEOs’ role legitimacy and directors’ prestige (in the 
form of elite education, membership of the political elite and the possession of British 
honours and titles).  
While there is much anecdotal evidence that VCs are involved in recruiting key 
individuals (e.g. Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 1989; Sahlman, 1990), 
there is a dearth of empirical research (especially outside the US) on the VC’s role with 
respect to specific human and social capital on the board of directors. This thesis aims at 
contributing to narrowing this gap in the literature by extending empirical work of 
Hellmann and Puri (2002) as well as Florin (2003) by relating additional CEO and 
board of directors characteristics to VC-backing, as will be outlined in the following 
chapter on hypotheses development. Such CEO and board characteristics respectively 
their chosen proxies have to the best of the author’s knowledge not been applied to a 
VC context in published research before. 
Since especially in an IPO context, informational asymmetries are pronounced, which in 
turn make signalling with CEO and board characteristics, like experience and prestige, 
all the more important, the literature only addressed this issue starting with the work of 
Certo et al. (2001b) and Certo (2003). This thesis aims at contributing to this rather new 
stream by not only relating board characteristics to IPO underpricing but also by 
examining whether such characteristics show substantive benefits in the long-run post 
IPO. Some of the chosen variables (capturing experience and prestige of the CEO 




The review of the literature enabled identification of gaps in the literature, and in the 
following chapter it is outlined how the author goes about addressing some of these 




3 Hypotheses development 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections, one focusing on developing hypotheses with 
respect to linkages between VCs and founders on the two board roles, and the other 
dealing with the formulation of hypotheses regarding board roles and IPO performance. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates how the author proceeds in this chapter.  
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Part A: VCs’ and founders’ role with respect to corporate governance and professionalisation




3.1 Venture capitalists, founders and board roles 
According to the two key roles of the board of directors, this section is split into a sub-
section leading to the formulation of hypotheses regarding the role of VCs and founders 
with respect to monitoring as well as resource provision. 
 
3.1.1 Venture capitalists, founders and monitoring role 
One means of enabling effective monitoring by the board of directors according to 
agency logic is the board’s independence. Since directors may be less effective monitors 
if they are potentially influenced by the CEO through personal, professional and/or 
economic relationships (e.g. Baysinger and Butler, 1985), individual directors’ 
independence of the CEO is considered to be a necessary condition for the fulfilment of 
the board’s control responsibilities.  
 
As seen earlier, board composition can be considered as the outcome of negotiations 
between the CEO and outside directors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). According to 
the latter authors’ bargaining hypothesis, CEO/founder(s) and the board negotiate with 
respect to the appointment and identity of directors which thus determine board 
independence. It is expected that the CEO/founder(s) strives for a role which enables 
him/her to govern the selection of board members (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; 
Westphal and Zajac, 1995), with the power of outside directors and institutional 
investors acting as a counter-balance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Kieschnick and 
Moussawi, 2004).  
Several papers tested whether bargaining determines board independence, with the 
bargaining model receiving support (Arthur, 2001; O'Regan and Oster, 2004; Ryan and 
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Wiggins, 2004; Roosenboom, 2005), also when VCs as outside investors are explicitly 
considered (Baker and Gompers, 2003; Boone et al., 2005). 
Based on the prediction of the bargaining model suggested by Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998) and evidence found in the papers mentioned above, the author proposes the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1a: Founder directors' power is negatively related to board 
independence 
 
Since constraints of CEO’s/founder’s influence decrease his/her bargaining power over 
board composition, the author proposes: 
Hypothesis 1b: VC’s power is positively related to board independence 
 
Agency theory predicts that the demand for monitoring will be high when managerial 
ownership is low. With the level of managerial ownership increasing, incentives for 
managers are also predicted to increase, which better aligns their interests with the 
interests of outside shareholders. The demand for outside monitoring will thus be 
reduced. Previous research has proposed and provided evidence of a negative 
relationship between the fraction of outsiders on the board and managerial ownership 
(e.g. Denis and Sarin, 1999; Filatotchev, 2006).  
Yet other research suggests that high levels of ownership held by management can be 
costly to other stockholders. Entrenched (founder-)managers may expropriate wealth 
from minority shareholders in a variety of ways (see Holderness and Sheehan, 1991). 
The market may not be able to distinguish between owner-managers who destroy value 
and those who maximise value, with the latter bearing the costs since their firms will be 
undervalued. Firms will thus aim at providing signals to the market that potential 
negative effects due to entrenchment are not warranted. One such signal can be board 
 122
independence. It is therefore suggested that the possibility of expropriation at higher 
levels of managerial ownership may generate a demand for increased monitoring by 
independent directors (Peasnell et al., 2003).  
According to the discussion above, the relationship between managerial ownership and 
the demand for independent directors is determined by two separate factors. Neglecting 
the entrenchment factor, the incentive-alignment factor predicts a negative relationship 
for all levels of managerial ownership. Ceteris paribus, when entrenchment becomes an 
issue, the entrenchment-related demand, which until this level of managerial ownership 
was zero, starts playing a role and will be a positive function of insider ownership from 
this certain level onwards.  
 
A few studies have examined the dual effects of ownership and their relationship with 
board independence in non-linear models. Arthur (2001) in a sample of Australian 
IPOs, Roosenboom (2005) employing French IPO data, and Peasnell et al. (2003) in a 
sample of UK IPOs present evidence of a non-linear relationship. 
Hypothesis 1c: There is a non-linear relation between founder directors’ 
power and board independence  
Since there is very limited evidence about the magnitude of the entrenchment cost factor 
to date, the precise form of the non-linear relationship can hardly be predicted. 
However, since Peasnell et al. (2003) employed recent UK data, the author expects the 
non-linear relationship to take a form similar to that in their findings. These authors find 
that while at lower levels of managerial ownership the negative incentive-alignment 
effect dominates, at higher levels of ownership this is moderated to a certain extent by 
the positive entrenchment factor.  
 
Yet the fraction of independent directors on the board is only one among a few variables 
proxying incentives of the board regarding performing the control role. Scholars have 
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also employed the tenure of independent board members as a measure of outsiders’ 
power. Knowledge and power to influence board decisions can be attained through 
seniority on the board (Singh and Harianto, 1989; Kosnik, 1990; Mallette and Fowler, 
1992; Sundaramurthy et al., 1996). Relatively newly appointed independent directors 
may be less confident on the focal board and more willing to conform to organisational 
norms. One of these directors’ main duties, the provision of monitoring services, might 
therefore be limited. On the other hand, relatively senior independent directors would be 
more likely to behave confidently on the board and be more powerful in influencing 
board actions (Singh and Harianto, 1989; Kosnik, 1990; Mallette and Fowler, 1992; 
Sundaramurthy et al., 1996). Since the sample IPO firms are relatively young, tenure of 
independent directors is likely to be very low, since the majority of unquoted firms do 
not appoint non-executive directors.7   
It is suggested that an effective monitoring structure is perhaps most important at the 
IPO. Governance structures are likely to be chosen optimally at flotation since existing 
shareholders bear the costs of sub-optimal monitoring (Baker and Gompers, 2003), yet 
unquoted companies can also appoint non-executives to their boards. Since agency 
relations come into place, at latest, when VCs become shareholders and VCs are usually 
regarded to be actively engaged in their companies, it might be expected that VC-
backed firms will have stronger monitoring structures in place at IPO. Similarly, the 
bargaining model also proposes that VC-backing/-power acts as a counterweight to the 
CEO’s power, respectively founders’ power, and thus should improve the strength of 
the monitoring mechanisms. This should not only be reflected in the fraction of 
independent directors on the board, but also in the independent directors’ relative longer 
tenure consistent with the argumentation made above.  
                                                 
7
 With increasing board tenure outside directors are likely to be compromised as monitors since they are 
more likely to co-opt with management. This argumentation is already reflected in the measures of 
independent directors, since ‘outsiders’ who serve on the board for more than 10 years are treated as 
insiders throughout this thesis, in line with, for example the Higgs’ report (Higgs, 2003).  
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Summarising these arguments, the author proposes: 
Hypothesis 2a: Founder directors' power is negatively related to the average 
tenure of independent directors 
Hypothesis 2b: VC-backing is positively related to the average tenure of 
independent directors 
 
Hypotheses proposing a non-linear relationship between insider ownership (founder 
ownership, insider director ownership, and CEO ownership) and board independence 
have been developed earlier. The arguments should also apply similarly for outsiders’ 
tenure. 
Hypothesis 2c: There is a non-linear relation between founder directors' 
power and the average tenure of independent directors 
 
After having reviewed the literature and developed hypotheses based on the monitoring 
role, the author turns to reviewing the literature on resource provision in the following 
section.  
 
3.1.2 Venture capitalists, founders and resource provision role 
In this sub-section, hypotheses are developed regarding the role venture capitalists and 
founders play with respect to the board’s resource provision role, focusing on human 
and social capital as well as legitimacy and prestige. 
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3.1.2.1 Hypotheses related to venture capitalists, founders, and human 
and social capital 
As companies move through their life-cycle, attracting talented employees becomes 
critical. The importance of the management team in the VC investment decision is 
believed to be a key determinant of the ongoing success of the venture (Bygrave and 
Timmons, 1992). However, Baum and Silverman (2004) state that, while VCs fund 
firms with strong technological potential, they do not identify entrepreneurial firms with 
inherently superior top management teams (and thus may need to be engaged in founder 
dismissal/professionalisation later on). Consistent with this view, VCs are said to play a 
significant role in identifying and recruiting top managers (e.g. Tyebjee and Bruno, 
1984; e.g. MacMillan et al., 1989). 
 
Professionalisation and the board of directors: 
The strength of the management team is frequently mentioned to be a key criterion 
when investment decisions are made by VCs. As has been outlined earlier, (post-
investment) VCs attribute a high importance to the management team as a whole but 
also the person filling the CEO position. Recent empirical evidence seems to confirm 
this role. VCs are actively engaged in recruiting or changing management teams in the 
post-investment stage, as found by Kaplan and Strömberg (2004). While Boeker and 
Wiltbank (2005) find VC equity and the fraction of VC directors on the board to be 
positively associated with the likelihood of top management change in firms from the 
semi-conductor industry, Florin (2003) finds TMTs to be more experienced and more 
educated in IPO firms with considerable VC-backing (with VC ownership of at least 
30%).  
VCs as principals have incentives and power to ensure that a TMT of high quality, 
possessing needed skills and experiences, is in place before, during and also after the 
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IPO, since usually VCs are restricted from fully exiting at IPO. Having a high calibre 
TMT at IPO is important to the success of the IPO, since it is argued that the quality of 
upper echelons (and directors) directly influences investor perceptions and decisions to 
invest in an IPO (Bochner and Priest, 1993; Certo, 2003). 
 
It has been outlined earlier that VCs are likely to strengthen corporate governance 
mechanisms just before IPO since VCs will lose part of their contractual rights at IPO. 
VCs are not only likely to influence board independence by ensuring an adequate 
number of non-executives/independent directors on the board, but also that these 
directors are able to fulfil their monitoring and resource roles. Directors can better serve 
these roles if they possess the necessary human and social capital, hence if they are 
highly experienced, qualified and possess access to resources e.g. through their 
networks. 
Due to the VCs’ incentives, power and already documented influence in recruiting 
directors and professionalisation of portfolio firms, it can be expected that VC-backing 
will be positively related to the quality of directors. 
 
In the following the author will focus on, arguably, the most influential position within 
a company, that of the CEO and the special case of founder-CEOs, as well as on 
directors and the qualities CEOs and directors should possess to enable them to fulfil 
their responsibilities. 
 
3.1.2.1.1 Founder leadership 
Being mainly based on organisational life cycle theory (Clifford, 1975; Hanks, 1990), 
the literature indicates that founders, while suitable in the early stages of a company’s 
life-cycle in which entrepreneurial challenges have to be handled, they might not be 
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adequate firm leaders since a different set of skills is needed in more established 
companies in which administrative challenges prevail (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). 
Busenitz and Barney (1997), building on non-rational decision-making models based on 
behavioural decision theory, suggest that founder-managers are more susceptible to the 
use of decision-making biases and heuristics relative to ‘professional’ managers. 
Jayaraman et al. (2000) note that founders may neither have the skills required nor an 
interest in running larger companies. Based on interviews with VCs, Tashakori (1980) 
suggested that the majority of firm founders do not make the transition to a professional 
style of management.  
 
Founder’s power in terms of retained ownership (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and 
control over the board (Lansberg, 1988), as well as a lack of appropriate replacement 
candidates (Kets de Vries, 1970), may help a founder-CEO to retain his position. On the 
other hand, it is suggested that VCs possess considerable control rights which might 
permit the replacement of the original CEO, since the founder’s skill level can hardly be 
detected at the time of investing (Chan et al., 1990). Supporting empirical evidence for 
VCs’ impact on CEO turnover is found by Lerner (1995) who shows that VC board 
representation increases around the time of CEO turnover, with the number of other 
outsiders remaining constant. Hellmann (1998) shows in a formal model that efficient 
contracts may allocate control to VCs with regard to the decision to appoint an outside 
CEO as a replacement for the founder manager. The impact of VCs on the 
professionalisation of start-up firms was analysed by Hellmann and Puri (2002). The 
authors found, among others, that professional and business contacts are used more 
extensively with respect to recruiting in VC-backed companies, and that companies 
funded by VCs are more likely and faster to replace the founder with an outsider as 
CEO.  
Taking these arguments together, the author states the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 3a: Founder power is positively related to the likelihood of a 
firm being led by a founder-CEO 
Hypothesis 3b: VC-backing is negatively related to the likelihood of a firm 
being led by a founder-CEO 
A higher number of investors on the one hand might have the effect that no investor has 
disproportionate control over the decision to replace the founder-CEO (Wasserman, 
2003). Yet counter to that suggestion, it is reported that VCs typically hold considerable 
contractual rights including the right to replace the CEO. Moreover, arguing from a 
bargaining perspective, two or more VCs are expected to be a heavier counter-weight to 
the CEO’s power than one VC alone. One of the main reasons for VC syndication is the 
diversification of risk (among more VCs). VC syndication may therefore be an indicator 
for the riskiness of the venture and the more risky the venture, the tighter a CEO may be 
monitored and the more the venture might benefit from a professional CEO.  
According to the argument made above, the author proposes: 
Hypothesis 3c: VC syndication is negatively related to the likelihood of a 
firm being led by a founder-CEO 
 
3.1.2.1.2 Professional accounting qualifications 
While agency theorists have employed measures of board independence to capture 
effective monitoring, they have not explicitly discussed the heterogeneity of monitoring 
ability. Yet the board’s knowledge base, set of skills, expertise and experience are likely 
to have an impact on the effectiveness of monitoring. 
Knowledge of professionals stems to a great extent from education and through learning 
on the job. Professionals providing services are usually required to have extensive 
education and training prior to entering their fields (Hitt et al., 2001). Since several 
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years of professional experience in the accounting profession and complex examinations 
precede the award of the respective professional qualification, professionally qualified 
accountants are experts in their fields.  
Since ability was found to be the single most important determinant of task performance 
(Hunter and Hunter, 1984), directors with professional accounting qualifications have 
(superior) ability to perform at least the monitoring role. 
 
Once again, VCs have power and incentives to influence recruiting and selection of top 
executives and non-executive directors. This, is among others, reflected in findings that 
VCs are associated with the professionalisation of portfolio firms (Hellmann and Puri, 
2002; Florin, 2003). It can thus be expected that VCs play a role in the appointment of 
directors who have the ability to fulfil their monitoring role on the portfolio firm’s 
board. Directors who possess detailed knowledge of accountancy may therefore be 
preferred by VCs to be appointed to the board. It is therefore proposed that: 
Hypothesis 4: VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of outside 
directors holding professional accounting qualifications 
 
3.1.2.2 Hypotheses related to venture capitalists, founders and 
legitimacy 
The focus will be on two groups of legitimacy, role legitimacy as well as legitimacy 
stemming from board prestige respectively endorsement prestige in the following. In 
line with signalling theory that different kinds of observable characteristics may convey 
signals associated with different kinds of legitimacy, unlike D’Aveni (1990) and others 
(Cohen and Dean, 2005) the author does not aggregate the different characteristics of 
legitimacy (see also Higgins and Gulati, 2006). 
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3.1.2.2.1 Role legitimacy 
As well as signalling with what Higgins and Gulati (2006) call ‘role legitimacy’ to 
outside investors, the ‘completeness’ (Roure and Keeley, 1990) of the management 
team respectively the board, in matching important roles to the directors’ respective 
backgrounds, may also be regarded as a measure of professionalisation. Starting with 
Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) suggestion on the symbolic role managers play to 
personify the organisation they serve, it was outlined earlier that one way of doing so is 
by holding positions corresponding to their respective backgrounds. This in turn 
provides legitimacy to the organisation since it reduces uncertainties, due to the 
predictability of organisational actions (Suchman, 1995).  
As outlined ealier, VCs as active investors and shareholders in the firm have incentives 
and power to ensure that a proper corporate governance system including having ‘the 
right people at the right place’ is in place. Since anecdotal evidence and empirical 
findings associate VCs with paying great attention to the management team and 
professionalising the TMT (Sahlman, 1990; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Florin, 2003), a 
better matching of TMT roles to the directors’ respective backgrounds in VC-backed 
firms as compared to non-VC backed ones, is expected.  
Hypothesis 5a: VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of the IPO 
firm having a CEO with experience of leading a company before 
 
While not specifically studying founder-CEO replacements, Bruton et al. (2000) show 
that CEO dismissals mainly relate to the CEO’s ability (as perceived by the VC). Since 
the founder-CEO’s dismissal is found to be disruptive, manifesting itself by having a 
negative impact on performance (Bamford et al., 2006), founders are likely to be 
replaced only if they do not perform adequately. Also, Baker and Gompers (2003) do 
not find VC-backed firms to disproportionately replace founders. 
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Incorporating these findings and extending them to founder-CEOs, the author argues 
that founders who are experienced managers are (more likely to be selected for VC 
funding and) less likely to be replaced by VCs. Stated differently, the following is 
proposed:  
Hypothesis 5b: VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of the IPO 
firm having a founder-CEO with experience of leading a company before 
 
3.1.2.2.2 Prestige 
In this sub-section, hypotheses are developed regarding role legitimacy as well as board 
prestige, respectively. 
 
3.1.2.2.2.1 Board prestige 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) contend that legitimate or prestigious individuals or 
organisations appointed to the focal firm’s board provide confirmation of the value and 
worth of the organisation. Similarly, according to Useem (1979), the focal 
organisation’s legitimacy may be improved by contact with elite individuals. It is 
argued by Bazerman and Schoorman (1983) that organisational reputation can be 
affected by who serves on the board and to whom the organisation is seen to have ties.  
While demographic/background data may not be representative of true skills of the 
directors, it is commonly assumed that going to the proper schools, having remarkable 
prior experience and associating with the right people indicate higher status, prestige 
and skills (Berger et al., 1980). Thus, investors may assess firm quality by taking 
prestigious credentials of the firm’s top executives into consideration, as argued by 
D’Aveni (1990).  
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VCs as professional investors and repeated players in the IPO market are most likely 
aware that prestigious individuals appointed to a firm’s board provide confirmation of 
the value and worth of the organisation which, among others, improves a firm’s access 
to capital markets (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Stuart et al., 1999). Since Pollock et al. 
(2005) showed that upper-echelon prestige is significantly related to IPO valuation even 
in the presence of other forms of prestige (like VC-certification and underwriter 
reputation), and since VCs have (ownership and reputational) incentives to ensure 
successful IPOs, it is expected that VC-backed firms will try to get hold of prestigious 
directors.  
It has already been outlined that VCs have been linked to the professionalisation of 
portfolio firms. VCs are likely to be involved in the appointment of directors who are 
able to fulfil their monitoring and resource roles. Since prestige represents both human 
and social capital and thus vital ability and resources, the author would expect VC-
backed firms to be more likely to have prestigious directors appointed to the board. 
Hypothesis 6a: VC-backing is positively related to director prestige 
 
After having developed hypotheses regarding legitimacy stemming from the (individual 
members of the) board of directors, hypotheses with respect to legitimacy stemming 
from endorsement by prominent organisations will be developed. 
 
3.1.2.2.2.2 Affiliations with prestigious organisations 
IPO companies can also gain legitimacy from affiliations with prestigious entities. 
According to the signalling literature, endorsement of prestigious entities provides a 
reliable signal of an IPO’s worthiness (e.g. Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Carter et al., 
1998; Stuart et al., 1999; Higgins and Gulati, 2003).  
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Titman and Trueman (1986) develop a signalling model documenting that the quality of 
the auditor may provide useful information regarding the assessment of the IPO firm’s 
value. 
Since the IPO literature advocates a direct relation between ex ante uncertainty and IPO 
underpricing, IPO firms have incentives to disclose low firm ex ante uncertainty. Firms 
with high ex ante uncertainty have motivation for misrepresentation. Hiring an agent 
able to credibly attest financial statements may be restricting the misrepresentation 
problem. Reports audited by prestigious audit firms are expected to be more precise, 
since such auditors have incentives (e.g. reputational capital at stake) to reduce errors.  
VCs as repeated players in the IPO market should be aware of the benefits (and costs) of 
prestigious auditors. Assuming VCs are value-maximisers, they are expected to select 
the auditing firm with reputation capital that equates the marginal costs of a higher 
quality audit.  
Previous research has been outlined showing that VCs are influential players in their 
portfolio firms that e.g. engage in selection of directors, it may be expected that they 
will play such roles with respect to selection of auditors as well. Also, relying on the 
VC certification argument (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) respectively the VCs’ 
network, it should be easier to convince reputable auditors to get involved in a VC-
backed portfolio firm. 
Since the VCs’ financial as well as reputational capital is to a great deal dependent on 
successful portfolio firms’ IPOs, they have incentives to influence auditor 
selection/auditor swap. VC-backing is therefore expected to be related to higher quality 
auditors, hence: 
Hypothesis 6b: VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of the IPO 
firm being affiliated with a prestigious auditor 
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Since the IPO context is the focus of this research, hypotheses as to relationships 
between board roles and IPO performance will be formulated in the following.  
   
3.2 Board roles and IPO performance 
This sub-section is split into formulating hypotheses related to the board’s monitoring 
role and IPO performance as well as hypotheses on the board’s resource provision role 
and IPO performance.  
3.2.1 Hypotheses related to monitoring role and performance 
Hypotheses regarding board independence and performance as well as equity incentives 
and performance, starting with the former, are developed in the following sub-sections 
 
3.2.1.1 Board independence and performance 
It is widely believed that outside directors are more effective in monitoring firm 
management than inside directors8, since the individual director’s independence from 
management enables directors to fulfil their monitoring responsibilities. According to 
agency theory, independent directors are appointed to monitor management and restrict 
managerial opportunism. Several external forces have pressured especially independent 
directors to gravely consider the responsibilities associated with being appointed to a 
company’s board. The increasing number of shareholder lawsuits, next to the more 
active involvement of large blockholders, is forcing directors to recognise the fiduciary 
responsibilities they have towards shareholders. 
Also, from a signalling point of view, board independence may lend legitimacy to the 
firm with respect to having proper governance mechanisms in place at the IPO, since it 
                                                 
8
 As can be seen e.g. from various countries’ codes of corporate governance, e.g. the Higgs report for the 
UK (Higgs, 2003) 
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is believed independently structured boards are valuable, which should be reflected in 
the offering price (Certo et al., 2001b). Due to he potential for indicating quality, 
uncertainty surrounding the IPO should be reduced which in turn is proposed to be 
positively associated with underpricing, therefore: 
Hypothesis 7a: Board independence is negatively related to underpricing 
 
This thesis extends the work of Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) who apply the concept 
of board capital to the divergence of opinion hypothesis (Miller, 1977), focusing on 
management quality (and reputation) and thus the resource role, to the monitoring role. 
The divergence of opinion hypothesis holds, as outlined in section 3.3.1.2.1, that long-
run underperformance of newly public firms occurs because the expectations about the 
IPO firm’s future cash flows differ among investors. To the extent that firms with 
higher levels of board capital (and the author argues in this case increased respectively 
more effective monitoring (potential) and thus board independence) are able to attract 
greater interest from institutional investors which are less likely to be prone to 
overoptimism, these firms are expected to face a smaller dispersion in investors’ beliefs. 
The implication of this argument is that board independence will be positively related to 
long-term post-IPO market performance, leading to the following proposition: 
Hypothesis 7b: Board independence is positively related to post-IPO market 
performance in the long-run 
 
3.2.1.2 Retained ownership and performance 
According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), with decreasing equity stakes 
of insiders, interests of insiders and outside shareholders become less closely aligned, 
increasing agency problems which will eventually be reflected in firm performance.  
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With regard to signalling research, insiders of high quality firms attempt to retain 
shares, because when the private information is fully reflected in the aftermarket share 
price, they can recoup their loss associated with underpricing at a later stage. Inside 
directors will only do so if they are confident of the firm’s future cash flows, thereby 
communicating private favourable information to investors (Leland and Pyle, 1977). 
As outlined before, empirical evidence regarding the relationship between retained 
ownership and organisational performance is mixed. Nevertheless, due to the 
importance of (insider) ownership to the signalling literature, it will be included in the 
study. Since both the incentive alignment and signalling hypotheses predict a positive 
relationship between retained ownership (by insiders) and performance, the following is 
proposed:  
Hypothesis 8a: Insider directors' retained ownership is negatively related to 
underpricing 
With respect to a possible relationship between ownership and long-run market 
performance, the author builds on Chemmanur and Paeglis’s (2005) work in 
conjunction with Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis. The latter proposes 
that long-run underperformance of newly public firms occurs because the expectations 
about the IPO firm’s future cash flows differ among investors. To the extent that firms 
with higher levels of retained ownership are able to attract greater interest from 
institutional investors which are less likely to be prone to overoptimism, these firms are 
expected to face a smaller dispersion in investors’ beliefs. The implication of this 
argument is that retained ownership will be positively related to long-term post-IPO 
market performance. 
Hypothesis 8b: Insider directors' retained ownership is positively related to 
post-IPO market performance in the long-run 
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Finally, in the following, the rationale for the hypotheses with regard to resource 
provision and IPO performance will be put forward. 
 
3.2.2 Hypotheses related to resource provision role and 
performance 
As already mentioned resource provision logic advocates that there is a direct link 
between the (board’s) provision of resources and organisational performance. Resources 
are a means of decreasing dependency between the firm and external contingencies, 
lessen transaction costs, reduce uncertainty of the firm, and eventually assist in the 
survival of the firm (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Williamson, 1984; Singh 
et al., 1986). 
Moreover, it is argued that signalling theory can be applied to the board of directors 
(Certo et al., 2001b; Certo, 2003). From a signalling point of view, possessing or having 
access to resources is a means of conveying firm quality and should reduce uncertainties 
present around the IPO and should thus be reflected in organisational performance. 
 
3.2.2.1 Human and social capital and performance 
In this section first a hypothesis regarding founder leadership and performance is 
developed before doing the same for professional accounting qualifications and 
performance 
3.2.2.1.1 Founder leadership and performance 
According to organisational life cycle theory across organisational phases of existence, 
different demands are made of managers (Clifford, 1975; Hanks, 1990). While founders 
are likely to be suitable in the early stages of a company’s life-cycle in which 
entrepreneurial challenges have to be handled, they might become inadequate as firm 
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leaders later on, since more established companies in which administrative challenges 
prevail require a different set of skills (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). Founders are 
suggested not to make the transition to a professional style of management (Tashakori, 
1980) since they may neither have the skills required nor an interest in running larger 
companies (Jayaraman et al., 2000). Thus, conventional wisdom and much of the 
entrepreneurship literature hold that new enterprises quickly outgrow the founder’s 
managerial capacity (Willard et al., 1992), expecting the founder to eventually become a 
liability to their firm. 
The ability of top managers to objectively assess ‘their’ firm’s competitive environment 
regarding opportunities and threats as well as the firm’s strengths and weaknesses has 
been considered as vital to effective general management (Drucker, 1974; Steiner, 
1979). Yet research indicates that founders seem to be rarely objective, in fact 
entrepreneurs exhibit severe biases towards optimism (Cooper et al., 1988). This lack of 
objectivity may lead to poor management decisions. Professional managers, on the other 
hand, are said to bring more objectivity to the decision-making process (Schein, 1968), 
which may be attributed partly to the greater ‘emotional distance’ of non-founder CEOs 
with respect to the firms they head.  
 
The offer price set by the underwriter has to reflect its valuation of firm management. 
Thus the evaluation of the quality of an IPO firm’s management is a high priority for 
underwriters (Tinic, 1988). Similar to the arguments for applying signalling to the board 
of directors, it can be applied, presumably, to the most important position in a company, 
that of the CEO. Again, the necessary criteria for having the power for being a signal 
have to be fulfilled. The person in the position of the CEO is observable and known in 
advance to the offering, because director information has to be included in the listing 
prospectus (London Stock Exchange, 2002), from where the information about firm 
founder(s) can also be extracted.  
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Explanations of underpricing based on information asymmetry (Leland and Pyle, 1977; 
Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986) suggest a positive association between the ex ante uncertainty 
encompassing an IPO and underpricing. Since founders taking their firms public are 
usually doing so for the first time and thus represent ‘untested management’, the 
assessment of firm management, in the case of founder management, is more difficult 
(Trigwell et al., 1999). This increased difficulty in determining IPO value accurately 
may lead underwriters with a bias towards risk aversion to set issue prices lower. 
Additionally, since underwriters frequently interact with entrepreneurs, they may 
suspect that founders are inclined to upwardly biased opinions about their firm’s 
standing in the competitive environment, also giving underwriters reason to set lower 
offer prices. 
Low initial offer prices would then be likely to promote underpricing, since 
underwriters and first-day investors will supposedly react differently to founder-CEOs. 
This different reaction may be due to the likely existence of information asymmetries 
between the investment banker and first-day investors with respect to founder-CEOs. 
First-day investors, expected to be less well informed than the underwriter, may not 
discount the value of founder-CEOs, and rather consider founders of IPO stage firms as 
successful entrepreneurs. Thus, the presence of a founder bias discount among 
underwriters, paired with the likely absence or at least weakness of this type of discount 
among first-day investors, may lead to a larger spread between offer price and the price 
at the end of the first trading day (Certo et al., 2001a). 
Findings in empirical papers examining founder-CEO status and underpricing of IPO 
stage firms seem to support the arguments made above. Certo et al. (2001a) find 
evidence suggesting higher underpricing for founder-led firms. 
According to the foregoing arguments and previous empirical findings, the following 
hypothesis is stated: 
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Hypothesis 9a: Founder-CEO status is positively related to underpricing 
 
Some founder-CEOs seem to be able to create value even long after the IPO, as 
indicated by recent evidence found in studies on large and mature IPOs (e.g. Demsetz 
and Villalonga, 2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Fahlenbrach, 2005). Yet these studies 
examine founders in large firms which are already successful, suggesting those founders 
to have an established track record and therefore reputation.  
As argued before, most founders seem unable to adapt to a more professional style of 
management and lack managerial skills as well as experience. Since the quality of 
management was found to be positively related to IPO firms’ long-run performance 
(Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005), which is in line with the logic of heterogeneous 
opinions among investors and its implications for long-term performance (Miller, 1977) 
outlined earlier in more detail, IPO firms led by founder-CEOs are expected to show 
inferior performance in the long-run.  
Hypothesis 9b: Founder-CEO status is negatively related to post-IPO 
market performance in the long-run 
 
3.2.2.1.2 Professional accounting qualifications and performance 
Similar to some aspects of the argument made above, especially explanations based on 
information asymmetry (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986) suggesting a 
positive association between the ex ante uncertainty encompassing an IPO and 
underpricing, the author contends that non-executive directors with professional 
accounting degrees signal to investors that expert financial knowledge and thus the 
ability to monitor are given in the IPO firm. Thus, non-executive directors with such a 
qualification are likely to reduce uncertainty surrounding the IPO and are therefore 
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expected to be negatively associated with underpricing. (This argument is similar to that 
of van der Zahn et al. (2006) who focus on accounting qualifications and professional 
credentials on audit committees.) It is therefore proposed:  
Hypothesis 10a: The proportion of independent directors holding 
professional accounting qualifications is negatively related to underpricing 
Board members holding professional accounting qualifications signal that financial 
expertise is present on the board and next to signalling in the IPO, more generally this 
type of human capital is expected to bring substantive benefits to the IPO firm. Due to 
their financial expertise, qualified directors are expected to be able to monitor more 
effectively and play a role in decision making at board level which may have longer-
lasting consequences for performance. The theoretical logic outlined more generally on 
management quality and reputation (Miller, 1977; Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005) 
should apply for financial expertise in the form of professional accounting 
qualifications, as well, so the author therefore contends: 
Hypothesis 10b: The proportion of independent directors holding 
professional accounting qualifications is positively related to post-IPO 
market performance in the long-run 
 
3.2.2.2 Legitimacy and performance 
Hypotheses with respect to legitimacy and performance are split over three separate 
sub-sections, one focusing on role legitimacy and performance, another on board 





3.2.2.2.1 Role legitimacy and performance 
Based on theory and research on roles, the author proposes similar to Higgins and 
Gulati (2006) that by communicating information that key people leading the venture 
have backgrounds matching their present roles, investor uncertainty can be lessened due 
to “… the comfort of knowing the firm is being led by those who have done it before” 
(Cohen and Dean, 2005: 686).  
While also proposing that role legitimacy affects investor decisions, another distinction 
from the work of Higgins and Gulati (2006) is the author’s focus on IPO performance 
rather than the number and quality of investors attracted to the venture. Again, since 
theoretical models based on information asymmetry suggest a positive association 
between the ex ante uncertainty surrounding an IPO and underpricing, the following 
hypothesis is stated: 
Hypothesis 11a: CEO role legitimacy is negatively related to underpricing 
Since human capital theory predicts that, for example education and experience affect 
performance, and specifically since human capital should yield its optimal effects on 
performance, if it is optimally matched to occupation-specific requirements (Belman 
and Heywood, 1997), the author would expect superior long-run performance of IPOs 
headed by a CEO who is experienced in this role. Also, in line with the divergence of 
opinion hypothesis (Miller, 1977) mentioned earlier and empirical evidence presented in 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) director quality and thus CEO prior experience is 
expected to be associated with long-run performance. 
Hypothesis 11b: CEO role legitimacy is positively related to post-IPO 
market performance in the long-run 
 
In the next sub-section hypotheses are developed regarding links between prestige and 
performance. 
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3.2.2.2.2 Prestige and performance 
Hypotheses formulation is split into two sections, one focusing on board prestige and its 
links to performance and a second on affiliations with prominent organisations and links 
to performance. 
 
3.2.2.2.2.1 Board prestige and performance  
Similar to the rationale outlined in the previous section suggesting that a positive 
relationship exists between the ex ante uncertainty surrounding the IPO and 
underpricing, signalling legitimacy with prestige, i.e. by having prestigious directors 
appointed to the IPO firm’s board, is expected to decrease uncertainties surrounding the 
IPO. This in turn may influence investor perceptions and should be reflected in the 
firm’s valuation and underpricing.  
In a recent study, Lester et al. (2006) examine IPO investor valuations focusing on TMT 
prestige and uncertainty The results suggest that investors regard TMT educational 
attainment and educational affiliations in determining their valuation of the firm going 
public. Also, Page and Spira (2000) contend that IPO firms in Britain signal the 
credibility of their corporate governance mechanisms by having trustworthy and 
reputable non-executives on their boards, and directors bestowed titles or honours 
serving as a proxy for reputation. This view is expected by proposing, consistent with 
the logic already outlined, that director prestige in general and especially in the form of 
British honours and titles conveys legitimacy, reducing uncertainty at IPO, and thereby 
reducing underpricing. Futhermore, for fulfilling the board’s resource role, it might be 
advantageous to have directors appointed who belong to or have ties to the political 
elite. These ties may also work as a signal that the IPO firm has critical elite social 
capital at its disposal. Since firms can gain legitimacy by association with prestigious 
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individuals, and since legitimacy reduces uncertainty, the author would also expect 
political prestige on the board to be negatively linked to underpricing.  
 
Since, consistent with explanations made above, board reputation in general is expected 
to be positively associated to offer prices, and the higher the offer price the lower the 
spread between offer price and the closing price of the first day of trading should be 
(Certo et al., 2001a), the author contends that:  
Hypothesis 12a: Director prestige is negatively related to underpricing 
Bearing in mind the human and social capital inherent in directors with prestigious 
backgrounds, director reputation may, next to signalling effects, have substantive 
benefits as well. In line with arguments based on the resource-dependence perspective, 
as well as theoretical explanations based on Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion 
hypothesis and evidence presented by Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), the author 
finally expects director prestige in general to bear a positive link with market 
performance in the long-run. 
Hypothesis 12b: Director prestige is positively related to post-IPO market 
performance in the long-run 
 
3.2.2.2.2.2 Affiliations with prestigious organisations and performance 
In this sub-section, hypotheses are derived with respect to two types of prominent 
affiliations, those with prestigious auditors and those with VCs. 
 
Affiliations with prestigious auditors: 
Since theoretical models suggest a direct relation between ex ante uncertainty and IPO 
underpricing, at least the firms not wishing to ‘leave money on the table’ have 
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incentives to disclose low firm ex ante uncertainty, with firms having in fact ‘high’ ex 
ante uncertainty having a greater motivation for misrepresentation. One way of 
lessening the misrepresentation problem is to hire an agent able to credibly attest to the 
assertions made in the audited financial statements (Kinney, 1986). According to 
Titman and Trueman’s (1986) signalling model, high quality auditors are considered to 
have a comparative advantage in establishing the reported information variable that is 
associated to the firm’s value, and higher quality audit has to be compensated with a 
price premium. For low value IPOs, the costs involved in hiring a top auditor exceed the 
expected gains of misrepresentation. Due to liability and reputational issues it can be 
expected that disclosed information in accounting reports will be more precise, enabling 
potential investors to perform more precise evaluation of firm value. 
In his empirical paper on auditor quality and IPO pricing, Beatty (1989) finds an inverse 
relationship between auditor reputation and initial IPO returns, as do Holland and 
Horton (1993) in a UK sample. In related research, Michaely and Shaw (1995) find, in 
line with their hypotheses, evidence suggesting that more prestigious auditors are 
associated with IPO firms considered to be a priori less risky, which is consistent with 
findings of Simunic and Stein (1987). Moreover, IPOs audited by lower prestige firms 
were found to experience higher initial returns.  
In line with these arguments and empirical findings the author expects a negative 
relationship between having prestigious auditors and initial returns. 
Hypothesis 13a: Being affiliated with a prestigious auditor is negatively 
related to underpricing 
 
Auditor choice may have some implications about an IPO firm’s long-run performance 
in addition to underpricing. As mentioned in the review, auditors face lawsuits if the 
IPO firm they audited experiences considerable decrease in value. The likelihood of 
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lawsuits depends not only on the IPO’s immediate performance but also on the 
performance following several years from flotation. The threat of lawsuits is higher for 
larger, more reputable auditors, because their pockets are deeper and the loss due to 
damaged reputation is higher for them. Thus there are incentives to prestigious auditors 
to associate themselves with IPO firms perceived less likely to perform poorly in the 
long-run (Michaely and Shaw, 1995). 
Also, Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis holds that long-run 
underperformance of IPOs occurs because the expectations about the IPO firm’s future 
cash flows differ among investors. To the extent that firms with reputable auditors are 
able to attract greater interest from institutional investors less likely to be subject to 
overoptimism, these firms are expected to face a smaller dispersion in investors’ beliefs 
which implies a smaller (downward) price adjustment in the after-market as more 
information becomes available. Thus, IPO firms whose financial statements are audited 
by reputable auditors are expected to exhibit better long-run performance relative to 
those IPOs with lower quality auditors.  
In line with these arguments and tentative evidence presented by Michaely and Shaw 
(1995) that the prestige of the auditor is related to long-run performance, the follwing is 
proposed: 
Hypothesis 13b: Being affiliated with a prestigious auditor is positively 
related to post-IPO market performance in the long-run 
Affiliations with venture capitalists: 
It has been argued earlier that in the IPO firm, corporate governance and 
professionalisation characteristics are determined endogenously, e.g. they depend on 
founders and VCs. Yet the finance literature developed the VC certification hypothesis 
proposing that there is a direct VC effect on performance (yet this research largely 
neglected governance and professionalisation parameters).  
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According to the VC certification hypothesis outlined earlier in more detail, the VC’s 
ability to reduce information asymmetry surrounding a firm’s IPO should result in a 
decrease in underpricing.  
 
Evidence on an association between VC-backing and initial returns is mixed, as already 
noted. While, for example Megginson and Weiss (1991) find VC-backing to be 
negatively related to underpricing, findings presented by various other authors suggest 
that no such relationship exists (e.g. Barry et al., 1990; Lin, 1996; Brau et al., 2004), 
and others have reported a positive relation between VC-backing and underpricing (e.g. 
Certo et al., 2001b; Francis and Hasan, 2001; Lee and Wahal, 2004). 
The mixed results might be explained by findings that underpricing is not constant over 
time (Gompers and Lerner, 1997), and that one should control for the VCs incentives to 
reduce underpricing (Ljungqvist, 1999; Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001).  
Other US-based explanations can be found in the collaboration hypothesis (Hoberg and 
Seyhun, 2006) and the spinning hypothesis (Loughran and Ritter, 2004), respectively, 
that propose a teaming up of VCs and prestigious underwriters (in hot periods according 
to the latter hypothesis) with the consequence of deliberately underpricing IPOs while 
recouping VCs’ money left on the table by having favourable allocation of other hot 
IPOs by the focal underwriter. VCs can benefit the underwriter by being more loyal and 
accept lower IPO prices. The VCs’ reward for this behaviour is the provision of 
marketing support and aggressive analyst forecasts by the underwriter, enabling VCs to 
exit at more favourable prices in the future.  
 
While the author acknowledges the recent debate regarding VC certification, in line 
with the argumentations made throughout this paper that VCs provide value added in 
terms of monitoring and the provision of resources among others, the concept of VC 
certification may still hold. It is therefore proposed: 
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Hypothesis 14a: VC-backing is negatively related to underpricing 
 
While there is also mixed empirical evidence regarding the effects of VC-backing on 
the long-run performance of IPOs, the common perception seems to be, as Gompers and 
Lerner (2001: 64) point out, that “… the early participation of venture firms … helps 
innovators sustain their success long after their company issues an IPO“. 
This is consistent with the notion of VCs as monitors (agency theory) and as providers 
of critical financial but also non-financial resources (resource-dependence perspective) 
and with empirical evidence found in studies employing UK data examining both stock-
returns and operating performance (Belghitar, 2003; Coakley et al., 2007). Therefore the 
following hypothesis is stated: 
Hypothesis 14b: VC-backing is positively related to post-IPO market 
performance in the long-run 
 
Non-linearity: 
Due to mixed findings in previous research, some authors suppose that a non-linear 
relationship might exist between performance and VC ownership (Daily et al., 2003). 
There might exist a possible trade-off between incentives and rent-seeking effects 
linked with VC ownership. The literature has established several possible governance 
roles for large blockholding shareholders. While some of those are likely to enhance 
value, others are likely to have detrimental effects. The literature on optimal ownership 
structures dependent on the levels of private benefits of control (Grossman and Hart, 
1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988) suggests that large blockholders may abuse their power 
in trying to extort a control premium at the expense of other shareholders. Yet, if the 
argument by Jensen and Meckling (1976) regarding the incentive effect of concentrated 
entrepreneurial ownership on the consumption of perquisites could be carried forward to 
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large blockholders, it may be suggested that the greater the level of cash flow rights held 
by large blockholding shareholders, the greater their incentives not to behave 
opportunistically should be (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). Conversely, it may be 
argued that at low levels of ownership, VCs may be prone to behave opportunistically, 
may float their portfolio firms prematurely and/or at considerable discounts and hence 
underprice the issue. 
Yet, since empirical evidence is scant, the exact nature of the relationship cannot be 
predicted ex ante. Due to the argument outlined above the author proposes a non-
monotonic relationship between VC ownership and market performance in the long-run. 
Hypothesis 14c: There is a non-linear relationship between VCs’ retained 
ownership and post-IPO market performance in the long-run 
 
3.3 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the author developed hypotheses on the role of VCs and founders 
regarding the board of directors’ monitoring and resource provision function. For the 
former function, based on the literature the author proposes that insiders’ (founders’) 
power is linked to board independence and that power of independent directors is linked 
to board independence, respectively, as is VC power (yet in the opposite direction). 
Including entrenchment-related arguments the author suggests non-linear relationships 
between insider directors’ power and board independence respectively the power of 
independent directors. 
As to resource provision, the author proposes VC-backing to be positively related to the 
(board`s) resource provision function. While the author contends that VC-backing and 
VC syndication are hypothesised to be negatively related to the likelihood of the firm 
being led by a founder-CEO at IPO, founder power is expected to be positively related 
to this likelihood. Also, the author contends that directors holding professional 
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accounting qualifications have the ability to provide (superior) monitoring services and 
thus VC-backing is expected to be positively related to the proportion of (non-
executive) directors holding professional accounting qualifications at IPO. It is also 
proposed that VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of a firm being led by a 
CEO (respectively a founder-CEO) with prior experience in this role. In this vein, the 
author also hypothesises that VC-backing is positively linked with director prestige as 
well as being endorsed by prestigious auditors. 
 
In the second part of this chapter, hypotheses with respect to the board roles and IPO 
performance were formulated. Hypotheses are largely derived from signalling theory 
(certification) as well as the proposition that underpricing of IPO firms increases in the 
ex ante uncertainty surrounding a firm’s evaluation, and the divergence of interest 
hypothesis with respect to long-run market performance. 
It is hypothesised that mechanisms of corporate governance (e.g. board independence, 
retained ownership) are able to reduce uncertainties surrounding the IPO firm and will 
thus exhibit an inverse relationship with underpricing. Similarly, human/social capital 
and (role) legitimacy/prestige are proposed to be able to reduce uncertainties 
surrounding the IPO firm, thus they are also hypothesised to be negatively related to 
underpricing. Accordingly, with respect to long-run market performance, the author 
hypothesises positive relationships. Moreover, since VC ownership may have incentive 
alignment and entrenchment effects depending on the level of that holding, a non-linear 
relationship between VC ownership and IPO long-run market performance is 
hypothesised.  
 
Table 1 shows a list of the research hypotheses formulated and after having reviewed 




Table 1: List of research hypotheses 
H1a Founder directors' power is negatively related to board independence 
H1b VC’s power is positively related to board independence 
H1c There is a non-linear relation between founder directors’ power and board independence 
H2a Founder directors' power is negatively related to the average tenure of independent directors 
H2b VC-backing is positively related to the average tenure of independent directors 
H2c There is a non-linear relation between founder directors' power and the average tenure of 
independent directors 
H3a Founder power is positively related to the likelihood of a firm being led by a founder-CEO 
H3b VC-backing is negatively related to the likelihood of a firm being led by a founder-CEO 
H3c VC syndication is negatively related to the likelihood of a firm being led by a founder-CEO 
H4 VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of outside directors holding professional 
accounting qualifications 
H5a VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of the IPO firm having a CEO with 
experience of leading a company before 
H5b VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of the IPO firm having a founder-CEO with 
experience of leading a company before 
H6a VC-backing is positively related to director prestige  
H6b VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of the IPO firm being affiliated with a 
prestigious auditor 
H7a Board independence is negatively related to underpricing 
H7b Board independence is positively related to post-IPO market performance in the long-run 
H8a Founder directors' retained ownership is negatively related to underpricing 
H8b Founder directors' retained ownership is positively related to post-IPO market performance in 
the long-run 
H9a Founder-CEO status is positively related to underpricing 
H9b Founder-CEO status is negatively related to post-IPO market performance in the long-run 
H10a The proportion of independent directors holding professional accounting qualifications is 
negatively related to underpricing 
H10b The proportion of independent directors holding professional accounting qualifications is 
positively related to post-IPO market performance in the long-run 
H11a CEO role legitimacy is negatively related to underpricing 
H11b CEO role legitimacy is positively related to post-IPO market performance in the long-run 
H12a Director prestige is negatively related to underpricing 
H12b Director prestige is positively related to post-IPO market performance in the long-run 
H13a Being affiliated with a prestigious auditor is negatively related to underpricing 
H13b Being affiliated with a prestigious auditor is positively related to post-IPO market performance 
in the long-run 
H14a VC-backing is negatively related to underpricing  
H14b VC-backing is positively related to post-IPO market performance in the long-run 
H14c There is a non-linear relationship between VCs’ retained ownership and post-IPO market 





This chapter discusses philosophical and methodological considerations relating to this 
research, deals with issues relating to data, presents the data collection and sampling 
procedure, and the variables employed. This is followed by a discussion of strengths 
and limitations of the data and an outline of econometrical methods used. 
 
4.1 Philosophical and methodological considerations 
The research process is characterised by several choices the researcher has to make as to 
what the appropriate research methodology is for the study in question. These decisions 
are not based on the researcher’s preference but on the nature of the inquiry itself and 
the research questions posed at the start. There may be a number of appropriate research 
paths at the same time (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002), but the methodological design 
should be limited to the research questions chosen (Robson, 2002). 
Research is based on a series of assumptions with respect to ontology, epistemology, 
and human nature, which have methodological consequences. Therefore, when 
addressing the research questions it is important to give some regard to what kind of 
knowledge can be attained.  
 
In this chapter, the author outlines the key research alternatives available to researchers 
and the discussion surrounding these options. The particular research strategy chosen 
for this research will then be presented along with a rationale for the choices made. 
 
Philosophies in social sciences: 
In many social sciences discussions about meta-theory have become a main feature of 
academic enquiry. These discussions centre around fundamental questions regarding 
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ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology, which taken together 
distinguish paradigms due to their different philosophical orientations outlined in the 
following. 
• Ontological assumptions: concerned with the nature of being (ontology is 
derived from the Greek ontos meaning being), focus on the nature of reality and 
how the reality is constructed and represented in human consciousness 
• Epistemological assumptions: concerned with the nature of knowledge 
(epistemology is derived from the Greek episteme meaning knowledge), focus 
on what constitutes knowledge and how it might be constructed and 
appropriately communicated 
• Assumptions about human nature: concerned with assumptions about human 
activity and behaviour underlying theory, focus typically on the debate between 
free-will and determinism, hence the extent to which human beings are able to 
act on their environment or whether circumstances beyond their control 
determine behaviour 
• Methodological assumptions: concerned with how the inquirer can go about 
finding out whatever he or she believes can be known. This is however 
constrained by assumptions previously made with respect to epistemology and 
ontology, which means that not just any methodology is suitable 
 
While different authors focus on different paradigms, and since this thesis does not aim 
at reviewing all the different approaches to research, the author will outline the two 
basic paradigms of social sciences research widely used in organisational research, 






One of the paradigms identified by Burrell and Morgan (1979) in their seminal work is 
functionalism, which is also commonly referred to as positivism (or post-positivism). 
While there are some variations on positivism such as Comtean positivism (Auguste 
Comte coined the term positivism), logical positivism, logical empiricism and 
organisational positivism, commonly positivism’s aim is to predict and control in 
pursuit of the ‘truth’. Positivism’s ontology focuses on realism which assumes reality is 
out there, driven by natural laws. Positivism has an objectivist epistemology, where the 
researcher adopts a distant, non-interactive position. Positivism is characterised by a 
nomothetic methodology, and hence focuses on quantitative methods (Guba, 1990). The 
functionalist paradigm therefore assumes that society has a concrete existence, 
following a certain order. Making these assumptions, in the functionalist’s view there 
exists an objective and value-free social science which can generate true explanatory 
and predictive power of the reality out there. Independence is attributed to the observer 
from the observed (meaning the ability to observe ‘what is’ without affecting it).  
 
Interpretivism: 
The interpretive paradigm stays in contrast to functionalism/positivism (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). The former is a useful umbrella term for non-positivisitic philosophies, 
like phenomenology, ethnomethodology, postmodernism, natural enquiry and 
hermeneutics (e.g. Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Rosenberg, 1995).  
Interpretivism is characterised by a subjectivist approach to social science, which is 
ontologically nominalist and epistemologically relativist. Human beings are regarded to 
be entirely free-willed and autonomous (voluntarism). Its methodology is ideographic, 
derived from the idea that one can understand the world only by getting first-hand 
knowledge of the subject under investigation. The interpretive paradigm aims at 
understanding the world as it is, at understanding the fundamental nature of the social 
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world at the level of subjective experience. It views the social world as a process that is 
created by individuals. In so far as it exists outside the consciousness of any individual, 
social reality is considered as being a network of assumptions and inter-subjectively 
shared meanings, which lead to the belief that there are shared multiple realities which 
are sustained and changed. Views that attribute a reality to the social world which is 
independent of people’s minds, are rejected. Scientists do regard a role for themselves, 
as participants as opposed to observers, within the phenomenon which they investigate. 
Interpretive researchers aim at finding the orders which prevail within the phenomenon 
studied, yet they are not objective (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
 











Critique of the two paradigms: 
There is an ongoing debate over philosophical positions. This thesis does not aim at 
engaging in this debate, rather the author briefly outlines key criticism of both of the 
paradigms mentioned. 
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Positivism has its roots in natural sciences with its basic principles having been 
transferred into the social sciences (e.g. Burrell and Morgan, 1979). However, various 
authors have raised concerns regarding the application of positivism outside of the 
natural sciences. Arguably, the main concern is due to the employment of methods from 
the natural sciences, focusing on establishing general laws, since these methods may not 
necessarily be applicable to the social sciences (e.g. Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The 
interpretive critcism has centred on positivism’s inadequate view of the nature of social 
reality. Positivsm cannot account for the way in which social reality is constructed, or 
how people interpret their own and others’ actions. As a first and vital step in any social 
investigation, interpretivism requires that the everyday reality must be discovered and 
described. From an interpretivist view, positivists mistakenly neglect social actors’ 
subjective point of view of the social reality, and wrongly impose their own point of 
view on the objective reality.  
Concerns regarding the positivist approach in finance research stem from one of three 
categories (Bettner et al., 1994). Stringency in the underlying assumptions caused by 
high levels of prior theorisation has an adverse effect on the ability of the approach to 
achieve deep understandings of complex social realities. Highly defined methodologies 
have, according to critics, led to an emphasis on measurement for the sake of 
measurement. Due to the exhaustive use of research methods based on the analysis of 
quantitative data, they have reached a point of diminishing returns. 
Although it has been suggested that positivism has unravelled (Rosenberg, 1995), is on 
trembling grounds (Johnson and Duberley, 2000), and even is untenable (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000), positivism is still considered as ‘conventional’ (Guba, 1990). A 
defending position of positivism/functionalism and an account of its advantages can be 
found, for example in Donaldson (1997).  
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The literature on philosophy of science also holds accounts of critique of interpretivism 
(e.g. Collin, 1985; Asquith et al., 1998). This approach is concerned to discover the 
nature of social life which necessitates a process of gaining direct pre-theoretical access 
to the unique meanings used by people in particular situations. Its aim is mistaken and 
impossible to achieve. Central concepts of this approach are misleading since they 
imply that competent social actors are aware of both their intentions and the reasons for 
their actions. However, actions often proceed without reflective monitoring. 
Interpretivism fails to acknowledge the role of institutional structures, especially 
relations of power and divisions of interest. Furthermore, a different and competing 
account of actions committed by social actors comes from the actors’ own accounts. 
Since social actors are unable to discuss all the effects of their practices and relations 
and are fallible, they are prone to criticism by social scientists. Also, idealism is unable 
to deal with conditions which give rise to meanings, interpretations, rules and beliefs, 
and actions. Not only the meanings of particular types of actions have to be investigated 
but those causal factors which give rise to and support the continuing existence of these 
meanings and rules. 
 
Rationale for conducting research according to the functionalism/positivism paradigm: 
The functionalism/positivism paradigm has been found to be the mainstream approach 
when conducting research in all of the three key disciplines on which this thesis is 
based: finance (Ardalan, 2003), (strategic) management (Seth and Zinkhan, 1991; 
Durand and Vaara, 2006), and entrepreneurship (Grant and Perren, 2002). These 
disciplines have in general been concerned mainly with theory testing, hence having a 
deductive approach relying on quantitative methodologies.  
However, researchers should not blindly follow mainstream tradition, but choose a 
research approach which is appropriate to the research objectives (Robson, 2002). Thus 
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the concern is that the research the author undertakes should be both relevant to the 
research questions and rigorous in its operationalisation. 
While positivist approaches can be characterised by both a high level of prior 
theorisation as well as highly defined methods, interpretive approaches can be 
characterised by both low levels of prior theorisation and less well defined methods 
(Laughlin, 1995).  
Since in the area of this thesis the level of prior theorisation is high and methods are 
also highly defined, this research will be undertaken from within the 
functionalist/positivist paradigm. The main research objective is to examine which role 
VCs and founders play with respect to corporate governance, professionalisation and 
performance of IPO firms. The research objectives can be accomplished by basing the 
research on existing theories from which hypotheses can be derived which are then 
tested. A quantitative approach enables comparative studies and since quantification is 
possible in this case, a positivist, quantitative approach is appropriate. 
Due to the nature of the research, the choice to follow a well-established approach from 
the appropriate literature is straightforward. Evidence for the omnipresence of this 
approach in the author’s research area can be found, for example, in renowned 
international journals which publish papers on corporate governance, venture capital 
and founder management, e.g. Strategic Management Journal, Academy of 
Management Journal, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics or Journal 
of Business Venturing.  
 
After having discussed philosophical and methodological issues and contrasted two key 
resulting paradigms, the author now turns to outlining the data collection procedure and 




In this section, the author discusses data types, data sources amd the data collection 
procedure and sampling. The basic alternative approaches available are outlined and 
reasons for the choices and assumptions made are provided while describing the 
procedure adopted in this thesis. 
 
4.2.1 Data types 
Basically, one can distinguish between two types of data: primary data and secondary 
data. 
Primary data are employed relatively frequently to examine the investor-investee 
relationship. Examples of influential research using primary data in this context are the 
seminal study on ‘what venture capitalists do’ by Gorman and Sahlman (1989) and the 
important paper on ‘value-added’ by venture capitalists by Sapienza (1992). 
On the other hand, the overwhelmingly used type of data in this research area is that of 
secondary data, which is usually collected from available data sources such as annual 
reports or, more importantly, IPO prospectuses.  
Using secondary data entails a number of advantages. If secondary data are reliable, 
they provide the opportunity of replication. Furthermore, they can be used for 
longitudinal and/or comparative research designs. Moreover, secondary data are, 
compared to primary data, inexpensive to obtain (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 
1996). Importantly, in contrast to the collection of primary data, there are fewer (and 
less severe) ethical issues involved when using secondary data. 
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4.2.2 Data sources 
The primary source of information this research uses companies’ IPO prospectuses. 
They have to be disclosed by the applicant who wishes to be listed in order to fulfil the 
requirements of the United Kingdom Listing Authority (UKLA), a division of the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), and AIM rules. These documents have to contain 
special information, e.g. about the company and its board members including details of 
the latter’s career histories and ownership (London Stock Exchange, 2002). 
Additionally, the author uses the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database 
which provides information on private and public firms in the UK and Ireland to cross-
check directors’ names and dates of service.  
Company prospectuses were usually obtained from ‘Thomson Research’. In cases 
where documents were not available from the aforementioned database, the company 
was contacted directly to have a copy of the prospectus sent, which is consistent with 
other research (e.g. Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002).  
Share prices as a performance indicator can be obtained from various sources. A reliable 
source for this kind of data and often used in similar research is ‘Datastream’ (e.g. 
Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Jelic et al., 2005). 
For data sources used in conjunction with the identification of all entrepreneurial IPOs 
and the VC-backed ones among them, see section 5.2.4. 
 
In the following section, concerns about the availability, reliability and validity of data 
and documents required for this research will be addressed.  
 
4.2.3 Data availability, reliability and validity 
The primary concern regarding the use of secondary sources, and thus IPO 
prospectuses, is the fact that they were created for purposes other than for those of the 
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researcher, while in the data extraction phase, reliability of the coding effort is the main 
concern.  
Among others, an IPO prospectus also serves as a means of communication in order to 
promote the company’s shares to investors (Lester et al., 2006), which may raise 
concerns regarding content validity. However, the use of company IPO prospectuses is 
appropriate for the author’s study because the FSA established guidelines for the 
preparation of a firm’s prospectus. Generally, each prospectus describes the firm, its 
business plan, financial data, management structure, directors’ details, products, risks, 
and provides detailed data on a number of further issues (London Stock Exchange, 
2002). Although, as already pointed out, potential for positive bias may exist in the 
prospectus, under the Financial Services Act 2000 directors and proposed directors may 
be personally responsible for information contained in listing particulars or 
supplementary listing particulars. Therefore, the issue of content validity of the IPO 
prospectus might be regarded as minimal under normal circumstances. The scrutiny of 
the official requirements also ensures reliability of the content data provided in the 
prospectus due to strict reporting requirements and sanctions for manipulation. Based 
on these requirements, all the prospectus documents contain the same level of detail 
regarding the firms’ management and operations, making various assessments 
consistent across all IPO firms (Wilbon, 1999). 
 
4.2.4 Data collection and sampling 
 
Data collection procedure: 
In the introductory chapter the author has already outlined that the focus will be on the 
IPO context and hence on IPO stage companies. In order to construct a sample of 
entrepreneurial IPOs, a multi-stage data collection procedure has been used. Initially a 
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list of all IPOs floated on the LSE and AIM from 1st January 1995 to 31st December 
2001 was compiled. The time frame was chosen to contain IPOs floated on AIM are 
also included (AIM started on 19th June 1995) and to contain both normal and hot IPO 
periods and since the sample period starts in 1995,. While some studies on long-run 
performance of IPOs used one-year, two-year and five-year post-IPO performance, 
three-year post-IPO performance seems to have been the preferred choice by 
researchers to date, thus for increased comparability the author chooses three-year post-
IPO returns. 
To do so, the author used the ‘All listed companies’ file from the LSE’s webpage as a 
basis. However, this list does not contain the names of companies which were once 
listed on the LSE but were delisted for various reasons. In order to capture those IPOs, 
as well, other lists as well were provided by the LSE upon enquiry. However, 
comprehensive lists only exist from the end of 1998 onwards. Therefore the author 
followed the lead of other UK researchers and used the KPMG New Issue Statistics 
(Espenlaub et al., 2001) and the Investors Chronicle (Barnes and McCarthy, 2002). The 
latter also comprised IPOs floated on AIM. For additional corroboration, the author 
used the relevant issues of the Stock Exchange Quarterly, the Stock Exchange Fact 
Book and the MacMillan Stock Exchange Yearbooks, as well as AIM market statistics 
publications.  
From this corroborated list, in line with previous research (e.g. Espenlaub et al., 2001; 
Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002), the author excluded rights issues, introductions, re-
admissions and transfers from one stock exchange or segment to another. Also 
consistent with previous research on IPOs, the author further excluded flotations of unit 
and investment trusts (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Beatty and Zajac, 1994). Then, de-
mergers and reverse take-overs were excluded. Flotations representing investment and 
acquisition vehicles were also excluded, since their governance systems are extremely 
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simplified and their management teams resemble investment committees of private 
equity firms. 
Since the author defines ‘entrepreneurial IPO’ as an IPO in which at least one of the 
original founders is a member of the board at IPO, the remaining companies were 
checked whether a (co-)founder still holds a board position at IPO. Typically, from the 
directors’ section respectively from the company background section of each IPO 
prospectus company founders can be identified. MBO/MBI firms in cases where the 
lead manager(s) was/were represented on the board of directors at the time of IPO are 
regarded as ‘entrepreneurial’ (see Wright et al., 1997 for a justification). Similarly, the 
author views corporate spin-offs as entrepreneurial in cases where an original (co-
)founder of the parent organisations also (co-)founded the spin-off company. Through 
this procedure, 569 entrepreneurial IPOs (including MBOs/MBIs and spin-offs with a 
founder or MBO/MBI leader holding a board position), as the author defined it, could 
be identified.  
In order to detect VC-backed IPOs in the preliminary sample, the author initially used a 
list of UK venture-backed flotations published by the BVCA. This list, however, ends in 
September 2000, does not include VC-backed IPOs floated on AIM, and only identifies 
issues as VC-backed if the VC is a member of the BVCA (i.e. larger UK-based VCs or 
international VCs with a major office in the UK). While using the BVCA list as a 
starting point, the author also compared the corresponding issues of Pratt’s Guide to 
Venture Capital Sources, publications of foreign venture capital associations and 
Internet resources with entries found in company IPO prospectuses. 
Commonly, the section on company history and, more importantly, the section on 
directors’ and others’ interests (which lists institutional equity holdings of at least 3% in 
the IPO company) provide necessary information regarding VC-backing. Following this 
procedure, the author identified 211 entrepreneurial VC-backed IPOs on the Official 
List and AIM during the specified time span. 
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Table 2 shows the industry distribution of entrepreneurial VC-backed and matched non-
VC-backed IPOs (1995 to 2001) according to the two-digit SIC. 
Almost half of all entrepreneurial IPOs floated on the Official List respectively on AIM 
stem from three industries, namely software & computer services (SIC 97), media & 
photography (SIC 54) and support services (SIC 58). The table also indicates that a 
certain reservation by VCs exists with respect to investing in certain industries, while 
VCs are heavily involved in others, funding the majority of entrepreneurial IPOs in 
industries like IT hardware (SIC 93) and pharmaceuticals (SIC 48) and health (SIC 44). 
This is consistent with the assertion that VC investments are clustered by industry.  
 
Table 2: Industry classification (initial sample) 
All % % % VCb/
IPOs All nVCb SIC VCb SIC nVCb
4 mining 8 1.41% 7 87.50% 1 12.50% 14.29%
7 oil & gas 11 1.93% 9 81.82% 2 18.18% 22.22%
11 chemicals 8 1.41% 3 37.50% 5 62.50% 166.67%
13 construction & building materials 12 2.11% 6 50.00% 6 50.00% 100.00%
21 aerospace & defence 1 0.18% 0 0.00% 1 100.00% -
25 electronic & electric equipment 15 2.64% 8 53.33% 7 46.67% 87.50%
26 engineering & machinery 7 1.23% 5 71.43% 2 28.57% 40.00%
31 automobiles 1 0.18% 0 0.00% 1 100.00% -
34 housing goods & textiles 14 2.46% 12 85.71% 2 14.29% 16.67%
41 beverages 1 0.18% 1 100.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
43 food producers & processors 3 0.53% 1 33.33% 2 66.67% 200.00%
44 health 13 2.28% 6 46.15% 7 53.85% 116.67%
46 packaging 1 0.18% 1 100.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
47 personal care & household products 2 0.35% 1 50.00% 1 50.00% 100.00%
48 pharmaceuticals 24 4.22% 10 41.67% 14 58.33% 140.00%
51 distributors 11 1.93% 7 63.64% 4 36.36% 57.14%
52 general retailers 34 5.98% 17 50.00% 17 50.00% 100.00%
53 leisure, entertainment & hotels 30 5.27% 18 60.00% 12 40.00% 66.67%
54 media & photography 71 12.48% 49 69.01% 22 30.99% 44.90%
56 restaurants, pubs & brewery 18 3.16% 9 50.00% 9 50.00% 100.00%
58 support services 70 12.30% 43 61.43% 27 38.57% 62.79%
59 transport 12 2.11% 7 58.33% 5 41.67% 71.43%
63 food & drug retailers 7 1.23% 5 71.43% 2 28.57% 40.00%
67 telecommunication services 17 2.99% 13 76.47% 4 23.53% 30.77%
72 electricity 1 0.18% 1 100.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
83 insurance 2 0.35% 2 100.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
86 real estate 16 2.81% 15 93.75% 1 6.25% 6.67%
87 specialty & other finance 36 6.33% 31 86.11% 5 13.89% 16.13%
93 information technology hardware 11 1.93% 3 27.27% 8 72.73% 266.67%
97 software & computer services 112 19.68% 68 60.71% 44 39.29% 64.71%





Before the author proceeds with the description of the data collection, a discussion 
regarding sampling is needed. 
The research focus is on corporate governance, professionalisation and performance of 
entrepreneurial IPOs. In an ideal world, the author would want to detect governance and 
professionalisation characteristics and performance of entrepreneurial VC-backed IPOs 
and these characteristics of the same entrepreneurial IPOs had they not received support 
by VC(s). Yet since the data are of a non-experimental nature, one actually observes 
characteristics of VC-backed IPOs and those of non-VC-backed IPOs. Assuming the 
provision of VC funding was random, one could merely calculate differences in the 
characteristics of interest between VC-backed firms and those which are not backed by 
the latter (Lee and Wahal, 2004). 
Early approaches employed OLS regressions with a dummy variable for VC-backing 
(using all IPOs within a specified time span or other criteria such as minimum offer 
size). Yet, since it is possible that sample differences overwhelm the analysis 
(Westhead, 1995), scholars have more recently increasingly employed matching 
techniques which weakened concerns about comparability (matched pairs were 
employed in a VC/IPO context by, for example Megginson and Weiss (1991), Jain and 
Kini (1995), Wang et al. (2003), and Arthurs and Busenitz (2006). Sample firms can be 
either matched by single control firms (one-to-one matching) or to portfolios). The 
matched-pairs are assumed to be identical on the basis of some essential variables, but 
differ in one other variable. For example, VC activity tends to be clustered in certain 
industries. If the author were to include all non-VC-backed IPOs next to VC-backed 
ones in the sample, there would probably be considerable differences between the two 
groups regarding industry. Consequently, a model attempting to distinguish between 
VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs may actually be differentiating between different 
industries.  
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The key advantages of matched-pair analysis are that with the matching criteria it 
provides controls for identified sources of potential bias and typically the standard 
deviation of the test statistics is smaller, hence making it more probable to detect a false 
null hypothesis (Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1988; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2004). For 
detecting long-run abnormal performance Barber and Lyon (1997) show that matching 
on a one-to-one basis (to one control firm in comparison to a portfolio of firms) is the 
most appropriate benchmark concept. 
Matching pairs, however, can be problematic. It is likely that some characteristics are 
under- or over-represented in the matched samples and this may lead to sample-specific 
predictions.  
 
Endogeneity of venture funding: 
However, as mentioned above, ideally the author would want to quantify differences 
between firm variables after VC funding and the hypothetical state if they had not been 
funded. This latter state (‘counterfactual’) is hypothetical, hence not observable and thus 
has to be estimated (Heckman et al., 1999). There are two factors regarding VC-backing 
which lead to a selection bias. There is a tough pre-investment screening procedure 
firms have to pass through in order to receive venture funding, thus VC-backed firms 
may have been selected on the basis of superior potential. A self-selection into venture-
funding may also be expected, meaning that firms may not expose themselves to the 
VC’s screening process if they regard themselves as not to able to be successful. It is 
moreover indicated by contracts designed to mitigate information asymmetry and 
agency problems that venture financing represents an endogenous choice by VCs and 
entrepreneurs and is reflected in the non-random distribution and characteristics of VC-
backed IPOs (Lee and Wahal, 2004).  
By explicitly modelling the selection process, the selection bias can be corrected for. To 
correct for the endogenous choice, a regression-based approach can be employed. 
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Seminal work on selection bias and on dummy endogenous variables was conducted by 
Heckman (1979) in the late Seventies and has only quite recently been implemented by 
a few researchers focusing on VC-backed firms. Typically, a two-step estimation 
procedure is employed, initially running a probit regression with a VC-dummy as 
dependent variable as a first-step. The parameters from the probit regression are used to 
estimate the probability that a firm will receive venture funding. Then, a second stage 
model is run (OLS) adding the estimated probability (lambda) as a regressor (see Jelic 
et al., 2005 for an application of Heckman's two-step estimation procedure in the VC 
context).   
The key issue of this method, however, is to find non-random data which can be used to 
construct instruments with some power in predicting the receipt of venture funding (in 
the probit regression). Studies in the US employing this procedure use geographical 
location, firm industry and/or a dummy variable for firm founding prior to 1980 (in 
1979 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act was amended, allowing pension 
funds to invest as limited partners in VC funds).  
The variables capturing changes in regulation and geographical location are, however, 
country-specific and are not appropriate in the UK, where geographical locations do not 
preponderate, VCs usually having offices in a number of major cities, and other 
regulations apply. A recent UK paper employing the Heckman procedure on a sample of 
VC-backed MBO flotations uses MBO value and the time from MBO to flotation (Jelic 
et al., 2005), variables available for MBOs (from a database operated by the Centre for 
Management Buy-Out Research) but not for other IPOs in the UK. Thus appropriate 
variables in a general VC context are lacking in the UK. 
 
As outlined earlier, matching sample firms to control firms has advantages, yet 
Heckman’s two-step estimation procedure cannot be applied in a matched-pairs 
framework.  
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The propensity score method (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, 2002), which is based on 
Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) propensity score theorem, can be used as a way to 
implement matching while the selection bias is eliminated. Heckman’s work on the 
selection model and the dummy endogenous variable problem can be regarded as a 
generalisation of the propensity-score method (Winship and Morgan, 1999). Although 
known to other disciplines in the social sciences for a number of years, the method has 
only very recently been employed in a VC/IPO context.  
Similar to Heckman’s two-step procedure, initially a probit model is estimated with the 
VC-dummy as a dependent variable. The predicted probability of receiving venture 
funding is then used as the propensity score which allows matching of each VC-backed 
IPO with the non-VC backed IPO of the highest propensity score (see Lee and Wahal 
(2004) for an application of the propensity score method in the VC context).  
Also similar to the Heckman procedure, the choice of instrumental variables employed 
in the probit model is critical in eliminating the selection bias. Lee and Wahal (2004: 
388) suggest that due to “… industry and geographic concentrations of VC-backed 
IPOs, SIC code and headquarter-state dummy variables are natural candidates.”  
The variables suggested as instruments are, naturally, the same variables as used in 
Heckman frameworks described previously. It has, however, been discussed already 
that instruments used in US studies to eliminate selection bias are country-specific and 
do not apply to the UK. The lack of appropriate instruments might be the reason why to 
the best of the author’s knowledge there is no published research using UK data in the 
VC-backed IPO context employing a Heckman framework or propensity score 
matching to correct for the selectivity bias, with the exception of Jelic et al. (2005) as 
mentioned earlier. The latter authors, however, employ a sample of VC-backed MBOs 
which go public. Yet the instruments these authors employed or similar instruments can 
either not be used for other types of IPOs or access to such data is constrained. 
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The author acknowledges that the methods of eliminating selection bias are theoretically 
appealing. Yet, due to the lack of appropriate instruments (in the UK) respectively data 
restrictions and since the power to eliminate selection bias depends on adequate 
instruments, the author decided to use the standard matching procedure which was 
employed in related research when scholars focused on various measures of 
performance ranging from underpricing (e.g. Megginson and Weiss, 1991), long-term 
performance (Jain and Kini, 1995) to firm survival (Manigart et al., 2002), but also 
when the focus was on firm resources (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006) as well as corporate 
governance (Daines and Klausner, 2004).  
 
Matching criteria: 
The choice of matching criteria draws on related empirical work which is typically 
matched by industry and size (e.g. Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini, 1995; 
Daines and Klausner, 2004). Since VC activity and the level of returns tend to be 
clustered by industry (Ritter, 1984), and a relationship between firm size and 
performance is pointed out by various researchers in the relevant literature (e.g. Aldrich, 
1979; Mikkelson et al., 1997), matching is usually based on indicators of firm size and 
industry.  
Megginson and Weiss (1991) match as closely as possible by offering amounts in three-
digit SIC code, and Jain and Kini (1995) follow the latter authors’ lead. In UK studies, a 
two-digit SIC code is typically employed, which the author will also use as the first 
criterion of the matching procedure. Thus, VC-backed and non-VC backed IPOs within 
the same two-digit SIC are identified. Table 2 reveals that VCs do indeed seem to 
neglect investing in certain industries while being heavily engaged in others.  
Analysing different matching criteria regarding detection of abnormal operating 
performance, Barber and Lyon (1996) advocate the matching of firms based on size and 
pre-event performance. In a related paper focusing on the detection of long-run 
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abnormal stock returns, the same authors suggest a matching procedure based on similar 
size and book-to-market ratios (Barber and Lyon, 1997). Yet it would only be adequate 
to match on pre-event performance if the objective would be to determine whether there 
is a change in performance of firms following the IPO and whether this change is 
different for VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. It was argued throughout this 
thesis that VC-backed IPOs differ in terms of governance and professionalisation (and 
thus firm quality) which in turn may engender different performance up to the IPO, at 
IPO, and beyond. Employing the matching firm approach based on matching criteria 
suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996; Barber and Lyon, 1997) would thus be 
inappropriate in this setting (see Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) for a similar 
explanation). 
IPOs funded by VCs are matched as closely as possible with regard to size to non-VC 
backed IPOs within the same SIC code. In contrast to Megginson and Weiss (1991) and 
Jain and Kini (1995), the author does not match by size of the offering. The size of the 
offering amount is a choice made by the IPO firm (probably also influenced by the VC 
backing the venture) and the underwriter, based on a variety of factors, typically driven 
by the net proceeds which a company plans to receive from the IPO. Since the author is 
focused on performance rather than issues surrounding the IPO itself, in line with 
Brown (2004) the author opts for a rather ‘hard’ measure of firm size as matching 
criterion rather than a choice-based one such as the offer size of the IPO. Another 
commonly employed proxy for firm size, market capitalisation is discarded. The 
objective is to determine whether IPOs backed by VCs are of different quality and thus 
perform differently at IPO and in the long-run. Since firm quality is assumed to be 
reflected in the evaluation by the underwriter and thus in the offer price respectively the 
market capitalisation (respectively in the book-to-market ratio as suggested by Barber 
and Lyon (1997) and also partly in the size of the offering as mentioned above), the 
author would likely neutralise the potential difference in firm quality between the two 
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types of IPOs as perceived at the IPO which is counter to this thesis’ objective and 
therefore inappropriate in this setting.  
The author believes that proxies for size which are not based on market 
evaluation/perception of firm quality are more appropriate in this case. Such proxies for 
size include pre-IPO sales (e.g. Jain and Kini, 1999; Ward and Bishop, 1999), assets 
(e.g. Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) or number of employees 
(e.g. Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990; Welbourne and Andrews, 1996). Since a 
considerable number of IPO companies having neither proper sales nor assets 
respectively reorganised their structure just before IPO (partly due to M&A activity), 
the author opts for matching by the number of employees as documented in the 
prospectus9. 
 
Thus, data were collected on all entrepreneurial IPOs regarding industry and number of 
employees in order to be able to match pairs. Matching by number of employees within 
the same two-digit SIC code for the two-digit SIC list provided by the LSE, the author 
could obtain 195 matched pairs (in line with related research the author matched 
without replacement). For a number of VC-backed IPOs no ‘partner’ was available 
since especially in industries such as health, pharmaceuticals and IT hardware, more 
entrepreneurial VC-backed firms were floated than non-VC-backed ones, thus justifying 
the industry matching criterion. Yet in several cases, more than one matching partner 
was available within the same industry with the same number of employees. In these 
cases, the author additionally matched pairs as closely as possible on the basis of 
founding year. 
                                                 
9
 While the number of employees may also reflect firm quality and VC involvement and may therefore be 
incorporated in underwriters’ evaluation of firm quality and hence market capitalisation, none of the other 
possible measures of firm size would be free from this criticism (and in no paper was this matching issue 
solved). Yet the author deems the chosen measure of firm size more appropriate than market 
capitalisation which directly reflects firm quality at IPO. 
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Since it is argued that IPO performance is influenced by market timing (Chalk and 
Peavy, 1987), several researchers have recently additionally matched by IPO year or a 
certain timeframe surrounding the VC-backed IPO (Lee and Wahal, 2004; Arthurs and 
Busenitz, 2006). This approach seems to be advantageous, especially when samples 
comprising a large time span are employed. Following this idea, the author initially also 
matched on the basis of the VC-backed IPO date +/- 6 months. Employing the IPO 
timing criterion in addition to the ones mentioned above yielded 127 matched-pairs, 
since not enough partners were available in the same industry with similar IPO date (let 
alone size). The consequence of including the timing criterion is that sample size is 
reduced considerably.  
A choice had to be made on sacrificing quality of the match for sample size or vice 
versa. It was decided to carry on with the larger sample, only matching on size and 
industry (and year of incorporation if appropriate), because otherwise 1) the IPO date 
criterion reduced sample size considerably, 2) lower ranking criteria (size, age) are 
largely neglected from the matching procedure due to limited availability of matching 
partners, and 3) although periods in which IPO returns are measured differ due to 
different IPO dates, the adjustment by market return should control for a timing effect 
when measuring performance. It is thus doubtful whether the overall quality of the 
match would be increased when also considering IPO date, since then in effect the 
author largely would have matching only by industry and IPO date, mainly neglecting 
the size criterion due to a lack of potential matching partners. Other research employing 
a matched-pairs methodology also chose the larger sample size (Chemmanur and 
Paeglis, 2005).  
Hence, the author finally used three criteria for matching in the following order: 1) 
industry (two-digit SIC), 2) size (number of employees), and where appropriate, 3) year 
of founding, and obtained a final sample of 195 matched-pairs.  
 173
For the final sample of 390 IPOs the author collected data on the variables of interest 
which will be described in the next section. 
 
The industry distribution of all the matched pairs of entrepreneurial VC-backed and 
non-VC-backed IPOs in the final sample is shown in Table 3. 
Since entrepreneurial IPOs are matched by industry and firm size, the number of VC-
backed and non-VC-backed IPOs is the same per industry and hence column 3 lists the 
number of matched pairs per SIC. Column 4 lists the percentage of non-VC-backed 
IPOs in the matched sample based on all non-VC backed flotations of that industry. The 
same applies for column 5 with regard to the VC-backed IPOs. Finally, the last column 
shows the fraction of pairs of that industry relative to the number of pairs across all 
industries. In a few industries, no matched pairs could be built due to lack of potential 
matching IPOs. Even after matching, it is apparent that almost half of the IPOs in the 




Table 3: Industry classification (final sample) 
matched % of all % of all pairs/
SIC industry pairs nVCb VCb all pairs
4 mining 1 14.29% 100.00% 0.51%
7 oil & gas 2 22.22% 100.00% 1.03%
11 chemicals 3 100.00% 60.00% 1.54%
13 construction & building materials 6 100.00% 100.00% 3.08%
21 aerospace & defence 0 - - -
25 electronic & electric equipment 7 87.50% 100.00% 3.59%
26 engineering & machinery 2 40.00% 100.00% 1.03%
31 automobiles 0 - - -
34 housing goods & textiles 2 16.67% 100.00% 1.03%
41 beverages 0 0.00% - 0.00%
43 food producers & processors 1 100.00% 50.00% 0.51%
44 health 5 83.33% 71.43% 2.56%
46 packaging 0 - - -
47 personal care & household products 1 100.00% 100.00% 0.51%
48 pharmaceuticals 10 100.00% 71.43% 5.13%
51 distributors 4 57.14% 100.00% 2.05%
52 general retailers 17 100.00% 100.00% 8.72%
53 leisure, entertainment & hotels 12 66.67% 100.00% 6.15%
54 media & photography 22 45.83% 100.00% 11.28%
56 restaurants, pubs & brewery 9 100.00% 100.00% 4.62%
58 support services 27 62.79% 100.00% 13.85%
59 transport 5 71.43% 100.00% 2.56%
63 food & drug retailers 2 40.00% 100.00% 1.03%
67 telecommunication services 4 30.77% 100.00% 2.05%
72 electricity 0 - - -
83 insurance 0 - - -
86 real estate 1 6.67% 100.00% 0.51%
87 specialty & other finance 5 16.13% 100.00% 2.56%
93 information technology hardware 3 100.00% 37.50% 1.54%
97 software & computer services 44 64.71% 100.00% 22.56%




In this section, the author is going to describe the variables used in this thesis, 
exemplifiying how the author measured or coded them. With the exception of 
performance measures and the market index used, obtained from Datastream, all other 




4.3.1 Study variables 
Before the author actually outlines this study’s variables, the author considers as 
appropriate a discussion about performance measurement and performance indicators. 
Related research from a corporate governance point of view addressing firm financial 
performance relied on market-based indicators, and accounting-based financial 
indicators, as well as a combination of both. The nature of a given financial 
performance indicator may be fundamental, as there is some disagreement regarding the 
extent to which any board or executive decisions might impact on accounting vs. 
market-based measures of financial performance. Reliance on financial accounting 
measures have been frequently criticised for reasons that such measures 1) are subject to 
manipulation, 2) may systematically undervalue assets, 3) create distortions due to the 
nature of depreciation policies elected, inventory valuation, and treatment of certain 
revenue and expenditure items, 4) differ in methods adopted for consolidation of 
accounts, and 5) lack standardisation in the handling of international accounting 
principles (Chakravarthy, 1986). Moreover, accounting measures of performance are 
susceptible to altering accounting methods (Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993) and financial 
accounting returns are difficult to interpret in the case of multi-industry participation by 
firms (Nayyar, 1992).  
Due to the various imprecisions involved in measuring and interpreting financial 
accounting indices, it is not surprising that it was suggested that such measures “… may 
be seen as more fully under management control” (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995: 
190), and thus more prone to manipulation (e.g. Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993; Degeorge 
et al., 1999). Since VCs are large equity blockholders which cannot immediately sell 
(all of) their equity, they are more interested in long-run market performance (Cyr et al., 
2000). 
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According to Ibbotson and Ritter (1995), market-based measures represent the most 
prevalent and relevant measures of firm performance in the IPO literature. Market-based 
returns have a number of advantages. They do reflect risk-adjusted performance and 
they are not adversely affected by multi-industry or multinational contexts (Nayyar, 
1992). Market-based performance indicators are often subject to forces beyond 
management’s control (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995).  
According to the reasoning mentioned above, the author applies market-based 
performance indicators in this research. 
 
Underpricing: 
Consistent with previous studies, the author considers underpricing as the difference 
between the price at the end of the first trading day and the offer price, relative to the 
offer price. In order to control for general market movements, the author accounts for 
changes in a market index (see also ‘Benchmark’ in this section) and adjusts the 
underpricing measure accordingly. As already mentioned, the price at the end of the 
first trading day, the offer price and the data on the benchmark are all obtained from 
‘Datastream’. 
Market-adjusted initial returns (also referred to as ‘underpricing’) are measured using 














IRAdj −−−=  
Adj.IRi is the market adjusted return of company i; Pi,1 is the closing price of company i  
at the end of the first trading day; Pi,0 is the offer price of company i (time index 0 refers 
to the last day of the subscription period); Ii,1 is the index (benchmark) at the end of the 
first trading day and Ii,0 is the index at the last day before company i’s first trading day. 




A market-based measure of long-run returns is employed in this thesis, following the 
discussion previously made. Yet scholars have debated not only with respect to 
employing accounting-based vs. market-based measures of long-run returns, but also 
within the latter about which exact measure to adopt. This debate is concentrated on two 
different measures: cumulative average returns (CARs) and buy-and-hold-returns 
(BHARs). 
Long-run performance is measured as the 12 months, 24 months and 36 months BHAR, 
also accounting for market movements by adjusting with an index (see below). While 
CARs also have been employed in long-run performance studies, following Barber and 
Lyon (1997), BHAR is chosen as the main measure because it is said to be superior to 
CAR, since the former approximates returns earned by an investor. These authors argue 
that “… researchers should calculate abnormal returns as the simple buy-and-hold 
return on a reference portfolio or control firm” (1997: 342), since biases are induced by 
summing daily or monthly abnormal returns (CARs).  
It should however be noted that BHARs also suffer from drawbacks. As with CARs, 
BHARs suffer from the new listing bias, since newly listed firms seem to underperform 
market averages (Ritter, 1991), which is assumed to lead to a positive bias. 
Additionally, BHARs are said to be positively skewed (see Barber and Lyon (1997) for 
a detailed discussion).  
Yet this thesis is concerned about the performance of VC-backed firms relative to their 
peers which did not receive VC funding, whereas the author assumes that if biases are 
present when comparing VC-backed IPOs with the market index, the same biases will 
also affect the comparison of the non-VC-backed IPOs with that same index. Therefore, 




The market adjusted abnormal returns are calculated for each event month t as 
tmtiti rrar ,,, −=  
where, in event months t, ri,t is the return of company i; rm,t is the return on the index, 
and ari,t is the abnormal return for company i. Months are defined as successive 21-
trading-day periods relative to the IPO date, thus the first trading months comprise the 
period from day 2 to 22, the second from day 23 to 42, etc. (e.g. Ritter, 1991; Jelic et al., 
2005) . 











BHARs are calculated as the difference of corresponding compounded daily companies’ 















where, in event month t, Ri,t is the abnormal return of company i, calculated on a 
compounded basis, ri,t is the return for company i, and rm,.t is the return of the index. 
Instead of traditional BHARs, log BHARs (LBHARs) are employed since the latter are 
expected to have better distributional properties and suffer less from the skewness 
problems linked with the traditional BHAR (Strong, 1992). LBHAR is computed as the 
difference between an IPO firm’s LBHAR (log(1+BHARi)) and the LBHAR of the 
benchmark (log(1+BHARm)) (see e.g. Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004).  
The variable is labelled ‘LBHAR12’ and indicates a performance period of 12 months 






Initial and long-run returns are adjusted by movements in a benchmark. As benchmark 
in this thesis, the author chose the FTSE Small Cap index. Alternatives to employing 
the FTSE Small Cap index are the FTSE All Share and the Hoare Govett Small 
Company indices. Yet, due to the entrepreneurial nature of this thesis’ IPO sample, the 
FTSE All Share index might not be appropriate. Since the sample also contains 
relatively large IPOs (i.e. some of the MBOs/MBIs) which is not typical of the Hoare 
Govett Small Company index (Jelic et al., 2005), the author thus employs the FTSE 




The VC-dummy variable (vc) is assigned the value ‘1’ if the IPO firm received venture 
funding. As outlined earlier, the company history and the directors’ and others’ interest 
sections in the prospectuses were checked. The names of pre-IPO investors found in the 
prospectus were then compared with the BVCA list, Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital 
Sources and Internet sources to determine whether the IPO was VC-backed or not. 
 
VC syndication: 
A number of studies argue that firms in which more than one VC invested are screened 
more thoroughly, and get more funding and more value added from their VCs. It has 
been outlined earlier that VC syndication may be an indicator for the riskiness of the 
venture which thus may require tighter monitoring. The VC syndication dummy 






The variable percentage of VC directors (pcvcdir) on the board accounts for the number 
of VC directors on portfolio firms’ boards relative to the total number or directors. 
Additionally, the number of VC directors with prestigious educational background 
(vcdpreste) is also employed.  
 
Founder-related variables: 
Several variables are created that can be regarded as proxies for founders’ power on the 
board of ‘their’ companies. A dummy variable is assigned the value ‘1’ if a founder 
holds the CEO position (foundceo). Similarly, a second dummy captures the presence of 
a founder as chairman at IPO (foundch). The percentage of founders among the whole 
board of directors is measured by ‘pcfoudir’.  
Interlocks can serve as a proxy for experience as well as social capital. According to 
paragraph 6.F.2(a) of the listing rules, the names of all companies and partnerships of 
which directors of the IPO firm have been a director or partner at any time in the 
previous five years have to be disclosed. Interlocks were summed up (without counting 
subsidiaries, thus trying to avoid double-counts) for all founders. The average number 
of founder interlocks (intfouil) is the sum of all interlocks of all founder-directors 
divided by the number of founders on the board.  
 
Corporate governance variables: 
Board independence: 
Various measures of board independence have been used by researchers to date, ranging 
from a crude distinction of executive and non-executive directors to more fine-grained 
approaches also distinguishing ‘grey’ directors. The author also uses a rather fine-
grained method, accounting for directors who are not ‘truly’ independent. Non-
executive directors who are (co-)founders, current or previous consultants/ 
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auditors/lawyers or family members of executive (‘grey’) directors are not considered to 
be ‘truly’ independent, thus are not reflected in the author’s measures of board 
independence, which are the number of ‘truly’ independent directors (also termed 
outsiders) relative to the total number of directors (board size) termed ‘pcoutsiders’ and 
referred to as percentage of independent directors. 
Additionally, the author measures independent directors’ power by their length of 
service on board (Singh and Harianto, 1989; Kosnik, 1990; Mallette and Fowler, 1992; 
Sundaramurthy et al., 1996), calculating the average tenure of independent directors 
(avgteno). Director tenure is measured in full years from appointment date to IPO. 
Generally information provided in the prospectus was used to create the tenure 
variables; if this information is not enclosed in the prospectus, the author additionally 
consulted the FAME database. 
 
Retained ownership: 
Data on ownership is taken from the section ‘directors’ and others’ interests’ of IPO 
prospectuses. The percentage of retained equity (total number of ordinary shares) 
immediately following the IPO is used here as reported in the listing prospectus. To the 
individual directors’ ownership variables the author added shareholdings whose voting 
rights have been effectively controlled by that individual director through various trusts, 
as well as stakes owned by outside firms which directors control. In cases where two or 
more directors are related, shareholdings of the lower-ranked family-director are 
attributed to the shareholdings of the higher-ranked family-directors (i.e. CEO). If 
family directors hold ordinary director positions, the author attributes the shareholdings 
of the family-director with the lower percentage of equity to the one with the higher 
percentage of equity. Due to this measure, the author can account for an ‘ownership 
pyramid effect’ which may increase individual directors’ voting power beyond their 
immediate share ownership.  
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Variables on retained ownership are distinguished into retained ownership by founders 
(retfoude), retained ownership by the CEO (retceoeq), retained ownership by VCs 
(retvceq) and finally retained ownership by ‘monitoring blockholders’ defined as 
institutional blockholders (those non-VC companies mentioned to hold at least 3% of 
the IPO firm’s equity) and VCs termed ‘retmoneq’. (To test for potential non-linear 
effects,, ownership variables are also squared (variable name ending ‘sq’), cubed 
variable name ending ‘cu’10) and their logarithm taken respectively (variable name 
beginning with ‘log’).) 
 
Experience, professionalisation and role legitimacy: 
Next to CEO power stemming from founder-CEO status and CEO’s equity position, 
CEO’s power may also be inherent in CEO’s experience proxied by CEO interlocks 
(intceoil). 
Two variables capturing independent directors’ specialist knowledge of accounting and 
finance issues were created. The variable ‘pcaccdout’ reflects the percentage of 
independent directors who hold a professional accounting qualification as indicated in 
the prospectus information on directors’ background by having the letters FCA, ACA, 
FCMA, ACMA, or FCCA attached to their names, whereas ‘accdoutyes’ is a dummy 
taking the value ‘1’ if at least one outside director holds such  a qualification.  
In order to capture what Higgins and Gulati (2006) call ‘role legitimacy’, the author 
creates two further dummy variables. The ‘ceoprceo’ dummy is assigned the value ‘1’ if 
the CEO held a CEO/MD position previously and ‘0’ if the CEO was promoted to the 
current position from a lower-ranked position. Similarly, the ‘foceprce’ dummy 
captures whether the founder-CEO is already experienced in heading a company. 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Centring was done beforehand (to reduce (unnecessary) multicollinearity) 
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Prestige  
In operationalising prestige and status the author was inspired by D’Aveni (1990) who 
differentiated between membership in elite educational circles, membership in the 
political elite and membership in the military elite. Since the directorial and military 
elite hardly seems to be interwoven in the UK or at least not in this sample of 
entrepreneurial IPOs11, the author concentrates on D’Aveni’s two other 
operationalisations of prestige, also adding a further variable which might particularly 
be suited in the UK. 
 
Educational prestige: 
It is considered that elite education can be obtained in the UK at Oxford and Cambridge 
the US at ‘ivy league’ institutions and the ‘grande écoles’ in France respectively 
(Bourdieu, 1998). For the purpose of this study with predominantly British firms (and 
predominantly UK-educated directors), any degree from ‘Oxbridge’ and also Harvard 
are considered as prestigious education. (A recent study among 14,000 directors of 
publicly traded firms reports 14% of directors attended Oxford or Cambridge with 
Harvard being the third most popular (see Murray-West, 2007)). In addition 
business/economics degrees obtained at the London School of Economics, London 
Business School, INSEAD and The Wharton School are also considered to be elite 
education due to these institutions being consistently top rated in various rankings such 
as the Financial Times (MBA) ranking. (It is acknowledged that there are prestigious 
institutions in various other countries which, however, due to the nature of this study 
will not be looked at in more detail.) 
While D’Aveni (1990) calculated the percentage of the TMTs who graduated from Ivy 
League institutions, the author needed to adapt this measure to the UK context. The 
                                                 
11
 It should be noted however that within the foreign IPOs in the sample, especially in Israeli IPO firms, a 
relatively large number of directors are or were members of the military elite. This is, however, country-
specific, and does not seem to apply to UK firms which comprise the vast majority in the sample. 
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percentage of directors who earned a degree (undergraduate or postgraduate) at Oxford 
or Cambridge universities (representing the top of British higher education), or Harvard, 
as well as business/economics degrees obtained at the London School of Economics, 
London Business School, INSEAD and The Wharton School is computed (pcpreste). In 
addition the percentage of directors with prestigious education but leaving out VC 
directors (pcpreduwvc) is also employed. 
 
Yet the provision of information on directors’ background in terms of specific education 
is not compulsory. Therefore, if directors’ educational background is not reported and 
thus information on institutions attended, in the prospectus, directors may either have 
not obtained degrees or companies just do not report them. Yet it could be assumed that 
IPO prospectuses are presented in an effort to induce investor participation (Lester et 
al., 2006), hence if no information of educational background is enclosed, it is assumed 
that directors do not possess degree-level education (the same assumption applies to 
other forms of prestige). 
 
British Honour System: 
In addition to the educational and political prestige variables created, the author 
employs a further one capturing the level of honours and titles conferred by the British 
Honours System. Following Page and Spira (2000), honours have been given a score on 
a five-point scale of seniority, ranging from MBE (1), OBE (2), CBE (3) to knighthoods 
(4) and peerages (5). The variable ‘pcsumhon’ captures the sum of directors’ highest 
honour for each board divided by the total number of directors. Also, the variable 






A dummy variable is created taking the value ‘1’ if at least one of the directors is a 
member of the political elite, i.e. directors who were or currently are a MP (mpdummy). 




As outlined earlier, it was suggested that auditor reputation may be used as a signalling 
device at IPO and may be associated with IPO performance (e.g. Titman and Trueman, 
1986; Beatty, 1989). Auditor reputation is traditionally dealt with in a dichotomous 
approach distinguishing ‘Big Eight’ from ‘non-Big Eight’ firms (e.g. Beatty, 1989; 
Michaely and Shaw, 1995). Due to merger activity, however, the ‘Big Eight’ 
consolidated into the ‘Big Six’ (Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & 
Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and Price Waterhouse) and the ‘Big Five’ (Arthur 
Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers) 
over the course of the sample years. The value ‘1’ was assigned to the prestigious 
auditor dummy variable (prestaud) if the IPO firm’s auditor belonged to the ‘Big 
Five/Big Six’ (in the case of ‘joint auditors’, the value ‘1’ was assigned, if at least one 
of the auditors belonged to the ‘Big Five/Big Six’).  
 
Power: 
Some of the variables already mentioned can be seen as proxies for power. Finkelstein 
(1992) identified and empirically assessed four dimensions of executive power: 
structural power (based on organisational structure and hierarchical authority), 
ownership power (shareholdings), expert power (e.g. functional experience, positions in 
the firm held), and prestige power (e.g. interlocks, elite education).  
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Thus, for the bargaining model, in addition to ownership other dimensions of power 
also apply. 
 
4.3.2 Control variables 
Several control variables are used in order to prevent spurious results. These variables 
can be distinguished between firm-specific control variables, industry-specific variables 
and variables capturing market conditions respectively. 
 
Firm-specific control variables: 
Previous IPO research recognised the importance of firm size and age with respect to 
their effects on organisational outcomes, including governance and performance (e.g. 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1989a; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Booth and Chua, 
1996; Mikkelson et al., 1997; Lee and Wahal, 2004). Firm age may serve as an indicator 
of the uncertainty of its quality since very young companies have limited performance 
histories on which quality can be assessed (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Firm age (firmage) 
is considered in full years from incorporation to flotation. 
Firm size as a control variable is measured as the logarithm of the market capitalisation 
(logmarcap) of IPOs, in line with other research (e.g. Stuart et al., 1999; Filatotchev and 
Bishop, 2002). 
The dummy ‘foreign’, taking the value ‘1’ if the company is registered outside the UK 
is also employed. Additionally, the dummy variable ‘segment’, capturing whether the 
IPO is listed on AIM (value ‘1’) or on the main market (value ‘0’) is created and used as 
a control variable. Employing these dummies as controls is consistent with recent 
research in the UK (Filatotchev et al., 2005). 
To control for board size ((log) total number of board seats), the author finally enters the 
variable ‘logdirs’, since board size is associated with both firm performance (Yermack, 
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1996) and corporate governance (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Similarly, a 
variable counting the (log of the) number of non-executive directors on the board 
(lognexdirs) is employed in some models as well. 
Also, a further dummy variable is employed as a proxy of an IPO firm’s risk, ‘lossb4ip’ 
taking the value ‘1’ if a financial loss was reported in the listing documents and ‘0’ 
otherwise. 
 
Market condition/industry-specific control variables: 
Stock market conditions are not stable but vary with time, and there are periods when 
investors exhibit periodic overoptimism (Ritter, 1984; Finkle, 1998; Derrien and 
Womack, 2003). These periods are exemplified by large underpricing and a large 
number of new flotations. Therefore underpricing regressions include market 
momentum variables. The market volatility variable ‘marketvo’ was computed similar 
to Derrien and Womack (2003) as the standard deviation of the one-month return of the 
FTSE Small Cap index in the month immediately prior to the IPO’s first trading day. 
Additionally, the market return variable (marketreturn) is employed, calculated as a 
weighted average of the buy-and-hold returns of that index in three months before the 
IPO date. The weights were equal to 1 for the third month, 2 for the second month and 3 
for the first month before the offering, and the weighted sum was divided by 6. 
The need to employ further control variables, a year control variable and industry 
dummies (since organisational outcomes may also be affected by external, industry-
level factors as suggested by a growing body of research (see Mauri and Michaels 





A number of researchers documented a relationship between underwriter reputation and 
IPO performance (e.g. Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Booth and Smith, 1986). Different 
operationalisations of underwriter reputation have been created. One widely used 
measure is the underwriter ranking developed by Carter and Manaster (1990), which in 
turn is motivated by the work of Hayes (1971). The latter suggested that the investment 
banking industry is subject to a strict hierarchy, which is reflected in listings of pending 
public security offers, also called ‘tombstone announcements’. Investment banks in the 
underwriter syndicate are listed in such announcements, with lead and co-lead 
underwriters being listed first. The reputation of an underwriter is reflected by its 
position in these announcements (Lewis, 1984; Monroe, 1986). Carter and Manaster 
(1990) establish a ranking scale by comparing tombstone announcements assigning an 
integer rank zero to nine (nine representing the most prestigious) for each underwriter 
according to its position in the announcement. 
Another frequently created proxy for underwriter quality is the average underwriter’s 
share of the total IPO market, with the underlying assumption that the greater the 
average market share of the (lead) underwriter(s), the higher is the quality (Megginson 
and Weiss, 1991). 
While many US studies employ readily available ranking lists based on Carter and 
Manaster (1990), these lists do not reflect the UK IPO market. In line with other UK 
research (e.g. Filatotchev, 2006), the author thus distinguishes between prestigious and 
non-prestigious underwriters based on their average share of the IPO market 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991). Since evidence in the results by Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
suggest that the reputational capital of investment banks changes over time, the author 
built classifications for each sample year, assuming, for example that average share in 
the 1994 IPO market reflects underwriter reputation in 1995 and so on. The average 
market share was measured on the basis of offering amount (number offer shares 
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multiplied by offer price). The number of offer shares is disclosed in the prospectus and 
the offer price was taken from ‘Datastream’. The offer amount (instead of market 
capitalisation) was chosen since the underwriter is responsible to market offer shares 
(rather than all shares). In cases when IPOs had two co-lead underwriters, the author 
assigned 50% of the offer value to each co-lead. Offer values for each underwriter in a 
given year are then summed up and dummy variable (prestund) is created assigning the 
value ‘1’ for the top ten underwriters and ‘0’ otherwise for each sample year.12  
 
Interaction terms:  
Interaction terms are defined as products of two (or more) independent variables already 
contained in the specification (Hardy, 1993). The following interaction terms are 
employed in this thesis:  
 
The product of prestigious underwriter (prestund) and VC-backing (vc) is labeled 
‘prestund*vc’. Similarly, the products of retained founder ownership and retained VC 
ownership ‘retfoude*retvceq’ (also retained founder equity square and retained VC 
equity ‘retfoudesq*retvceq’), founder ownership and monitoring ownership (VC equity 
+ institutional blockholder equity) ‘retfoude*retmoneq’ (and ‘retfoudesq*retmoneq’ as 
the product of founder equity square with retained monitoring equity), board 
independence and the fraction of those independent directors holding professional 
accounting qualifications ‘pcoutsiders*pcaccdout’ and finally retained CEO ownership 
and CEO role legitimacy ‘retceoeq*ceoprceo’ are also employed.13 
 
A summary of the variables employed in this thesis is presented in the following table. 
                                                 
12
 The list of top ten underwriters changed slightly year by year 
13
 Continuous variables were centred beforehand (to reduce (unnecessary) multicollinearity) 
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Table 4: List of variables 
Variable
name Description Y/N value
VC-related:
vc VC-backing Y 1
syndummy VC syndication Y 1
pcvcdir per cent VC directors on board N
vcdpreste number of VC directors with elite education N
founder-related:
foundceo founder-CEO Y 1
foundch founder chairman Y 1
pcfoudir per cent founder directors on board N
intfouil number of interlocks per founder N
governance-related (also proxy of power):
retfoude retained ownership by founder directors (and its square 'retfoudesq' N
retvceq retained ownership by VCs (its square 'retvcsq', cube 'retvccu' and logarithm 'logretvceq') N
retmoneq retained monitoring ownership (VC + institutional blockholder ownership) N
retceoeq retained ownership by CEO N
pcoutsiders per cent outsider directors N
avgteno average tenure of outsider directors
experience, professionlisation and role legitimacy (partly also proxy of power):
ceoprceo CEO with prior experience at CEO-level Y 1
foceprce founder-CEO with prior experience at CEO-level Y 1
intceoil number CEO interlocks N
pcaccdout per cent of outsider directors with professional accounting qualifications N
accdoutyes outsider director(s) with professional accounting qualification(s) Y 1
prestige:
pcpreste per cent directors with prestigious educational background N
pcsumhon level of British honours and titles per director N
brithon British honours and titles held by at least one director Y 1
mpdummy membership political elite among directors Y 1
prestaud prestigious auditor (Big Five/Big Six auditor) Y 1
pcpreduwvc per cent dirs with prestigious educational background disregarding VC dirs N
performance-related variables:
up underpricing: (market adjusted initial returns)  up = N
LBHAR12 log buy-and-hold abnormal return 12 months following flotation N
LBHAR24 log buy-and-hold abnormal return 24 months following flotation N
LBHAR36 log buy-and-hold abnormal return 36 months following flotation N
with LBHAR = log(1+BHARi) - log(1+BHARm)
and 
control variables:
foreign firm registered outside the UK Y 1
segment firm floated on AIM Y 1
logmarcap log market capitalisation at IPO N
logfirmage firm age N
logdirs board size (log number of directors) N
lognexdirs log number of non-executives on board N
prestund prestigious underwriter Y 1
lossb4ip reported loss in financial statements before IPO Y 1
marketvodw market volatility N
































- Table 4 continued overleaf - 
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Table 4 (continued): 
Variable
name Description Y/N value
interaction terms:
prestund*vc product of prestigious underwriter dummy and dummy for VC-backing N
refoude*retvceq product of retained founder equity and retained VC equity N
retfoudesq*retvceq product of retained founder equity square and retained VC equity N
retfoude*retmoneq product of retained founder equity and retained monitoring equity N
retfoudesq*retmoneq product of retained founder equity squareand retained monitoring equity N
pcoutsiders*pcaccdout product of board independence and the fraction of independent directors N
with professional accounting qualifications




4.4 Common tests 
For models presented, Wald-tests of joint significance of additional control variables 
that included a year control variable and industry dummies were carried out with test 
results reported in all tables.14 
With respect to testing for multicollinearity, the author employs variance inflation 
factors (VIF). A commonly given rule of thumb is that an individual VIF of ten or 
higher and/or an average VIF greater than six may be a reason for concern.  
Since standard errors (and p-values) may be biased when heteroscedasticity is severe, 
by making adjustments using the commonly employed Huber-White sandwich estimator 
(Huber, 1967; White, 1980) robust standard errors can be obtained. 
Testing the normality assumption is carried out in the case of tobit estimations by 
employing a conditional moment (CM) test first developed by Newey (1985) and 
Tauchen (1985). A parametric bootstrap is used to correct the size distortion reported 
(Skeels and Vella, 1997) employing bootstrap critical values (see Drukker, 2002). 
The probit model is also based on the assumption of a standard normal distribution 
function (see e.g. Verbeek 2004). This assumption is tested by employing a semi non-
parametric (SNP) alternative. This alternative fits a generalised (ordered) response 
                                                 
14
 Since a Wald-test for joint significance of these additional control variables is not significant (see Wald 
p-value at the lower end of the tables) only models with the ‘standard’ control variables are reported and 
described in the chapters to follow. 
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model that nests the probit employing the semi-nonparametric series estimator of an 
unknown density proposed by Gallant and Nychka (1987). A Hermite series expansion 
is used to approximate the unknown distribution of the stochastic error term in the 
underlying latent variable model. Likelihood-ratio (LR) tests of the (ordered) probit 
model against the corresponding SNP extended models are then performed.  
Jarque-Bera tests are performed with respect to testing OLS’ normality assumption. 
Median regression (least absolute-deviations) regression is employed as an alternative 
to OLS since it is more robust to outliers than is mean regression. Also, it is semi-
parametric in the sense that it evades assumptions about parametric distribution of 
residuals (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
 
4.5 Chapter summary 
In this chapter the author discussed philosophical and methodological considerations 
researchers face when doing social science research in general and put forward a 
rationale for conducting research in this case following a positivist tradition. 
Furthermore, an outline of data types and sources is provided along with a discussion 
regarding data availability, reliability and validity. This is followed by a presentation of 
the data collection procedure also including a rationale for the sampling. In addition, the 
variables this study employs are introduced and descriptions are given how they are 
measured. The chapter closes with an outline of methods chosen to deal with 
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and non-normality. 
 
After having outlined and discussed methodological issues relating to this thesis, in the 




In this chapter, the author tests the research model developed earlier and present results 
of univariate and multivariate analysis after providing descriptive statistics. 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 lists descriptive statistics for the study’s variables. The table shows that, on 
average, founders, VCs and VCs along with other institutional blockholders owned 
32.6%, 9.5% and 18.3% of equity in the IPO firm respectively. These (and further) 
results are consistent with prior research using US and UK data (Certo et al., 2001b; 
Chahine et al., 2007). On average, founders represented nearly a third (31.3%) of board 
members at the time of flotation. The considerable involvement of founders is further 
documented by the result that in 74.6% of the sample firms a founder held the CEO 
position at IPO.  
In terms of board independence, boards of sample firms on average consist of 36.1% 
outsiders and among the outsiders almost 22% hold professional accounting 
qualifications. For (further) professionalisation related variables the same table reports 
that 42.0% of the sample firms go public with a CEO who was already experienced in 
the CEO role before. Membership of the political elite was found to be present in 3.6% 
of sample firms only and on average 5.8% of directors hold degrees from elite 
educational institutions. Furthermore, a prestigious auditor was involved in 61.8% of 
sample firms at IPO.  
With respect to performance related variables including initial returns, the average 
underpricing was 16%, while post-IPO market performance was negative for all periods 
examined following the IPO, thus confirming the existence of IPO anomalies reported 
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in the IPO literature (see e.g. Ibbotson (1975) for IPO underpricing and Ritter (1991) 
and Espenlaub et al. (2000) for IPO long-run underperformance). 
 
On certain variables the standard deviation is high relative to the mean (which is typical 
where count measuring is involved). 
As can be seen from the Jarque-Bera asymptotic test for normality on the specified 
variables, several variables show non-normal distributional behaviour. Ownership 
variables, for example, are, according to histograms, clustered at lower levels of 
ownership. While VC and monitoring equity are clustered at zero and low levels of 
ownership with rather few observations at higher levels, there is a high density of 
founder ownership up to 45% of ownership with (rather smoothly) decreasing density 
from that level onwards.  
Continuous dependent and independent variables may therefore be transformed to 
ensure data normality. Transforming variables in an attempt to ensure data normality 
was unsuccessful for most non-normally distributed continuous variables as 
transformation could not significantly improve their distributional properties. Notable 
exceptions are market capitalisation, firm age and board size (dirs) for which via 
logarithmic transformation normality could be achieved. These variables are depicted 
after (log) transformation in Table 5 while those continuous variables for which 
normality via transformation could not be achieved are depicted in their ‘raw’ form.15  
 
                                                 
15
 The issue of normality is going to be raised again when dealing with multivariate analysis 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
variable mean sd skewness kurtosis min max Jarque-Bera
vc 0.5 0.501 0.000 1.000 0 1 65***
syndummy 0.195 0.397 1.541 3.374 0 1 156.6***
pcvcdir 0.050 0.100 2.543 12.576 0 0.8 1910***
vcdpreste 0.062 0.271 4.750 27.001 0 2 11000***
foundceo 0.746 0.436 -1.131 2.280 0 1 91.61***
foundch 0.405 0.491 0.389 1.151 0 1 65.04***
pcfoudir 0.313 0.159 0.912 3.643 0.083 1 60.84***
intfouil 3.142 4.929 3.039 15.243 0 38 3036***
retfoude 0.326 0.208 0.515 2.634 0 0.962 19.16***
retvceq 0.095 0.143 1.703 5.527 0 0.700 289.2***
retmoneq 0.183 0.185 1.005 3.409 0 0.888 64.84***
retceoeq 0.197 0.194 1.175 3.755 0 0.870 98***
pcoutsiders 0.362 0.153 -0.137 3.152 0 0.750 1.599
avgteno 0.926 1.428 1.855 6.397 0 8 318.4***
ceoprceo 0.420 0.494 0.323 1.105 0 1 59.66***
foceprce 0.311 0.464 0.817 1.667 0 1 66.13***
intceoil 2.669 4.528 3.498 19.670 0 38 5311***
pcaccdout 0.220 0.317 1.254 3.465 0 1 100.9***
accdoutyes 0.392 0.489 0.440 1.194 0 1 62.58***
pcpreste 0.058 0.116 2.354 8.979 0 0.667 933.9***
pcpreduwvc 0.049 0.103 2.310 8.196 0 0.5 785.7***
pcsumhon 0.124 0.280 2.354 8.100 0 1.6 7277***
brithon 0.202 0.402 1.480 3.191 0 1 143***
mpdummy 0.036 0.186 4.989 25.894 0 1 54.60***
prestaud 0.618 0.487 -0.485 1.236 0 1 65.9***
up 0.160 0.310 4.700 38.309 -0.455 3.352 120.116***
LBHAR12 -0.067 0.303 1.152 11.032 -0.768 2.208 1108***
LBHAR24 -0.164 0.395 0.929 5.019 -0.944 1.840 111***
LBHAR36 -0.158 0.483 1.593 7.930 -1.113 2.790 460.9***
lossb4ip 0.368 0.483 0.547 1.299 0 1 65.26***
foreign 0.049 0.216 4.193 18.578 0 1 5086***
segment 0.503 0.501 -0.010 1.000 0 1 65***
logmarcap 7.508 0.564 0.199 2.836 5.878 9.214 2.933
logfirmage 0.742 0.351 -0.207 2.680 0 1.602 4.445
logdirs 0.773 0.121 -0.220 3.390 0.301 1.079 5.611°
lognexdirs 0.375 0.202 -0.239 2.848 0 0.903 4.054
marketvodw 0.004 0.003 1.600 5.251 0.001 0.019 248.8***
marketreturn 1.007 0.026 -0.584 4.589 0.882 1.073 62.89***
prestund 0.241 0.428 1.211 2.467 0 1 99.95***
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
 
 
5.2 Univariate analysis 
Due to the nature of the data (there are two related observations since there are matched 
pairs) a paired t-test is employed. This tests the equality of means of matched pairs of 
observations, hence whether the means of these two variables differ from one another. 
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The null hypothesis proposes that both distributions are the same, and is rejected if the 
associated p-values are statistically significant.  
In addition, the author also employs the non-parametric version of the paired t-test, the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test. It calculates the differences between the pair of variables, 
ranks the absolute differences and sums the positive and negative ranks. Then it 
determines the test statistic Z from the positive and negative signed ranks.  
Where appropriate, the author provides a test statistic for a comparison of paired 
proportions estimated employing McNemar’s test. It focuses on discordant pairs only 
and evaluates whether discordant pairs are evenly distributed.  
 
Moving from offering characteristics to board and ownership characteristics, the author 
presents univariate analysis of experience, professionalisation and role legitimacy, 
finally coming to testing differences with regard to prestige and IPO performance. (A 
correlation matrix is presented in Appendix 2.) 
 
5.2.1 Offering characteristics 
In Table 6 the differences in offering characteristics of VC-backed (VCb) and matched 
non-VC-backed (nVCb) entrepreneurial IPOs are reported.  
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Table 6: Offering characteristics 
No. VCb nVCb Paired Wilcoxon's
pairs t-test Z
market capitalisation in £m 193 98.1 57.3 2.859**  4.782***
net assets £m (yr before IPO) 183 2.5 2.1 0.100  4.519***
sales 152 45.4 23.2 2.154*  2.916**
no. employees 195 363.1 291.5 0.899  0.722
offer amount  in £m 191 36.9 16.6 4.612***  5.858***
net proceeds in £m 167 18.1 8.5 4.116***  4.978***
offer price in £ 193 1.7 1.1 5.835***  5.926***
participation ratio % 158 0.2 0.1 5.925***  5.758***
dilution factor % 156 0.4 0.4 0.924  1.847°
market volatility 195 32.6 37.1  -1.553 -1.509
firm age 195 5.7 7.3  -2.901** -2.122*
risk factors 78 13.8 10.2   3.194**  2.422*
Offering statistics mean
Significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
 
 
Consistent with US data presented, for example by Megginson and Weiss (1991) and 
Jain and Kini (1995) and UK data presented by Belghitar (2003), the author finds that 
VC-backed IPOs have higher market capitalisation respectively higher net assets and 
sales. According to the paired t-test the differences between the pairs are statistically 
significant for market capitalisation and sales, while the Wilcoxon signed rank test 
shows significant differences for all these measures.  
With respect to the matching criterion ‘number of employees’, no statistical difference 
between the pairs is found, indicating that the pairs match reasonably closely.  
The differences in the amount offered at flotation and correspondingly the net proceeds 
raised as well as the offer price are all statistically significant at the 0.1% level for both 
tests (with higher means for the VC-backed IPOs), indicating that the probability that 
such differences could be observed solely as a result of random variations is less than 
0.1 %. Furthermore, the table shows that the mean participation ratio (shares sold by 
existing shareholders/outstanding shares before the IPO), as well as the dilution factor is 
higher for IPOs backed by VC. The differences of the former are highly significant in 
both tests, while the difference in the latter is significant in the non-parametric tests and 
at the 10% level only.  
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With respect to market fluctuations as well as uncertainty and riskiness surrounding the 
IPO, the market volatility one month preceding the IPO is found to be lower among the 
VC-backed firms, yet the difference is not statistically significant. VC-backed firms are 
younger at flotation and report more risk factors (all tests are significant) which could 
harm the further development of the firm and is consistent with anecdotal and empirical 
evidence that VC-backed firms are riskier (e.g. Carleton, 1986; Bamford and Douthett, 
2000). 
 
After having presented offering statistics, in the following board characteristics of the 
matched sample, as published in the IPO prospectus right before flotation, will be 
shown including the results of univariate analysis. 
 
5.2.2 Board characteristics 
Table 7 shows differences in board characteristics of VC-backed and matched non-VC-
backed entrepreneurial IPOs. The lower end of the table presents results of a chi2-test 
for a relationship between board-related dummy variables and VC-backing. 
The mean board size (number of directors) is larger in VC-backed IPOs than in IPOs 
not funded by VCs. The difference between the pairs is highly significant in both tests. 
If smaller boards are more effective, this seems to be counter to the notion that VCs 
create better boards. Yet VC-backing may lead to larger, more complex firms requiring 
larger boards (see Table 5). This is in line with US evidence presented by Baker and 
Gompers (2003) who report similar mean values regarding board size of VC-backed 
IPOs (6.22) and their peers (5.99). Number and percentage of founders on the board are 
also higher for VC-backed IPOs (differences significant in both tests). If founder 
directors are split into executive and non-executive directors, the means are again higher 
for the VC-backed IPOs (while the differences are significant for executive founder 
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directors only). While the number of executives is slightly higher in IPOs funded by 
VCs, the fraction of executives is smaller in these IPOs, with the test of difference being 
significant for the fraction only. The number and fraction of non-executive directors as 
well as the number and fraction of independent (outside) directors are higher in IPOs in 
which VCs are involved, with the differences test being significant at the 0.1% and 1% 
levels, respectively. Overall, this is consistent with evidence presented by Baker and 
Gompers (2003) and Campbell and Frye (2005).  
The number and percentage of directors who are affiliated with an institutional block-
holder in the company is lower in VC-backed IPOs compared to their peers (both 
difference tests are significant). In addition, the author tested for the difference in the 
pairs regarding the number of additional directors planned to be appointed to the board 
in due course following the IPO as announced in the prospectus. Since Baker and 
Gompers (2003) argue that corporate governance is likely to be chosen optimally at the 
IPO, planned appointments of new directors soon after the flotation may be a sign of 
having sub-optimal governance in place at IPO. The announced number of directors due 
to be appointed to the board is smaller in VC-backed firms, with both tests of the 
difference between the pairs being significant.  
In the lower end of Table 6 the author provides a test statistic for a comparison of paired 
proportions, estimated by a McNemar’s test. It appears that having founder-CEO 
(founder chairman) at IPO is more (less) common among VC-backed IPOs compared to 
those not funded by VCs, yet this difference could have occurred by chance alone. The 
number of firms in which CEO duality is present is exactly the same for VC-backed and 
non-VC-backed IPOs (30 observations each). 
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Table 7: Board characteristics 
No. VCb nVCb Paired Wilcoxon's
pairs t-test Z
no. dirs 195 6.585 5.728  5.404***  5.538***
no. founder dirs 195 2.103 1.631  5.017***  4.741***
% founder dirs 195 0.329 0.299  2.046*  1.683°
no. exec founder dirs 194 1.861 1.490  3.727***  3.554**
no. non-exec founder dirs 195 0.215 0.169  0.886  0.487
no. exec dirs 195 3.667 3.476  1.594  1.605
% exec dirs 195 0.561 0.615 -3.644*** -3.212***
no. non-exec dirs 195 2.918 2.282  5.428***  5.140***
% non-exec dirs 195 0.441 0.393  3.372***  2.950**
no. independent dirs 195 2.579 1.979  5.917***  5.654***
% independent dirs 190 0.388 0.341  3.281**  2.885**
no. blockholding dirs 195 0.133 0.262 -2.358* -2.046*
% blockholding dirs 195 0.018 0.040 -2.842** -2.338*
no. additional dirs planned 195 0.185 0.272 -1.855° -2.109*
VCb nVCb McNemar 
chi2
founder-CEO 151 140 0.09
founder chairman 76 79 166
CEO duality 30 30 0
family ties among directors 16 19 0.26





In the next section, the author examines ownership retained by the different parties who 
have interests in the firm, testing for differences between the pairs, using paired t-test 
and the non-parametric Wilcoxon sign rank test. 
 
5.2.3 Ownership characteristics 
In Table 8 results of paired t-tests and Wilcoxon signed rank tests are presented with 
respect to various ownership variables. While the mean of retained ownership by 
founders is just above 25% in the VC-backed firms, it is nearly 40% in their peers (both 
difference tests are highly significant). This finding is not surprising since founders are 
required to sell off parts of their interests in the firm to the VC as a trade-off for the 
VC’s investment in the firm. CEO’s and chairman’s retained ownership are also lower 
in VC-backed IPOs with both tests again being highly significant. Retained ownership 
by independent directors is, expectedly, relatively small and even lower in VC-backed 
IPOs, yet both tests of differences between the pairs show no significance. While mean 
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ownership retained by private block-holders as well as institutional block-holders (other 
than VCs) is smaller in VC-backed firms, mean ‘monitoring ownership’ (ownership by 
institutional blockholders and ownership by VCs) is higher in VC-backed IPOs. These 
findings are consistent with evidence presented by Campbell and Frye (2005). The 
difference between the matched pairs with respect to ownership retained in an 
Employee Share Ownership Plan (ESOP) is significant. The mean is higher for VC-
backed IPOs, yet it is just above 1% in this type of IPO firm.   
 
Table 8: Ownership characteristics 
No. VCb nVCb paired Wilcoxon's
pairs t-test Z
retained founder ownership 190 0.252 0.400 -7.130*** -6.132***
retained CEO ownership 191 0.150 0.246 -4.764*** -4.427***
retained chairman ownership 191 0.081 0.161 -4.277*** -3.541**
retained independent dirs 190 0.011 0.017 -1.631 -1.218
retained priv. blockholing ownership 175 0.019 0.044 -4.369*** -4.467***
retained inst. blockholding ownership 177 0.066 0.101 -2.549* -1.699°
retained monitoring ownership 173 0.260 0.100  9.139***  7.876***
retained ESOP 174 0.010 0.003  2.244*  1.721°
Ownership characteristics (in %) mean
 
Addressing one of the key research questions of the thesis, in the following the author 
turns to univariate analysis of board capital and quality of IPOs in the form of directors’ 
experience, professionalisation and role legitimacy. 
 
5.2.4 Experience, professionalisation and role legitimacy 
In Table 9 results of paired t-tests, Wilcoxon signed rank tests and McNemar tests are 
presented with respect to experience and professionalisation of directors.  
The difference regarding founder’s average interlocks is significant in both tests with 
VC-backed firms showing a lower founder interlock intensity. This seems to be counter 
to the notion that the entrepreneur/management team is one of the key criteria for the 
VC’s investment decision (MacMillan et al., 1987; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Fried 
and Hisrich, 1994; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004) and typically the management at that 
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point consists mostly of founders. Whithout doubt, founder’s (past) experience is 
important, yet it is only one among many criteria used (e.g. Wright et al., 1997) and 
VCs may look for other forms of experience rather than founder’s interlocks when 
making the investment decision. Among the matched pairs there are no significant 
differences with respect to CEO and chairman interlocks. The next block of variables 
examines age as another proxy of experience. The average age of founders, as well as 
CEOs’ and chairmen’s age is higher in VC-backed firms, with the difference between 
the pairs being significant for CEO age (both tests) and chairman age (paired t-test). As 
a proxy of experience within the firm, the author examines directors’ average tenure. 
Founders’ average tenure is lower in VC-backed firms with the difference being 
significant. However, Table 5 showed that VC-backed firms are younger at IPO, thus 
(founders’) tenure has to be lower, as well. The difference in CEO tenure is significant 
and lower in VC-backed IPOs. Chairman tenure and executive directors’ average tenure 
is also lower in VC-backed firms, though the difference is not significant. Again, the 
difference in firm age might explain the former, yet it might also be an indication that a 
possible founder-CEO and chairman replacement took place and the management team 
was strengthened with professional directors. Non-executives’ and independent 
directors’ average tenure is longer in VC-backed firms with the difference being 
significant in all tests. These findings indicate that firms funded by VCs have 
monitoring and especially independent monitoring systems in place longer before IPO 
than other firms. Finally the author tests for differences with respect to the number of 
directors holding professional accounting qualifications. Financial literacy at top-level 
is more common among VC-backed firms, since both tests of difference are significant.  
With respect to role legitimacy, the lower end of the same table shows that having a 
CEO at IPO with experience in the role of the CEO is more common among VC-backed 
IPOs relative to their peers, with McNemar’s test being highly significant. There is a 
similar finding with respect to having a chairman at IPO with experience of heading a 
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board (McNemar’s test is weakly significant). Finally, having a founder-CEO with prior 
experience at the helm of a company is more common among firms funded by VCs. The 
highly significant test-score indicates that it is highly unlikely that this difference has 
occurred by chance alone. 
Overall, while undoubtedly directors’ experience is important to VCs, these findings 
might indicate that VCs attach more importance to age and role legitimacy rather than to 
interlocks as proxies for experience. In addition, non-executives’ and independent 
directors’ experience on the board of the focal IPO, measured by tenure, is also higher 
in VC-backed firms. Coming from a bargaining perspective, this suggests that through 
their longer tenure they are more powerful vis-à-vis inside directors and therefore the 
potential for more effective monitoring may be greater in IPOs funded by VCs. 
 
Table 9: Experience, professionalisation and role legitimacy 
No. VCb nVCb paired Wilcoxon's
pairs t-test Z
founder interlocks (average) 195 2.595 3.690 -2.199* -3.033**
CEO interlocks 195 2.449 2.890 -1.028 -1.122
chairman interlocks 195 6.918 8.092 -1.473 -1.230
founder age 191 46.313 45.141 1.398   1.369
CEO age 191 44.927 42.620 2.393*   2.725**
chairman age 192 54.073 52.219 1.944°   1.516
founder tenure (average) 189 5.630 7.188 -2.827** -2.025*
CEO tenure 184 4.302 5.997 -3.630*** -2.853**
chairman tenure 166 3.452 4.151 -2.069*   0.338
executive dirs tenure (average) 166 3.334 3.990 -2.069* -1.247
non-executive dirs tenure (average) 136 1.568 0.805  3.732***  4.550***
independent dirs tenure (average) 131 0.692 0.493  1.408  2.619**
no. dirs with prof. accounting qualification 182 1.511 1.209  2.922**  2.673**
dirs with prof. accounting qualification % 182      0.240      0.219     1.213     0.635
VCb nVCb McNemar 
Role legitimacy chi2
CEO prior CEO  85 52 11.97***
chairman prior chairman 93 77 3.28°
founder-CEO prior CEO 68 33 15.12***
Experience & professionalisation mean
No.
Significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
 
After having presented test statistics on director experience, in the next section the 
author examines differences in characteristics associated with prestige. 
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5.2.5 Prestige characteristics 
Univariate analysis regarding prestige of directors and entities involved with the IPO 
firm are presented in Table 10. Both mean number and fraction of directors who 
graduated from an elite institution is higher among the VC-backed IPOs with all tests of 
difference being significant. While the level of director prestige stemming from their 
British titles and honours is slightly higher in firms funded by VCs compared to firms 
not backed by VCs, the difference is not significant. Similarly, while elite political 
background is more common in VC-backed IPOs compared to IPOs not thus funded the 
McNemar test indicates that this could have occurred by chance alone. Finally, having 
engaged an auditor belonging to the Big Five/Big Six and having hired a prestigious 
underwriter is more common for firms which received VC funding, with the McNemar 
test being highly significant for both. This is in line with propositions of the certification 
hypothesis (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). 
In the final section of univariate analysis, the author present results from paired t-tests 
and Wilcoxon signed rank tests attempting to detect differences in performance between 
the pairs with respect to initial returns (underpricing) and returns in the long-run. 
 
Table 10: Prestige characteristics of directors and entities involved 
No. VCb nVCb paired Wilcoxon's
pairs t-test Z
no. dirs with prestigious education 195 0.456 0.256  2.828** 2.976**
dirs with prestigious education % 192 0.071 0.044  2.460* 2.617**
sum ranked titles & honours 195 0.836 0.780  0.300 0.608
ranked titles & honours per director 195 0.119 0.130 -0.390 0.184
VCb nVCb McNemar 
chi2
prestigious political background, dummy  8 6    0.593
prestigious auditor, dummy 141 100  16.98***
prestigious underwriter, dummy 61 33  12.25***
Prestige mean
No.




5.2.6 Short- and long-run performance 
In Table 11 the author presents univariate analysis regarding short- and long-run market 
performance of VC-backed and matched non-VC-backed IPOs. The upper end of that 
table is dedicated to initial returns at the closing of the first and forth day of trading, 
respectively. While mean underpricing based on both measures is considerably lower 
for VC-backed firms (e.g. 14.6% vs. 18.0% for mean first day underpricing), it is not 
significantly different, as indicated by paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test, and 
seems to be inconsistent with the certification argument and US as well as UK evidence 
presented for example by Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Belghitar (2003), but in line 
with for example Brau et al. (2004) and Jelic et al. (2005).  
The lower end of the table examines differences in long-run performance measured by 
BHAR and CAR at 12, 24 and 36 months from flotation. Mean values differ 
considerably depending on which measure of long-run performance is employed. 
Moreover, tests of difference are mainly insignificant, except for BHAR 24 months 
from flotation with its marginally significant non-parametric test. The finding indicates 
that VC-backed firms perform better than firms not funded by VCs, though both seem 
to under-perform the market (based on the FTSE Small Cap index). 
 
Table 11: Short- and long-run performance 
No. VCb nVCb paired Wilcoxon's
pairs t-test Z
initial returns:
underpricing (up) 195 0.144 0.177 -1.048 0.512
long-run performance:
LBHAR 12 months 186 -0.062 -0.076 0.456 1.227
LBHAR 24 months 161 -0.145 -0.208 1.480 1.596
LBHAR 36 months 134 -0.125 -0.233 1.826° 2.182*
Performance mean




These rather inconclusive findings with respect to firm performance point towards the 
necessity of multivariate analysis, yet univariate analysis with respect to grouping on 
other than the VC-dummy is to be presented in the next sub-section. 
 
5.2.7 Other 
Univariate tests based on grouping on the founder-CEO dummy depicted in Table 12 
show significant differences between the groups in terms of the level of British honours 
and titles (per director) in both the parametric independent sample t-test and the non-
parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test. With respect to performance, post-
IPO market performance 12 months following flotation was found to be significantly 
higher in founder-led firms according to the independent sample t-test. In addition, 
according to WMV-test in the group of founder-led firms average tenure of outside 
directors is found to be longer. Finally, chi2-tests are significant with respect to the 
dummy for membership in the political elite (in fact only founder-led firms seem to 
have this form of director prestige among its board of directors). 
When CEO role legitimacy (ceoprceo) is employed as the criteria for splitting samples, 
firms with an experienced CEOs seem to have higher retained VC ownership (WMV-
test only), a greater fraction of outsiders on board (both tests) and longer average 
outsider tenures (WMV-test). Furthermore, significant test results are found between the 
dummy for the involvement of a prestigious auditor with the IPO firm and CEO role 
legitimacy as well as between VC-backing and CEO role legitimacy respectively. While 
VC-backing is more prevailant in firms led by an experienced CEO, prestigious auditors 
are less prevailant in firms with experienced CEOs at IPO. 
Grouping the sample by the involvement of a prestigious auditor in the IPO firm, tests 
show significant differences in group means of certain variables. The group of firms that 
undergoes an IPO with a prestigious auditor involved shows significantly lower levels 
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of retained founder ownership, higher levels of retained VC ownership and higher 
fraction of outsiders on board in both parametric and non-parametric tests. In parametric 
tests the group mentioned above shows a significantly lower fraction of those outsiders 
with professional accounting qualifications, higher levels of total British honours and 
titles and higher post-IPO market performance 36 months following the IPO. Non-
parametric tests show significantly longer average tenure of outsiders and significantly 
lower underpricing. Moreover, significant test results are found between CEO role 
legitimacy and the involvement of a prestigious auditor and also between VC-backing 
and having a Big Five/Six auditor. 
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Table 12: Grouping on other dummy variables 
group 0 group 1 group 0 group 1 indep.sampleWMW chi2 Fisher's 
variable name # obs # obs mean mean t-test Z test exact p
foundceo(0/1)
retfoude 97 288 0.298 0.335 -1.486 -1.598
retvceq 98 288 0.097 0.094 0.196 -0.670
pcoutsiders 99 291 0.349 0.366 -0.974 -0.958
avgteno 71 231 0.716 0.991 -1.423 -1.732°
pcaccdout 95 277 0.207 0.225 -0.479 -0.227
pcpreste 98 289 0.068 0.055 0.993 -1.472
pcsumhon 99 291 0.084 0.138 -1.666° -1.949°
up 99 291 0.146 0.165 -0.535 -1.616
LBHAR12 97 284 -0.118 -0.053 -1.894° -1.634
LBHAR24 90 264 -0.219 -0.145 -1.550 -1.594
LBHAR36 79 242 -0.232 -0.134 -1.561 -1.448
ceorpceo 39 111 0.274
prestaud 59 182 0.272
vc 44 151 1.638
mpdummy 0 14 4.940* 0.025
ceoprceo(0/1)
retfoude 203 149 0.330 0.301 1.303 1.294
retvceq 205 149 0.089 0.114 -1.628 -3.060**
pcoutsiders 207 150 0.357 0.385 -1.684° -1.967*
avgteno 155 124 0.807 1.048 -1.429 -1.744°
pcaccdout 198 144 0.218 0.217 0.038 -0.115
pcpreste 205 149 0.062 0.055 0.574 -0.357
pcsumhon 207 150 0.121 0.146 -0.807 -0.798
up 207 150 0.141 0.175 -1.033 -0.382
LBHAR12 204 145 -0.070 -0.066 -0.215 0.213
LBHAR24 189 135 -0.180 -0.161 -0.430 -0.348
LBHAR36 171 121 -0.175 -0.134 -0.700 -0.638
foundceo 148 111 0.273
prestaud 117 106 7.422**
vc 86 96 17.547***
mpdummy 9 5 0.238 0.785
prestaud(0/1)
retfoude 147 238 0.371 0.298 3.413*** 3.306***
retvceq 146 240 0.062 0.115 -3.553*** -4.613***
pcoutsiders 149 241 0.313 0.392 -5,094*** -4.740***
avgteno 108 194 0.821 0.986 -0.942 -1.913°
pcaccdout 135 237 0.261 0.197 1.888° 1.295
pcpreste 149 238 0.057 0.059 -0.127 -0.595
pcsumhon 149 241 0.105 0.136 -1.074 -1.308
up 149 241 0.176 0.151 0.786 2.106*  
LBHAR12 143 238 -0.056 -0.074 0.585 -0.256
LBHAR24 135 219 -0.202 -0.140 -1.420 -0.133
LBHAR36 123 198 -0.222 -0.119 -1.862° -0.160
foundceo 109 182  0.272
ceorpceo 44 106  7.422**
vc 54 141  18.257***
mpdummy 4 10  0.571 0.580
 
 




5.3 Multivariate analysis 
This sub-section presents results from multivariate analysis split into segments outlining 
governance-related results followed by professionalisation-related results and closing 
with performance-related results. 
 
As can be seen from the correlation matrix (Appendix 2), pairs of certain variables are 
(partially) highly correlated with each other.  
Most notably, retained founder equity is considerably (negatively) correlated with 
retained VC equity (and to a lesser extent with VC-backing) and monitoring equity 
respectively, which is not surprising as VCs demand ownership in the firm for 
providing financial resources. Also, correlations between average founders’ interlocks 
and CEO interlocks as well as between equity retained by founders and that of the CEO 
are found to be high. Two of the prestige related variables, social prestige and political 
prestige, also show a considerable level of correlation. Furthermore, there is a hightened 
level of correlation between founder interlocks and the segment-dummy, as well as 
between retained founder equity and ‘logdirs’/’lognexdirs’. Also, among control 
variables considerable correlation is found. The segment-dummy (capturing whether the 
firm was floated on the Official List or on AIM) is rather highly correlated with firm 
size and to a lesser extent with board size and the dummy capturing underwriter prestige 
which does not come unexpectedly. Similarly, noticeable correlations between firm size 
and board size as well as the dummy for underwriter prestige are found. 
Variable omission and stepwise model building are employed as means of dealing with 
multicollinearity. Model performance is measured, depending on the estimation method 
used, by adjusted R2 (pseudo R2, Cox-Snell R2 respectively), Akaike (AIC) and 
Schwarz Bayesian (BIC) information criteria. The measures favour parsimonious 
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models since they penalise the addition of further independent variables (BIC more than 
AIC) (Verbeek 2004). 
 
5.3.1 Results related to corporate governance 
 
In the following section the author describes the models employed to test agency and 
bargaining propositions regarding board independence. 
 
Models 0 to 10 of Table 13 test hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c derived from agency and 
bargaining propositions with respect to board independence.  
Models are estimated using the OLS regression technique. (Since there is no 
disproprortionately large number of observations with zero outsiders on the board, tobit 
estimations are only performed as robustness check. Also, fractional probit estimations 
are run (as proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) when fractions are used as 
dependent variables) as robustness check.16) 
Normality is tested by employing Jarque-Bera tests. Test results indicate that the 
normality assumption is not rejected. Individual VIFs and mean VIFs for all models are 
below levels which would raise concerns regarding multicollinearity. Since in some 
models (the level of) heteroscedasticity is of concern, all models report robust standard 
errors. 
With respect to control variables (model 0), the dummy ‘foreign’ (capturing whether the 
firm was registered in the UK or elsewhere) is positively related to board independence. 
This might indicate that there is a need for higher levels of board independence in (to 
the UK rather unknown) foreign firms, probably due to higher information asymmetry 
surrounding the IPO of these firms. The dummy indicating whether the flotation took 
                                                 
16
 Similar results to those of the OLS models were obtained when performing both tobit and fractional 
probit estimations. 
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place on the Official List or on AIM is negatively and weakly significantly related to 
board independence, showing that IPOs floated on the Official List tend to have higher 
levels of board independence. Firm size is positively related to board independence. 
Firm age, on the other hand, is negatively related to the proportion of independent 
directors, though in this model only.  
All following models additionally contain founder-related variables and VC retained 
equity. In model 1 retained founder equity is negatively and strongly significantly 
related to the fraction of outsider directors on board consistent with hypothesis 1a, 
whereas VC power proxied by retained VC equity is positively and significantly related 
to the latter in line with hypothesis 1b. The other founder-related variables included also 
show a significant relationship with the dependent variable yet this relationship is 
positive and might indicate that the need for higher levels of board independence is 
greater in firms headed by a founder-CEO. Also with increasing levels of founder 
experience measured by average number of founders’ interlocks the need for higher 
fractions of independent directors on the board seems to increase. With the exception of 
firms size and the segment dummy which are no longer (weakly) significantly related to 
board independence, no major changes in control variables occurred compared to model 
0.  
In model 2 the author tests for the hypothesised non-linear relationship between retained 
ownership of founders and the fraction of independent directors (hypothesis 1c). In 
addition to the specification of model 1 only the square of the retained founder 
ownership variable is added. While retained founder ownership remains negative and 
significant, its square is positive and significant in line with hypothesis 1c that proposed 
a non-linear relationship between founder power and board independence. It appears 
that at higher levels of founder ownership considerable incentives exist to reduce the 
expectation of value destroying behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Denis and 
Denis, 1994). The level of 26.8% retained founder ownership marks the inflection 
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point.17 Due to entrenchment, a relatively strong demand for independent directors 
seems to be created. The coefficient of the variable capturing VC’s retained equity is 
positive and significant, as hypothesised (hypothesis 1b). Measures of model fit 
improved. 
In models 3 and 4 it is tested whether the nature of the relationship between founders’ 
retained ownership and the fraction of independent directors on board changes at 
different levels of retained VC ownership. Model 3 adds an interaction term between 
founder equity and VC equity. The sign of the coefficient of this term is negative 
(though the relationship is not significant) indicating that the relationship between 
retained founder equity and board independence becomes stronger. That is retained 
founder equity and retained VC equity seem to work in a complementary way. 
Model 4 is based on model 2 and additionally interacts founder equity and its square 
with VC equity. The sign of the coefficient of both interaction terms are negative 
(though not significant), indicating that with VC equity increasing the alignment effect 
of founder equity on board independence increases (suggesting that founder equity and 
VC equity work as complements) and the entrenchment effect of founder equity on 
board independence becomes weaker (suggesting that founder equity and VC equity 
work as substitutes).  
Model 5 presents results from a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 0.2 
significance level for variable addition). The model confirms the positive relationship 
between VC ownership and board independence (hypothesis 1b) as well as the quadratic 
relationship of retained founder ownership with the fraction of outsiders on the board 
hypothesis 1c). Measures of model fit are better than in all previous models. 
 
                                                 
17
 Calculated by setting the first derivative of the quadratic function equal to zero. 
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In models 6 to 10 the VC equity variable is replaced by a variable capturing both VC 
equity and equity held by institutional blockholders in the IPO firm. This variable is 
referred to as ‘monitoring equity’ (retmoneq). 
Similar to model 1, while founder equity is negatively and significantly associated to 
the fraction of outsiders on the board, monitoring equity is positively and strongly 
significantly associated to the latter (model 6). 
Also, model 7 (similar to model 2) shows, that while founder equity is negatively 
associated with the fraction of outsiders on the board, founder equity square is 
positively related to the dependent variable. The level of 23.5% retained founder 
ownership marks the inflection point. 
The interaction term between founder equity and monitoring equity in model 8 is 
negatively and significantly related to the proportion of independent directors on the 
board. As monitoring equity increases the relationship between equity retained by 
founders and board independence becomes stronger, meaning that monitoring equity 
and founder equity work as complements. 
Model 9 also includes founder equity squared as well as interaction terms of founder 
equity with monitoring equity and founder equity squared with monitoring equity. 
While the first interaction term is negative and significant, the second is also negative 
yet insignificant. This indicates that as monitoring equity increases, the alignment effect 
of founder equity on board independence increases (suggesting that founder equity and 
monitoring equity work as complements) and the entrenchment effect of founder equity 
on board independence weakens (suggesting that founder equity and monitoring equity 
work as substitutes). 
Model 10 presents results from a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 0.2 
significance level for variable addition). The model confirms the positive relationship 
between monitoring equity and board independence (in line with the spirit of hypothesis 
1b) as well as the negative relationship of retained founder ownership with the fraction 
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of outsiders on the board (hypothesis 1c). It furthermore confirms that as monitoring 
equity increases the relationship between retained founder equity and board 
independence becomes stronger.  
 
According to AIC and BIC, model 5 may be the preferred one. In view of the 
considerable correlation between ‘retvceq’ and ‘retfoude’18 (as well as ‘retfoude’ and its 
square19), t-statistics for individual variables should be treated with caution. 
 
Overall results of these models are in line with hypotheses 1a (proposing a negative 
association between founder power and board independence), 1b (proposing a positive 
association between VC power and board independence), and 1c (proposing a non-
linear relationship between founder power and board independence). Moreover, further 
tests indicate that with increasing monitoring equity (and to a lesser extent also VC 
equity), the alignment effect of founder equity on board independence increases 
(suggesting that founder equity and monitoring equity work as complements) and the 
entrenchment effect of founder equity on board independence decreases (suggesting that 
founder equity and monitoring equity work as substitutes). The interpretation for the 
latter should be treated with caution since the corresponding interaction term was not 
found to be significant. 
  
The following model was employed to perform OLS regressions: 
pcoutsiders = α0 + β1X + β2retfoude + β3retfoudesq + β4foundceo + β5intfouil +  
β6retfoude*X + β7retfoudesq*X +β8foreign + β9segment + β10logmarcap  
+ β11logfirmage + β12logdirs + ε 
(with X = retvceq (models 1 to 5), X = retmoneq (models 6 to 10) 
                                                 
18
 Joint inclusion of these variables is conceptually necessary 
19
 Although reduced through centering 
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Table 13: Fraction of independent directors 
 
Models estimating outsiders’ power (measured by the average tenure of outsider 
directors) are depicted in Table 14 below. In order to test the hypotheses derived from 
agency theory and the bargaining model, founder and VC related variables are used next 
to control variables typically employed in corporate governance research.  
Due to the properties of the dependent variable, tobit estimations are performed. 
Normality is tested by employing a conditional moment test first developed by Newey 
pc o uts ide rs mo d0 mo d1 mo d2 mo d3 mo d4 mo d5 mo d6 mo d7 mo d8 mo d9 mo d10
b/s e b/s e b/s e b/s e b/s e b/s e b/s e b/s e b/s e b/s e   b/s e
retvceq 0.125* 0.090° 0.074 0.123° 0.090°                               
(0.052) (0.054) (0.061) (0.074) (0.053)                               
re tfo ude -0.167*** -0.225*** -0.181*** -0.234*** -0.225*** -0.123* -0.182*** -0.165*** -0.208*** -0.165***
(0.046) (0.050) (0.045) (0.050) (0.047) (0.048) (0.053) (0.047) (0.055)   (0.044)   
retfo udes q 0.419** 0.391** 0.429** 0.388** 0.199                  
(0.141) (0.140) (0.139) (0.144) (0.161)                  
re tmo neq 0.168*** 0.137** 0.093° 0.131*  0.095°  
(0.045) (0.047) (0.049) (0.058)   (0.049)   
retfo ude* -0.316 -0.066                               
re tvceq (0.260) (0.246)                               
re tfo udes q* -0.851                               
re tvceq (0.802)                               
re tfo ude* -0.592** -0.413°  -0.581** 
retmo neq (0.207) (0.225)   (0.207)   
retfo udes q* -0.874                  
re tmo neq (0.767)                  
fo undceo 0.033* 0.036* 0.034* 0.036* 0.036* 0.028° 0.031* 0.030° 0.031*  0.030°  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)   (0.015)   
intfo uil 0.004* 0.004* 0.005* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004° 0.004° 0.004* 0.004*  0.005*  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002)   
fo re ign 0.081* 0.101** 0.096** 0.100** 0.096** 0.088** 0.089** 0.087** 0.085** 0.086** 0.082** 
(0.035) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)   (0.030)   
s egment -0.033° -0.026 -0.022 -0.027 -0.022 -0.033° -0.030 -0.033° -0.032°  -0.029   
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)   (0.018)   
lo gmarcap 0.061** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.052** 0.053** 0.052** 0.053** 0.051** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)   (0.016)   
lo gfirmage -0.046* -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.011 -0.011 -0.015 -0.012                  
(0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)                  
lo gdirs 0.055 -0.045 -0.051 -0.043 -0.053 -0.041 -0.049 -0.043 -0.043                  
(0.078) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.077)                  
_co ns -0.091 -0.069 -0.099 -0.076 -0.098 -0.195° -0.005 -0.033 -0.021 -0.031   -0.055   
(0.144) (0.140) (0.138) (0.141) (0.138) (0.107) (0.136) (0.134) (0.136) (0.134)   (0.127)   
N 388 381 381 381 381 381 368 368 368 368 368
F 9,509 10,196 10,741 9,437 8,887 14,228 10,935 11,287 11,508 9,762 13,237
R 2 0.122 0.199 0.218 0.202 0.219 0.214 0.216 0.232 0.231 0.239   0.230   
adj.R 2 0.110 0.180 0.197 0.180 0.193 0.199 0.197 0.210 0.210 0.213   0.212   
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000   
AIC -396.68 -421.45 -428.30 -420.49 -424.89 -432.52 -414.25 -419.64 -419.36 -418.82 -422.47
BIC -372.91 -382.02 -384.93 -377.12 -373.63 -400.97 -375.16 -376.65 -376.37 -368.02 -387.29
Wald(p) 0.150 0.105 0.106 0.103 0.119 - 0.219 0.228 0.222 0.234 -
J a rque- 0.852 0.354 0.076 0.305 0.070 0.079 0.331 0.095 0.144 0.068 0.190
Bera(p)
inflectio n pt. 0.268 0.235
Standard e rro rs  a re  repo rted bas ed o n the  Huber-White  s andwich es timato r o f va riance
s ignificant ° a t 10% leve l, * a t 5% leve l, ** a t 1% leve l, *** a t 0.1% leve l
OLS
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(1985) and Tauchen (1985). Since the asymptotic distribution of this test produces 
severe size distortions (Skeels and Vella, 1997), a parametric bootstrap is used to 
correct the size distortion by employing bootstrap critical values (Drukker, 2002). For 
all models estimated, the normality assumption cannot be rejected at all conventional 
levels. Since multicollinearity statistics are unknowable for tobit, VIFs were calculated 
for similar OLS regressions (see Gupta and Swenson, 2003, for a similar application). 
Individual VIFs and mean VIFs for all models are below levels which would raise 
concerns regarding multicollinearity. Models report robust standard errors. 
Model 0 consists solely of control variables. Firm age (logfirmage) is positive and 
significant, suggesting that the older the firm, the longer the average tenure of outsider 
directors. Similarly, board size (logdirs) is also positively and weakly significantly 
related to the dependent variable (yet this holds for model 0 only). No other control 
variable shows a significant relationship (this holds for all models). 
In line with hypothesis 2a, retained founder ownership (model 1) as an indicator of 
founder power is negatively and significantly related to the average tenure of outsiders. 
Thus, the more ownership (hence power) held in the hands of founders, the more 
limited is independent directors’ power proxied by the length of their service on the 
board. Similarly there is also a negative and significant relationship between founders’ 
experience proxied by their average interlocks and average outsider tenure on board at 
IPO. On the other hand, the founder-CEO dummy is also significant but the sign of the 
coefficient is positive. This may indicate that with a founder-CEO heading the firm, the 
need for outsiders serving on the board has arisen earlier (and thus their average tenure 
is longer). As expected, the coefficient of the retained VC equity variable is positive and 
strongly significantly related to independent directors’ average tenure. Thus, the data 
support hypothesis 2b.  
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Overall, the evidence is consistent with hypotheses 2a and 2b, in line with Baker and 
Gompers (2003) as well as Boone et al. (2005) who also relied on agency and 
bargaining. 
 
In order to test for the hypothesised non-linear relationships between ownership 
variables and independent directors’ tenure intensity, the square of the retained founder 
ownership variable is included as a regressor in model 2. While the coefficient of 
retained founder ownership remains negative and significant, the coefficient of its 
square is also negative and not significant, indicating the absence of a non-linear 
(quadratic) relationship between retained founder equity and the power of outsiders on 
the board proxied by their average tenure, thus hypothesis 2c is not supported.20  
Model 3 tests whether the nature of the relationship between founders’ retained 
ownership and outsider directors’ power changes at different levels of retained VC 
ownership. Retained founder equity is interacted with retained VC equity and is 
included as an additional regressor in model 3. The interaction term is positive and 
significant indicating that the (negative) association between founder equity and 
outsiders’ power weakens as retained VC equity increases. Measures of model fit 
improved. 
Model 4 presents results from a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 0.2 
significance level for variable addition). The model confirms the negative relationship 
between retained founder ownership and outsider directors’ average tenure (hypothesis 
2a) as well as the positive relationship between VC ownership and outsiders’ tenrue 
(hypothesis 2b) and that the (negative) association between founder equity and 
outsiders’ power weakens with increasing levels of retained VC equity. 
 
                                                 
20
 An unreported model tested for a cubic relationship, yet the data does not support such a relationship 
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In models 5 to 8 the retained VC equity variable is replaced with a variable capturing 
both VC equity and equity held by institutional blockholders (‘retmoneq’). 
Results show that monitoring equity is positively and significantly related to outsider 
directors’ power (model 5). Other results are similar to model 1.  
Model 6, similar to model 2, tests for a non-linear relationship between founder equity 
and outsiders’ power, yet fails to detect one.21   
Model 7 tests whether the nature of the relationship between founders’ retained 
ownership and outsider directors’ power changes at different levels of monitoring 
ownership. Retained founder equity is interacted with monitoring equity and is, similar 
to model 3, included as an additional regressor in model 7. The interaction term is 
positive yet not significant, unlike the significant interaction term in model 3. Thus 
while with increasing levels of monitoring equity the effect of founder equity on 
outsiders’ power is weakened, this relationship is not statistically significant. 
A stepwise forward selection model (model 8) confirms the negative relationship 
between retained founder ownership and outsiders’ board tenure (hypothesis 2a) as well 
as the positive relationship between monitoring ownership and outsiders’ average tenure 
(in line with the spirit of hypothesis 2b).  
According to AIC and BIC model 8 is the preferred one. In view of the considerable 
correlation between ‘retmoneq’ and ‘retfoude’22, t-statistics for individual variables 
should be treated with caution. 
 
To sum up, the evidence is consistent with hypotheses 2a and 2b, yet, unlike with board 
independence as dependent variable, a non-linear relationship between founder 
ownership and average tenure of outside directors is not detected, thus hypothesis 2c is 
not supported. 
                                                 
21
 An unreported model tested for a cubic relationship, yet the data does not support such a relationship 
22
 Joint inclusion of these variables is conceptually necessary 
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Since the author examines companies at IPO and since unquoted companies are not 
required to have non-executives, the finding that VC equity is associated with longer 
average independent director tenure (as is VC-backing per se as tested in unreported 
models) may indicate that the higher VCs’ equity the higher is outsiders’ power 
(average tenure) and VC-backed firms seem to move to the next level of the corporate 
governance life-cycle earlier than their peers. The establishment of monitoring 
mechanisms before IPO and earlier than their peers, is an indication for the relative 
higher level of professionalisation in VC-backed companies, thus lending support to one 
of the main research questions. 
These results should, however, be viewed with caution because of the considerable 
number of missing data with respect to the dependent variable for many sample firms. 
(Board appointment dates (and thus tenure) of directors of pre-IPO firms are often not 
available.) 
 
The following model was employed to perform tobit regressions: 
avgteno = α0 + β1X + β2retfoude + β3retfoudesq + β4foundceo + β5intfouil +  
β6retfoude*X + β7retfoudesq*X +β8foreign + β9segment + β10logmarcap + 
β11logfirmage + β12logdirs + ε 
(with X = retvceq (models 1 to 4), X = retmoneq (models 5 to 8) 
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Table 14: Average tenure of independent directors 
 
After having examined founders’ and VCs’ role regarding board independence and 
independent directors’ power, the author turns to presenting results relating to the 
professionalisation among the board of directors in the following.  
 
avgteno mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5 mod6 mod7 mod8
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
retvceq 3.183*** 3.249*** 5.928*** 5.831***
(-0.946) (-0.957) (-1.459) (-1.459)
retfoude -4.780*** -4.715*** -4.288*** -4.176*** -4.800*** -4.749*** -4.591*** -4.738***
(-0.998) (-0.999) (-0.982) (0.958) (-1.084) (-1.071) (-1.079) (-1.059)
retfousq -1.465 -1.093                
(-3.986) (-4.201)                
retmoneq 2.416** 2.475** 3.100** 2.331** 
(-0.868) (-0.871) (-1.175) (0.859)   
retfoude*retvceq 15.549** 15.487**                
(-5.93) (-5.990)                
retffousq*retvceq                
               
retfoude*retmoneq 4.410                
(-4.944)                
retfousq*retmoneq                
               
foundceo 0.932* 0.933* 0.915* 0.951** 0.995** 1.000** 0.996** 0.999** 
(-0.363) (-0.363) (-0.362) (0.355) (-0.360) (-0.360) (-0.361) (0.357)   
intfouil -0.085* -0.087* -0.099* -0.098* -0.092* -0.093* -0.093* -0.098*  
(-0.040) (-0.041) (-0.040 (0.039) (-0.041) (-0.041) (-0.041) (0.040)   
foreign 0.219 0.323 0.345 0.33 -0.028 -0.02 0.009                
(-0.803) (-0.704= (-0.708) (-0.664) (-0.684) (-0.685) (-0.669)                
segment -0.689 -0.103 -0.107 -0.071 -0.199 -0.201 -0.193                
(-0.432) (-0.417) (-0.418) (-0.418) (-0.412) (-0.412) (-0.414)                
logmarcap -0.227 -0.144 -0.136 -0.124 -0.045 -0.038 -0.039                
(-0.380) (-0.378) (-0.377) (-0.386) (-0.385) (-0.384) (-0.390)                
logfirmage 1.623** 2.480*** 2.487*** 2.532*** 2.585*** 2.460*** 2.469*** 2.517*** 2.492***
(-0.494) (-0.519) (-0.523) (-0.523) (0.507) (-0.520) (-0.527) (-0.534) (0.493)   
logdirs 3.070° -0.465 -0.451 -0.603 -0.805 -0.805 -0.864                
(-1.661) (-1.511) (-1.518) (-1.495) (-1.515) (-1.515) (-1.498)                
_cons -1.812 -1.191 -1.205 -1.08 -2.589*** -1.605 -1.624 -1.575 -2.677***
(-2.998) (-3.098) (-3.099) (-3.144) (0.534) (-3.178) (-3.182) (-3.212) (0.536)   
lnsigma 0.895*** 0.776*** 0.777*** 0.776*** 0.780*** 0.759*** 0.759*** 0.760*** 0.761***
_cons (-0.069) (-0.075) (-0.074) (-0.075) (0.077) (-0.077) (-0.077) (-0.077) (0.079)   
N 300 294 294 294 294 285 285 285 285
ll -427.139 -392.586 -392.498 -390.345 -390.640 -380.137 -380.09 -379.787 -380.410
chi2 23.454 95.972 97,58 93.281 89.044 90.932 92.235 90.742 85.757
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
ML(Cox-Snell) R2 0.071 0.240 0.241 0.252 0.250 0.247 0.247 0.249 0.246
AIC 868.279 807.171 808.997 804.691 797.281 782.274 784.181 783.574 774.819
BIC 894.205 847.69 853.200 848.894 826.749 822.451 828.011 827.404 800.387
Wald(p) 0.404 0.955 0.955 0.977 - 0.904 0.908 0.906 -
CM 5.281 4.732 5.398 8.584 7.720 4.884 5.402 6.696 5.156
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance; CM level of significance 
for all models: p>0.05; significant  ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
TO BIT
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5.3.2 Results related to experience and professionalisation 
In the following sections, the author describes the models used to test hypotheses 
regarding the professionalisation of the most important position in the firm and 
professionalisation with respect to the board.  
 
5.3.2.1 Founder leadership 
Table 15 shows models examining the likelihood of having a founder-CEO at IPO. 
Mainly founder and VC-related variables next to control variables commonly used in 
corporate governance research are included. 
Model 0 contains control variables only, all of which are insignificantly related to the 
likelihood of having a founder serving as CEO at IPO. 
It has been argued earlier that founders’ power increases the chance of the founder-CEO 
to retain the position at least until the IPO (hypothesis 3a). While the coefficient of the 
ownership retained by founders variable points in the predicted direction it is not 
significant (model 1). The fraction of founders on the IPO firm’s board is strongly 
significantly positively related to likelihood of a founder heading the firm as CEO. Thus 
founder power (with respect to the proportion of founders on the board) is positively 
associated with the likelihood of having a founder-CEO at IPO in line with hypothesis 
3a. The coefficient of the VC-dummy has a positive sign but is insignificantly related to 
the likelihood of having a founder-CEO at IPO. This finding is inconsistent with 
hypothesis 3b. 
In model 2 retained founder equity is swapped for the founder chairman dummy. The 
sign of the coefficient of the founder chairman dummy is negative and strongly 
significant.  
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In the next model, the author swaps the dummy for VC-backing with a dummy 
indicating that an IPO firm is backed by a syndicate of VCs, i.e. backed by at least two 
VCs (model 3). The VC-syndication dummy is negative and significant at the 5% level.  
Model 4 presents results from a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 0.2 
significance level for variable addition). The model confirms the positive association 
between founder power (in the form of the fraction of founders on board) and the 
likelihood of a founder-CEO leading the firm at IPO (hypothesis 3a), as well as the 
negative relationship between VC syndication and the likelihood of having the IPO firm 
having a founder-CEO (hypothesis 3c). Being backed by a VC syndicate corresponds to 
a decrease by 0.110 in the probability of being floated with a founder-CEO heading the 
IPO firm (according to marginal effects when all other variables are held at their mean). 
(Similarly, the change in the founder-chairman dummy from ‘0’ to ‘1’ corresponds to a 
0.204 decrease in the probability of having a founder-CEO (according to marginal 
effects). Thus having both positions filled by founders may indicate too high a level of 
founder power and seems therefore not preferred in IPO firms.) 
 
While the probit model is based on the assumption of a standard normal distribution 
function (see e.g. Verbeek 2004), standard tests used for OLS regressions do not apply 
for probit estimations. Therefore, a semi-nonparametric estimator is employed (Stewart, 
2004) which fits a generalised response model that nests the probit employing the semi-
nonparametric series estimator of an unknown density proposed by Gallant and Nychka 
(1987). A Hermite series expansion is used to approximate the unknown distribution of 
the stochastic error term in the underlying latent variable model. Likelihood-ratio (LR) 
tests of the probit model against the corresponding semi-nonparametric (SNP) extended 
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models are performed. Since LR-tests are significant (with the exception of the one for 
model 4), probit models (0 to 3) are rejected (see Stewart, 2004).23 
However, results of SNP models are similar to those obtained by probit models. With 
the inclusion of the syndication dummy (SNP model 3), the significance level for 
founders’ proportion on the board is reduced from the 0.1% level becoming marginally 
significant only (10%-level).  
All in all, support is found with respect to hypothesis 3a stating that founder power is 
positively associated with the chance of a founder-CEO holding this position at IPO. 
Furthermore, evidence is found consistent with hypothesis 3c proposing that VC 
syndication is negatively linked to the likelihood of having a founder-CEO leading the 
IPO firm, while VC-backing per se does not seem to bear a significant association in 
this respect. Hypothesis 3b is therefore not supported. 
 
AIC and BIC improved model by model and point to model 4 as the preferred model. In 
view of the hightened correlation between ’syndummy’ and ‘pcfoudir’, t-statistics for 
individual variables may have to be treated with caution. 
 
The following model was employed to perform probit regressions and SNP 
respectively: 
foundceo = α0 + β1vc + β2syndummy + β3retfoude + β4pcfoudir + β5foundch +  
 β6foreign + β7segment + β8logmarcap + β9logfirmage + β10logdirs + ε 
 
                                                 
23
 LR-tests are also significant when models employing transformed continuous variable(s) are run. Yet, 
qualitatively similar estimation results to those depicted in the table were obtained when performing 
probit models excluding the most influential observations (making running SNP models unnecessary 
according to LR-tests). 
Since stepwise (forward) selection for SNP is not supported by the software and since the LR-test (probit 
vs corresponding SNP) for model 4 is insignificant, model 4 is reported as probit estimation only. 
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Table 15: Founder-CEO likelihood at IPO  
foundceo mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
vc 0.179 0.104 0.187 0.268
(0.164) (0.159) (0.174) (0.236)




pcfoudir 2.500*** 2.790*** 2.998*** 2.809*** 4.019*** 3.973*** 3.567°
(0.693) (0.662) (0.682) (-0.636) (0.683) (-1082) (-2.128)
foundch -0.633*** -0.686*** -0.652*** -0.646° -0.565***
(0.145) (0.148) (-0.148) (0.335) (0.123)
foreign 0.004 0.001 0.059 0.017 -0.549 0.035 -0.007 -0.001
(0.324) (0.332) (0.326) (0.329) -1.004 (0.301) (0.307) (0.275)
segment -0.081 -0.059 0.014 -0.033 0.540 -0.055 0.049 -0.052
(0.172) (0.186) (0.188) (0.185) (-2.061) (0.152) (0.157) (0.191)
logmarcap -0.154 -0.145 -0.061 0.014 -0.368 -0.337* -0.192* -0.118
(0.165) (0.173) (0.167) (0.170) (0.408) (0.140) (0.086) (0.141)
logfirmage 0.034 0.300 0.447° 0.453° 0.452* -0.843 0.058 0.370 0.241
(0.219) (0.249) (0.239) (0.237) (-0.226) -1.319 (0.213) (0.368) (0.284)
logdirs -0.363 0.444 0.486 0.695 -0.269 0.990 0.635 0.850
(0.630) (0.691) (0.709) (0.695) (-2.471) (0.968) (0.680) (0.606)
_cons 2.112 0.255 -0.196 -0.805 -0.139
(-1.289) (-1.437) (-1.401) (-1.414) (-0.272)
b1 -5.886 1.972** 0.858 1.516
_cons (-6.109) (0.646) (0.976) -3469
b2 2.588 -0.303 -0.066 -0.126
_cons (-2.260) (0.543) (0.129) (0.580)
b3 2.948 -0.492*** -0.233 -0.365
_cons (-3.065) (0.102) (0.188) (0.691)
N 388 384 386 386 382 388 384 386 386
ll -219.318 -20.1388 -195.653 -193.794 -191.785 -215.885 -197.437 -192.298 -191.244
chi2 1.927 21.888 39.193 41.568 39.748 1107.587 95.086 28.069 136.312
p 0.859 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 450.636 420.777 409.305 405.587 393.570 447.770 416.873 406.597 404.488
BIC 474.402 456.332 444.908 441.19 413.297 479.458 460.33 450.111 448.003
ML(Cox-Snell)R2 0.005 0.078 0.110 0.118 0.121
Wald(p) 0.375 0.552 0.217 0.118 -
LR(probit vs SNP) 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.024 0.132
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
PROBIT SNP
 
5.3.2.2 Professional accounting qualifications 
Due to the nature of the dependent variable the data was initially grouped into quartile 
categories and analysed by ordered probit. However, tests reveal that the parallel 
regression assumption ordered models make (Long, 1997) is violated.  
Alternatively, generalised ordered probit models could be run since they relax the 
parallel regression assumption. Also, since in over 60% of the sample firms no outside 
director holding a professional accounting qualification is appointed and since there is 
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rather little variation among firms with such qualified directors, it may be appropriate to 
use a dummy indicating whether there is at least one outside director on the board 
possessing such qualification (‘accdoutyes’) as a dichotomous dependent variable in 
probit models.  
 
Table 16 displays models estimating the likelihood of firms having one (or more) board 
members holding professional accounting qualifications. 
Model 0 of Table 16 solely contains usual control variables that are amended by a 
dummy indicating a reported loss of the firm prior to IPO proxying for the riskiness of 
the firm. Only the latter variable was found to be significant. The sign of its coefficient 
is negative and a change in this dummy from ‘0’ to ‘1’ corresponds to a 0.180 decrease 
in the probability of having at least one outside director with a professional accounting 
qualification on the IPO firms board (according to marginal effects). 
In model 1 the VC-dummy is added along with control variables. The VC-dummy is 
positively and significantly related to the likelihood of the IPO firm having independent 
director(s) holding professional accounting qualification(s), consistent with hypothesis 
4.  
Holding all other variables at their means, the change in the VC dummy from ‘0’ to ‘1’ 
corresponds to a 0.108 increase in the probability of having at least one outside director 
with a professional accounting qualification (according to marginal effects). 
In the following models founder-related variables are added. Retained founder 
ownership and the founder-CEO dummy are not significantly related to the likelihood 
of having independent directors with professional accounting qualifications. 
In model 3 the newly added founder-related variables are swapped in favour of two 
others, the fraction of founders on board and average founder interlocks, both of which 
are found to be insignificant. This suggests that neither founder power nor founder 
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experience is related to the likelihood of outsiders possessing professional accounting 
qualifications. 
Model 4 employs controls, the VC-dummy and the fraction of independent directors on 
the board. The (sign of the) coefficient of the latter variables is positive and significant 
suggesting that the likelihood of having qualified accountants as outside directors is 
higher the higher the fraction of outsiders on the board. 
Model 5 (probit) is referred to when describing SNP models. 
 
As for the probit models estimated in previous sections, the ordered probit models 
employed here are also compared to SNP models via a LR-test since probit is based on 
the assumption of a standard normal distribution function (see e.g. Verbeek 2004).  
Table 16 also reports LR-tests some of which are significant, making running of SNP 
models necessary for those cases. 
Overall, results are similar. The VC-dummy is positive and significant (with 
considerably larger coefficients) in all models in line with hypothesis 4.24 The dummy 
for reported loss prior to the IPO is also negative and significant (with considerably 
larger coefficients) in all models. In SNP model 2, retained founder ownership is 
positive and significant, while in SNP model 3 average interlocks by founders are found 
to be negative and significant. In model 4, VC-backing and the fraction of outsiders on 
the board are both positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of having 
one or more professionally qualified accountants among the independent directors. 
Model 5 (SNP) is a parsimonious model containing significant variables only (probit 
model 5 is the corresponding model to this one)25 again confirming a positive and 
                                                 
24
 Hypothesis 4 is also supported when (probit) models are run without controlling for foreign firms (that 
are associated with some of the most influential observations). In those models there is no strong case for 
running SNP models according to LR-tests. 
25
 Since for a stepwise forward selection probit model (unreported) a significant LR-test was obtained and 
since stepwise (forward) selection for SNP is not supported by the software, a parsimonious SNP model 
along with its corresponding probit model is reported instead. 
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significant association between VC-backing and the likelihood of having at least one 
outsider holding a professional accounting qualification.  
According to measures of model performance model 5 should be the preferred one. In 
view of the considerable correlation between ‘vc’ and ‘retfoude’ and to a lesser extent 
‘pcfoudir’ and ‘retfoude’, t-statistics for individual variables should be treated with 
caution. 
 
The following model was employed to perform probit models: 
accdoutyes = α0 + β1vc + β2retfoude + β3foundceo + β4pcfoudir + β5intfouil +  
 β6pcoutsiders + β7lossb4ip + β8foreign  + β9segment + β10logmarcap +  
 β11logfirmage + β12logdirs + ε 
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Table 16: Outside directors with professional accounting qualifications 
accdout- mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5 mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5
yes b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se   b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se   
vc 0.284° 0.330* 0.287° 0.257°  0.303* 1.181*** 1.192** 1.053*** 0.693°  0.815***
 (0.145) (0.153) (0.147) (0.147)   (-0.150) (0.283) (0.379) (0.289) (0.381)   (-0.215)
retfoude 0.288                (0.573) 1.821*                0.726*  
(0.390)                (-0.380) (0.762)                (-0.307)
foundceo -0.095                0.147                               
(0.160)                (0.543)                               
pcfoudir -0.357                -1,057                               
(0.475)                -1,503                               
intfouil -0.023                (-0.020) -0.111***                -0.073***
(0.017)                (-0.016) (0.029)                (-0.019)
pcoutsiders 1.466** 1.553** 3.764** 3.906***
(0.530)   (-0.539) -1,374 (-0.558)
lossb4ip -0.485** -0.482** -0.492** -0.492** -0.526*** -0.457** -1,320 -1.537** -1.645*** -1.680** -1.990** -2.349***
(0.151) (0.152) (0.157) (0.155) (0.155)   (-0.152) (0.882) (0.515) (0.361) (0.520) (0.622)   (-0.264)
foreign -0.072 -0.035 -0.042 -0.073 -0.128   -0.168 -0.329 -0.058 -0.413 -0.194                  
(0.317) (0.315) (0.316) (0.317) (0.324)   (0.848) (0.359) (0.276) (0.368) (0.437)                  
segment -0.105 -0.045 -0.040 0.027 -0.002   -0.153 0.261 -0.316 0.439 -0.033                  
(0.180) (0.184) (0.188) (0.191) (0.185)   (0.240) (0.352) (0.506) (0.367) (0.275)                  
logmarcap -0.042 -0.050 -0.065 -0.043 -0.113   0.078 0.138 0.102 0.281° -0.223                  
(0.160) (0.163) (0.165) (0.165) (0.164)   (0.129) (0.146) (0.141) (0.158) (0.222)                  
logfirmage -0.194 -0.130 -0.158 -0.231 -0.080   -0.206 0.390 -0.171 -0.212 0.720°                 
(0.210) (0.214) (0.217) (0.232) (0.220)   (0.862) (0.437) (0.856) (0.425) (0.397)                  
logdirs -0.102 -0.278 -0.134 -0.343 -0.117   -0.755 -1,985 -1.966° -2.248* -0.095                  
(0.647) (0.657) (0.677) (0.674) (0.661)   -1,053 -1,577 -1,039 -1,061 -2,076                
_cons 0.489 0.459 0.425 0.680 0.230   -1.004***                               
(-1.249) (-1.257) (-1.303) (-1.337) (-1.260) (-0.299)                               
b1 -0.915 -1.504* -2,044 -1.594*** -2.329** -1.959***
_cons (-2.054) (0.678) (-1.600) (0.312) (0.792)   (-0.207)
b2 0.016 -0.326*** -0.302* -0.324*** -0.288   -0.304***
_cons (0.225) (0.050) (0.129) (0.056) (0.190)   (-0.057)
b3 0.323 0.653** 0.771° 0.669*** 0.806** 0.730***
_cons (0.515) (0.211) (0.437) (0.116) (0.259)   (-0.092)
N 364 364 362 364 364 362 364 364 362 364 364 362
ll -237.15 -235.19 -232.68 -234.23 -231.57 -228.71 -236.90 -233.41 -229.48 -231.20 -227.57 -222.86
chi2 12,280 15,479 16,667 17,151 22,079 22.972 32,535 43,317 96,984 78,260 68,907 232.112
p 0.056 0.030 0.054 0.046 0.005   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000   
AIC 488.29 486.37 485.37 488.47 481.14 469.43 491.80 486.81 482.96 486.40 477.14 461.71
BIC 515.57 517.55 524.29 527.44 516.21 492.78 526.87 525.78 529.66 533.17 520.01 492.85
ML(Cox- 0.034 0.044 0.048 0.049 0.063 0.068
Snell R2)
Wald(p) 0.252 0.258 0.291 0.243 0.103 -
LR(probit 0.482 0.059 0.011 0.014 0.005 0.001
vs SNP)
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
PROBIT SNP
 
5.3.3 Legitimacy-related results 
This results section is again split into one sub-section presenting results with respect to 
role legitimacy and a second presenting results related to board prestige. 
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5.3.3.1 Role legitimacy 
In Table 17 models examining founders’ and VCs’ roles with respect to role legitimacy 
are examined.  
Model 0 contains control variables only. As described earlier, using these control 
variables is typical in corporate governance research. There is a negative and weakly 
significant association between the stock market segment dummy and the likelihood of 
the IPO firm being headed by an experienced CEO, indicating that companies floated on 
AIM on average have a lower likelihood of having an experienced CEO at their IPO. 
Firm age at IPO (logfirmage) is negatively and strongly significantly associated with the 
likelihood of an experienced CEO at the helm of the IPO company.  
Compared to model 0, model 1 adds with the VC dummy the first independent variable. 
The sign of the coefficient of the VC dummy is positive and the coefficient is 
significantly related to the likelihood of the IPO firm being led by a CEO who has 
already accumulated experience of leading a firm before.  
Models 2 and 3 additionally contain founder related variables. In model 2 retained 
founder equity and the founder-CEO dummy are added yet both do not seem to be 
significantly related to the likelihood of having an experienced CEO leading the IPO 
firm. 
Model 3 swaps the founder-CEO dummy for founders’ average interlocks, yet the latter 
is also insignifantly associated with the dependent variable. The VC-dummy remains 
positive and significantly related to the likelihood a having an experienced CEO at the 
helm of the IPO firm consistent with hypothesis 5a.  
Results of a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 0.2 significance level for 
variable addition) are reported in model 4. The model confirms the positive and 
significant association of VC-backing with the likelihood of the IPO firm having a CEO 
with prior experience in the CEO role (hypothesis 5a). Holding all other variables at 
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their means, the change in the VC dummy from ‘0’ to ‘1’ (and hence being VC-backed) 
corresponds to 0.177 increase in the probability of the IPO firm being led by a founder-
CEO with prior experience in this role.  
 
Since the probit model is based on the assumption of a standard normal distribution 
function, the probit models are compared to SNP models via LR-tests (as outlined in 
more detail earlier. With the exception of model 4, LR-tests are significant at the 5%-
level (model 0 containing control variables only) and the 1%-level for the other models, 
making a case for running SNP models 0 to 3.26 
The coefficient of the VC-dummy is of higher magnitude, remains positive and, 
becomes strongly significant (0.1% level) in all models consistent with hypothesis 5a. 
The founder-related variables of model 2 also remain insignificant in SNP model 2, yet 
in model 3 both retained founder ownership and average founder interlocks are 
positively and significantly related to the likelihood of the firm having an experienced 
CEO at IPO at the 10%-level and 1%-level respectively. This finding may indicate that 
the more powerful founders are by virtue of ownership and experience the higher the 
chance of the most senior executive to be experienced in the CEO position. 
 
Measures of model performance point towards model 4 as the preferred model. In view 
of the considerable correlation between ‘vc’ and ‘retfoude’, t-statistics for individual 
variables should be treated with caution. 
 
                                                 
26
 LR-tests for models 0 to 3 are also significant when models employing transformed continuous 
variable(s) are run. Yet, qualitatively similar estimation results to those depicted in the table below were 
obtained when performing probit models excluding the most influential observations (making running 
SNP models unnecessary according to LR-tests).  
Since stepwise (forward) selection for SNP is not supported by the software and since the LR-test (probit 
vs corresponding SNP) for model 4 is insignificant, model 4 is reported as probit estimation only. 
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To sum up, results are consistent with hypothesis 5a proposing that VC-backing is 
positively associated with the firm going public with a CEO who has already 
accumulated CEO experience with another firm before. 
 
The following model was employed to perform probit and SNP estimations: 
ceoprceo = α0 + β1vc + β2retfoude + β3foundceo + β4intfouil + β5foreign + β6segment  
 + β7logmarcap + β8logfirmage + β9logdirs + ε 
 
Table 17: CEO role legitimacy  
ceoprceo mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3   mod4 mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3   
b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   
vc 0.463** 0.505** 0.514** 0.459** 1.248*** 1.119*** 1.377***
(0.148) (0.156) (0.156)   -0.146 (0.322) (0.317) (0.318)   
retfoude 0.475 0.443   0.725 1.094°  
(0.385) (0.389)   (0.484) (0.659)   
foundceo 0.002                0.235                
(0.161)                (0.288)                
intfouil 0.018   0.086** 
(0.018)   (0.032)   
foreign 0.142 0.210 0.186 0.219   0.036 1.134** 0.903* 0.512   
(0.313) (0.327) (0.328) (0.325)   (0.579) (0.358) (0.446) (0.757)   
segment -0.307° -0.202 -0.242 -0.293   -0.198 -0.209 -0.302 -0.474 -0.642°  
(0.179) (0.185) (0.190) (0.196)   (-0.151) (0.386) (0.314) (0.321) (0.362)   
logmarcap -0.041 -0.065 -0.064 -0.070   -0.058 -0.174 -0.240° -0.324*  
(0.159) (0.161) (0.164) (0.163)   (0.349) (0.116) (0.144) (0.155)   
logfirmage -0.964*** -0.879*** -0.965*** -0.918*** -0.907*** -1.658 -2.576*** -2.282*** -2.607***
(0.212) (0.214) (0.225) (0.231)   -0.215 (-1.281) (0.328) (0.647) (0.497)   
logdirs 0.775 0.538 0.680 0.610   1.253 1.794° 2.103° 3.026*  
(0.664) (0.671) (0.690) (0.697)   (-2.297) (0.970) (-1.107) (-1.314)
_cons 0.339 0.345 0.151 0.189   0.320                
(-1.241) (-1.244) (-1.292) (-1.274) (-0.232)                
b1 1.972 3.615* 2.448 2.634** 
_cons (-2.121) (-1.771) (-1.604) (0.993)   
b2 0.373 -0.001 -0.033 -0.000   
_cons (-2.050) (0.113) (0.106) (0.089)   
b3 -0.633 -1.184* -0.818° -0.910** 
_cons (0.884) (0.505) (0.450) (0.281)   
N 355 355 351 351 351 355 355 351 351
ll -227.413 -222.497 -219.508 -218.961 -220.792 -224.689 -218.256 -215.339 -214.618
chi2 25.762 33.531 33.452 34.735 32.617 97.112 280.816 154.556 168.962
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
AIC 466.826 458.995 457.016 455.922 449.584 465.378 454.513 452.679 451.235
BIC 490.059 486.099 491.763 490.669 465.027 496.355 489.362 495.147 493.704
ML(Cox- 0.074 0.100 0.105 0.108 0.098              
Snell) R2
Wald(p) 0.863 0.914 0.886 0.911 -
LR(probit 0.020 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.181
vs SNP)  
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance




Founder-CEO with previous experience as CEO: 
It may be expected that it is the CEO’s experience rather than the CEO’s founder status 
per se that matters to VCs. But since there is considerable social capital inherent in 
founder-CEOs, those with relevant experience should be more likely to retain their 
position or, put differently, should be less prone to founder-CEO replacement. VC 
backing may therefore be positively related to founder-CEOs who are experienced in 
the CEO role (at least among the founder-CEO sub-sample). 
 
In the founder-CEO sub-sample (Table 18), among the control variables (model 0) a 
strongly significant negative relationship is found between firm age at IPO (logfirmage) 
and also the segment dummy, indicating the likelihood of having an experienced 
founder-CEO in the CEO seat at IPO is lower for companies floated on AIM. 
Across all following models that additionally contain independent variables, VC-
backing is found to be strongly significantly positively associated with the likelihood of 
having a founder-CEO with prior experience in the CEO role elsewhere. For model 1, 
holding all other variables at their means, the change in the VC-dummy from ‘0’ to ‘1’ 
corresponds to an increase in the probability of having an experienced founder-CEO at 
IPO by 0.221. Among the founder-related variables only founder experience proxied by 
average founder interlocks shows a significant (positive) association with the likelihood 
of having an experienced CEO heading the IPO firm.  
Model 4 is referred to when describing SNP models. 
 
Again, since probit is based on the assumption of a standard normal distribution 
function, LR-tests are employed that compare SNP and probit models. All LR-tests are 
significant indicating the need to estimate SNP models.27 
                                                 
27
 This holds when models employing transformed continuous variable(s) are run. Yet, qualitatively 
similar estimation results to those depicted in the table below were obtained when performing probit 
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In all SNP models the coefficient of the VC-dummy increased in magnitude and it is 
also positive and significant. The same holds for the coefficient for average founder 
interlocks.  
Model 4 (SNP), a parsimonious model containing significant variables only (probit 
model 4 is the corresponding model to this one)28, again confirming the significant 
positive association of VC-backing with the likelihood of having an experienced 
founder-CEO at IPO. 
According to BIC, model 4 may be the preferred one. In view of the hightened 
correlation between ‘intfouil’ and ‘logfirmage’, t-statistics for individual variables 
should be treated with caution. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
models excluding the most influential observations (making running SNP models unnecessary according 
to LR-tests). 
28
 Since for a stepwise forward selection probit model (unreported) a significant LR-test was obtained 
and since stepwise (forward) selection for SNP is not supported by the software, a parsimonious SNP 
model along with its corresponding probit model is reported instead. 
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Table 18: Founder-CEO role legitimacy (founder-CEO sub-sample) 
 
foceprce mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se   
vc 0.382 0.629*** 0.698*** 0.602** 0.674*** 0.715** 0.975*** 0.858*  1.023***
(0.181) (0.194) (0.184)   (-0.169) (0.240) (0.229) (0.435)   (-0.212)
retfoude 0.651                0.733                               
(0.493)                (0.545)                               
intfouil 0.061* 0.055*  0.043* 0.156*** 0.185** 0.120** 
(0.025) (0.024)   (-0.020) (0.041) (0.065)   (-0.037)
lossb4ip -0.291   -0.654*                 
(0.196)   (0.286)                  
foreign 0.382 0.459 0.511 0.599   0.776° 1,016 0.824                  
(0.376) (0.416) (0.408) (0.410)   (0.431) (0.706) (0.908)                  
segment -0.471* -0.315 -0.555* -0.426°  -0.233 -0.702* -0.379                  
(0.209) (0.218) (0.229) (0.228)   (0.292) (0.330) (0.590)                  
logmarcap -0.241 -0.262 -0.271 -0.268   -0.424*** -0.617*** -0.412°                 
(0.198) (0.205) (0.202) (0.201)   (0.113) (0.111) (0.231)                  
logfirmage -1.355*** -1.197*** -1.287*** -1.299*** -1.024*** -2.046*** -2.121* -2.730*** -2.473***
(0.281) (0.287) (0.297) (0.301)   (-0.268) (0.595) -1,070 (0.681)   (-0.502)
logdirs 0.270 -0.160 -0.055 -0.105   0.835 1,164 1,602                
(0.767) (0.787) (0.853) (0.790)   -1.229 -1.406 -1.009                
_cons 2.609° 2.552 2.329 2.654°  0.073                               
(-1.562) (-1.599) (-1.591) (-1.581) (-0.262)                               
b1 4.397 -4.094 9.364 1.905
_cons (-13.945) (-5.428) (-50.524) (-2.961)
b2 4.218 1.813 5.541 2.336
_cons (-13.880) (-2.424) (-43.163) (-4.395)
b3 -0.822 1.460 -2.077 -0.372
_cons (-2.617) (-1.608) (-10.059) (-0.566)
N 257 257 255 252 259 257 255 252 259
ll -160.489 -154.424 -149.063 -148.413 -155.050 -152.292 -144.300 -142.138 -151.091
chi2 25.150 35.741 43.078 42.929 41.033 233.958 154.071 32.196 53.997
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000   
AIC 332.978 322.849 316.127 314.826 318.100 322.584 310.600 306.276 314.181
BIC 354.272 347.692 347.998 346.591 332.328 354.526 349.554 345.099 335.522
ML(Cox- 0.108 0.149 0.178 0.169 0.242                
Snell R2)
Wald(p) 0.949 0.954 0.899 0.966 -
LR(probit 0.003 0.039 0.002 0.000 0.005
vs SNP)
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
PROBIT (founder-CEO sub-sample) SNP (founder-CEO sub-sample)
 
In addition the same models are run on the full sample of firms (Table 19). The 
coefficient of the VC-dummy is again, in all models, positively and strongly 
significantly related to the likelihood of the firm going public with a founder in the CEO 
position who has accumulated experience in the CEO position before having been 
appointed CEO of the focal IPO firm. For example, for model 4 which presents results 
from a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 0.2 significance level for 
variable addition), holding all other variables at their means, the change in the VC-
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dummy from ‘0’ to ‘1’ corresponds to an increase in the probability of having an 
experienced founder-CEO at IPO by 0.212. 
None of the founder-related variables is significantly related to the likelihood of having 
a founder-CEO at IPO who has prior experience of heading a firm but the dummy for a 
reported loss prior to the IPO is.  
The only control variable consistently showing a statistically significant (negative) 
association with the likelihood of having a founder holding the CEO position with prior 
experience in that position accumulated elsewhere is firm age. The older the firm at IPO 
the less likely it is headed by an experienced founder-CEO. 
 
Due to the probit model’s assumption of a standard normal distribution function, 
corresponding SNP models are run and compared via LR-tests to the probit models. 
Overall, LR-tests for some models are significant, indicating a need for running SNP 
estimations in those cases.29  
Again, the coefficient of the VC-dummy is positive and significantly related to the 
likelihood of having a founder with prior CEO experience heading the IPO firm for 
those models. Among the founder-related variables founders’ experience proxied by 
average founder interlocks is also positively and significantly related to the probability 
of having a founder as CEO who already gained experience in the CEO role.  
Similarly, the coefficient of the dummy capturing whether an IPO firm reported a loss 
before its flotation is (negative and) significant. Furthermore, next to firm age also firm 
size (logmarcap) is negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of the IPO firm 
going public with an experienced founder-CEO. 
                                                 
29
 This holds when models employing transformed continuous variable(s) are run. Yet, qualitatively 
similar estimation results to those depicted in the table below were obtained when performing probit 
models excluding the most influential observations (making running SNP models unnecessary according 
to LR-tests). 
Since stepwise (forward) selection for SNP is not supported by the software and since the LR-test (probit 




According to AIC and BIC model 4 should be the preferred model. In view of the 
hightened correlation between ‘logfirmage’ and ‘lossb4ip’, t-statistics for individual 
variables should be treated with caution. 
 
Overall, VC-backing is positively and significantly related to the likelihood of having a 
founder-CEO at IPO who is experienced in this role, supporting hypothesis 5b. This 
finding holds for the founder-CEO sub-sample as well as the whole sample.  
 
Table 19: Founder-CEO role legitimacy (full sample) 
 
foceprce mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3
b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   
vc 0.661*** 0.722*** 0.629*** 0.631*** 0.618* 0.697** 0.667** 
(0.157) (0.168) (0.158)   (-0.154) (0.259) (0.237) (0.224)   
retfoude 0.636                0.778                
(0.414)                (0.507)                
intfouil 0.003 0.004   0.063* 0.066*  
(0.020) (0.020)   (0.029) (0.028)   
lossb4ip -0.394*  -0.376* -0.539** 
(0.167)   (-0.164) (0.164)   
foreign 0.361 0.480 0.464 0.572°  0.046 0.524 0.369 0.575   
(0.316) (0.341) (0.341) (0.341)   (0.341) (0.446) (0.418) (0.434)   
segment -0.419* -0.274 -0.343° -0.194   -0.050 -0.083 -0.350 -0.172   
(0.190) (0.198) (0.204) (0.207)   (0.251) (0.434) (0.222) (0.192)   
logmarcap -0.218 -0.267 -0.268 -0.232   -0.133 -0.242** -0.341*** -0.358*** -0.249*  
(0.165) (0.172) (0.175) (0.174)   (-0.129) (0.092) (0.080) (0.092) (0.106)   
logfirmage -0.983*** -0.883*** -0.972*** -0.999*** -0.937*** -2.362*** -1.603 -1.556** -1.754** 
(0.211) (0.216) (0.235) (0.239)   (-0.219) (0.385) -1.273 (0.493) (0.547)   
logdirs 0.159 -0.159 0.030 0.070   1.257 0.485 0.546 0.193   
(0.704) (0.729) (0.754) (0.735)   (0.793) -1.696 (0.819) (0.763)   
_cons 1.901 1.997 1.724 1.749 0.955                
(-1.273) (-1.313) (-1.336) (-1.332) (-0.967)                
b1 7.126 17.619 23.869 27.297
_cons (-6.908) (-83.055) (-80.254) (-117.603)
b2 4.361 11.002 12.253 13.073
_cons (-4.139) (-49.197) (-39.720) (-55.451)
b3 -2.133 -4.697 -6.081 -7.055
_cons (-2.068) (-21.267) (-20.330) (-30.243)
N 355 355 351 349 349 355 355 351 349
ll -207.533 -198.578 -195.856 -192.812 -194.654 -201.009 -197.151 -192.487 -188.313
chi2 22.916 37.396 38.456 39.747 36.777 756.493 282.244 779.231 925.916
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
AIC 427.066 411.156 409.711 403.625 399.307 418.018 412.302 406.974 398.627
BIC 450.299 438.260 444.458 438.320 418.583 448.995 447.151 449.442 441.033
ML(Cox- 0.062 0.108 0.116 0.120 0.111                
Snell R2)
Wald(p) 0.497 0.676 0.597 0.905
LR(probit 0.000 0.091 0.009 0.002 0.051
vs SNP)
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level




In a further related analysis (yet not testing a hypothesis) the same models are run for 
the sub-sample of firms headed by CEOs that have already gained experience as a CEO 
before (Table 20).  
The dummy for VC-backing is also positively and significantly associated with the 
likelihood of having an experienced founder-CEO at IPO.30  
 
According to AIC and BIC, model 4 (a stepwise forward selection model) should be 
regarded as the preferred model. In view of the hightened correlation between ‘vc’ and 
‘logmarcap’, t-statistics for individual variables may have to be treated with caution. 
 
                                                 
30
 However, it should be noted that for probit models the p-value for the overall model is far from 
optimal. (Variables in these models remained unchanged to models in the two previous tables for easy 
comparability. In unreported models adding the fraction of founders on the board (positive and strongly 
significant in both probit and SNP) improves p-values considerably). While in SNP models p-values for 
the overall models are considerably improved compared to probit models, LR-tests point out that only for 
model 0 and to a lesser extent model 3, SNP models need to be run (again, the inclusion of the fraction of 
founders on the board makes the case for running SNP models stronger according to LR-tests). 
Since stepwise (forward) selection for SNP is not supported by the software and since the LR-test (probit 
vs corresponding SNP) for model 4 is insignificant, model 4 is reported as probit estimation only. 
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Table 20: Founder-CEO role legitimacy (sub-sample of experienced CEOs) 
foceprce mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   
vc 0.692** 0.721** 0.661* 0.689** 1.149 0.950* 0.838*  
(0.265) (0.267) (0.268) (-0.255) (-1.234) (0.441) (0.390)   
retfoude 0.312 1.270                
(0.692) (0.964)                
intfouil -0.025 -0.023 -0.081* -0.028   
(0.028) (0.027) (0.041) (0.030)   
lossb4ip -0.382 -0.414° -0.533   
(0.250) (-0.242) (0.419)   
foreign 0.787 0.927 0.856 1.037° 1.002° 0.016 3.022* 0.852 1.010
(0.538) (0.601) (0.587) (0.609) (-0.607) (0.262) (-1.535) (0.602) (-1.325)
segment -0.451 -0.316 -0.226 -0.164 0.033 -0.201 -0.193 -0.053   
(0.283) (0.291) (0.325) (0.311) (0.259) (0.309) (0.286) (0.244)   
logmarcap -0.516° -0.601* -0.578* -0.526° -0.465° -0.659*** -0.512 -0.817** -0.504*  
(0.276) (0.274) (0.276) (0.275) (-0.241) (0.097) (0.429) (0.262) (0.208)   
logfirmage -0.471 -0.382 -0.450 -0.462 -1.757*** -0.455 -0.744 -0.764   
(0.417) (0.409) (0.427) (0.447) (0.379) (0.399) (0.458) (0.610)   
logdirs -1.085 -1.189 -0.937 -0.788 0.270 -3.330 -0.039 -1.798
(-1.011) (-1.101) (-1.137) (-1.085) (0.903) (-4.942) (-2.090) (-1.587)
_cons 5.904** 6.098** 5.705* 5.417* 3.865*
(-2.270) (-2.344) (-2.412) (-2.363) (-1.799)
b1 1.986*** 1.299*** 1.214*** 1.274***
_cons (0.243) (0.370) (0.358) (0.379)   
b2 0.225° -0.340* -0.623*** -0.267   
_cons (0.130) (0.152) (0.105) (0.193)   
b3 -0.435*** -0.452*** -0.367*** -0.380***
_cons (0.061) (0.114) (0.103) (0.073)   
N 148 148 148 146 146 148 148 148 146
ll -81.304 -77.456 -76.901 -75.401 -76.845 -77.434 -75.612 -75.014 -72.701
chi2 8.029 12.675 13.252 13.692 12.997 3208.93 2274.79 2892.49 2563.98
p 0.155 0.048 0.103 0.090 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
AIC 174.608 168.913 171.801 168.801 163.690 170.868 169.223 172.028 167.403
BIC 192.592 189.893 198.776 195.654 178.608 194.845 196.198 204.997 200.223
ML(Cox- 0.095 0.139 0.147 0.147 0.102                
Snell R2)
Wald(p) 0.271 0.314 0.258 0.420 -
LR(probit 0.005 0.054 0.052 0.020 0.079
vs SNP)
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
PROBIT (ceoprceo sub-sample) SNP (ceoprceo sub-sample)
 
The following model was employed to perform probit and SNP estimations: 
 foceprce = α0 + β1vc + β2retfoude + β3intfouil + β4lossb4ip + β5foreign + β6segment +  
        β7logmarcap + β8logfirmage + β9logdirs + ε 
 
To sum up, VCs are associated with experienced CEOs in general and experienced 
founder-CEOs in particular, whereas VC-backing is not associated with founder-CEOs 
per se (as an earlier finding of this thesis showed).  
 
In the next section, the author is going to present results related to director prestige. 
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5.3.3.2 Board prestige 
In this sub-section, the author presents results with respect to VCs, founders and their 
role regarding prestige, including educational, social and political prestige. 
 
Prestigious educational background: 
Table 21 displays models examining director prestige in terms of prestigious education. 
Mainly founder and VC-related variables next to control variables commonly used in 
corporate governance research were included. Due to the properties of the dependent 
variable, tobit estimations are run. VIFs and mean VIFs are below levels to raise 
concern regarding multicollinearity.31 According to conditional moment tests with 
bootstrap critical values, the normality assumption cannot be rejected at the 5% level 
and the 1% level respectively.32 Robust standard errors are reported.  
Model 0 solely contains control variables typically used in corporate governance 
research. Since it can be argued that (prestigious) directors are recruited for strategic 
reasons including ‘windowdressing’ of firms with reported less favourable performance/ 
characteristics before their IPO, a dummy indicating the firm reported losses before the 
IPO (lossb4ip) is added to the model(s). While none of the standard control variables 
seems to be significantly associated with the dependent variable, the latter dummy is 
positive and significant, indicating that there is a positive association between firms 
with reported losses before their IPO and the fraction of directors with prestigious 
education.  
Next, the VC-dummy is added to the estimation (model 1). The coefficient of the VC 
dummy is positively and significantly related to the proportion of directors with elite 
education in line with hypothesis 6a.  
                                                 
31
 As for reasons outlined earlier, VIFs were calculated based on similar OLS regressions. 
32
 The same applies when models employing transformed continuous independent variable(s) are run. If 
the dependent variable had also been transformed, the normality assumption would have strongly been 
rejected. 
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In models 2 and 3, founder-related variables are added, yet neither retained founder 
ownership and the founder-CEO dummy (model 2) nor the fraction of founders on 
board and founders’ experience (model 3) seem to be significantly related to the 
proportion of directors holding degrees from prestigious educational institutions with 
the dummy for VC-backing remaining (positive and) statistically significant. 
The data collection phase revealed that among VC directors a considerable number was 
educated at elite universities. It is possible that VC directors with prestigious education 
may themselves have driven the results found previously, since the dependent variable, 
the proportion of directors with elite educational background, includes VC directors 
with such a background. While among the 2,274 directors not affiliated with a VC 
according to the prospectus, 116 were educated at an elite institution (5.10%), among 
the 127 VC directors 24 reportedly are graduates of prestigious universities (18.90%). 
In half of the VC-backed IPOs (98), VC directors were present at flotation. The variable 
‘pcvcdir’ capturing the fraction of VC-directors on board (model 4) is added in favour 
of the VC-dummy. The coefficient of the new variable is strongly significantly 
positively related to the fraction of directors with prestigious education and much larger 
in magnitude than the coefficient of the VC-dummy in previous models.  
Model 5, a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 0.2 significance level for 
variable addition), confirms this result, which indicates that it may the proportion of VC 
directors on board which is related to the fraction of directors with degrees from 
prestigious universities (rather than VC-backing per se).  
Among this block of models, model 5 is the preferred one according to measures of 
model performance. In view of the hightened correlation between between ‘logfirmage’ 
and ‘lossb4ip’, t-statistics for individual variables should be treated with caution. 
 
However, as outlined above, the proportion of VC directors with degrees from 
prestigious universities is much larger than that of non-VC directors on the board. All 
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VC-directors with prestigious education were filtered out and a new dependent variable 
(pcpreduwvc) measuring the proportion of all other directors with prestigious education 
(relative to the total number of directors minus those VC directors with elite education) 
was created for model 6. This model contains next to control variables a variable 
capturing the number of VC directors educated at prestigious universities as well as the 
dummy indicating reported losses before the IPO. The coefficient of the variable 
capturing VC directors with elite education is significantly (positively) related to the 
proportion of directors with prestigious education (having previously filtered out VC 
directors with such education). Model 7, a stepwise forward selection model (employing 
a 0.2 significance level for variable addition) based on model 6, confirms this result.33 
This model should be the preferred one according to AIC and BIC. In view of the 
hightened correlation between between ‘logfirmage’ and ‘lossb4ip’, t-statistics for 
individual variables should be treated with caution. 
 
Results indicate that it is the VC directors with prestigious education who are associated 
with the fraction of (other) directors who graduated from prestigious universities. This 
finding is in line with the similarity hypothesis (Byrne, 1971) proposing similarity 
biases in interpersonal attraction.  
 
The following model was employed to perform tobit regressions (models 0 to 5): 
pcpreste = α0 + β1vc + β2pcvcdir +  β3retfoude + β4foundceo + β5pcfoudir +  
β6intfouil + β7lossb4ip +  β8foreign + β9segment + β10logmarcap +  
β11logirmage + β12logirs + ε 
 
The following model was employed to perform tobit regression (models 6 and 7): 
                                                 
33
 Fractional probit estimations (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) of all models in this table produced 
qualitatively similar results. 
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pcpreduwvc = α0 + β1vcdpreste + β2lossb4ip +  β3foreign + β4segment + β5logmarcap  
+ β6logirmage + β7logirs + ε 
 
Table 21: Director prestige by elite educational background 
mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5 mod6 mod7
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se   
vc 0.104* 0.098* 0.100*                               
(0.047) (0.049) (0.048)                               
pcvcdir 0.728*** 0.745***                               
(0.186) (-0.185)                               
vcdpreste 0.205** 0.207** 
(0.072)   (0.071)   
retfoude -0.064                               
(0.119)                               
foundceo -0.046                               
(0.048)                               
pcfoudir 0.047                               
(0.158)                               
intfouil -0.004                               
(0.006)                               
lossb4ip 0.135** 0.135** 0.123** 0.138** 0.128** 0.137** 0.093*  0.093*  
(0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (-0.042) (0.045)   (0.045)   
foreign 0.032 0.047 0.046 0.043 0.035 0.083                  
(0.080) (0.079) (0.077) (0.081) (0.084) (0.078)                  
segment -0.044 -0.026 -0.021 -0.015 -0.035 -0.057 -0.038                  
(0.056) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.056) (-0.044) (0.056)                  
logmarcap 0.034 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.013 0.018                  
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.050) (0.047)                  
logfirmage 0.122° 0.143* 0.148* 0.141° 0.134* 0.130* 0.125°  0.138*  
(0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.074) (0.066) (-0.065) (0.066)   (0.063)   
logdirs 0.121 0.055 0.012 0.078 0.131 0.221   0.338*  
(0.197) (0.198) (0.197) (0.206) (0.191) (0.193)   (0.170)   
_cons -0.679° -0.651 -0.571 -0.693 -0.574 -0.356*** -0.660°  -0.638***
(0.410) (0.413) (0.416) (0.445) (0.392) (-0.077) (0.372)   (0.142)   
lnsigma -1.124*** -1.136*** -1.143*** -1.138*** -1.162*** -1.168*** -1.177*** -1.174***
_cons (0.070) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066) (-0.066) (0.062)   (0.062)   
N 379 379 376 379 379 376 382 382
ll -151.028 -148.409 -146.774 -147.993 -143.601 -142.713 -138.004 -138.939
chi2 17.748 25.179 26.743 25.891 37.300 34.699 26.470 22.882
p 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000   
ML(Cox- 0.039 0.052 0.056 0.054 0.076 0.076 0.059 0.055
Snell)R2
AIC 318.056 314.817 315.548 317.986 311.025 297.426 294.009 289.878
BIC 349.556 350.255 358.774 361.299 346.463 321.004 329.517 313.551
Wald(p) 0.145 0.161 0.199 0.164 0.169 - 0.478 -
CM 4.323 16.918 19.171 16.192 34.286 43.966 48.036 44.184
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance; CM level of signif. p>0.05 




To sum up, VC-backing is associated with higher levels of directors with degrees from 
elite universities, supporting hypothesis 6a. (The hypothesis was also supported by 
findings in unreported models with the proportion of directors who received elite 
education at ‘Oxbridge’ as the dependent variable.) Further analysis revealed that it may 
 243
not be VC-backing per se but rather the VC directors who drive this result. It is 
attempted to distinguish between the whole of the VC directors and those who obtained 
degrees from elite universities. Results of model 6 and 7 indicate that similarity biases 
might be present, since the fraction of VC directors with degrees from elite universities 
is positively related to the fraction of directors with similar elite background (excluding 
the VC directors with prestigious education). This corresponds to recent findings of 
Franke et al. (2006) who present evidence that VCs tend to prefer start-up teams similar 
to themselves in training and professional experience. Their and this thesis’ finding are 
consistent with the similarity hypothesis (Byrne, 1971).  
 
Prestigious social background: 
Due to the nature of the dependent variable (pcsumhon) the data was initially grouped 
into quartile categories and analysed by ordered probit. However, tests reveal that the 
parallel regression assumption ordered models make (Long, 1997) is violated. 
Alternatively, generalised ordered probit models could be run since they relax the 
parallel regression assumption. Also, since in roughly 80% of the sample none of the 
directors have a prestigious social background (as defined by directors holding British 
honours and titles) and since there is rather little variation among firms with directors of 
a prestigious background, it may be more appropriate to use a dummy indicating 
whether any (level of) British honours and titles is held among the directors. Thus, a 
corresponding dichotomous dependent variable is created (‘brithon’) and models are 
estimated by probit.  
 
Table 22 shows models estimating the likelihood of directors holding (any) social 
prestige (as defined previously).  
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Model 0 solely contains control variables commonly used in corporate governance 
research plus an indicator for reported loss before flotation, of which only board size 
(logdirs) is significant.  
In model 1 the VC dummy is added. The sign of its coefficient is negative but it is not 
significant which is counter to hypothesis 6a. 
All subsequent models also contain founder-related variables. In model 2 (and model 3) 
the dummy for VC-backing is (negative and) significant, indicating that VC-backing is 
associated with a decrease in the likelihood of the firm having British honours and titles 
held among the board. Also, the coefficient of the founder-CEO dummy is positive and 
significant, thus being led by a founder is associated with an increase in the likelihood 
of having at least one director holding British honours or titles. 
Since Page and Spira (2000) report that non-executive directors are much more likely to 
hold British honours and titles, model 3 swaps the board size (logdirs) control variable 
for (the log of) the number of non-executives on the board (lognexdirs). The latter 
control variable is found to be strongly significant and measures of model performance 
show improvements compared to the previous model.34 
Model 4 is referred to when describing SNP models. 
 
Again, corresponding SNP models are run and compared via LR-tests to the probit 
models. LR-tests were found to be significant, indicating that SNP estimation is 
required (except for the controls only model (0)).35  
For all models, VC-backing is found to be negatively and significantly associated with 
the likelihood of having British honours and titles present on the board of directors. 
Model 4 (SNP) is a parsimonious model containing significant variables only (probit 
                                                 
34
 Since none of the VC-directors in the sample firms was reportedly awarded honours or titles, the results 
cannot be driven by the (fraction of) VC-directors as it seems to be the case with director prestige in terms 
of prestigious education. 
35
 The same applies when models with a transformed continuous independent variable are run and for 
models run without controlling for foreign firms (that are associated with some of the most influential 
observations). 
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model 4 is the corresponding model to this one)36 again confirming the negative and 
significant association of VC-backing with the presence of British honours and titles 
held by directors found in previous models. The sign of the coefficient of the founder-
CEO dummy is positive and it is significant as is the dummy for firms reporting losses 
prior to the IPO (except for model 1). Among the control variables next to board size 
(logdirs and lognexdirs) that were also significant in probit models, firm size 
(logmarcap) and the segment dummy are consistently significantly (negatively) related 
to the likelihood of having directors with British honours or titles on the board.  
Measures of model performance (AIC and BIC) point towards model 4 as the preferred 
model. In view of the considerable correlation between ‘logmarcap’ and ‘segment’ and 
between ‘logmarcap’ and ‘lognexdirs’, t-statistics for individual variables should be 
treated with caution.  
 
Overall, with respect to prestige in the form of British honours and titles, the data does 
not support hypothesis 6a. 
 
The following model was employed to perform probit regressions (and SNP models 
respectively): 
brithon = α0 + β1vc + β2retfoude + β3foundceo + β4lossb4ip + β5foreign + β6segment +  
β7logmarcap + β8logfirmage + β9logdirs +β10lognexdirs + ε 
 
                                                 
36
 Since for a stepwise forward selection probit model (unreported) a significant LR-test was obtained and 
since stepwise (forward) selection for SNP is not supported by the software, a parsimonious SNP model 
along with its corresponding probit model is reported instead. 
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Table 22: Director prestige by elite social background 
brithon mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   
vc -0.175 -0.280° -0.297° -0.241 -1.036*** -2.385*** -1.401*** -2.379** 
(0.150) (0.161) (0.160) (0.150) (0.230) (0.385) (0.254) (0.744)   
retfoude -0.572 -0.373 -0.109 -0.375                
(0.438) (0.437) (0.874) -1.300                
foundceo 0.459* 0.478* 0.470* 2.053*** 1.146*** 1.557** 
(0.190) (0.195) (0.192) (0.453) (0.317) (0.583)   
lossb4ip 0.144 0.141 0.191 0.147 0.148 0.947** 0.370 1.310** 1.015** 1.072°  
(0.164) (0.164) (0.169) (0.170) (0.163) (0.297) (0.275) (0.442) (0.345) (0.574)   
foreign -0.280 -0.312 -0.271 -0.404 -0.653 -1.234** -1.672** -1.033                
(0.362) (0.358) (0.371) (0.383) (0.441) (0.476) (0.531) (0.743)                
segment -0.295 -0.336° -0.325 -0.312 -0.345° -1.827*** -1.662*** -3.353*** -1.888*** -3.050***
(0.202) (0.198) (0.200) (0.203) (0.190) (0.261) (0.290) (0.341) (0.435) (0.539)   
logmarcap -0.169 -0.154 -0.114 -0.136 -0.148 -0.572*** -0.021 -0.828*** -0.438*** -0.276***
(0.175) (0.174) (0.180) (0.179) (0.171) (0.120) (0.096) (0.165) (0.110) (0.069)   
logfirmage -0.044 -0.075 -0.008 0.046 0.685* -0.122 -0.277 0.457                
(0.243) (0.244) (0.260) (0.261) (0.287) (0.350) (0.816) (0.650)                
logdirs 2.335** 2.444** 2.223** 4.695*** 4.011*** 9.752***                
(0.746) (0.764) (0.766) -1.219 -1.114 -1.724                
lognexdirs 1.728*** 1.748*** 3.797*** 5.576***
(0.504) (0.481) (0.813) -1.028
_cons -1.285 -1.349 -1.669 -0.532 -0.566                
(-1.324) (-1.322) (-1.428) (-1.415) -1.300                
b1 -0.659 1.894** 1.541 -0.027 -0.254   
_cons (0.592) (0.631) (-1.576) (0.405) -11.319
b2 -0.715*** -0.558** -4.200* -0.967*** -7.068
_cons (0.207) (0.191) (-.2006) (0.250) -16.552
b3 0.164 -0.660*** -1.161 0.088 -3.474
_cons (0.115) (0.164) (0.885) (0.111) -15.215
b4 0.093*** 0.187*** 1.622 0.129** 5.547
_cons (0.024) (0.037) (-1.174) (0.044) -24.248
N 382 382 379 376 378 382 382 379 376 378
ll -181.909 -181.335 -177.004 -174.268 -175.895 -180.586 -177.289 -169.743 -167.362 -168.510
chi2 17.007 19.587 27.221 32.513 28.829 196.052 144.455 299.403 333.909 144.107
p 0.009 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
AIC 377.819 378.669 374.007 368.535 365.789 381.172 376.577 365.487 360.724 357.020
BIC 405.436 410.233 413.382 407.831 393.334 420.626 419.977 416.675 411.808 396.369
ML(Cox- 0.044 0.047 0.066 0.077 0.070
Snell R2)
Wald(p) 0.446 0.433 0.483 0.420 -
LR(probit 0.266 0.017 0.001 0.001 0.001
vs SNP)
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
PROBIT SNP
 
Prestigious political background: 
Models estimating relationships between independent variables and the likelihood of 
having political prestige among the IPO firm’s board are depicted in Table 23. 
Model 0 solely contains control variables. The dummy capturing whether a firm was 
registered in the UK or abroad (‘foreign’) is not included in the controls since it predicts 
failure perfectly. None of the controls is significantly related to the likelihood of 
political prestige among directors. The p-value for the overall model is beyond 
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conventionally accepted levels (note that political prestige is present in 14 out of the 
390 sample firms only). 
Model 1 adds the VC dummy next to controls. The sign of the coefficient of the VC 
dummy is positive but it is not significant with the p-value for the overall model being 
beyond conventionally accepted levels. 
With ownership retained by founders and the founder chairman dummy, founder-related 
variables are added to the model (model 2). (The usually employed founder-CEO 
dummy is swapped for the founder chairman dummy since a current or former MP can 
only be found in sample firms headed by a founder-CEO.) Only the dummy for founder 
chairman is significantly (positively) related to the likelihood of political prestige held 
among the board of directors, though the p-value for the overall model is still beyond 
conventionally accepted levels. 
In model 3 the fraction of directors educated at prestigious institutions is added. Such 
directors are negatively (and significantly) related to the likelihood of firms having 
members of the political prestige among its directors. This may indicate that among the 
sample firms a ‘prestige snowball’ effect (that causes those firms that already have the 
most prestige to build up even more (e.g. Chen et al., 2008)) does not seem to exist. The 
p-value for the overall model reached an acceptable level. 
Model 4, a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 0.2 significance level for 
variable addition), is the preferred model according to AIC and BIC.  
 
As has been outlined previously, probit is based on the assumption of a standard normal 
distribution function, corresponding SNP models are run and compared via LR-tests to 
the probit models. According to the LR-tests, SNP models are not preferred over probit 
models and the former models are therefore not reported. 
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Due to the fact that only 14 out of 390 sample firms appointed members of the political 
elite to their IPO-firms’ boards and the (associated) insufficient model fit in most 
models, these models were only presented to allow covering all types of prestige 
outlined in previous chapters. 
 
The following model was employed to perform probit regressions: 
mpdummy = α0 + β1vc + β2retfoude + β3foundch + β4pcpreste + β5segment +  
β6logmarcap + β7logfirmage + β8logdirs + ε 
 
Table 23: Director prestige by elite political background 
mpdummy mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se








segment 0.180 0.189 0.175 0.216
(0.329) (0.334) (0.331) (0.341)
logmarcap 0.060 0.058 0.063 0.116
(0.225) (0.224) (0.229) (0.234)
logfirmage -0.066 -0.058 -0.118 -0.078
(0.387) (0.384) (0.370) (0.372)
logdirs 1.035 1.013 0.790 0.712
(0.842) (0.881) (0.956) (0.956)
_cons -3.142° -3.137° -3.127° -3.427° -1.912***
(-1.724) (-1.725) (-1.758) (-1.813) (0.196)
N 388 388 382 379 379
ll -56.311 -56.299 -54.894 -52.638 -53.405
chi2 2.106 2.265 5.253 16.541 7.053
p 0.716 0.811 0.629 0.035 0.029
AIC 122.621 124.597 125.788 123.276 112.810
BIC 142.426 148.363 157.351 158.714 124.622
ML(Cox-Snell)R2 0.003 0.003 0.010 0.021 0.017
Wald(p) 0.8860 0.8793 0.9183 0.930 -
LR(probit vs SNP) 0.136 0.165 0.193 0.055 0.780
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance




Summing up, VC-backing is found to be positively and significantly related to the 
fraction of directors holding degrees from prestigious educational institutions, yet 
negatively (and significantly) associated with the presence of British honours and titles 
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among the IPO firms’ directors. VC-backing was not found to be linked to the 
likelihood of the IPO firm having a member of the political elite appointed to the board. 
Thus, support was found for hypothesis 6a with respect to prestige in the form of elite 
education only. 
 
5.3.3.3 Affiliations with prestigious organisations 
Table 24 shows results of probit models estimating the likelihood of a prestigious 
auditor being involved with the firm at IPO. Model 0 solely contains control variables. 
Companies floated on AIM have a lower likelihood of being audited by one of the top 
players. Examining marginal effects, being floated on AIM corresponds to a 0.226 
lower likelihood of having a prestigious auditor being involved with the IPO firm. With 
increasing firm size as well as board size, the likelihood of the IPO firm being audited 
by Big Five/Big Six auditors increases.  
In model 1, the author adds the VC dummy. The sign of the coefficient is positive and 
the latter is weakly statistically significantly related to the likelihood of the firm going 
public having a prestigious auditor at the IPO. Holding all variables at their means, the 
change of the VC-dummy from ‘0’ to ‘1’ (indicating VC-backing) corresponds to a 
0.092 increase in the likelihood of being audited by a Big Five/Big Six firm. 
Model 2 and 3 additionally contain founder related variables. Neither retained founder 
equity nor having a founder-CEO at IPO (model 2) nor the fraction of founders holding 
board position and founders’ experience (measured by their average interlocks) seem to 
be associated with the likelihood of having hired a prestigious auditor at IPO. While the 
VC-dummy is weakly significant in model 3, it is just outside the 10% significance 
level in model 2.  
Since founder-related variables show now significance, model 4 adds CEO experience 
proxied by CEO’s interlocks to the VC-dummy and controls. Both the VC-dummy and 
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the variable capturing CEO’s experience are positive and significant at the 10% and 5% 
level respectively.  
Model 5, a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 0.2 significance level for 
variable addition), confirms the negative association between VC-backing and the 
likelihood of having a prestigious auditor involved in the IPO firm. This model is the 
preferred model according to measures of model performance. In view of the 
considerable correlation between ‘logmarcap’ and ‘segment’ and between ‘logmarcap’ 
and ‘logdirs’, t-statistics for individual variables should be treated with caution. 
 
Again, LR-tests are performed (SNP versus probit models) because of the probit 
model’s assumption of a standard normal distribution function. None of the LR-tests are 
significant, hence probit models are not rejected. Corresponding SNP models are 
therefore not reported. 
 
Overall, evidence is found in support of hypothesis 6b that proposed VC-backing to be 
positively associated with the likelihood of the IPO firm having hired a prestigious 
auditor. 
 
The following model was employed to perform probit regressions: 
prestaud = α0 + β1vc + β2retfoude + β3foundceo + β4pcfoudir + β5intfouil +  
 β6intceoil + β7foreign + β8segment + β9logmarcap + β10logfirmage +  
 β11logdirs + ε 
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Table 24: Prestigious auditor 
prestaud mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4   mod5
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se
vc 0.248° 0.219 0.259° 0.249°  0.266°
(0.146) (0.153) (0.148) (0.147)   (0.146)
retfoude -0.228                
(0.375)                
foundceo 0.156                
(0.164)                
pcfoudir -0.141                
(0.504)                
intfouil 0.012                
(0.016)                
intceoil 0.041*  0.042*
(0.020)   (0.020)
foreign 0.080 0.122 0.134 0.145 0.182   
(0.315) (0.312) (0.306) (0.311) (0.312)   
segment -0.613*** -0.568** -0.533** -0.609** -0.701*** -0.600***
(0.176) (0.179) (0.181) (0.186) (0.187)   (0.178)
logmarcap 0.584*** 0.573*** 0.602*** 0.562*** 0.537** 0.590***
(0.167) (0.168) (0.170) (0.170) (0.171)   (0.172)
logfirmage -0.324 -0.282 -0.287 -0.270 -0.250   
(0.206) (0.209) (0.218) (0.224) (0.212)   
logdirs 1.516* 1.363* 1.268° 1.303* 1.291*  1.277*
(0.644) (0.647) (0.668) (0.660) (0.642)   (0.644)
_cons -4.652*** -4.627*** -4.811*** -4.483** -4.358*** -4.987***
(-1.276) (-1.283) (-1.324) (-1.390) (-1.309) (-1.285)
N 388 388 384 388 388 384
ll -216.056 -214.629 -212.333 -214.288 -212.138 -211.359
chi2 79.400 79.242 77.772 80.884 83.622 80.572
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000
AIC 444.112 443.258 442.666 446.576 440.276 434.719
BIC 467.878 470.985 478.222 482.225 471.964 458.423
ML(Cox-Snell)R2 0.196 0.202 0.201 0.203 0.212 0.205
Wald(p) 0.199 0.236 0.218 0.212 0.168 -
LR(probit vs SNP) 0.530 0.730 0.663 0.660 0.741 0.065
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance




In the following section, the author presents results regarding relationships between 
board roles and IPO market performance. 
 
5.3.4 Results related to performance 
The final sub-section of the results chapter outlines results from the analysis of 





For models estimating initial returns ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis 
was performed. Regression diagnostics suggest that residuals are not normally 
distributed with residual graphs pointing towards the existence of unusual and 
influential data. A (full) White test for heteroscedasticity was employed attempting to 
find the source of these problems (Verbeek 2004).37 An examination of the test 
regression’s coefficients did not provide new insights as to the potential cause of non-
normality. Since a common cause of non-normally distributed residuals is non-normally 
distributed dependent and/or predictor variables, by transforming variables they may 
become more normally distributed. Thus, e.g. in addition to measuring underpricing in 
the traditional way, it is also measured as natural logarithm of the price at the end of the 
first day of trading to the offer price since this is closer to a normally distributed 
variable than the traditional measure commonly used (Ellul and Pagano, 2006). 
Regression residuals in (unreported) models with log underpricing as the dependent 
variable are still non-normally distributed.38  
Given that there are more than the few odd outliers and the properties of the variables 
employed (kurtosis) in the models, median regression (least absolute-deviations 
regression) is performed since this method is more robust to outliers than is mean 
regression and since it is semi-parametric in the sense that it evades assumptions about 
parametric distribution of residuals (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).39 
 
Table 25 displays median regression models estimating initial returns. The models 
contain founder and governance-related variables as well as variables proxying 
experience, professionalisation and prestige.  
                                                 
37
 White’s test can be regarded as a general test of misspecification (rather than (just) a specific test of 
heteroscedasticity. The test is conducted by regressing squared residuals on all independent variables, 
squares of these variables and cross-products of independent variables. 
38
 This also applies when transformed independent variables are employed. 
39
 For corresponding OLS models see Appendix 3 (Tables 37-39) 
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Model 0 solely contains control variables that in addition to the control employed in 
previous estimations also contain a dummy capturing prestigious underwriters, and 
variables on market volatility and market return prior to the flotation. The coefficient of 
the dummy capturing whether the IPO firm is registered in the UK or abroad (‘foreign’) 
is negative and significant. This may at first glance be surprising, since it could be 
expected that there is less information available regarding foreign firms. Yet, it is 
possible that foreign firms are aware of their (initial) information disadvantage and put 
more efforts into communication/investor relations, and/or that only the cream of the 
crop of foreign companies seek a London listing. The coefficient of the variable 
capturing market return prior to the IPO date is (strongly) significantly related to 
underpricing as is market volatility which also is economically prominent. Other control 
variables do not show a significant relationship with the dependent variable.  
Model 1 introduces governance related variables. Counter to expectation, both the 
fraction of equity retained by founders40 and the fraction of outsiders on the board are 
not significantly related to underpricing. 
In model 2 professionalisation related variables (in terms of experience and 
legitimacy/prestige) are introduced. The founder-CEO dummy is positive and 
significant in line with hypothesis 9a. The fraction of outsiders holding professional 
accounting qualification is negatively but not significantly associated with underpricing. 
Among the prestige related independent variables only the dummy capturing the 
involvement of a prestigious auditor at IPO is negatively and significantly related to 
underpricing as proposed by hypothesis 13a.41  
                                                 
40
 A log transformed retained founder ownership variable in the spirit of Leland and Pyle (1977) was 
found to be insignificantly related to underpricing. 
41
 Among the prestige related independent variables the dummy capturing membership of the political 
elite on IPO firms’ boards is highly correlated with the level of British honours and titles and is therefore 
left out of the models reported (in unreported models swapping the level of British honours and titlels for 
the dummy of having members of the political elite among the directors, irrespective of sample period, no 
significant relationship between this dummy and underpricing was found.) 
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Model 3 contains variables related to both governance and professionalisation. The 
dummies for having a founder-CEO (positive) and for being audited by a prestigious 
auditor remain significant. None of the other independent variables of model 3 seem to 
be statistically significantly related to initial returns.  
For model 4 previously insignificant variables are dropped while the variables capturing 
board independence and the fraction of outsider directors holding professional 
accounting qualifications are retained and interacted. Again the dummies for the firm 
being led by a founder-CEO and having a prestigious auditor involved at IPO remain 
significant while the interaction term is negative and significant (indicating that as the 
fraction of those outsiders with professional accounting qualifications increases, the 
(negative) effect of board independence on underpricing becomes stronger).  
Model 5 adds the VC-dummy to variables entered in model 4. The sign of its coefficient 
is positive but it is not significantly related to underpricing counter to hypothesis 14a.  
In model 6 the author examines whether the combination of VCs and prestigious 
underwriters is indeed positively related to underpricing as proposed by spinning and 
collaboration hypotheses. An interaction term ‘prestund*vc’ which is the product of the 
dummy for prestigious underwriter and the dummy for VC-backing is added. Due to the 
inclusion of the interaction term, the regression coefficient for VC-backing and having a 
prestigious underwriter reflect conditional relationships. While here the coefficient of 
the VC-dummy reflects the influence of VC-backing when the IPO is not underwritten 
by a prestigious underwriter, the coefficient of the prestigious underwriter dummy 
reflects the influence of a prestigious underwriter when there is no VC-backing. The 
coefficient of the interaction term estimates the extent to which the effect of going 
public with a prestigious underwriter differs for VC-backed and non-VC backed firms. 
The interaction term’s coefficient has a negative sign, though it is not significant. This 
is not necessarily surprising, since Loughran and Ritter (2004) argue that there are 
special periods in which spinning occurs. 
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Finally, model 7 presents results from a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 
0.2 significance level for variable addition). The model confirms the positive and 
significant association of the founder-CEO dummy with underpricing. The interaction 
term (‘pcoutsiders*pcaccdout) is negative and remains significant.  
While according to pseudo R2 model 5 and model 6 are indifferent and preferred over 
others, the more parsimonious model 7 might be the more appealing.42 In view of the 
hightened correlation between ‘marketvol’ and ‘marketreturn’43, t-statistics for 
individual variables should be treated with caution.44 
 
The following model was employed to perform median regressions: 
up = α0 + β1retfoude + β2pcoutsiders + β3foundceo +β4pcaccdout + β5ceoprceo +  
 β6prestaud + β7pcpreste + β8pcsumhon + β9pcoutsiders*pcaccdout + β10vc +  
 β11prestund + β12prestund*vc + β13marketvol + β14marketreturn + β15foreign  
 + β16segment + β17logmarcap + β17logfirmage + β20logdirs + ε 
 
                                                 
42
 AIC and BIC are not available for median regression. 
43
 These control variables for market conditions are typically jointly employed in similar research. 
44
 Qualitatively similar results to those depicted in the table are obtained when employing log 
underpricing as dependent variable. 
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Table 25: Underpricing (full sample) 
up mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6   mod7
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se   b/se
vc 0.008   0.008   
(0.018)   (0.021)   
retfoude 0.066 0.042                               
(0.053) (0.046)                               
foundceo 0.042* 0.036* 0.034* 0.033°  0.033   0.034°
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020)   (0.021)   (0.018)
pcoutsiders 0.017 -0.005 -0.018 -0.021   -0.021   0.001
(0.070) (0.065) (0.055) (0.067)   (0.070)   (0.060)
pcaccdout -0.015 -0.009 -0.032 -0.033   -0.033   -0.046°
(0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.028)   (0.029)   (0.026)
pcoutsiders* -0.377* -0.386°  -0.386°  -0.414*
pcaccdout (0.170) (0.205)   (0.215)   (0.186)
ceoprceo 0.008 0.009                               
(0.016) (0.017)                               
prestaud -0.035* -0.032° -0.040* -0.036°  -0.036°  -0.026
(0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020)   (0.020)   (0.017)
pcpreste 0.037 0.023                               
(0.065) (0.070)                               
pcsumhon -0.034 -0.018                               -0.045
(0.026) (0.029)                               (0.028)
prestund*vc                -0.003   
               (0.043)   
prestund 0.004 0.015 0.015 0.020 0.005 0.001   0.004   
(0.019) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023)   (0.036)   
marketvol 6.243** 5,697 7.897** 8.544** 4.590° 5.180°  5.180°  5.684*
(-2.395) (-3.487) (-2.665) (-2.835) (-2.476) (-2.987) (-3.120) (-2.697)
marketreturn 1.552*** 1.661*** 1.568*** 1.798*** 1.615*** 1.621*** 1.621*** 1.431***
(0.282) (0.404) (0.307) (0.324) (0.290) (0.349)   (0.364)   (0.312)
foreign -0.060° -0.068 -0.068* -0.074* -0.054° -0.063   -0.063   -0.090*
(0.032) (0.045) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.038)   (0.040)   (0.035)
segment -0.030 -0.031 -0.030 -0.037° -0.029 -0.034   -0.034   
(0.018) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023)   (0.024)   
logmarcap -0.023 -0.019 -0.031 -0.029 -0.011 -0.010   -0.010   
(0.017) (0.025) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022)   (0.024)   
logfirmage -0.011 -0.033 -0.016 -0.033 -0.015 -0.020   -0.020   
(0.021) (0.030) (0.023) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026)   (0.027)   
logdirs -0.077 -0.073 -0.060 -0.079 -0.103 -0.124   -0.124   -0.125°
(0.066) (0.098) (0.076) (0.084) (0.072) (0.087)   (0.091)   (0.072)
_cons -1.230*** -1.373** -1.213*** -1.447*** -1.353*** -1.350*** -1.350*** -1.265***
(0.297) (0.427) (0.323) (0.342) (0.307) (0.369)   (0.384)   (0.324)
N 386 382 335 332 368 368 368 332
pseudo R2 0.038 0.042 0.060 0.064 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.065
Wald(p) 0.247 0.058 0.667 0.951 0.342 0.576 0.334 -
Jarque-Bera(OLS) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
QREG (median): full sample
 
It was recognised long ago that there are distinct cycles in the number of IPOs per 
month and also in the average initial return per month (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; 
Ibbotson et al., 1988; Ibbotson et al., 1994). The observation has been made that periods 
of high and increasing initial returns tend to be followed by waves of IPOs, which 
themselves are followed by periods of lower initial returns (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; 
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Lowry and Schwert, 2002). Since this phenomenon existed in the sample period (1995 
to 2001) as well, creating sub-samples accordingly seems appropriate.  
While scholars have defined the hot period differently, the author follows Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) and regard the years 1999 to 2000 as the hot period within the sample 
years.45 
 
Table 26 displays corresponding models run on the sub-sample of firms floated in the 
normal IPO period. 
Model 0 contains control variables only. Among them market return is strongly 
positively significantly related to underpricing as is the dummy ‘foreign’ (negative). 
Firm age (log) is negatively and significantly related to the dependent variable as is 
board size (log). (Yet, only market return, the foreign dummy and (log) firm age are 
consistently significantly related to underpricing in all models reported in this table). 
In model 1, ownership retained by founders is positively and significantly related to 
underpricing counter to hypothesis 8a.46  
Among the experience and legitimacy related variables of model 2, the founder-CEO 
dummy remains positive and significant while the dummy indicating the involvement of 
a prestigious auditor remains negative and significant with other independent variables 
also remaining non-significant when compared to models run on the full sample.  
In model 3 that combines independent variables of models 1 and 2, ownership retained 
by founders remains positively and significantly related to underpricing as does the 
founder-CEO dummy and the dummy for having a prestigious auditor (though with a 
negative relationship for the latter). 
                                                 
45
 Structural break tests could indicate whether splitting the sample, in this case into a hot (1999–2000) 
and a normal period (1995–1998 and 2001), was appropriate. Yet, OLS regression diagnostics mentioned 
earlier indicated non-normally distributed residuals (that led to employing median regression), the 
assumptions of the structural break test statistic are not met. Nevertheless, the sample is split into a 
normal and hot IPO period following other authors mentioned above.  
46
 A log transformed retained founder ownership variable in the spirit of Leland and Pyle (1977) was 
found to be insignificantly related to underpricing. 
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The interaction term of model 4 also remains negative and significant (with an 
improved level of significance in this and further models) like in the corresponding 
model for the full sample. 
When focusing on the normal IPO period only, the VC-dummy remains insignificantly 
related to underpricing (model 5) and the interaction term indicating a combination of 
VC and prestigious underwriter in the IPO firm (model 6) also remains insignificant. 
Model 7 presents results from a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 0.2 
significance level for variable addition). The model confirms the negative relationship 
between having a founder-CEO and underpricing. Also, the interaction term 
(‘pcoutsiders*pcaccdout’) remains negative and significant. While according to pseudo 
R2 model 6 is preferred over others, the more parsimonious model 7 might be the more 
appealing.47 In view of the hightened correlation between ‘marketvol’ and 
‘marketreturn’48, t-statistics for individual variables should be treated with caution. 
 
                                                 
47
 AIC and BIC are not available for median regression. 
48
 These control variables for market conditions are typically jointly employed in similar research. 
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Table 26: Underpricing (normal IPO period) 
up mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6   mod7
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se   b/se
vc 0.015   0.005   
(0.019)   (0.016)   
retfoude 0.089* 0.079°                               0.048
(0.038) (0.043)                               (0.043)
foundceo 0.036* 0.035* 0.033° 0.037°  0.039*  0.039*
(0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019)   (0.016)   (0.018)
pcoutsiders -0.000 -0.052 -0.033 -0.048   -0.017   
(0.049) (0.061) (0.066) (0.070)   (0.056)   
pcaccdout -0.007 -0.019 -0.028 -0.035   -0.032   
(0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026)   (0.022)   
pcoutsiders* -0.458** -0.438*  -0.487** 
pcaccdout (0.176) (0.183)   (0.158)   
ceoprceo -0.009 -0.011                               
(0.013) (0.015)                               
prestaud -0.034* -0.029° -0.054** -0.053** -0.055*** -0.016
(0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)   (0.015)   (0.017)
pcpreste -0.035 0.008                               
(0.050) (0.059)                               
pcsumhon 0.030 0.021                               
(0.021) (0.025)                               
prestund*vc                0.040   
               (0.035)   
prestund 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.013 0.006 0.014   -0.000   
(0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023)   (0.030)   
marketvol 3.509 6.060* 7.477*** 7.903** 1.716 1.687 1.501 5.860*
(-2.707) (-2.417) (-2.206) (-2.635) (-3.030) (-3.107) (-2.512) (-2.887)
marketreturn 1.120*** 1.497*** 1.531*** 1.800*** 1.493*** 1.359*** 1.369*** 1.629***
(0.308) (0.280) (0.255) (0.303) (0.351) (0.358)   (0.293)   (0.333)
foreign -0.105** -0.089** -0.075** -0.095** -0.085* -0.068°  -0.079*  -0.093**
(0.033) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.036) (0.039)   (0.032)   (0.035)
segment 0.001 -0.021 -0.011 -0.035° -0.015 -0.016   -0.012   
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022)   (0.018)   
logmarcap 0.019 -0.000 0.024 0.004 0.022 0.014   0.019   
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024)   (0.019)   
logfirmage -0.043* -0.068** -0.048** -0.068** -0.055* -0.060*  -0.055*  
(0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027)   (0.021)   
logdirs -0.125° -0.098 -0.146** -0.106 -0.159* -0.154°  -0.173*  -0.099
(0.065) (0.062) (0.055) (0.070) (0.078) (0.081)   (0.067)   (0.070)
_cons -1.050** -1.307*** -1.486*** -1.633*** -1.382*** -1.206** -1.236*** -1.505***
(0.339) (0.305) (0.277) (0.335) (0.387) (0.395)   (0.324)   (0.350)
N 252 250 218 217 237 237 237 217
pseudo R2 0.061 0.070 0.108 0.115 0.114 0.115 0.119 0.096
Wald(p) 0.694 0.847 0.686 0.194 0.597 0.822 0.592 -
Jarque-Bera(OLS) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
QREG (median): normal IPO period
 
Table 27 below displays corresponding models run on the sub-sample of firms floated 
in the hot IPO period. 
As usual, model 0 contains control variables only. Market return remains strongly 
positively related to underpricing for the hot period as well. Market volatility also 
shows a positive and significant association with the dependent variable (though not 
consistently in all models). In the hot period the segment dummy is negative and 
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significant (not in all models) indicating the firms floated on AIM are less underpriced 
than firms floated on the official list. Similarly, firm size (log market capitalisation) is 
negatively and weakly significantly related to underpricing (again not consistently so in 
all models). 
In model 1 both ownership retained by founders and the fraction of independent 
directors on the board are significantly positively related to underpricing counter to 
hypotheses 8a and 7a that predicted a negative relationship in both cases.49 
None of the independent variables entered in model 2 were significantly related to 
underpricing in the hot period.  
When combining independent variables of model 1 and 2 in model 3, none of the 
variables are significant, similarly the interaction term in model 4 is also not significant. 
Neither the VC dummy (model 5) nor the interaction between the VC-dummy and the 
prestigious underwriter dummy (model 6) are significant. The latter finding is in 
contrast to recent UK research by Coakley et al. (2006) who report significantly higher 
underpricing for the group of IPOs backed by VCs and floated by prestigious 
underwriters and interpret their findings as support for the “… spinning hypothesis of 
Loughran and Ritter (1994) for reputable US underwriters and venture capitalists” 
(Coakley et al., 2006: 13). Yet the difference in results might be explained by sample 
differences. Coakley et al. (2006) define the hot period to include the years 1998 to 
2000, whereas Loughran and Ritter (2004) and the author regard 1999 and 2000 as the 
hot period. Furthermore, the Coakley et al. (2006) sample does not include flotations on 
AIM, whereas this study does.   
In model 7, presenting results of a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 0.2 
significance level for variable addition), the fraction of outsiders holding professional 
accounting qualifications as well as the level of British honours and titles per director 
                                                 
49
 A log transformed retained founder ownership variable in the spirit of Leland and Pyle (1977) was 
found to be insignificantly related to underpricing. 
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are significantly negatively related to underpricing and thus to ‘money left on the table’ 
(hypotheses 10a and 12a respectively).  
While for other models higher pseudo R2 is reported, the more parsimonious model 7 
might be the more appealing.50 In view of the hightened correlation between 
‘marketvol’ and ‘marketreturn’51, t-statistics for individual variables should be treated 
with caution. 
 
Overall, while the whole and the normal IPO period are rather similar in terms of 
results, the hot IPO period seems to be considerably different and only in the stepwise 
forward selection model support is found for two of the hypotheses (10a and 12a) which 
were not supported in both the full sample and the sub-sample of firms floated in the 
normal IPO period. 
 
                                                 
50
 AIC and BIC are not available for median regression. 
51
 These control variables for market conditions are typically jointly employed in similar research. 
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Table 27: Underpricing (hot IPO period) 
up mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6   mod7
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se   b/se   
vc 0.021   0.051                  
(0.027)   (0.051)                  
retfoude 0.160** 0.030                                              
(0.058) (0.169)                                              
foundceo 0.024 0.014 0.016 0.011   0.037                  
(0.075) (0.076) (0.028) (0.028)   (0.045)                  
pcoutsiders 0.178* 0.101 0.068 0.077   0.131                  
(0.082) (0.252) (0.094) (0.090)   (0.152)                  
pcaccdout -0.076 -0.085 -0.107* -0.110*  -0.079   -0.086°  
(0.121) (0.122) (0.045) (0.044)   (0.072)   (0.047)   
pcoutsiders* -0.509 -0.507   -0.199                  
pcaccdout (0.336) (0.326)   (0.533)                  
ceoprceo -0.005 0.018                                              
(0.072) (0.070)                                              
prestaud -0.014 -0.031 -0.029 -0.031   -0.047                  
(0.084) (0.084) (0.030) (0.030)   (0.048)                  
pcpreste 0.037 -0.030                                              
(0.328) (0.296)                                              
pcsumhon -0.149 -0.169                               -0.153** 
(0.107) (0.111)                               (0.045)   
prestund*vc                -0.095                  
               (0.093)                  
prestund -0.030 -0.031 0.001 0.007 -0.066° -0.052   0.002                  
(0.034) (0.030) (0.091) (0.090) (0.033) (0.033)   (0.071)                  
marketvol 11.795* 9.361* 12.559 13.851 13.223** 12.242** 12.405°  15.726** 
(-4.852) (-4.219) (-11.829) (-11.654) (-4.381) (-4.160) (-6.561) (-4.699)
marketreturn 2.822*** 2.777*** 2.639° 3.042* 3.344*** 3.667*** 3.997*** 2.586***
(0.555) (0.477) (-1.427) (-1.395) (0.520) (0.496)   (0.814)   (0.509)   
foreign 0.019 0.004 -0.033 -0.043 -0.025 -0.021   -0.026   -0.091°  
(0.054) (0.046) (0.149) (0.126) (0.047) (0.050)   (0.081)   (0.050)   
segment -0.093* -0.092** -0.085 -0.094 -0.034 -0.043   -0.108°                 
(0.037) (0.033) (0.098) (0.094) (0.036) (0.035)   (0.057)                  
logmarcap -0.059° -0.049° -0.071 -0.093 -0.041 -0.056°  -0.086°                 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.091) (0.085) (0.032) (0.031)   (0.049)                  
logfirmage -0.033 -0.060° -0.020 -0.045 -0.007 -0.011   -0.048                  
(0.040) (0.035) (0.106) (0.106) (0.040) (0.039)   (0.063)                  
logdirs -0.168 -0.027 -0.003 0.089 -0.015 -0.028   -0.155                  
(0.141) (0.129) (0.363) (0.371) (0.129) (0.132)   (0.214)                  
_cons -2.140*** -2.314*** -2.018 -2.302 -2.975*** -3.174*** -3.134*** -2.577***
(0.565) (0.486) (-1.447) (-1.391) (0.526) (0.493)   (0.816)   (0.522)   
N 134 132 117 115 131 131 131 115
pseudo R2 0.046 0.060 0.078 0.089 0.061 0.063 0.067 0.065
Wald(p) 0.148 0.162 0.130 0.136 0.219 0.244 0.283 -
Jarque-Bera(OLS) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
QREG (median): hot IPO period
 
To sum up results depicted in the three tables, neither is the existence of a VC 
certification effect with respect to IPO underpricing (hypothesis 14a) as proposed by 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) supported by the data, nor does the call for an increase in 
board independence seem to be justified, at least not for entrepreneurial IPOs, since it is 
not found to be statistically significantly negatively related to underpricing in any 
sample period examined (hypothesis 7a). While the proportion of outsiders with 
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professional accounting qualifications in all (sub-)samples is negative, it is not 
significantly related to initial returns (hypothesis 10a).52 
Yet, when interacting board independence with the fraction of outsiders holding 
professional accounting qualifications the interaction term is negative and significant 
suggesting that as the proportion of those outsiders holding professional accounting 
qualifications increases, the (negative) effect of board independence on underpricing 
increases in the normal IPO period and the full sample. 
A signalling effect regarding retained ownership by founders does seem to exist for the 
full sample period and rather seems to provide a ‘negative’ signal in the two sub-
samples as it is positively and significantly related to underpricing in some models run 
on the normal and hot period counter to hypothesis 8a. 
In line with hypothesis 9a arguing founder-CEOs represent ‘untested management’ at 
the IPO, the founder-CEO dummy is positively and significantly related to underpricing 
for both the full sample and the normal IPO period.  
The proposition of hypothesis 11a that CEOs with previous experience of leading a 
company will be a signal of quality thus decreasing uncertainty surrounding the IPO 
firm is not supported as the dummy indicating CEO role legitimacy is not significantly 
negatively related to underpricing. 
With respect to prestige the models present mixed findings. While director prestige in 
the form of the fraction of directors holding degrees from elite educational institutions 
and the level of British honours and titles held among the board of directors does not 
show a statistically significant relationship with underpricing (hypothesis 12a)53, having 
a prestigious auditor involved in the IPO firm is negatively associated with underpricing 
as predicted by hypothesis 13a for models in the sub-sample of firms floated in the 
normal IPO period as well as in the full sample. 
                                                 
52
 with the exception of model 7 run on the sub-sample of firms floated in the hot IPO period 
53
 with the exception of model 7 run on the sub-sample of firms floated in the hot IPO period that reports 
a significant negative relationship between ‘brithon’ and underpricing 
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The hot IPO period seems to be special. Only in the stepwise forward selection model 
(model 7) the fraction of outsiders holding professional accounting qualifications as 
well as having British honours and titles held among directors were found to be 
negatively and significantly related to underpricing (hypotheses 10a and 12a). 
Additional research needs to be done to shed more light on hot IPO markets in this 
context. 
 
After having described the results with respect to underpricing, the author turns to 
outlining results related to long-run returns in the following sub-section.  
 
5.3.4.2 Long-run performance 
As outlined earlier the measure of long-run performance adopted in this thesis are log 
BHARs (LBHAR) since they are expected to have better distributional properties and 
suffer less from the skewness problems linked with the traditional BHAR (Strong, 
1992). LBHAR is computed as the difference between an IPO firm’s LBHAR 
(log(1+BHARi)) and the LBHAR of the benchmark (log(1+BHARm)) (see e.g. 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004).  
 
For models estimating long-run performance ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis was performed. Yet, according to regression diagnostics residuals are not 
normally distributed with residual graphs pointing towards the existence of unusual and 
influential data. A (full) White test for heteroscedasticity was performed attempting to 
detect the source of these problems (Verbeek 2004).54 An examination of the test 
                                                 
54
 White’s test can be regarded as a general test of misspecification (rather than (just) a specific test of 
heteroscedasticity. The test is conducted by regressing squared residuals on all independent variables, 
squares of these variables and cross-products of independent variables. 
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regression’s coefficients failed to provide new insights as to the potential cause of non-
normality.55  
Given that there are more than the few odd outliers and the properties of the variables 
employed (kurtosis) in the models, median regression is employed. As outlined earlier 
when modelling underpricing, median regression is more robust to outliers than is mean 
regression and it is semi-parametric in the sense that it evades assumptions about 
parametric distribution of residuals (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  
As control variables, the author uses dummies for the companies’ origin (UK or 
abroad), the market of flotation (taking the value ‘1’ for AIM and ‘0’ for the Official 
List), firm size (log market capitalisation), (log) firm age and the size of the board 
(logdirs). Additionally, the author adds controls typically used in studies examining 
long-run performance of IPOs, like having a prestigious underwriter and underpricing. 
In addition, as a proxy for firm-level risk a dummy was added that was equal to ‘1’ if 
the IPO firm reported a loss prior to its flotation.  
 
In the following, results of models estimated by median regressions will be presented. 
The first block reports results for estimations of market performance following 12 
months from flotation, the next block lists results for models estimating market 
performance following 24 months and the final one reports results for models 
estimating market performance following 36 months from flotation.56 
 
LBHAR 12 months from flotation: 
Model 0 of Table 28 solely contains the control variables mentioned above. The dummy 
for the IPO firm having hired a prestigious underwriter is positively and significantly 
related to long-run market performance at the 1% level. The dummy for having reported 
                                                 
55
 Transforming non-normal independent variables only very marginally improved residual behaviour in 
unreported models. 
56
 For corresponding OLS models see Appendix 4 (Tables 40-42) 
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a loss before a firm’s initial public offering is negative and strongly significant. This 
indicates that firms that reported losses before IPO perform worse over 12 months 
following flotation than other sample firms. Similarly, the coefficient for firm size 
(logmarcap) is negatively and significantly related to long-run performance. Other 
control variables do not seem to be significantly related to market performance 
following 12 months from flotation.  
Next to control variables, model 1 adds governance related variables. Neither the 
fraction of outsiders on the board nor ownership retained by founders show the 
hypothesised relationships (hypotheses 7b and 8b).57 
In model 2 variables proxying professionalisation are introduced next to control 
variables. For none of the former variables a significant relationship could be detected.  
Model 3 combines the variables used in models 1 and 2. In this model the dummy 
capturing a Big Five/Big Six auditor involved with the IPO firm is positive and 
significant, suggesting that IPO firms that are audited by a prestigious auditor perform 
better 12 months following the flotation than other firms (all else being equal) in line 
with hypothesis 13b. Among the other independent variables all are insignificant with 
the dummy for having an experienced manager in the CEO role (‘ceoprceo’) being just 
outside the 10% significance level.  
Therefore in model 4, only the dummies for having a prestigious auditor at IPO and the 
IPO firm being led by a CEO with prior experience in the CEO role are kept next to 
controls. Both independent variables are significantly related to market performance 12 
months following the flotation. Yet, the sign of the dummy for the CEO’s role 
legitimacy is negative counter to hypothesis 11b. A possible explanation could be that 
while an experienced CEO (arguably) has the ability to lead the firm in a way to 
perform well, such a CEO may lack incentives to do so and/or may be entrenched. 
                                                 
57
 No significant quadratic or cubic relationship between founder ownership and LBHAR12 was detected, 
also a log transformed retained founder ownership variable in the spirit of Leland and Pyle (1977) was 
found to be insignificantly related to LBHAR12 (in unreported models corresponding to models 1 and 3). 
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Model 5 therefore introduces ownership retained by the CEO (positive sign but 
insignificant) to the regression and model 6 interacts this variable with the dummy for 
CEO role legitimacy. The coefficient of the interaction term that estimates the 
difference between the net effect of retained CEO ownership (on predicted long-run 
performance) between firms headed by an experienced CEO and those who are not is 
positive and significant. This indicates that the (positive) effect of CEO retained 
ownership on long-run market performance is higher for firms with an experienced 
CEO. 
Model 7 adds the VC dummy to the other independent variables. While the sign of the 
coefficient of the VC dummy is positive it is not significantly related to market 
performance 12 months following flotation (hypothesis 14a).  
Finally, model 8 presents results from a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 
0.2 significance level for variable addition). The model confirms the positive 
association of a prestigious auditor with market performance in the long-run. 
Furthermore, the founder-CEO dummy is negative and becomes significant now as does 
underpricing, while board independence (‘pcoutsiders’) becomes positive and 
significant. The positive association between the involvement of a prestigious 
underwriter in the IPO and market performance in the long-run, as well as the negative 
association between board size as well as the dummy indicating a reported financial loss 
before the IPO and LBHAR12 was confirmed.58  
This model is, according to pseudo R2, the preferred model.59 In view of considerable 
correlations between ‘foundceo’ and ‘retceoeq’, t-statistics for individual variables 
should be treated with caution. 
 
 
                                                 
58
 A stepwise forward selection model with a log transformed retained founder ownership variable in the 
spirit of Leland and Pyle (1977) and otherwise same pool of variables would not have selected the former 
variable into the model. 
59
 AIC and BIC are not available for median regression. 
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The following model was employed to estimate LBHARs: 
LBHAR = α0 + β1vc + β2retfoude + β3pcoutsiders +β4foundceo + β5pcaccdout +  
β6ceoprceo + β7prestaud + β8pcpreste + β9pcsumhon + β10retceoeq +  
β11retceoeq*ceoprceo + β12prestund + β13up + β14foreign + β15segment + 
β16logmarcap + β17logfirmage + β18logdirs + β19lossb4ip + ε 
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Table 28: Long-run performance (12 months following flotation) 
LBHAR12 mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6 mod7 mod8
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se b/se b/se
vc                0.013
               (0.028)
retfoude 0.035 0.021                
(0.074) (0.071)                
retceoeq 0.041   0.027 0.071 0.011
(0.059)   (0.084) (0.086) (0.065)
foundceo 0.008 0.003                -0.038°
(0.035) (0.028)                (0.020)
pcoutsiders -0.065 -0.095                0.298*
(0.098) (0.101)                (0.119)
pcaccdout -0.016 -0.001                
(0.051) (0.040)                
ceoprceo -0.036 -0.041 -0.060* -0.067** -0.039 -0.042
(0.033) (0.026) (0.027) (0.022)   (0.026) (0.027)
retceoeq*                0.264* 0.231°
ceoprceo                (0.133) (0.138)
prestaud 0.045 0.057* 0.070* 0.074** 0.065* 0.080** 0.064**
(0.036) (0.029) (0.030) (0.024)   (0.028) (0.029) (0.022)
pcpreste -0.035 -0.033                
(0.130) (0.104)                
pcsumhon -0.053 -0.062                -0.051
(0.058) (0.046)                (0.034)
prestund 0.101* 0.102** 0.135** 0.149*** 0.136*** 0.143*** 0.140*** 0.137*** 0.152***
(0.039) (0.036) (0.042) (0.033) (0.035) (0.029)   (0.033) (0.034) (0.025)
up -0.035 -0.055 -0.069 -0.037 -0.022 -0.019   -0.054 -0.057 -0.084*
(0.050) (0.046) (0.056) (0.044) (0.045) (0.030)   (0.035) (0.037) (0.034)
foreign 0.010 -0.002 0.035 0.038 0.027 0.029   0.019 0.013
(0.067) (0.063) (0.068) (0.053) (0.059) (0.047)   (0.055) (0.058)
segment -0.032 -0.046 -0.004 0.012 0.003 -0.003   -0.014 -0.004
(0.039) (0.036) (0.042) (0.034) (0.035) (0.028)   (0.033) (0.035)
logmarcap -0.112** -0.119*** -0.108** -0.108*** -0.111*** -0.118*** -0.120*** -0.119*** -0.126***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.039) (0.031) (0.032) (0.026)   (0.030) (0.031) (0.020)
logfirmage 0.004 -0.000 0.002 0.005 -0.006 -0.017   -0.014 -0.016
(0.044) (0.042) (0.049) (0.039) (0.040) (0.034)   (0.039) (0.041)
logdirs -0.065 -0.061 -0.176 -0.152 -0.074 -0.039   -0.045 -0.009
(0.137) (0.131) (0.153) (0.126) (0.125) (0.103)   (0.118) (0.124)
lossb4ip -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.198*** -0.193*** -0.187*** -0.191*** -0.199***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.036) (0.029) (0.029) (0.024)   (0.027) (0.029) (0.020)
_cons 0.877** 0.938*** 0.913** 0.861*** 0.837*** 0.871*** 0.898*** 0.846*** 0.900***
(0.276) (0.259) (0.307) (0.241) (0.251) (0.202)   (0.234) (0.241) (0.149)
N 374 371 324 322 342 340 340 340 322
pseudo R2 0.109 0.113 0.132 0.137 0.118 0.115 0.118 0.119 0.138
Wald(p) 0.180 0.158 0.662 0.142 0.704 0.954 0.942 0.919 -
Jarque-Bera(OLS) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
QREG (median)
 
LBHAR 24 months from flotation: 
In the second block, results of models estimating long-run market performance 24 
months following flotation are described (see Table 29). 
Again, model 0 solely contains control variables. The dummy for the IPO firm having 
hired a prestigious underwriter is positive but no longer significantly related to long-run 
market performance. This indicates that while being affiliated to a prestigious 
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underwriter is significantly positively associated with market performance over 
relatively shorter periods of long-run performance (see Table 28) this does not seem to 
hold for relatively longer periods. The dummy indicating reported losses before an IPO 
firm’s flotation remains (strongly) negative and significant as does (log) firm size. No 
other control variable shows a significant relationship to long-run market performance 
24 months following flotation. 
Model 1 adds governance related variables to the control variables employed in model 
0. No significant relationship is detected between retained ownership by founders and 
LBHAR 24 months following flotation.60 The same holds for board independence and 
LBHAR 24.  
In model 2 next to control variables the variables proxying professionalisation are 
added. The coefficient of the dummy capturing auditor prestige is positive and 
significant as is the fraction of directors with prestigious education (hypotheses 13b and 
12b). Other independent variables of this model were not found to be significantly 
related to LBHAR 24 months following flotation.  
When combining independent variables used in model 1 and 2 for model 3, ownership 
retained by founders is negative and weakly significant (inconsistent with hypothesis 
8b). (The sign of the coefficient changed from positive in the LBHAR12 models to 
negative.) While the dummy indicating involvement of a prestigious auditor in the IPO 
firm remains positive and significant compared to the previous model, director prestige 
in the form of elite education does not.  
Following model 4 of the models estimating LBHAR 12 months from flotation, the next 
model contains controls along with the dummy for the involvement of a Big Five/Big 
Six auditor (positive and significant) with the IPO firm and the dummy for CEO role 
legitimacy (positive but not significant).  
                                                 
60
 No significant quadratic or cubic relationship between founder ownership and LBHAR24 was detected, 
also a log transformed retained founder ownership variable in the spirit of Leland and Pyle (1977) was 
found to be insignificantly related to LBHAR24 (in unreported models corresponding to models 1 and 3). 
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Model 5 adds ownership retained by the CEO to the variables of model 4. The 
coefficient of this independent variable is positive but it is not significant. 
In model 6 an interaction term between ownership retained by the CEO and CEO role 
legitimacy is added. The interaction term is (again) positive and significant. (The 
interaction term’s coefficient estimates the difference between the net effect of retained 
CEO ownership (on predicted long-run performance) between firms headed by an 
experienced CEO and those firms headed by a CEO who has not gained experience in 
the CEO role beforehand.)  
In model 7 that is based on variables used in model 6, the VC dummy is added. The 
coefficient of this dummy is positive and significant at the 10% level, indicating that 
VC-backing is positively associated with long-run market performance (LBHAR24) in 
line with hypothesis 14b. (While the sign of this dummy was positive in model 7 
estimating LBHAR12, it was not significant.) 
Finally, model 8, a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 0.2 significance 
level for variable addition), confirms the positive and significant association of VC-
backing as well as that of having a prestigious auditor at IPO and market performance in 
the long-run. Founders’ retained equity is found to be negatively (and significantly) 
related to LBHAR2461 as is underpricing, firm size and the dummies ‘foreign’ and 
‘lossb4ip’. 
While according to pseudo R2 model 3 is preferred, the more parsimonious model 8 
may be more appealing.62  In view of the considerable correlation between ‘vc’ and 
‘retfoude’ as well as between ‘prestaud’ and ‘logmarcap’, t-statistics for individual 
variables should be treated with caution. 
 
                                                 
61
 A stepwise forward selection model with a log transformed retained founder ownership variable in the 
spirit of Leland and Pyle (1977) and otherwise same pool of variables would not have selected the former 
variable into the model. 
62
 AIC and BIC are not available for median regression. 
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Table 29: Long-run performance (24 months following flotation) 
LBHAR24 mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6 mod7 mod8
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se b/se b/se
vc                0.105° 0.083*
               (0.058) (0.037)
retfoude -0.213 -0.195°                -0.214*
(0.163) (0.101)                (0.090)
retceoeq 0.090   -0.127 -0.096
(0.138)   (0.183) (0.185)
foundceo 0.033 0.058                
(0.051) (0.039)                
pcoutsiders 0.182 0.094                
(0.212) (0.137)                
pcaccdout 0.017 -0.011                
(0.073) (0.056)                
ceoprceo -0.006 0.003 0.005 0.001   0.015 0.006
(0.047) (0.036) (0.046) (0.052)   (0.056) (0.056)
retceoeq*                0.482° 0.525°
ceoprceo                (0.291) (0.290)
prestaud 0.117* 0.123** 0.126* 0.132*  0.172** 0.125* 0.128***
(0.052) (0.040) (0.050) (0.056)   (0.060) (0.061) (0.038)
pcpreste 0.331° 0.212                
(0.194) (0.145)                
pcsumhon -0.049 -0.033                
(0.081) (0.062)                
prestund 0.065 0.075 0.071 0.039 0.063 0.069   0.034 0.034
(0.076) (0.079) (0.060) (0.046) (0.060) (0.067)   (0.071) (0.072)
up -0.083 -0.087 -0.185* -0.164** -0.097 -0.067   -0.160° -0.221* -0.167**
(0.097) (0.101) (0.075) (0.061) (0.076) (0.085)   (0.093) (0.092) (0.057)
foreign -0.114 -0.104 -0.173° -0.164* -0.188* -0.133   -0.182 -0.215° -0.185**
(0.126) (0.128) (0.096) (0.075) (0.095) (0.107)   (0.115) (0.112) (0.069)
segment -0.073 -0.048 -0.036 -0.026 -0.027 -0.022   -0.054 -0.019
(0.076) (0.080) (0.060) (0.047) (0.058) (0.067)   (0.071) (0.072)
logmarcap -0.197** -0.189* -0.280*** -0.262*** -0.264*** -0.240*** -0.236*** -0.205** -0.212***
(0.070) (0.074) (0.055) (0.043) (0.052) (0.059)   (0.064) (0.065) (0.032)
logfirmage -0.079 -0.046 -0.096 -0.030 -0.044 -0.055   -0.047 -0.046
(0.086) (0.089) (0.071) (0.055) (0.068) (0.078)   (0.086) (0.084)
logdirs 0.121 0.001 0.354 0.119 0.367° 0.434°  0.349 0.143
(0.267) (0.286) (0.218) (0.174) (0.206) (0.238)   (0.257) (0.257)
lossb4ip -0.245*** -0.267*** -0.230*** -0.246*** -0.230*** -0.209*** -0.220*** -0.236*** -0.247***
(0.063) (0.066) (0.051) (0.040) (0.048) (0.055)   (0.059) (0.058) (0.035)
_cons 1.378* 1.448* 1.699*** 1.744*** 1.552*** 1.295** 1.329** 1.244* 1.448***
(0.538) (0.560) (0.434) (0.331) (0.411) (0.463)   (0.501) (0.503) (0.241)
N 347 344 299 297 317 315 315 315 297
pseudo R2 0.095 0.103 0.126 0.134 0.113 0.112 0.117 0.123 0.130
Wald(p) 0.617 0.858 0.121 0.792 0.437 0.847 0.801 0.665 -
Jarque-B.(OLS) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
QREG (median)
 
LBHAR 36 months from flotation: 
In the final block, results of models estimating long-run market performance 36 months 
following flotation are described (see Table 30). 
As usual model 0 contains control variables only. Next to firm size and the dummy 
indicating reported losses before flotation, here the dummy indicating whether the firm 
sought a listing on the Official List or on AIM is negative and significant, indicating 
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that those firms floated on AIM perform worse over 36 months following their IPO. 
(Yet, the sign of the dummy is always negative it is not consistently significant in the 
following models.) 
Among the governance related variables entered in model 1, ownership retained by 
founders is significantly related to long-run market performance though the sign is 
negative counter to hypothesis 8b.63 
In the group of variables entered in model 2 representing professionalisation only the 
dummy for having a prestigious auditor is (positive) and significant.  
When combining both groups of variables in model 3, both the previously significant 
retained founder ownership and the prestigious auditor dummy become insignificant 
with other independent variables remaining insignificant.  
In model 4, that next to controls solely contains the dummies for CEO role legitimacy 
and for having hired a prestigious auditor, the latter becomes significant again and 
remains so in model 5 that additionally introduces ownership retained by the CEO.  
While the the sign of the interaction term between retained ownership by CEOs and the 
dummy for CEO role legitimacy is positive (model 6), unlike with LBHAR12 and 
LBHAR24 it is not significant when estimating long-run market performance 36 months 
following flotation.  
In model 7 the VC dummy is added. While the sign of the coefficient is positive it is, 
unlike in model 7 estimating LBHAR24, not significant. Since in model(s 6) and 7 
neither ownership retained by the CEO nor the CEO role legitimacy dummy nor the 
corresponding interaction term are significant, model 8 drops them with the VC dummy 
then becoming significant (again). 
Finally, model 9 presents results from a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 
0.2 significance level for variable addition), confirming the positive association between 
                                                 
63
 No significant quadratic or cubic relationship between founder ownership and LBHAR24 was detected, 
also a log transformed retained founder ownership variable in the spirit of Leland and Pyle (1977) was 
found to be insignificantly related to LBHAR24 (in unreported models corresponding to models 1 and 3). 
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having a prestigious auditor on market performance in the long-run (yet the VC-dummy 
becomes insignificant). The negative relationship between firm size as well as the 
‘lossb4ip’ dummy and post-IPO market performance in the long-run is also validated.64 
While pseudo R2 is higher for other models, the more parsimonious model 9 might be 
the more appealing one.65 In view of the considerable correlation between ‘vc’ and 
‘retfoude’ as well as between ‘prestaud’ and ‘logmarcap’, t-statistics for individual 
variables should be treated with caution. 
 
                                                 
64
 A stepwise forward selection model with a log transformed retained founder ownership variable in the 
spirit of Leland and Pyle (1977) and otherwise same pool of variables would not have selected the former 
variable into the model. 
65
 AIC and BIC are not available for median regression. 
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Table 30: Long-run performance (36 months following flotation) 
LBHAR36 mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6 mod7 mod8 mod9
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se b/se b/se   b/se   
vc                0.063 0.075°  0.057   
               (0.065) (0.043)   (0.047)   
retfoude -0.267* -0.195                                -0.186   
(0.131) (0.161)                                (0.114)   
retceoeq -0.000   -0.027 -0.014                                
(0.122)   (0.176) (0.204)                                
foundceo 0.041 0.023                                               
(0.056) (0.065)                                               
pcoutsiders 0.019 0.048                                               
(0.168) (0.232)                                               
pcaccdout 0.039 0.038                                               
(0.080) (0.088)                                               
ceoprceo 0.017 -0.024 0.010 -0.005   0.023 0.004                                
(0.052) (0.060) (0.048) (0.049)   (0.056) (0.064)                                
retceoeq*                0.275 0.304                                
ceoprceo                (0.281) (0.319)                                
prestaud 0.127* 0.089 0.123* 0.111*  0.122* 0.126° 0.100*  0.147** 
(0.055) (0.064) (0.052) (0.053)   (0.059) (0.067) (0.045)   (0.047)   
pcpreste 0.277 0.184                                               
(0.197) (0.229)                                               
pcsumhon -0.025 0.012                                               
(0.086) (0.100)                                               
prestund -0.011 -0.006 0.029 -0.007 0.007 0.021   0.025 0.007 0.026                  
(0.054) (0.066) (0.065) (0.076) (0.063) (0.064)   (0.073) (0.081) (0.055)                  
up -0.092 -0.127 -0.119 -0.096 -0.056 -0.068   -0.065 -0.093 -0.054                  
(0.063) (0.078) (0.082) (0.095) (0.075) (0.077)   (0.071) (0.100) (0.066)                  
foreign 0.020 -0.029 -0.067 0.024 -0.045 -0.041   -0.023 -0.031 0.006                  
(0.087) (0.106) (0.105) (0.122) (0.098) (0.099)   (0.116) (0.130) (0.091)                  
segment -0.131* -0.099 -0.109° -0.121 -0.107° -0.114°  -0.110 -0.104 -0.093°                 
(0.051) (0.064) (0.063) (0.075) (0.060) (0.061)   (0.069) (0.077) (0.054)                  
logmarcap -0.147** -0.176** -0.213*** -0.189** -0.205*** -0.206*** -0.191** -0.182* -0.191*** -0.192***
(0.048) (0.060) (0.059) (0.070) (0.056) (0.057)   (0.063) (0.071) (0.050)   (0.041)   
logfirmage -0.070 -0.018 -0.074 -0.058 -0.045 -0.051   -0.052 -0.035 -0.042                  
(0.060) (0.075) (0.076) (0.086) (0.071) (0.074)   (0.084) (0.093) (0.062)                  
logdirs 0.197 0.080 0.130 0.091 0.237 0.302   0.240 0.215 0.062                  
(0.181) (0.230) (0.232) (0.285) (0.217) (0.224)   (0.252) (0.282) (0.189)                  
lossb4ip -0.247*** -0.270*** -0.186*** -0.242*** -0.220*** -0.216*** -0.221*** -0.181** -0.217*** -0.240***
(0.044) (0.055) (0.055) (0.066) (0.051) (0.052)   (0.060) (0.066) (0.045)   (0.045)   
_cons 0.909* 1.291** 1.288** 1.278* 1.196** 1.176** 1.098* 1.002° 1.204** 1.213***
(0.369) (0.449) (0.465) (0.531) (0.435) (0.440)   (0.488) (0.541) (0.382)   (0.306)   
N 316 313 269 267 287 285 285 285 316 267
pseudo R2 0.070 0.082 0.085 0.090 0.078 0.078 0.080 0.083 0.085 0.077
Wald(p) 0.253 0.245 0.202 0.000 0.443 0.068 0.501 0.533 0.329 -
Jarque-B.(OLS) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
QREG (median)
 
Finally, hypothesis 14c is tested and results displayed in Tables 31, 32 and 33. Models 1 
to 4 are based on models 7 of the previous tables but swap the VC-dummy for variables 
capturing retained equity by VCs, its square, cube as well as log VC equity. Model 5 
contains the log of VC equity, the dummy for prestigious auditor and controls only 
while model 6 is a stepwise forward selection model.  
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With respect to LBHAR following 12 months from flotation (Table 31), no significant 
linear or non-linear relationship is detected.  
When following the IPO firms’ market performance for 24 months from flotation 
(Table 32), VC equity in model 1 is positive and significant. While this results would 
point towards a significant linear relationship, models 2 and 3 show that the signs of the 
coefficient of VC ownership square and cube change from plus to minus (model 2) and 
from plus to minus to plus (model 3) respectively indicating a non-linear relationship. 
Yet, no statistical significance was detected for the quadratic or cubic specification. In 
model 4 the log of ownership retained by VCs is entered and is found to be significantly 
related to LBHAR24 at the 5% level and at the 0.1% level in the more parsimonious 
model 5 as well as in model 6, a stepwise forward selection model (employing a 0.2 
significance level for variable addition).  
When estimating long-run post-IPO market performance following 36 months from 
flotation (Table 33) no significant linear, quadratic or cubic relationship is found, while 
the log VC ownership is significant in model 5 and model 6 (stepwise forward selection 
model). 
While pseudo R2 is higher for other models, the respective models 6 (of Tables 31 to 
33) might be the more appealing ones.66 In view of the high correlation between 
‘retceoeq’ and ‘retceoeq*ceoprceo’67 as well as between and ‘prestund’/’prestaud’ and 
‘logmarcap’ (LBHAR12), as well as between ‘prestaud’ and ‘logmarcap’ (LBHAR24), 
and also between ‘segment’/’logdirs’ and ‘logmarcap’ (LBHAR36), t-statistics for 
individual variables should be treated with caution. 
 
                                                 
66
 AIC and BIC are not available for median regression. 
67
 The dummy variable forming part of the interaction term was not centred since it is a predictor of 
interest (rather than a control), high correlation is therefore to be expected. 
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Overall, results indicate that a non-linear (logarithmic specification (not allowing for a 
turning point)) between retained VC ownership and post-IPO market performance 
exists, albeit for rather longer periods of long-run performance.68 
 
The following model was employed to estimate LBHARs using linear and non-linear 
specifications of retained VC ownership: 
LBHAR = α0 + β1retvceq + β2retvcsq + β3retvccu +β4logretvceq + β5retceoeq +  
  β6ceoprceo + β7retceoeq*ceoprceo + β8prestaud + β9prestund + β10up +  
  β11foreign + β12segment + β13logmarcap + β14logfirmage + β15logdirs +  
  β16lossb4ip + ε 
 
                                                 
68
 Similar results are obatined when the dependent variable is BHAR (instead of LBHAR) and when 
retained VC ownership is log transformed in the spirit of Leland and Pyle (1977).  
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Table 31: Long-run performance 12 months following flotation: linear and non-
linear specifications of retained VC ownership 
LBHAR12 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se
retvceq 0.085 0.040 0.071                
(0.122) (0.257) (0.209)                
retvceqsq 0.294 -1.443                
(0.781) (-1.984)                
retvceqcu 3.070                
(-3.478)                
logretvceq 0.288 0.292   
(0.353) (0.331)   
retceoeq 0.057 0.054 0.075 0.061                0.038
(0.113) (0.137) (0.105) (0.118)                (0.082)
ceoprceo -0.031 -0.031 -0.034 -0.027                -0.043°
(0.035) (0.044) (0.033) (0.037)                (0.025)
retceoeq*ceoprceo 0.234 0.232 0.228 0.231                0.255°
(0.181) (0.220) (0.171) (0.189)                (0.135)
prestaud 0.079* 0.075 0.073* 0.078° 0.072°  0.081**
(0.039) (0.047) (0.036) (0.041) (0.038)   (0.028)
prestund 0.144** 0.143** 0.141*** 0.146** 0.097*  0.130***
(0.045) (0.055) (0.042) (0.047) (0.045)   (0.033)
up -0.054 -0.052 -0.055 -0.053 -0.019   -0.056
(0.049) (0.059) (0.045) (0.051) (0.047)   (0.035)
foreign 0.028 0.030 0.018 0.028 0.051   
(0.074) (0.088) (0.067) (0.077) (0.076)   
segment -0.008 -0.006 -0.000 -0.005 0.005   
(0.046) (0.055) (0.043) (0.048) (0.044)   
logmarcap -0.121** -0.115* -0.118** -0.122** -0.117** -0.115***
(0.041) (0.050) (0.038) (0.043) (0.041)   (0.027)
logfirmage -0.001 -0.005 -0.009 0.004 0.038   
(0.054) (0.066) (0.050) (0.057) (0.051)   
logdirs -0.045 -0.048 -0.017 -0.044 -0.132   
(0.164) (0.201) (0.155) (0.171) (0.157)   
lossb4ip -0.188*** -0.190*** -0.186*** -0.184*** -0.212*** -0.191***
(0.038) (0.046) (0.035) (0.040) (0.037)   (0.027)
_cons 0.880** 0.839* 0.853** 0.866* 0.868** 0.805***
(0.322) (0.394) (0.296) (0.335) (0.313)   (0.194)
N 338 338 338 338 371 338
pseudo R2 0.1209 0.1210 0.1223 0.1208 0.1132 0.118
Wald(p) 0.8166 0.7945 0.8676 0.6933 0.5011 -
Jarque-Bera(OLS) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -







Table 32: Long-run performance 24 months following flotation: linear and non-
linear specifications of retained VC ownership 
LBHAR24 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se
retvceq 0.480* 0.469 0.419                
(0.185) (0.366) (0.468)                
retvceqsq 0.102 -1.512                
(-1.132) (-4.342)                
retvceqcu 3.472                
(-7.482)                
logretvceq 1.262* 1.332*** 1.258***
(0.508) (0.370)   (0.359)
retceoeq 0.007 -0.001 0.004 -0.027                
(0.181) (0.205) (0.248) (0.179)                
ceoprceo -0.001 -0.001 0.008 0.002                
(0.053) (0.061) (0.074) (0.053)                
retceoeq*ceoprceo 0.584* 0.562° 0.555 0.620*                
(0.278) (0.317) (0.381) (0.276)                
prestaud 0.126* 0.123° 0.141° 0.124* 0.087*  0.143***
(0.059) (0.067) (0.082) (0.058) (0.043)   (0.041)
prestund 0.060 0.059 0.062 0.067 0.068   
(0.069) (0.078) (0.094) (0.068) (0.051)   
up -0.106 -0.114 -0.114 -0.091 -0.012   
(0.089) (0.101) (0.121) (0.072) (0.063)   
foreign -0.194° -0.190 -0.189 -0.185° -0.025   
(0.105) (0.120) (0.145) (0.108) (0.083)   
segment -0.016 -0.020 -0.033 -0.011 -0.033   
(0.069) (0.078) (0.095) (0.069) (0.051)   
logmarcap -0.200** -0.207** -0.214* -0.198** -0.226*** -0.195***
(0.062) (0.071) (0.085) (0.062) (0.047)   (0.035)
logfirmage -0.074 -0.073 -0.083 -0.068 -0.019   
(0.081) (0.093) (0.111) (0.081) (0.058)   
logdirs 0.181 0.182 0.279 0.208 -0.145   
(0.249) (0.288) (0.347) (0.247) (0.179)   
lossb4ip -0.242*** -0.235*** -0.249** -0.247*** -0.245*** -0.221***
(0.057) (0.065) (0.078) (0.057) (0.042)   (0.038)
_cons 1.240* 1.291* 1.282° 1.152* 1.624*** 1.189***
(0.481) (0.553) (0.666) (0.480) (0.355)   (0.252)
N 313 313 313 313 344 313
pseudo R2 0.1326 0.1326 0.1337 0.1324 0.1153 0.114
Wald(p) 0.3001 0.4778 0.6565 0.5821 0.1119 -
Jarque-Bera(OLS) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -





Table 33: Long-run performance 36 months following flotation: linear and non-
linear specifications of retained VC ownership 
LBHAR36 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se   
retvceq 0.388 -0.154 -0.114                                
(0.247) (0.322) (0.334)                                
retvceqsq 2.092* 3.146                                
(-1.045) (-3.244)                                
retvceqcu -3.088                                
(-5.499)                                
logretvceq 0.975 0.812*  0.795*  
(0.643) (0.362)   (0.367)   
retceoeq 0.008 -0.037 -0.029 0.023                                
(0.222) (0.176) (0.174) (0.210)                                
ceoprceo 0.032 0.041 0.040 0.032                                
(0.067) (0.055) (0.053) (0.063)                                
retceoeq*ceoprceo 0.320 0.457° 0.479° 0.310                                
(0.344) (0.274) (0.270) (0.325)                                
prestaud 0.099 0.121* 0.117* 0.098 0.112** 0.088*  
(0.073) (0.059) (0.058) (0.069) (0.039)   (0.042)   
prestund -0.014 0.003 -0.007 -0.020 0.023                  
(0.089) (0.070) (0.068) (0.084) (0.047)                  
up -0.097 -0.087 -0.095 -0.101 -0.039                  
(0.108) (0.086) (0.083) (0.101) (0.056)                  
foreign -0.072 -0.091 -0.046 -0.067 0.013                  
(0.137) (0.113) (0.111) (0.129) (0.077)                  
segment -0.104 -0.106 -0.100 -0.102 -0.097*  -0.112*  
(0.083) (0.067) (0.065) (0.079) (0.046)   (0.047)   
logmarcap -0.185* -0.169** -0.165** -0.187* -0.182*** -0.200***
(0.077) (0.062) (0.060) (0.073) (0.043)   (0.043)   
logfirmage -0.063 -0.052 -0.051 -0.064 -0.048                  
(0.102) (0.082) (0.080) (0.095) (0.053)                  
logdirs 0.239 0.263 0.274 0.252 0.058   0.242   
(0.307) (0.251) (0.243) (0.290) (0.160)   (0.172)   
lossb4ip -0.207** -0.201*** -0.202*** -0.206** -0.237*** -0.206***
(0.073) (0.058) (0.057) (0.069) (0.038)   (0.040)   
_cons 1.093° 0.865° 0.816° 1.058° 1.150*** 1.102***
(0.590) (0.480) (0.468) (0.557) (0.326)   (0.315)   
N 283 283 283 283 314 283
pseudo R2 0.0880 0.0925 0.0926 0.0873 0.0869 0.079
Wald(p) 0.0011  0.3464 0.3691 0.0901 0.0809 -
Jarque-Bera(OLS) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -




5.4 Chapter summary 
In Chapter 5 results of this research have been outlined starting with section 5.1 that 
displayed descriptive statistics followed by results from univariate analysis in section 
5.2 and by a documentation of results from multivariate analysis in the third sub-
section. Before a discussion of the results is provided in the next chapter, a list of 
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hypotheses tested along with an indication of whether support was found for the latter is 
exhibited in the table below.  
 
Table 34: List of results 
No. Hypotheses Supported 
Yes/No 
H1a Founder directors' power is negatively related to board independence Yes 
H1b VC’s power is positively related to board independence Yes 
H1c There is a non-linear relation between founder directors’ power and board 
independence 
Yes 
H2a Founder directors' power is negatively related to the average tenure of independent 
directors 
Yes 
H2b VC-backing is positively related to the average tenure of independent directors Yes 
H2c There is a non-linear relation between founder directors' power and the average 
tenure of independent directors 
No 
H3a Founder power is positively related to the likelihood of a firm being led by a 
founder-CEO 
Yes 
H3b VC-backing is negatively related to the likelihood of a firm being led by a founder-
CEO 
No 
H3c VC syndication is negatively related to the likelihood of a firm being led by a 
founder-CEO 
Yes 
H4 VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of outside directors holding 
professional accounting qualifications 
Yes 
H5a VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of the IPO firm having a CEO 
with experience of leading a company before 
Yes 
H5b VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of the IPO firm having a founder-
CEO with experience of leading a company before 
Yes 
H6a VC-backing is positively related to director prestige  Yes 
H6b VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of the IPO firm being affiliated 
with a prestigious auditor 
Yes 
H7a Board independence is negatively related to underpricing No 
H7b Board independence is positively related to post-IPO market performance in the 
long-run 
No 
H8a Founder directors' retained ownership is negatively related to underpricing No 
H8b Founder directors' retained ownership is positively related to post-IPO market 
performance in the long-run 
No 
H9a Founder-CEO status is positively related to underpricing Yes 
H9b Founder-CEO status is negatively related to post-IPO market performance in the 
long-run 
No 
H10a The proportion of independent directors holding professional accounting 
qualifications is negatively related to underpricing 
No 
H10b The proportion of independent directors holding professional accounting 
qualifications is positively related to post-IPO market performance in the long-run 
No 
H11a CEO role legitimacy is negatively related to underpricing No 
H11b CEO role legitimacy is positively related to post-IPO market performance in the 
long-run 
No 
H12a Director prestige is negatively related to underpricing No 
H12b Director prestige is positively related to post-IPO market performance in the long-
run 
No 
H13a Being affiliated with a prestigious auditor is negatively related to underpricing Yes 
H13b Being affiliated with a prestigious auditor is positively related to post-IPO market 
performance in the long-run 
Yes 
H14a VC-backing is negatively related to underpricing  No 
H14b VC-backing is positively related to post-IPO market performance in the long-run Yes 
H14c There is a non-linear relationship between VCs’ retained ownership and post-IPO 
market performance in the long-run 
Yes 
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After having presented the results of the analysis, the next chapter provides a discussion 





In this chapter results of the study are discussed split by the main themes of this thesis, 
starting with VCs’ and founders’ role regarding monitoring and these actors’ role 
regarding resource provision, respectively, concluding with a discussion of results on 
board roles and IPO performance. 
 
6.1 Venture capitalists, founders and monitoring role 
Individual directors’ independence of the CEO is considered to be a necessary condition 
for the fulfilment of the board’s control responsibilities, since directors may be less 
effective monitors if they are potentially influenced by the CEO through personal, 
professional and/or economic relationships (e.g. Baysinger and Butler, 1985). Findings 
with respect to board independence (measured by the proportion of independent 
directors on the board) are by and large supportive of agency and bargaining 
explanations of board formation. The negative relationship between retained founder 
equity and board independence (incentive alignment) becomes stronger with increasing 
levels of VC equity (or rather monitoring equity) suggesting the two work in a 
complementary way. 
 
While the linear models are in line with the assumption of incentive alignment due to 
founder ownership at all levels of founder ownership, results from the non-linear 
models indicate that at higher levels of founder ownership entrenchment-related effects 
come into existence.   
These results are in line with evidence presented in Arthur (2001), Roosenboom (2005), 
as well as Peasnell et al. (2003) (the latter authors using UK data). As predicted by the 
bargaining model, power of outside institutional investors (like VCs and instiutional 
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blockholders) acts as counter-balance to founders’/CEO’s power (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998), as documented by evidence found showing VC power is positively 
related to board independence, in line with Baker and Gompers (2003), Kieschnick and 
Moussawi (2004), Roosenboom (2005) and Boone et al. (2007) in both linear and non-
linear models. Models with interaction variables showed that while the alignment effect 
of founder equity on board independence increases with rising levels of monitoring 
equity (indicating that founder and monitoring equity work as complements), the 
entrenchment effect becomes weaker (indicating that founder and monitoring equity 
work as substitutes (yet, not statistical significance was detected for the latter)). 
 
Since it is argued that knowledge and power to influence board decisions can be 
attained through seniority on the board (Singh and Harianto, 1989; Kosnik, 1990; 
Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy et al., 1996), the author additionally 
employs independent directors’ average tenure as a dependent variable. With this 
measure of outsiders’ power the author finds similar results in linear models, yet a 
significant non-linear relationship between founder equity and outsiders’ power is not 
detected. An entrenchment related effect of founder equity on outsiders’ tenure may 
arguably be less clear than for board independence per se. Moreover, the measure 
employed for outsiders’ power is quite crude and could not be determined for relatively 
many observations.  
 
6.2 Venture capitalists, founders and resource provision role 
6.2.1 Founder leadership 
With respect to founders holding the CEO position at IPO, consistent with hypothess 3a, 
the author finds evidence that founder power (fraction of founders on the board of 
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directors) is positively related to the likelihood of a founder heading the company at 
IPO. Yet having a founder chairing the board is negatively related to that likelihood. 
Counter to hypothesis 3b and evidence presented by Hellmann and Puri (2002), the data 
do not show a negative and significant link between VC-backing and the likelihood of 
having a founder-CEO at IPO. Yet, the data support hypothesis 3c proposing that VC 
syndication is negatively related to the likelihood of a founder holding the CEO position 
at IPO. This result is at odds with arguments and evidence presented by Wasserman 
(2003) who shows that there is a lower chance of replacing the founder-CEO when a 
new investor is added. However, the latter author’s results are derived from a sample of 
Internet start-ups, which may not be representative.   
Yet the interpretation has to be treated with caution. Due to the sample definition, the 
author is able to observe voluntary (founder-CEO) turnover only (see section 2.2.2.3.1 
and Hellmann and Puri (2002)) which means that the founder remains on the board in 
either an executive or non-executive position. If the founder-CEO as the sole founder is 
involuntarily replaced (meaning that founder does not take any board position), than 
such a company is by definition not captured in the sample. Therefore it is likely that 
more founder-CEOs retained their CEO position at least until the IPO in the sample 
relative to a sample which is not restricted to having at least one of the original founders 
on the board at IPO (the criterion of being ‘entrepreneurial’). These issues merit further 
examination in the future. 
 
6.2.2 Directors with professional accounting qualifications 
Since Hunter and Hunter (1984) suggested that ability was the single most important 
determinant of task performance, directors with professional accounting qualifications 
are expected to have (superior) ability to perform at least the monitoring role. In line 
with arguments that VCs are associated with the professionalisation of their portfolio 
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firms (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Florin, 2003) and hypothesis 4, the data show that VC-
backing is positively associated with the likelihood of the IPO firm having at least one 
outsider holding professional accounting qualifications on the board of directors. 
 
6.2.3 Role legitimacy 
Extending prior research on roles to the VC context, the author shows that in line with 
hypothesis 5a, VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of having a CEO who 
has accumulated experience in this role in another company. This may indicate that VCs 
tend to prefer experienced CEOs to head portfolio companies at IPO.  
In addition it was shown that VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of 
having a founder-CEO at IPO who has prior experience in this role both in the founder-
CEO sub-sample as well as the full sample. Furthermore, in the sub-sample of IPO 
firms headed by a CEO with prior experience in this role, VC-backing is significantly 
associated with the likelihood of having a founder-CEO (who in such a sample is a 
founder-CEO with accumulated previous experience as a CEO). Together with the 
finding that VC-backing per se is not negatively related to the likelihood of having a 
founder-CEO at IPO, the results may indicate that VCs tend to prefer having 
experienced CEOs at IPO, yet among the already experienced CEOs, founder-CEOs are 
preferred. It is rather the CEO’s prior experience than founder status which seems to be 
important for VCs in the sample of all entrepreneurial IPOs, though among experienced 
CEOs, founder-CEOs seem to matter to VCs. 
These results are in line with more general empirical evidence regarding VCs’ 
professionalisation of portfolio firms (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Florin, 2003). Again, 
the interpretations regarding founder-CEOs have to be treated with caution due to the 
sample definition as outlined previously, results may therefore be overstated. 
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6.2.4 Director prestige 
Although there is anecdotal and empirical evidence that VCs tend to be associated with 
quality managers in their portfolio firms (e.g. Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Florin, 2003) 
and although scholarly interest in director prestige recently increased (e.g. Certo, 2003; 
Lester et al., 2006), the literature to date seems to have omitted examinations regarding 
VCs role with respect to director prestige. In line with similar explanations and findings 
by Megginson and Weiss (1991) that VC-backed IPOs are able to attract more 
prestigious auditors and underwriters, the author hypothesised a positive association 
between VC-backing and director prestige in general (hypothesis 6a). Three separate 
proxies of director prestige deemed to be important, especially in the UK context, 
educational, political and social prestige, the latter measured as having British honours 
and titles held among the directors, are employed in this thesis.  
 
As outlined before, results are mixed. In line with hypothesis 6a, VC-backing was found 
to be positively associated to the fraction of directors who graduated from prestigious 
universities. Yet, in the sample, degrees from elite educational institutions are more 
common among VC directors than non-VC directors. Results from further examinations 
indicate that it is not VC-backing per se but rather VC directors sitting on sample 
companies’ boards driving the results. Furthermore, indications for the existence of a 
similarity bias among the VC directors who were educated at elite institutions towards 
investing in and/or recruiting directors to the portfolio firms who also received 
prestigious education were found, similar to results documented by Franke et al. (2006). 
 
When the measure of director prestige is that of having (at least one director holding) 
British honours and titles, hypothesis 6a was not supported. VC-backing was not found 
to be positively associated with the likelihood of having directors holding British 
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honours and titles (it is rather associated with a decrease in the likelihood). This finding 
may indicate that VCs could be doubtful regarding possible benefits of having directors 
holding British honours and titles among portfolio firms’ boards, which is in line with 
suggestions made by several authors who question the value of having titled directors.        
Possible explanations for this finding may be that VCs seem to prefer director selection 
based on ‘hard’ attributes like experience rather than by mere virtue of holding honours 
and titles which typically are awarded in areas other than business. It has been noted 
long ago that director selection may depend on the director’s name and background 
rather than competence. May (1939: 484) criticised the exploitation of names from the 
nobility: “The genesis of abuse lies in attributes which motivates initial selection for 
service. Particularly for prospectus purposes, boards are dressed up for snobbery 
appeal.”  
According to Sargant Florence (1961), directors may be appointed for their drawing 
power, with reputation for honour and honesty being more important for this purpose 
than actual efficiency. Similarly, Clutterbuck and Waine (1994) state that management 
experience is only possessed by a few aristocratic company directors, stemming 
primarily from financial disciplines. Moreover, these authors suggest that directors 
appointed from some misguided sense of status frequently struggle to keep up with the 
demands the job brings with it nowadays.  
Social capital that may go along with such titles seems not to be considered critical by 
VCs. Yet, VC-backed firms may not need potential further attention through 
appointments of distinguished names to their boards.  
Thus, it seems that it is rather the non-VC backed firms which tend to ‘dress up’ their 
boards by appointing directors holding British honours and titles. 
The finding that the (log of the) number of non-executives on the board is positively 
related to the level of British honours and titles is in line with Page and Spira (2000) 
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who report that a non-executive is six times as likely to hold a British honour compared 
to an executive director. 
 
Regarding the third measure of director prestige, no significant relationship was 
detected in the models between VC-backing and having at least one member of the 
political elite among the board. Yet, having members of the political elite appointed to 
the board may make more sense in certain industries. Hillman et al. (2000) show that 
during deregulation the likelihood of community influentials (including politicians) 
being appointed, as replacements, to the board increases. Within a certain industry, 
characteristics such as exports, sales to government and lobbying may play a role, since 
Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) show on a sample of manufacturing firms that politically 
experienced directors are more prevalent in firms where such issues arise. 
Yet it should be noted that only 14 out of the 390 sample firms in the sample have 
members of the political elite on their boards.  
 
6.2.5 Prestigious auditor 
In line with expectation, VC-backing is found to be significantly positively associated 
with the likelihood of having an auditor involved in the IPO firm belonging to the Big 
Five/Big Six auditing firms, lending support to hypothesis 6b. This finding is in line 
with Megginson and Weiss (1991) who suggest, relying on VC certification 
respectively the VC’s network, that it should be easier to attract reputable auditors to get 
involved in VC-backed firms. These authors report findings consistent with this view. 
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6.3 Board roles and performance 
The discussion is opened regarding the findings on to IPO performance by focusing at 
first on the governance-related variables employed, followed by the discussion of 
results related to the resource provision role and performance. 
 
6.3.1 Monitoring role and performance 
 
Board independence: 
According to agency logic, one means of enabling effective monitoring by the board of 
directors is the board’s independence. Moreover, from a signalling point of view, board 
independence may be a signal that a system of managerial oversight is in place, which is 
expected to lead to a decrease in the spread between the offer price and the closing price 
on the first day of trading.  
Yet greater fractions of independent directors on the IPO firms’ board are not found to 
be significantly negatively related to underpricing (in the whole and normal IPO 
periods) inconsistent with hypothesis 7a. In model 1 of the estimations for the hot IPO 
period board independence was even found to be significantly positively related to the 
dependent variable.  
For an IPO firm, growth opportunities are usually present which may offer some 
explanation regarding the finding. It is suggested by Jensen (1986b) that firms with high 
levels of free cash flow and few possibilities for making investments may encounter 
problematic agency issues. Agents (managers) may, in such situations, use cash flows in 
other ways than those consistent with shareholders’ interests. Yet, firms at their IPO 
usually have limited amounts of cash flow at management’s disposal but a variety of 
opportunities for investments in new projects. Raising money to finance growth 
opportunities is a key reason for undertaking an IPO (Rock, 1986). Having proper 
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control mechanisms in place may therefore be less critical and thus less meaningful as a 
signal in IPOs.  
Insights may also be provided by the corporate entrepreneurship literature. Zahra (1996) 
documents a negative relationship between the fraction of outside directors on the board 
and firms’ venturing activities, commitment to innovation as well as strategic renewal. 
Yet, exactly these activities are essential for the success of the newly listed corporation. 
The finding of a positive relationship between the fraction of independent directors and 
underpricing may be a reflection of underwriters’ opinion that those directors familiar 
with the firm and its growth opportunities may suit better in the IPO context (a view 
which may not be shared by new IPO investors in the aftermarket).  
 
As documented earlier the proportion of independent directors on the board is not 
significantly positively related to market performance in the long. While this finding is 
counter to hypothesis 7b and counter to reports by Florackis (2005) (and also Mura 
(2007)), it is in line with results of other research that suggest that there is little 
relationship between firm performance and board structure (e.g. Dalton et al., 1998; 
Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002; Florackis et al., 2009), with Sanders 
and Boivie (2004) even documenting a negative and significant relationship using an 
Internet IPO firm sample. Yet these studies use different measures of performance 
and/or different measures of board independence. 
A few possible hints why increasing levels of board independence are not associated 
with long-run stock returns can be found in the literature. In an attempt to explain such a 
finding, at first one would normally suggest that investors anticipate the effects of board 
structure on market performance (see, for example, Bhagat and Black (2002)), even if a 
significant correlation between long-term stock returns and board independence exists. 
Zahra’s (1996) findings from the corporate entrepreneurship literature that the 
proportion of outsiders on the board is negatively related to some essential corporate 
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activities have just been outlined. Also, Short et al. (1999) propose an overemphasis on 
the monitoring role of governance which may have led to a vast amount of managerial 
time spent on providing non-executive directors with detailed information, resulting in 
an ignorance of the corporate governance’s responsibility in promoting enterprise. As 
indicated earlier, there is also a tradeoff between incentives and performance (e.g. 
Bhagat and Black, 2002; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Independent directors typically 
own only very small proportions of the focal company’s shares (see Table 8), thus these 
directors seem to be lacking proper incentives to monitor prudently. Moreover, the 
group of independent directors is not homogeneous, e.g. in terms of experience and 
ability, thus it may be more valuable to have the ‘right’ independent directors on the 
board rather than a higher proportion of ‘less suitable’ ones (the author will focus on 
this issue later in this chapter). 
 
This finding, is in line with Daily et al. (2005) who suggest that investment bankers may 
not regard prospectus information (here, the level of board independence) particularly 
informative when determining the offer price or offer price spread. Also, Loughran and 
Ritter (2002) report that IPO price adjustments only partially incorporate publicly 
available information.  
 
A further explanation comes from the suggestion that firm performance is dependent on 
the efficiency of a bundle of mechanisms of governance in controlling agency issues. It 
is argued by previous research that one means of governance may complement and/or 
substitute for another (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Hoskisson et al., 2002). For example, it 
has been shown earlier in the results chapter that board independence and founder 
ownership are interrelated. Agency theory proposes that equity ownership aligns the 
interest of managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), thus insider 
ownership may be a substitute for direct board monitoring.  
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Ownership: 
According to Leland and Pyle (1977), entrepreneurs can signal the value of their 
ventures by the percentage of equity retained by them. The authors argue that 
entrepreneurs with higher ownership stakes in their firms will have lower levels of 
wealth diversification, thus increasing their personal risk. Only if entrepreneurs are 
confident of the firm’s future cash flows they are willing to do so, thereby 
communicating private favourable information to investors who may interpret the 
percentage of ownership retained as a sign of the venture’s value. When the private 
information is fully reflected in the aftermarket share price, entrepreneurs who retained 
shares in their quality firms can recoup their loss associated with underpricing at a later 
stage.  
The empirical evidence found is inconsistent with Leland and Pyle’s (1977) model and 
hypothesis 8a. In models employing the full sample as well as the sub-sample of IPOs 
floated in the normal period, retained founder equity does not show a significant 
relationship with underpricing. This is however in line with similar UK evidence 
documented, e.g. by Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) who find no evidence in support of 
the view that retained ownership serves as an IPO signal reducing underpricing. Yet, 
employing the sub-sample of IPOs floated in the hot period, in the model that only 
contained control variables and governance related variables, a significant positive 
relationship was found. 
Results indicate that retained founder ownership does not seem to serve as a signal of 
firm quality. An explanation for the finding of a positive relationship between retained 
equity by founders and underpricing in the hot period (model 1) may be that in such 
periods the difference in opinion regarding ‘value’ of retained founder equity (as a 
signal) between underwriters setting the offer price and first day investors (due to 
unanticipated or larger than anticipated investor sentiment) may be larger.  
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Further results presented indicate that equity retained by founders is not positively and 
significantly related to long-run market performance for any of the three periods 
examined following the IPO. This finding is inconsistent with hypothesis 8b but in the 
vein of e.g. Himmelberg et al. (1999) who conclude that (managerial) ownership does 
not affect firm performance to an econometrically observable extent.  
This thesis’ finding may indicate that firms with higher levels of ownership retained by 
founders may not be better able to attract greater interest from institutional investors 
which are less likely to be prone to overoptimism, which in turn should be reflected in 
the market price once formerly private information becomes fully available. 
While for the UK Florackis (2005) reports a significant non-linear (cubic) relationship 
(and Florackis et al. (2009)  report a quintic structure) between executive ownership and 
Tobin’s Q, when similarly testing for a (quadratic or cubic) relationship between 
founder’s retained ownership and long-run performance no significant relationship of 
these forms could be detected. Yet, Florackis (and Florackis and colleagues) used 
Tobin’s Q as dependent variable and executive ownership as one of his/their 
independent variables using GMM. This thesis, focusing on founders rather than 
executives and long-run market performance, employed founder ownership and (log) 
BHAR using quantile (median) regression, thus results may therefore differ. 
 





Based on arguments derived from organisational life cycle theory (Clifford, 1975; 
Hanks, 1990) and information asymmetries surrounding the IPO, the author proposed a 
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positive relationship between having a founder-CEO heading the IPO firm and 
underpricing (hypothesis 9a). While suited to the early stages of the venture’s life 
cycles, founders are suggested to be unable or unwilling to make the transition to a 
professional style of management (Tashakori, 1980) since they may have neither the 
skills required nor an interest in running larger companies (Jayaraman et al., 2000). 
Moreover, especially since founders floating their firms are usually doing so for the first 
time, therefore representing ‘untested management’, the assessment of firm 
management in the case of founder management is more difficult (Trigwell et al., 1999). 
Consistent with hypothesis 9a, a significant positive relationship between having a 
founder-CEO at IPO and underpricing was detected. This finding indicates that there 
may be critical informational asymmetries between underwriters and first-day investors 
since these parties did seem to have attached different values to founder management. 
This finding is in line with suggestions that a ‘founder bias discount’ conceptually 
derived from the risk averse underwriter hypothesis exists (Certo et al., 2001a). Yet, 
while this finding holds for the whole sample and the normal IPO period, it does not 
hold for the hot IPO period in which the sign of the coefficient of the founder-CEO 
dummy is negative but the relationship with underpricing is not found to be significant. 
 
Following a similar argument combined with the divergence of opinion hypothesis, the 
author proposed a negative relationship between founder-CEO status and post-IPO 
long-run market performance in hypothesis 9b. Counter to expectation, no significant 
relationship between the two was found in models focusing on long-run performance 
although a founder bias discount respectively divergence of opinion regarding founder-
CEO status between underwriters and first-day investors seems to be present at 
flotation. 
While there are several studies relating founder-CEOs to long-run performance of IPO 
firms (e.g. Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Fahlenbrach, 
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2005) unlike this thesis, these studies focus on large and mature IPOs. Results are 
therefore hardly comparable.  
 
Professional accounting qualifications: 
It has been argued earlier in this thesis that special human capital inherent in outsider 
directors holding professional accounting qualifications are important for IPO 
performance, since performing the board’s control role effectively requires the ability to 
monitor. Professional accounting qualifications fulfil the requirements of being a signal 
since it is costly to obtain and observable in advance due to corresponding letters of 
accounting bodies attached to directors’ names. It was hypothesised that the proportion 
of outside directors holding professional accounting qualification is negatively 
associated with underpricing (hypothesis 10a). Evidence found in models run is 
inconsistent with this hypothesis irrespective of the sample period chosen. 
It should be noted that the aforementioned study by van der Zahn et al. (2006) uses 
similar arguments and hypothesised that an IPO with at least one independent director 
appointed to the audit committee who holds academic qualifications and professional 
credentials in accounting, auditing or finance will have lower underpricing than other 
IPOs. Yet their data on IPOs floated in Singapore showed the opposite result. The 
authors suggest that while the positive association seems contrary to conventional 
wisdom, it may however imply support for a signalling-based hypothesis. If having such 
qualified directors on the audit committee is regarded as a mark of quality, it may be 
used by informed investors as a signal to the market of the firm’s long-term value, and 
thus informed investors are willing to accept higher underpricing since they expect to 
collect higher returns later on. Yet these authors do not analyse long-term performance 
to support their interpretation. 
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While neither board independence nor (superior) monitoring skills held among outsiders 
are significantly negatively related to underpricing, the interaction of both variables is, 
indicating that monitoring skills held among outsiders may moderate the board 
independence – firm performance (here: initial returns) relationship. This finding is in 
line with related empirical evidence presented by Combs et al. (2007) and 
conceptualisations developed by Hillman and Dalziel (2003). 
 
Additionally, the author proposed that through the more informed decisions, with 
possibly longer-lasting consequences, which directors with monitoring ability are 
supposed to be able to make, there should be substantive effects of having such 
directors in the long-run (hypothesis 10b). The fraction of independent directors holding 
professional accounting qualifications is not significantly related to (log) BHAR in all 
models. Hypothesis 10b is therefore rejected.  
This finding may indicate that directors professionally trained in accountancy either do 
not provide better monitoring services, that these are not reflected in the whole board’s 






The author extended previous work by Higgins and Gulati (2006) who showed in a 
sample of US bio-technology IPOs that having a chief scientific officer with similar 
prior experience gained in that role at another company before is positively associated 
with the number of institutional investors investing in the IPO firm, by showing that 
VC-backing is positively related to role legitimacy of the CEO (hypothesis 5a). 
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Moreover, not restricting the analysis to a certain industry, the author also tested for a 
hypothesised relationship between role legitimacy and IPO performance.  
No significant relationship as proposed by hypotheses 11a and 11b between the CEO’s 
role legitimacy and underpricing as well as long-run post-IPO market performance was 
found. This may indicate, that information inherent in the CEO’s role legitimacy is 
already reflected in the offer price so that the dispersion in opinions between the parties 
involved regarding the CEO may be neglectable. 
Yet, when interacting ownership retained by the CEO (incentives proxy) with CEO role 
legitimacy (ability proxy), the interaction term was positively and significantly related 
to long-run market performance following 12 and 24 months from flotation. The net 
effect of an increase in CEO’s retained ownership on estimated long-run market 
performance is higher in firms led by an experienced CEO. This finding may lend 
support to suggestions made by Hillman and Dalziel (2003: 388) that: “Both ability and 
incentives are likely to affect behaviour within organizations, suggesting that examining 
one without the other is insufficient.”  
 
Director prestige: 
Scholars have suggested long ago that members of the economic elite are not all equal, 
e.g. that among them ‘inner circles’ exist (e.g. Warner and Abegglen, 1955; Useem and 
Karabel, 1986). Following conceptual and empirical work by Certo et al. (2001b) and 
Certo (2003), the author suggested that the prestige of board members lends legitimacy 
to the firm which should be reflected in the IPO firm’s short and long-run performance. 
While some of the proxies of prestige (prestigious education, membership in the 
political elite) are based on D’Aveni (1990), one proxy is specific to the UK context 
(British honours and titles).  
Results show that counter to expectation, the fraction of directors holding degrees from 
elite educational institutions is not significantly negatively related to underpricing 
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irrespective of the sample period examined. This finding holds for British honours and 
titles, as well (only in a more parsimonious model run on firms floated in the hot IPO 
market, a significant negative relationship was displayed). 
 
Regarding post-IPO market performance in the long-run, none of the measures proxying 
for different types of director prestige showed the predicted significant positive 
relationship, with the exception of model 2 when estimating LBARH24 when the 
fraction of directors with elite education is weakly positively significant. Overall, 
evidence found is counter to hypothesis 12b and inconsistent with empirical evidence 
presented by Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). (Yet it was noted earlier that the latter 
authors largely employed proxies of management quality rather than proxies of prestige 
in the sense of D’Aveni (1990).)  
 
Prestigious auditor: 
In line with prior research indicating that reputation is an important driver for auditor 
choice and that there is demand for high quality auditing, the author proposed that 
having a prestigious auditor at the focal firm’s IPO is negatively related to underpricing 
as predicted by hypothesis 13a since auditor quality may provide useful information 
regarding the assessment of the IPO firm’s value (e.g. Titman and Trueman, 1986). The 
evidence reported with respect to the relationship between having a prestigious auditor 
and IPO underpricing is largely consistent with these arguments. This finding is in line 
with, for example, Beatty (1989) who reports an inverse relationship between auditor 
reputation and initial IPO returns, and Holland and Horton (1993) who document a 
similar finding in a sample of IPOs floated on the Unlisted Securities Market.  
Yet when splitting the sample into firms floated in the normal period and the hot IPO 
market, auditor prestige may only be perceived as a signal in the normal period. This 
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finding again indicates that more research is needed focusing on hot IPO markets which 
seem to be detached from most contemporary theories. 
 
All in all, hypothesis 13b, proposing that being affliated to a prestigious auditor is 
positively related to post-IPO market performance in the long-run, is supported. It 
seems the dispersion in opinion that was suggested to have existed between 
underwriters setting the offer price and first-day investors (as indicated by the 
significant relationship found between auditor prestige and underpricing) does seem to 
get a considerable reflection in the post-IPO market performance. This finding is in line 
with Michaely and Shaw (1995) who suggest auditor prestige to be related to long-run 
performance of IPOs. 
Thus, at least in this sample of entrepreneurial IPOs, there does seem to be a substantive 
effect of having the firm audited by a Big Five/Big Six auditor regarding post-IPO 
market performance in the long-run.  
 
In regressions with respect to IPO short and long-run performance, the author used 
different types of prestigious directors and prestigious affiliates, with underwriter 
prestige as a control and also as a part of an interaction term. Yet relatively little 
attention has been paid in the literature to date regarding the implications of having 
various types of prestige involved in a firm at the same time (initial work by Pollock et 




VC-backing and underpricing: 
The VC certification hypothesis (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) proposes that VCs 
enable the reduction of information asymmetries between insiders and uninformed 
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outside investors by certifying the value of those firms in which VCs are involved and 
the quality of the information disclosed associated with the IPO. Moreover, the VCs’ 
ability to reduce information asymmetries is suggested to result in a decrease in costs 
associated with the IPO as well as a decrease in underpricing. This hypothesis is based 
on certifying models developed by Booth and Smith (1986) and Titman and Trueman 
(1986) in which the signal of the agent (here VC) becomes credible by the imminent 
threat of losing reputation when certifying falsely.  
No statistically significant (negative) relationship was detected in all (sub-)periods, 
which is counter to the VC certification hypothesis (hypothesis 14a) but adds to the 
growing number of papers not finding evidence in support of this hypothesis.  
It has already been indicated that (earlier) tests of the certification hypothesis produced 
inconclusive results (see section 2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2). Scholars provided several explanations 
regarding the mixed results in empirical tests of the VC certification hypothesis. While 
Gompers and Lerner (1997) document that the relationship between VC-backing and 
underpricing is not constant over time and was positive during the five year period 
preceding the Megginson and Weiss (1991) sample, Ljungqvist (1999) and Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001) argue that underpricing is not the entrepreneurs’ primary concern, as 
they (and their backers, if any) will only care about pricing of an issue to the degree that 
such choices affect their wealth. Since the more an entrepreneur (and similarly the VC) 
participates in the offering and the size of any capital increase, the more the 
entrepreneur (and similarly the VC) will benefit from optimising pricing, hence, 
according to these authors, research should control for incentives to reduce 
underpricing. Yet, in a 1990s’ sample VC certification could not be confirmed, with or 
without controlling for incentives to reduce underpricing (Ljungqvist, 1999). Due to 
data limitations for nearly half of the VC-backed IPOs in the sample, it could not be 
detected whether the VC(s) actually participated in the IPO (by offering (parts of their) 
equity). Since the inclusion of a variable capturing VCs’ selling activity during IPO 
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would have decreased sample size considerably, results might then not have been driven 
by this variable but might rather be due to missing data and thus the reduced sample 
size. 
 
Recently, the literature came up with other explanations of the mixed findings regarding 
VC certification. The collaboration hypothesis (Hoberg and Seyhun, 2006) and the 
spinning hypothesis (Loughran and Ritter, 2004) propose a teaming up of VCs and 
prestigious underwriters (in hot IPO periods, according to the latter), with the 
consequence of deliberate underpricing of IPOs while recouping VCs’ money left on 
the table by enabling favourable allocation of other hot IPOs by the focal underwriter. 
While Flagg (2005) and Coakley et al. (2006) interpret their findings as indirectly 
supporting the spinning hypothesis, results in this thesis are different.  
Employing the full sample, the coefficient of the interaction term (prestigious 
underwriter dummy multiplied by the VC dummy) is negatively but insignificantly 
related to underpricing, for the normal sub-period it is positive and is negative again for 
the hot IPO period, yet never significant. Thus, this finding is at odds with the Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) spinning hypothesis, which was proposed for hot IPO markets and is 
also not in line with the collaboration hypothesis, not restricted to hot markets, by 
Hoberg and Seyhun (2006). The difference in results may, however, be due to 
differences in sample period definitions.  
 
Also, while most research in this area was conducted from a pure finance perspective, 
the author argued that VC-backing is associated with governance and 
professionalisation characteristics. A direct VC-effect on underpricing may not have 
been found since the author included variables capturing characteristics mentioned 
above in the models and found partial VC effects regarding these variables. Therefore, 
by including such variables, a direct effect of VC-backing per se may not be captured, 
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since VC effects are already reflected in governance and professionalisation variables. 
Examinations employing more sophisticated methods are clearly needed in the future. 
 
Heterogeneity: 
Several authors therefore point to other factors which may offer some explanation for 
the ‘non-finding’ mentioned above. Some scholars explicitly assume that VCs are not 
homogeneous. The grandstanding hypothesis, developed by Gompers (1996) builds on 
VC heterogeneity. According to this hypothesis young VCs tend to rush their portfolio 
companies to IPO in order to achieve visibility associated with that flotation, exploiting 
this visibility to attract investors for the focal VC’s new funds. Long-term value 
creation is not necessarily considered to have high priority. Regarding short-term 
performance, grandstanding posits that IPOs of younger VCs will be more underpriced 
than IPOs backed by older ones, as older, more experienced VCs are better able to 
certify their portfolio firm’s quality at IPO. While some empirical evidence derived 
from US data is largely consistent with the hypothesis that VC quality is negatively 
related to underpricing (e.g. Barry et al., 1990; Gompers, 1996; Lin and Smith, 1998), 
evidence of a positive relation between VC reputation and underpricing also exists. 
Gifford (1997) argues that increased monitoring by young VCs with a smaller number 
of portfolio firms permits these firms to go public earlier than those funded by more 
established and more active VC firms (in the sense of having ‘more’ ventures in their 
portfolio). This suggests that there must be a trade-off between the number of ventures 
in a VC’s portfolio and the intensity of advice (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2003). 
Interestingly, papers using UK data do not find a significant relationship between VC 
quality and initial returns (Espenlaub et al., 1999; Barnes and McCarthy, 2002; Jelic et 
al., 2005; Coakley et al., 2006). Some authors also point out that the length of being 
VC-backed and the length of service of a VC director in the portfolio firm might be 
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important, since the longer the VC-directors’ service, the greater their ability to monitor 
and influence actions of the portfolio company (Jain and Kini, 1995). 
 
Conflicts of interest: 
Conflicts of interest may offer an explanation regarding the lack of support with respect 
to the VC certification hypothesis documented by results of this thesis. It was (in line 
with the VC heterogeneity suggestion) argued by some scholars that VCs differ in terms 
of (potential) conflicts of interests. Starting with Barry et al. (1990), researchers have 
been interested whether there are differences in the performance of IPOs backed by VCs 
which are affiliates of investment banks or even backed by affiliates of the actual 
underwriter and IPOs backed by independent VCs. Gompers and Lerner (1999a) predict 
conflicts of interest to affect short-run performance, such as the underwriter’s incentive 
for setting the offer price too high, which will lead rational investors to demand 
compensation for greater information asymmetry and the higher probability of adverse 
selection in the form of a discount (underpricing). Offer prices would then be lower 
relative to fundamentals than they would be if the conflicts illustrated above were not 
present. If this conflict is not anticipated by investors, they will be exploited, as 
underwriters will set higher offer prices the higher their self-interest.  
Yet, Gompers and Lerner (1999a) do not find evidence for this type of conflict of 
interest in their sample. Additionally, a small number of papers also analysed this issue, 
however with mixed results, partly finding evidence in the opposite direction, which 
may be due to alternative sub-sample definitions and/or small sample size). Evidence 
presented on a UK sample indicates that backing by VCs with links to investment banks 
reduces underpricing but only if the VC backing the IPO firm is not affiliated to the 




VC-backing and long-run performance: 
In the second part of section 2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2, the author provided explanations found in 
the literature why VC-backing may be associated with superior long-run performance 
and cited research reporting empirical evidence. All in all, evidence is presented in the 
results chapter showing VC-backing to be (weakly) positively associated with LBHAR 
24 months and also 36 months following the IPO which is in line with hypothesis 14b 
and the perception of Gompers and Lerner (2001: 64) that “… the early participation of 
venture firms … helps innovators sustain their success long after their company issues 
an IPO“. 
Since it is in the very nature of the VC to exit sooner or later after the IPO, it may be 
expected that the VC effect may diminish. In fact, while in a German sample of IPOs, 
Kraus and Burghof (2003) provide some evidence that prior to the expiration of lock-
ups, VC-backed IPOs outperform non-VC-backed IPOs and underperform around and 
after the exit, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) suggest rational investors anticipate 
negative long-run returns associated with insiders’ exit.  
 
Further results also imply that the association between LBHAR and equity retained by 
VCs is an increasing (non-monotonic) function of equity retained by VCs, since a 
significant relationship between log retained VC equity and LBHAR (24 and also 36 
months following flotation) was found. In contrast to the quadratic and cubic 
specifications (that were not found to be significant) the logarithmic specification does 
not allow for turning point(s), hence entrenchment due to relatively high VC ownership 
does not seem to prevail. 
 
Bringing VC heterogeneity into the discussion with respect to long-run performance, 
Gompers and Lerner (1999a) propose that the consequence of the presence of conflicts 
of interest will be worse performance in the long-run for IPOs underwritten by VC 
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affiliates, assuming the market fails to recognise the adverse effects of the underwriters’ 
self-interest regarding timing and pricing of the IPO. Yet the authors do not find 
evidence in line with their proposition. However, Espenlaub et al. (1999) report 
considerably better long-run performance for IPOs underwritten by VC affiliates 
compared to other IPOs. 
 







After having discussed results in the previous chapter, the final chapter is devoted to 
concluding the thesis, comprising a summary of the main findings which is followed by 
an outline of implications with respect to key audiences. Then, limitations of this study 
will be acknowledged and areas of future research will be pointed out, concluding this 
thesis. 
 
7.1 Summary of key findings 
Regarding the role of VCs and founders with respect to the board’s monitoring role, 
support was found for all but one hypothesis. Founder power (ownership) was found to 
be negatively related to board independence (hypothesis 1a) and to average tenure of 
independent directors as a proxy of independent directors’ power (hypothesis 2a), while 
VC power was found to be positively related to board independence (hypothesis 1b) as 
well as to average tenure of insiders (hypothesis 2b). Moreover, when also examining 
entrenchment-related effects, a non-linear relationship (quadratic) is detected between 
founders’ power and board independence (hypothesis 1c) but not between founders’ 
power and independent directors’ tenure (hypothesis 2c). 
Furthermore, as monitoring equity (a measure capturing VCs’ retained equity plus 
institutional blockholders’ retained equity) increases the relationship between founder 
equity and board independence becomes stronger, indicating that monitoring equity and 
founder equity work as complements. With respect to independent directors’ power, the 
interaction term between founder equity and VC equity is positive and significant 
suggesting that the relationship between founder equity and independent director’s 
power weakens as equity retained by VCs increases. 
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Also, founder power was found to be positively related to the likelihood of a founder 
holding the CEO position at IPO (hypothesis 3a). While VC-backing per se did not 
show a significant (negative) relationship with the likelihood of having a founder-CEO 
with prior experience in such a role at IPO (hypothesis 3b), VC syndication did 
(consistent with hypothesis 3c). In line with hypotheses 4, VC-backing was found to be 
positively associated the likelihood of the IPO firm having at least one independent 
director holding a professional accounting qualification. Similarly, and consistent with 
hypothesis 5a, a positive association between VC-backing and CEO role legitimacy 
(proxied by a dummy for having a CEO with prior experience in this role) was detected. 
Also, VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of having a founder-CEO at 
IPO who already has accumulated experience as CEO consistent with hypothesis 5b. 
With respect to director prestige a significant positive relationship was found for one 
form of director prestige only, the proportion of directors holding degrees from elite 
educational institutions. Thus at least with respect to elite education, hypothesis 6a is 
supported.  
Coming to results regarding board roles and their relationship to IPO performance, 
board independence measured by the fraction of independent directors on the board was 
not found to be significantly negatively related to underpricing irrespective of the 
sample period examined (hypothesis 7a) and little evidence is found with respect to a 
signficiant positive relationship to post-IPO long-run performance (hypothesis 7b). Yet, 
additionally it was shown that as the fraction of those outsiders holding professional 
accounting qualifications increases, the (negative) effect of board independence on 
underpricing increases.  
Founder directors’ retained ownership does not show the significant negative 
relationship with underpricing as proposed by hypothesis 8a. Evidence in support of 
hypothesis 8b suggesting the existence of a positive and significant relationship between 
retained ownership by founders and long-run market performance was also not detected. 
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Consistent with hypothesis 9a, the dummy for a founder holding the CEO position was 
found to be positively significantly related to underpricing. When estimating long-run 
market performance for the latter dummy, little evidence of a significant negative 
relationship was found. 
The proportion of those independent directors holding professional accounting 
qualifications was not found to be significantly negatively related to underpricing in all 
(sub-)samples (main effect) counter to hypothesis 10a. (See above regarding the 
interaction with board independence.) Counter to the prediction of hypothesis 10b the 
fraction of those outsiders who are qualified accountants did not seem to be related to 
long-run market performance.  
No relationship between CEO with experience in this role (role legitimacy) and 
underpricing/long-run market performance was detected, counter to hypotheses 11a and 
11b. (When estimating long-run market performance in models allowing for an 
interaction between CEO incentives (retained CEO ownership) and CEO ability (CEO 
role legitimacy), the (incentive alignment) effect of CEO ownership on LBHAR (12 and 
24 months following flotation) is higher in firms headed by an experienced CEO.) 
With respect to board prestige (hypotheses 12a and 12b) no consistent negative 
relationship with underpricing respectively positive relationship with long-run post-IPO 
performance was found. Yet having a prestigious auditor involved in the IPO firm is 
negatively related to underpricing (as predicted by hypothesis 13a) in the whole sample 
period as well as the normal period, and a significant positive relationship with long-run 
IPO performance was detected (hypothesis 13b).  
Finally, the VC certification hypothesis regarding underpricing (14a) was not confirmed 
by the data, yet VC-backing per se (as well as VC ownership) was found to be 
positively related to long-run IPO performance 24 months (and to a lesser extent also 36 
months) following flotation, thus some evidence is found in support of hypothesis 14b. 
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When testing for a non-linear relationship, while quadratic and cubic specifications 
were insignificant, a statistically significant relationship was detected for the 
logarithmic specification, thus supporting hypothesis 14c.  
 
Next, the author turns to outlining implications the results of this thesis may hold for 
key audiences. 
 
7.2 Implications of the study 
Arising implications from the findings will be outlined in separate sections 
differentiated by target audience in the following.  
 
7.2.1 Managerial/entrepreneurial implications 
The analysis shows that VCs and founders play an important role in shaping corporate 
governance and the professionalisation of IPO-stage ventures in which they are 
involved. Furthermore, it is some of these board/director characteristics that seem to 
make a significant difference in terms of market performance of IPO firms both in the 
short- and long-run.  
 
This study shows that a firm’s board independence is the outcome of bargaining 
between founders and VCs. Yet, founders should be aware that VCs power is not only 
associated with higher levels of board independence but results also indicate that a 
governance system with independent directors is built up earlier in VC-backed firms 
reducing founder discretion. If founders retain high levels of ownership, entrenchment-
related effects may induce the need for a more independent board in the IPO-stage 
venture. 
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Findings of the study also show that with increasing founder power the likelihood of a 
founder heading the company as CEO in this sample of entrepreneurial IPOs is 
increasing. VC-backing per se is unrelated to this likelihood, yet increased VC power 
(proxied by VC syndication) is negatively associated with the likelihood of a founder 
holding CEO position. Bearing this in mind, if founders aim at retaining the most 
prominent leadership position at least up to the IPO, power in the hands of founders and 
avoidance of backing by a VC syndicate rather than a single VC might be the key. 
Additionally, founders should also be aware that VC-backing is associated with the 
professionalisation of the CEO-position of the IPO-stage venture. While VC-backing is 
generally related to CEO role legitimacy at IPO, among the experienced CEOs VC-
backing is related to (experienced) founder-CEOs. These findings indicate that 
founder’s power in terms of previous experience in the leadership position may help a 
founder to hold (on to) the CEO-position at IPO. 
 
VCs seem to be involved in the professionalisation of portfolio companies beyond 
merely the CEO-position. VC-backing is positively related to the likelihood of having at 
least one outsider director holding a professional accounting qualification, a proxy for 
monitoring ability.  
Results also show that VC-backing is positively related to the proportion of directors 
graduated from prestigious universities (for other forms of director prestige a similar 
finding cannot be reported).  
 
Board composition and board characteristics may be an outcome of strategic decisions 
reflecting the needs of the young venture (at IPO). When the reduction of underpricing 
is of key concern for existing shareholders (i.e. founders and VCs), the results of this 
study have several implications. 
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While neither board independence at IPO is negatively associated with underpricing 
(possible explanations have been discussed earlier), nor the fraction of those 
independent directors holding professional accounting qualifications, their interaction 
is. This finding suggests that it is a combination of board independence and 
concentration of (superior) monitoring ability among independent directors that should 
be of interest to pre-IPO shareholders/management in entrepreneurial IPOs. 
 
Therefore, especially when underpricing and ‘money left on the table’ is of key concern 
for founders and executives of IPO firms, they should not get confused by shareholder 
activists, who often call for greater board independence, and therefore may not float 
their companies with a ‘higher’ level of board independence just for the sake of having 
an ‘independent’ board, and also since board independence was found to be unrelated to 
post-IPO market performance in the long-run. 
Furthermore, existing shareholders may be advised to consider appointments of CEOs 
who accumulated experience as a CEO at another company before, as well as 
prestigious directors from a cost/benefit perspective, since appointments of such CEOs 
and directors may come at a higher cost but their value regarding firm performance is 
questionable, especially since no link to long-run post-IPO market performance (or 
initial returns) could be established.  
Director prestige does not seem to be of importance and should again be seen from a 
cost/benefit point of view especially since recent evidence was found that prestige-rich 
firms build up even more prestige and that prestige-poor firms aggressively build up 
board prestige in the run up to IPO and bear higher costs to do so (Chen et al., 2008).  
A certification effect of being audited by a prestigious auditor, however, does seem to 
exist. Having a Big Five/Big Six auditor involved with the IPO firm also seems to have 
a substantive effect on market performance in the long-run. This should be borne in 
mind when choosing/switching auditors (in the run up to IPO). 
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While IPOs in which VCs are involved were found to have better market performance 
24 (and 36) months from flotation it is beyond the scope of this study to examine 
whether founders in VC-backed (IPO) firms are financially better off than founders in 
similar IPOs not funded by VCs (in the spirit of Florin (2003)), despite compensating 
for VC funding by having to transfer parts of their equity stakes to VCs.  
 
Overall, entrepreneurs and managers should be aware that VCs do seem to use their 
power in portfolio firms influencing corporate governance and engaging in the 
professionalisation of the board of directors in terms of its CEOs’ and directors’ 
experience, qualification and prestige. 
 
7.2.2 Investment implications 
Regarding implications for investors, one has to differentiate by investment horizon as 
well as by state of the IPO market.  
Beginning with implications for investors who wish to take advantage of IPO 
underpricing, such investors should be aware that a founder bias disount seems to exist 
(in the whole period and in the sub-sample of IPOs floated in the normal period). 
Investors buying at the offer price and selling near closing of the first day of trading 
would have made some financial gain (everything else being equal). 
With respect to prestigious affiliates, having auditors belonging to the Big Five/Big Six 
is negatively related to underpricing (full sample and the sub-sample of IPOs floated in 
the normal period). Everything else being equal, IPO firms with prestigious auditors 
seem to leave less money on the table.  
 
For investors with a medium-term investment horizon other implications arise. 
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Within the sample of entrepreneurial IPOs, VC-backed ones perform significantly better 
24 (and 36) months following the flotation.  
There is little evidence that experience and prestige-related characteristics of directors  
are related to short- or long-run IPO market performance, indicating that either no 
substantive benefit of having such directors exist or the information inherent in such 
characteristics is already reflected in the share price. However, having a prestigious 
auditor involved in the IPO firm does seem to bear a positive association with long-run 
market performance (as does having a prestigious underwriter, yet for 12 months 
following the IPO only). 
 
Thus, the information provided above may be used strategically by IPO investors when 
making investment decisions.  
 
7.2.3 Policy implications 
In general, corporate governance mechanisms should promote the preservation of 
shareholder value. Especially, due to the separation of ownership from control in 
modern corporations, the monitoring role of the board has attracted much attention. 
More recently, the literature has seen a surge of papers examining the resource 
provision function of the board. Yet not only have these roles largely been analysed 
separately to date, even within one role the focus was mostly on a single characteristic. 
Results show that the corporate governance regulations becoming ever tighter that do 
not differentiate, for example by the firm’s life-cycle, do not seem to work well with 
entrepreneurial IPOs. Board independence in entrepreneurial IPOs does not seem to be 
significantly negatively related to underpricing and thus to ‘money left on the table’. It 
seems that the propagated high emphasis on control is not necessary for firms in such a 
stage. It may be the relatively high proportion of equity retained by founders/insiders 
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which provides them with adequate incentives to perform properly and aligns their 
interests with those of (other) shareholders. 
Thus, the call for greater levels of board independence seems to be too simplistic. 
Corporate governace is too complex for a ‘one size fits all’ to work. It should be 
acknowledged that the appropriate board structure varies from firm to firm. Therefore 
more attention should be given to special circumstances of the firm, e.g. firm 
size/age/life-cycle and industry. In the interest of shareholders, more flexibility in 
‘acceptable’ governance structures may be necessary.  
Moreover, it may be fruitful to shift the focus away from board structure and thus board 
independence per se towards the ability of non-executive directors. While board 
independence provides the opportunity for monitoring, it is the outsiders’/non-
executives’ ability which is essential for task performance and hence monitoring but 
also resource provision. Ideally, such directors should also have appropriate incentives 
to use their ability to benefit the company and its shareholders.  
 
In short, an overemphasis on the monitoring role of governance (Short and Keasey, 
1999) may not be beneficial, at least when focusing on entrepreneurial IPOs.  
 
7.3 Limitations of the study 
There are several limitations to this study which need to be addressed. Some 
measurements and operationalisations used in this piece of research need further 
development and refinement. Due to data availability constraints, regarding role 
legitimacy of the (founder-) CEO, this thesis attributes the focal firm’s CEO with 
having previous CEO experience if in the directors’ section of the prospectus previous 
CEO/MD experience for this director is mentioned. This implicitly assumes that being 
the CEO of a large listed firm provides the same experience and role legitimacy as 
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heading a small start-up, which apparently is not the case. A more fine-grained 
distinction regarding the exact types of companies in which these CEOs held positions 
would be reasonable.  
Additionally and more generally, this thesis assumes that such information as well as 
information on directors’ educational credentials, prestige, etc. is provided in IPO 
prospectuses in a way to induce investor participation at IPO. Since investors may 
assess firm quality by examining directors’ backgrounds and prestigious credentials 
(e.g. D'Aveni, 1990), the author assumes this information to have been included in the 
prospectus voluntarily. Stating academic degrees in the prospectus is not compulsory, 
and if academic degrees are mentioned often no hint of the awarding institutions is 
given. Also, since the measures of director prestige do not seem to be related to long-
run market performance, one could think of creating an aggregate measure as did 
previous research (e.g. D'Aveni, 1990; Lester et al., 2006).  
Furthermore, as indicated earlier, due to the sample definition which requires at least 
one of the original founders to be a board member at the time of IPO, if the sole founder 
has resigned from any board position before an IPO, then such a company is by 
definition not captured in this sample. Thus, there is a need to take into account a 
potential ‘founder-survivor bias’. Similarly, the design of the sample solely included 
firms which have successfully gained a listing on the LSE’s Official List or AIM, 
introduces a certain selection bias towards more successful firms. While this sample 
selection is consistent with previous IPO studies, it is pointed out by several authors that 
findings might be biased in examining solely listed firms instead of all firms which 
could have conceivably been floated during the same time period. Hence, this potential 
bias needs to be taken into account (e.g. Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003).  
 
In addition, as already noted in section 4.2.4, it is indicated that venture financing 
represents an endogenous choice by VCs and entrepreneurs reflected in the non-random 
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distribution and characteristics of VC-backed IPOs (e.g. Lee and Wahal, 2004). Due to 
data availability constraints the author cannot account for that. 
Also, it should be noted that the author treats ownership variables as predetermined, 
although there is a rising controversy regarding the treatment of ownership as 
exogenous. Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) demonstrate that ownership 
is endogenously determined to balance various cost advantages and disadvantages of the 
firm, while Himmelberg et al. (1999) point out that the ownership decision is 
endogenous because of unobserved firm heterogeneity. More recently, scholars suggest 
that ownership structures and board characteristics are endogenous factors which may 
be driven by organisational outcomes (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Arthur, 2001; 
Mak and Li, 2001). It can also be derived that in the context of IPO, the governance 
system may be an outcome of strategic decisions (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Certo et al., 
2001b; Lester et al., 2006). 
However, the vast majority of papers does not account for possible endogeneity. Those 
papers doing so address the endogeneity problem which confronts the use of ownership 
as an explanatory variable, by employing an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Yet 
IV approaches require instruments which need to fulfil the conditions of 1) relevance 
(the endogenous variable should be highly correlated with the instruments), and 2) 
exogeneity (the instruments should not be correlated with the disturbance term) (e.g. 
Hall et al., 1996; Davis and Kim, 2002). Yet it is difficult to find instrumental variables 
for ownership. The fundamental problem is that for any variable which credibly 
determines the optimal level of (insider) ownership, it may also be proposed that the 
same variable credibly affects the fraction of independent directors. While 
acknowledging the endogeneity problem, the author cannot address it since instruments 
proposed by the literature turned out to be extremely weak in unreported models. If 
instruments are weak, the IV estimator will be misleading as prior research has 
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demonstrated (Phillips, 1989; Buse, 1992; Staiger and Stock, 1997; Wang and Zivot, 
1998).  
 
A further limitation of this study is that the variance of the dependent variables 
explained by each model is often modest, indicating that many factors which may 
potentially impact on governance, professionalisation and especially performance are 
not included in the analysis (e.g. VCs’ and entrepreneurs’ participation in the offering 
(Ljungqvist, 1999; Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001) and (other/additional measures of) firm 
risk (e.g. Leland and Pyle, 1977), for example, may affect the extent of underpricing). 
Yet, this unexplained variance is in line with other examinations of IPO underpricing 
(e.g. Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991) also when board and 
management characteristics are explicitly examined (Certo et al., 2001b; Chemmanur 
and Paeglis, 2005).  
 
Moreover, Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) recently suggest that underpricing may 
not be the most appropriate measure in studies on the role of VC-backing. The 
certification hypothesis implies that VCs price their portfolio firm IPOs closer to the 
intrinsic value of the firm, because they care for preserving reputation in the IPO 
market. For underpricing to be a meaningful measure in studies on venture-backing, one 
has to make the rather strong assumption that the closing price of the VC-backed IPO 
firm’s stock is not affected by VC-backing and always equals the intrinsic value of that 
stock. These authors therefore propose using the ratio of the valuation placed on the 
firm in the IPO (the valuation at the offer price) to its intrinsic value. Another measure 
used by Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) is the ratio of the secondary market 
valuation placed on a firm at the end of the first trading day in the secondary market to 
its intrinsic value. They find evidence that VC-backed firms exhibit higher valuations 
based on intrinsic value for various multiples employed. The results are robust for 
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different methodologies to compute the intrinsic value (basic comparative firm 
approach, propensity score-based comparable firm approach and discounted cash flow 
approach). These results strongly reject the certification hypothesis. The valuation 
differential between venture-backed and non-venture-backed IPOs becomes even larger 
at the start of trading in the secondary market (at the close of the first trading day) and 
dissipates over time. While the author of this thesis acknowledges these authors’ 
concern regarding underpricing in such a context, due to data availability constraints the 
author was not able to run sensitivity analyses based on their suggested valuation 
measures. 
 
7.4 Recommendations for future research 
By linking founders and VCs with corporate governance and professionalisation as well 
as performance it contributes to a better understanding of the development of corporate 
governance in entrepreneurial fast-growing firms and its link to performance, pointing 
not only at “… which players are involved and why” (Pettigrew, 1992: 178), but also 
how.  
 
This study has several limitations which may suggest a number of avenues for future 
research.  
1. The study does not differentiate between the various board committees. Thus, an 
analysis of founders’ and VCs’ role regarding the composition (in terms of structure 
and experience/prestige) of the board’s different committees may be valuable. A 
further step would be to link different configurations of board committees with 
organisational outcomes. 
2. Although this study addresses the call to focus on the “… strategic context of 
director appointment, not simply the presence or number of such appointments…” 
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(Carpenter and Westphal, 2001: 653), by focusing on director experience and 
prestige, which conceptually are prerequisites of monitoring and provision of 
resources, future research should focus on the differentiation between potential and 
realised monitoring, respectively, between potential and realised resource provision 
by the board of directors, and also on the related issue of benefits gained and costs 
involved in having certain types of board capital. 
3. Furthermore, it is indicated that a firm’s corporate governance system may be an 
equilibrium response to an individual firm’s strategic needs and its competitive 
environment (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). It is, for example, argued that a firm’s 
ownership structure “… should be thought of as an endogenous outcome of 
decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders and of trading on the market for 
shares” (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001: 210). 
Consequently, the governance properties identified in the sample of IPO firms may 
merely be one of several stages in the IPO firm’s corporate governance life-cycle. 
Accordingly, two possible lines of further research can be thought of.  
(1) The evolution of a venture’s governance system at the IPO may be directly 
affected and/or moderated by ownership and control systems created prior to 
the IPO. At that stage, the firm’s governance system is limited to 
entrepreneurs, family and friends and other holders of residual claims like 
VCs. As indicated in prior research and in this study, VCs play an important 
role regarding monitoring and control, yet due to the static nature of this 
piece of research focusing on IPO-stage data, it cannot verify various stages 
of board development and altering of VC teams from founding to flotation. 
Typically, there are several rounds of financing between a firm’s founding 
and obtaining a listing, with each new financing round, and the addition of 
new investors, leading to some changes to the team, board and governance in 
general.  
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Prior research suggests that there are several stages in the professionalisation 
of a young venture. While at early stages of the firm’s life-cycle the creation 
of an efficient team of executives is of main concern, as the venture grows 
and approaches its IPO ‘threshold’, ownership structure and board 
composition evolve with the focus moving towards recruitment and retention 
of experienced non-executive directors (e.g. Daily and Dalton, 1992b; Certo 
et al., 2001a). Results suggest that VC-backing is positively associated with 
the average tenure of independent directors at IPO. Together with previous 
findings and the finding from univariate analysis documented in Table 6 that 
VC-backed IPOs are significantly younger at their IPO than their matched 
pairs, this may indicate that governance systems are set up earlier in VC-
backed firms. Nevertheless, this does not substitute for a more detailed 
examination of pre-IPO governance evolution and the role played by VCs in 
this respect. 
Control is gradually transferred from original owners and monitors to new 
outside investors as the firm evolves through its corporate governance life-
cycle. Hence, the governance characteristics observed at the IPO may in part 
be an outcome of pre-IPO mechanisms of control. Yet, the main variables of 
interest were collected from listing documents, thus very little is known 
about pre-IPO governance effects of VCs.  
Thus, future research should examine how the extent of board independence, 
ownership structure and resource needs change over time, and how different 
director characteristics attract external backers and vice-versa. Additional 
analyses based on longitudinal case studies of fast-growing ventures may add 
to the understanding of stages and processes involved regarding board 
development.  
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(2) The corporate governance life-cycle does not end with an IPO. From a 
dynamic perspective, governance factors may be shaped by strategic actions 
and outcomes, and the choice of the different governance options may be 
associated with alterations in firm strategy and performance. While in this 
research the author examined long-run post-IPO market performance, the 
analysis is based on governance data at the time of IPO. Original founders 
play a diminishing role in the post-IPO development of the venture’s 
corporate governance system. Typically, incumbents’ share ownership 
becomes diluted by an IPO and the interests of managers and shareholders 
become less closely aligned (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Previous research 
indicates that with an entrepreneurial firm maturing, power and authority of 
the founders becomes depersonalised as a result of what Weber (1978) 
termed the process of ‘routinization of charisma’ (Ocasio, 1999). Since 
venture capital can be viewed as a cycle (Gompers and Lerner, 2004), it is in 
the very nature of VCs to exit from their investments. For VC-backed IPOs 
this means that VCs will (gradually) exit within a rather short time after 
flotation. Consequently, following flotation, ownership structure (Barry et 
al., 1990) and board composition (Campbell and Frye, 2005) may 
subsequently be altered also in order to accommodate new challenges the 
young IPO firm is facing, like managing the important elements of the 
environment related to changes in the organisation’s size and diversity 
(Pfeffer, 1972; Provan, 1980). Conducting longitudinal studies of the post-
IPO evolution of corporate governance may make important contributions.  
4. Also, while the author found evidence that VC-backing is indeed associated with the 
professionalisation of portfolio firms, future research may make the important 
extension of focusing on cost/benefit of such professionalisation.   
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5. Finally, the literature is acknowledging that governance and the operation of VC 
firms may depend on the institutional environment which makes non-US-based 
research all the more valuable (Black and Gilson, 1998; Jeng et al., 2000). This 
thesis’ analysis based on UK data may be extended by future research to other 
institutional contexts like countries associated with network-based systems of 
corporate governance (La Porta et al., 1997). 
 
7.5 Contributions of the study 
The main objective of this thesis has been to examine the role VCs and founders play 
with respect to corporate governance and professionalisation in IPO stage ventures and 
whether these are linked to IPO performance. 
This study suggests an integrated framework building on both agency theory and the 
resource-dependence perspective to examine founders’ and VCs’ involvement to cover 
both structural and resource-related board characteristics.  
 
By doing so the thesis has extended previous research in several ways: 
 
Unlike most previous research that examined corporate governance in large mature 
organisations, this thesis has focused on IPO-stage ventures thus firms that make a 
crucial transition, thereby contributing to research on threshold firms. With the board 
being considered to be of high importance in such firms, the study had moved the 
analysis of the process of board formation beyond the routinely examined board 
composition and size. 
This thesis has examined the impact of theoretically significant contextual factors like 
venture capital on board composition and board characteristics in the IPO context. 
Research so far has mostly dealt with agency issues culminating in the involvement of 
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founders and VCs with respect to structural board characteristics. This study has taken a 
broader view, including more specific board characteristics drawn also from the 
perspective of resource provision in the analysis that have previously largely been 
neglected respectively have mostly been examined separately.  
In contrast to many other studies this thesis has not only examined rather typical 
structural board characteristics like board independence by using the fraction of 
independent directors as a proxy for board independence it employs a rather more fine-
grained measure compared to most extant UK studies using the proportion of non-
executive directors as such a proxy. The findings are by and large in line with 
bargaining, incentive-alignment and entrenchment arguments. 
This study additionally employs independent directors’ average tenure at IPO as a proxy 
for independent directors’ power. Neither is the author aware that a (significant 
negative) relationship between founder directors’ power (ownership) and tenure of 
independent directors nor that a (significant positive) relationship between VC-power 
(proxied by VC retained equity at IPO) and independent directors’ tenure has been 
documented in published research before. The thesis’ findings not only contribute to the 
governance literature but also to the small (empirical) literature on VC 
professionalisation of portfolio firms.  
The finding that founder power is positively and VC power negatively associated with 
the likelihood of a founder holding CEO position at IPO is unique in a UK context, 
since the author is unaware of other research using UK data that has examined and 
published findings of such relationships before.  
 
Another novelty of this thesis is that it introduces the concept of role legitimacy to the 
VC context and presents evidences of a positive relationship between VC-backing and 
CEO role legitimacy. This finding is not only another indication of VC’s being involved 
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in the professionalisation of portfolio firms but it also makes a unique contribution to 
the literature on organisational legitimacy respectively. 
Moreover the findings of this study indicate that VCs do not only seem to prefer CEOs 
with previous experience in this role, but founder-CEOs with that experience and thus 
document the importance VCs attribute to the (founder-)CEO’s experience. 
The author believes this to be the first study that has related VC-backing to the 
monitoring ability of independent directors in terms of the latter’s professional 
accounting qualifications, thus not only making another contribution to the literature on 
VC professionalisation of portfolio firms but also to the more general board roles 
literature from both a monitoring and resource-dependence perspective. The finding that 
VC-backing is positively related to the proportion of independent directors with 
professional accounting qualifications indicates greater concentration of monitoring 
ability on the board of VC-backed firms. 
A further unique contribution to both the literature on organisational legitimacy in 
general and director prestige in special and the literature on VC professionalisation 
respectively, stems from the examination of associations between VC-backing and 
various forms of director prestige. The findings that VC-backing is positively related to 
directors’ educational credentials, negatively related to social prestige (British honours 
and titles held among directors) but unrelated to political prestige present among the 
directors indicate that VCs deem certain forms of director prestige important, others 
detrimental and are indifferent for again some others. Such findings have to the best of 
the author’s knowledge not been published before. 
The additional finding of a (weak) positive relationship between VC-backing and the 
endorsement of prestigious organisations in terms of Big Five/Big Six auditors is 
consistent with Megginson and Weiss’ (1991) certification arguments makes a novel 
contribution to the UK VC literature.   
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In addition, this study contributes to signalling research since it extends previous work 
by studying non-financial indicators of firm quality that may influence investors’ 
decision making process. Especially, it contributes to an emerging stream of research 
centring on signalling with board characteristics which is extended by both this thesis’ 
focus on entrepreneurial IPOs and the examination of more specific characteristics with 
respect to a link with IPO performance such as role legitimacy and prestige related 
characteristics specifically chosen to reflect the UK context.  
This thesis contributes to the founder-management literature showing that IPOs headed 
by founder-CEOs do seem to leave more money on the table than other IPOs (holding 
everything else constant), hence a founder-discount seems to exist. 
One of the novelties of this study is that it highlighted the importance of monitoring 
ability by finding indications that the latter moderates the board independence – board 
performance (initial returns/underpricing) relationship. 
This is only one of a few studies that have examined director prestige (in the sense of 
D’Aveni (1990)) from a signalling point of view at IPO and the only one so far 
employing UK data. None of the variables proxying director prestige was consistently 
negatively related to underpricing.  
This study also contributes to the literature on certification through affiliation with 
prestigious organisations by documenting a negative relationship between prestige of 
the auditor involved and underpricing for the whole sample period and the sub-sample 
containing firms having had their IPO in the normal period. 
The study also adds to the increasing evidence questioning earlier studies which report a 
VC certification effect, since irrespective of the state of the IPO market, the data does 
not indicate such an effect. The author also shows that having a combination of VCs 
and prestigious underwriters involved in IPO firms is not significantly related to 
underpricing in any period, a finding that is at odds with recent propositions by 
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Loughran and Ritter (2004) ‘spinning hypothesis’ or Hoberg and Seyhun (2006) 
‘collaboration hypothesis’ and needs further exploration. 
 
Furthermore, this study does not stop at studying signalling effects in the short-run but 
also examines whether substantive benefits over the long-run exist. It makes a 
contribution to the small literature focusing on substantive benefits of having well 
qualified individuals in charge of running the IPO company not least by extending the 
current focus on the management team to the whole board of directors.  
This thesis is probably the first study that has examined structural board characteristics 
as well as more specific board characteristics (related to human capital and prestige) and 
post-IPO market performance in the long-run. 
Finally the author contributes to the literature on long-run performance of IPOs. 
Evidence is presented indicating that CEO ability (CEO role legitimacy) moderates the 
CEO ownership – long-run performance relationship, a unique result to date. 
Furthermore, VC-backing and (VC retained ownership) are positively related to post-
IPO market performance in the long-run (24 and 36 months from flotation) as is the log 
of retained VC equity. 
 
The majority of research on venture capital employs US data, yet because it has been 
acknowledged that the VC industry differs from country to country, for example due to 
economic and legal reasons, projecting findings from US studies to other regions is 
problematic, making studies of the VC industry in other countries all the more 
important. Compared to studies using UK data, this thesis is different data wise (let 
alone for the number of reasons that have just been outlined above). It relies on a hand-
collected data set obtained through a multi-stage data collection procedure based on a 
corroborated list of IPOs floated on both the Official List and AIM (IPOs on the latter 
are typically neglected in UK VC studies). Furthermore, unlike most other UK studies 
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that examine ‘all’ VC-backed IPOs in a certain period this thesis uses a number of 
sources to identify VC-backed IPOs (not exclusively relying on a (rather 
incomprehensive) BVCA-list typically used by UK academics) and focuses solely on 
entrepreneurial IPOs, matched VC-backed and non-VC-backed ones. 
 
Taken together, this thesis has made several contributions to the venture 
capital/entrepreneurship literature as well as to the IPO performance and corporate 
governance literatures. This was achieved by examining the role VCs and founders play 
with respect to board structure and board characteristics from both a monitoring and 
resource-dependence perspective. Through the lense of the rather recently developed 
concept of the board of directors representing a signal of firm quality, the link between 
board structure/board characteristics (in other words corporate governance and 
professionalisation) and IPO short and long-run performance has been examined.  
The findings of this thesis have advanced the current understanding of the role the most 
prominent players in IPO stage ventures, founders and VCs, play with respect to 
corporate governance, professionalisation and performance. 
The outcomes of this research have a number of implications to several key audiences 
as has been outlined earlier in this concluding chapter along with the study’s limitations.  
This study may encourage future research to extend current knowledge on the 
involvement and organisational outcomes of prominent individuals/parties in 
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Appendix 1: Entrepreneurial activity and venture capital 
 
Self-employment and small businesses are an important element of the private economy 
in developed countries. As for the UK, at the start of 2006 there were an estimated 4.5 
million businesses. While some 6,000 large firms represent only 0.1% of the overall 
figure, small businesses with up to 49 employees accounted for more than 99% of the 
total. These businesses achieve 37% of the total turnover and are responsible for 47% of 
employment.  
Fostering a culture of entrepreneurship is therefore regarded as an essential part of 
ensuring the long-term success of the corporate envrironment. The UK is regarded as 
one of the most entrepreneurial countries in Europe, and has generally a very positive 
attitude towards entrepreneurship (Harding, 2006). 
 
Providing capital for businesses, private equity has helped in shaping the UK economy 
(BVCA, 2006c). The UK private equity industry is the largest and most developed in 
Europe and second only to the US on a world scale. It accounts for over half of the 
European private equity investments made in 2005. In that year, £11.7 billion were 
invested in 1,535 companies worldwide and 1,307 UK companies by BVCA full 
members alone. Together, these businesses form a vital and dynamic component of the 
UK economy. An estimated 2.8 million people in the UK are employed by companies 
that have received private equity finance, accounting for nearly one-fifth of UK private 
sector employees (BVCA, 2006a).  
IPOs represent a small but important exit route for VCs (the fraction of companies using 
IPOs ranged between 1% and 5% during 1998 and 2004). It has been documented 
recently that between 1998 and 2004, around 50% of the companies floated on the 
LSE’s main market were private-equity backed. For AIM, this figure is just under 8%, 
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with their relative market value accounting for 16%. While initial returns were found to 
be higher in private equity-backed IPOs relative to other IPOs, the difference was not 
statistically significant. Similarly, one-year buy-and-hold returns were also higher for 
IPOs with private-equity backing, yet again no statistical significance was detected 
(BVCA, 2006b). 
 
In his paper, Sahlman (1990) refers to venture capital as a professionally managed pool 
of risk capital invested in private companies of various stages of their development and 
where the providers of capital actively participate in the decision-making process of 
their portfolio companies.  
The exact definition of venture capital, also referred to as risk capital, differs throughout 
the world. It is important to make a distinction between the US and European notion of 
venture capital. The US definition is narrow in scope and comprises private equity in 
young, rapidly growing, innovative and often technology-based firms, excluding 
management buy-outs (MBOs) and management buy-ins (MBIs). This form of 
financing is frequently called ‘classic’ venture capital (Keeley and Roure, 1990; Roure 
and Keeley, 1990; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). The broader European view adopted 
e.g. by the European Venture Capital Association and the BVCA, on the other hand, 
includes MBOs/MBIs and thus comprises the full spectrum of private equity 
investments (BVCA, 2007).  
 
Taken together, start-ups are the lifeblood of the UK economy, with VCs providing both 
funding for growth and value added services. VCs thereby invest in unquoted 
companies in exchange for a proportion of the firm’s equity. Target companies for the 
VC’s medium to long-term investment horizon are ventures with high growth potential 
(BVCA, 2006a). 
 
How venture capital investments are made and how VCs are involved in their portfolio 
firms has attracted not only the interest of academics but also policy makers and 
entrepreneurs alike and will be outlined in the following. 
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Venture capital investments 
 
Within this section the author will outline the VC’s investment stages and the process 
VCs typically follow when making investments. 
 
Investment stages 
The development of new businesses occurs in sequential stages (Galbraith, 1982; 
Churchill and Lewis, 1983). Ruhnka and Young (1987) showed that the venture capital 
industry takes account of that and differentiates several investment stages, which 
according to the BVCA (2006c) can be structured as follows: 
1. Start-up: Supply of finance to companies which may be in the process of being 
set up or may have a short business history, where product(s) have not yet been 
sold commercially. Capital is provided for product development and initial 
marketing. 
2. Early stage: Finance for companies with completed product development. 
Funding is needed for initiating manufacturing and sales.  
3. Expansion: Development capital supplied for growth and expansion of an 
already established business. Funding may be employed to increase the capacity 
of production, for the development of products and/or for marketing purposes. 
4. MBO: Finance supplied to enable existing management to acquire a product line 
or business  
5. MBI: Capital provided to enable external manager(s) to buy into an existing 
business. 
  
VCs are significantly different regarding the stage in the life-cycle of businesses they 
invest in (Robinson, 1987) and tend to specialise their investments in one or more of 
these phases (Sahlman, 1990). 
 
After having mentioned the different stages VCs invest in, the author now also outlines 
the venture capital investing life-cycle which spans from establishing a fund to exiting 
from the investment (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992).  
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Investment process 
The question of how VCs raise money and what determines their fundraising is a topic 
on its own and has recently attracted increasing attention (Gompers and Lerner, 1999b; 
Cumming et al., 2005). Venture capital funds in the UK are usually structured as limited 
partnerships or independent funds which raise capital from financial institutions. In 
limited partnerships, institutional investors represent the ‘limited partners’, with the 
venture capital firm acting as ‘general partner’ (Barnes and McCarthy, 2002). 
VC investments tend to be risky in nature regarding future cash flows and profit 
creation. Therefore evaluating a venture is done with particular care. Funding is only 
provided if the potential for abnormally high returns is given. Most VCs employ an 
investment procedure similar to that described by Fried and Hisrich (1994).  
 
In Figure 5 the author incorporates the two sequential procedures by both Bygrave and 
Timmons (1992: 14) and Fried and Hisrich (1994: 51). 
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Figure 5: VCs’ investment process  
Establishing funds and
targeting of investment opportunities
Raising capital for investments
Generating deal flow
1. Deal origination




















Source: Adapted from Bygrave and Timmons (1992: 14) and Fried and Hisrich (1994: 51) 
 
After funds are obtained for investing potential deals have to be discovered by VCs and 
essentials of the business have to be confirmed and clarified (due diligence). This 
process requires extensive work which is justified due to high risk and large amounts of 
money frequently involved. 
1. Deal origination: VCs may actively approach new ventures or founding teams 
or, more commonly, passively wait for deals to come to them. Most proposals 
which finally receive funding come by referral.  
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2. VC firm-specific screen: Proposals which obviously do not meet the VC’s 
investment criteria (e.g. financing stage, industry, investment size) are rejected. 
The proposal itself is not analysed at this stage. 
3. Generic screen: The business plan is examined and linked with any existing 
experience the VC might have regarding the proposal.  
Most proposals of the above two screening phases are rejected with a minimum 
investment of time. Hall and Hofer (1993) report that VCs reach a go/no-go 
decision in an average of less than six minutes in the initial screening, and in 
less than 21 minutes for proposal assessment. 
4. First-phase evaluation: Additional information is gathered and compared to the 
information provided in the business plan in order to determine whether there is 
a serious interest in a deal. The entrepreneur and the management team are met, 
interviewed critically and their references checked. There is consensus in the 
literature that the entrepreneur/management team is one of the most important 
criteria used by VCs in evaluating investment opportunities (MacMillan et al., 
1987; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2004). All business aspects are examined in detail, technical studies 
are conducted and financial and accounting information analysed (Wright and 
Robbie, 1996). Even other VCs can be consulted. Rejection rates are high. When 
the investment is being considered, the VC is confronted with a potential 
adverse selection problem as prior to investing they cannot determine the 
entrepreneur’s performance (Amit et al., 1990b). 
5. Second-phase evaluation: The assessment continues with regard to determining 
potential obstacles to the investment and means of how they can be overcome. 
Time invested in the proposal increases, thus at this point the VC must have 
already gained a rough understanding of the deal structure and price, in order to 
avoid not wasting time and money on proposals which are priced too high (Fried 
and Hisrich, 1994). While in an early work Lorenz (1989) argues that VCs most 
commonly employ the internal rate of return as an evaluation measure, 
according to a more recent paper by Wright and Robbie (1996), various 
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valuation techniques are used. In the UK, particularly among later stage 
investments, emphasis is placed on valuations based on price-earnings. 
6. Closing: If the proposal has progressed to the closing phase, the details of the 
deal are structured and legal documents finalised. The ability of VCs to reach 
their target levels of return depends on the appropriate structuring of the deal 
(Wright and Robbie, 1998). The main focus in VCs’ financial contracting is 
based on the allocation of cash, allocation of risk and supply of adequate 
incentives to both parties (Sahlman, 1990), including the equity share the 
entrepreneur has to give up (Golden, 1981). Protective covenants which limit 
various kinds of expenditures are established, comprising also those which form 
the basis under which the VC can take control of the board with all related 
powers even if the VC is only a minority shareholder. Although both VC and 
entrepreneur have spent a large amount of time to get to this phase, deals can 
still be rejected. 
 
With regard to deal negotiations, VCs pay high attention to business factors rather than 
product characteristics. It seems markets which offer unrestricted opportunities for rapid 
growth are considered to be most important to VCs (Rea, 1989). If the deal is 
accomplished, the VC usually provides staged financing in several rounds upon meeting 
predetermined targets rather than a one-off capital injection, thus allowing more control 
for the investor. In addition to providing funds, the VC becomes actively involved in the 
company, thereby adding value. (The next section provides a more detailed overview.)  
The transit to the exit stage begins with planning the exit and ends with the consecutive 
sale of the VC’s equity. A typical timeframe provides for the VC’s exit within 5-10 
years. Exit can occur by trade sale, flotation (IPO) which is the focus of this thesis, as 
well as refinancing or purchase of own shares which is less common. If the project fails 






Involvement of venture capitalists 
 
The VC literature has named various benefits VCs bring to the companies in their 
portfolio beyond the provision of finance, summarised as VC value added. 
One of the pioneering studies on the nature of VC value added was conducted by 
Gorman and Sahlman (1989) who studied 49 VCs and ranked the assistance provided 
by them to the entrepreneur(s) in the following order: 1) assistance in obtaining 
additional funding, 2) strategic analysis, 3) management recruitment, 4) operational 
planning, 5) introductions to potential customers as well as suppliers, and 6) resolving 
issues surrounding compensation. Building on that, MacMillan et al. (1989) analysed 62 
VCs regarding activities attracting the highest degree of VC involvement. Results were 
as follows: serving as a sounding board to the entrepreneurial team, assisting in 
obtaining further sources of equity funding, interfacing with investors, monitoring 
financial and operating performance, as well as assisting in obtaining alternative sources 
of debt funding. In addition, Rosenstein (1988) shows that in contrast to traditional 
boards, VC-backed boards are actively involved in strategy formulation and monitoring 
of its implementation. Moreover, the board is dominated by outsiders and has frequent 
meetings. Employing a framework based on MacMillan et al. (1989), Harrison and 
Mason (1992) show for the UK that entrepreneurs value strategic activities and 
sounding board as most important. In a survey of 149 VCs, Elango et al. (1995) found 
that VCs were involved in seeking additional funding, recruiting management and 
operational planning.  
To sum up, these studies suggest that VC investors provide value added services mainly 
by advising ventures on a financial, strategic and operative level, as well as by using 
their network of contacts with suppliers, customers and professional service firms. Also, 
VCs engage in control activities e.g. monitoring the venture’s management.  
 
These activities can be differentiated into two distinct yet not mutually exclusive roles, 
that of monitoring, controlling and intervening, as well as that of providing advice and 
support, hence of providing resources. In other words, VCs are engaged in corporate 
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governance and the professionalisation of their portfolio firms, both of which will be 
outlined in more detail in the literature review presented in the following chapter.  
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Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
1 vc 1.00
2 syndummy 0.49 1.00
0.00
3 pcvcdir 0.50 0.50 1.00
0.00 0.00
4 vcdpreste 0.23 0.30 0.48 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
5 foundceo 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.13 1.00
0.20 0.28 0.73 0.01
6 foundch -0.02 -0.09 -0.04 0.10 -0.20 1.00
0.67 0.08 0.46 0.04 0.00
7 pcfoudir 0.09 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.25 0.03 1.00
0.06 0.51 0.29 0.21 0.00 0.61
8 intfouil -0.11 -0.10 -0.06 0.03 -0.11 0.20 -0.08 1.00
0.03 0.05 0.23 0.53 0.04 0.00 0.11
9 retfoude -0.36 -0.38 -0.31 -0.15 0.08 0.18 0.09 0.09 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.07 0.08
10 retvceq 0.67 0.56 0.66 0.32 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 -0.09 -0.42 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.14 0.78 0.06 0.00
11 retmoneq 0.44 0.40 0.46 0.21 -0.05 -0.13 -0.04 -0.01 -0.55 0.68 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.01 0.47 0.80 0.00 0.00
12 retceoeq -0.25 -0.30 -0.20 -0.15 0.40 -0.07 -0.10 0.01 0.67 -0.29 -0.38 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.04 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 pcoutsiders 0.18 0.16 0.28 0.12 0.05 -0.20 -0.23 0.07 -0.30 0.24 0.33 -0.20 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 avgteno 0.22 0.21 0.30 0.13 0.08 -0.10 -0.01 -0.17 -0.25 0.22 0.22 -0.17 0.08 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18
15 ceoprceo 0.22 0.10 0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.09 0.09 -0.07 0.09 0.11 -0.04 0.09 0.09 1.00
0.00 0.07 0.24 0.68 0.60 0.42 0.11 0.07 0.19 0.10 0.05 0.50 0.09 0.15
16 foceprce 0.25 0.05 0.04 -0.10 0.41 -0.09 0.22 0.06 -0.04 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.79 1.00
0.00 0.30 0.49 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.28 0.47 0.11 0.41 0.23 0.07 0.04 0.00
17 intceoil -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.04 -0.07 0.77 0.08 -0.05 0.05 0.13 0.13 -0.13 0.24 0.18 1.00
0.34 0.17 0.72 0.77 0.12 0.43 0.17 0.00 0.11 0.35 0.34 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
18 pcaccdout 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.11 0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.11 1.00
0.03 0.50 0.43 0.37 0.63 0.31 0.08 0.04 0.22 0.46 0.36 0.25 0.26 0.18 0.97 0.96 0.04
19 accdoutyes 0.12 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.10 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.11 -0.11 0.03 0.00 -0.09 0.87 1.00
0.02 0.91 0.36 0.59 0.76 0.18 0.66 0.06 0.67 0.26 0.75 0.62 0.03 0.05 0.63 0.97 0.07 0.00
20 pcpreste 0.11 0.13 0.23 0.55 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 0.12 0.10 -0.08 0.09 0.13 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 1.00
0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.97 0.77 0.29 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.57 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.11
21 pcpreduwvc 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.27 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.06 0.11 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 0.94 1.00
0.37 0.29 0.13 0.00 0.88 0.53 0.84 0.13 0.41 0.98 0.66 0.38 0.27 0.06 0.70 0.41 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.00
22 pcsumhon -0.02 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.11 -0.08 0.07 0.08 1.00
0.69 0.08 0.70 0.92 0.10 0.26 0.39 0.86 0.03 0.99 0.68 0.23 0.00 0.79 0.42 0.14 0.44 0.03 0.13 0.18 0.12
23 brithon 0.02 0.14 0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.13 0.06 0.06 -0.08 0.20 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.05 -0.15 -0.10 0.09 0.11 0.88 1.00
0.71 0.01 0.46 0.69 0.04 0.60 0.75 0.91 0.01 0.23 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.56 0.42 0.13 0.32 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.00
24 mpdummy 0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.41 0.31 1.00
0.59 0.38 0.23 0.89 0.03 0.20 0.69 0.42 0.96 0.67 0.44 0.72 0.53 0.28 0.63 0.70 0.09 1.00 0.78 0.32 0.29 0.00 0.00
25 prestaud 0.22 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.08 -0.04 -0.17 0.18 0.21 -0.11 0.25 0.06 0.14 0.11 0.06 -0.10 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.04 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.22 0.60 0.54 0.11 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.34 0.01 0.04 0.28 0.06 0.51 0.90 0.95 0.28 0.18 0.45
26 up -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.11 0.10 -0.03 -0.09 0.08 0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.09 0.14 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 1.00
0.29 0.94 0.34 0.75 0.59 0.33 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.51 0.08 0.13 0.80 0.47 0.30 0.10 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.46 0.51 0.81 0.70 0.50 0.43
27 LBHAR12 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08 -0.07 0.12 0.02 -0.13 0.13 -0.12 0.05 0.01 0.08 -0.06 0.07 0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 1.00
0.69 0.55 0.64 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.02 0.76 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.36 0.83 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.28 0.14 0.17 0.29 0.32 0.62 0.56 0.64
28 LBHAR24 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.05 -0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.08 0.02 0.08 -0.09 0.08 0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.68 1.00
0.16 0.20 0.19 0.70 0.12 0.86 0.60 0.25 0.95 0.38 0.26 0.24 0.89 0.18 0.67 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.22 0.64 0.35 0.81 0.86 0.43 0.16 0.89 0.00
29 LBHAR36 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.08 -0.05 0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.10 -0.05 0.52 0.80 1.00
0.35 0.16 0.28 0.88 0.12 0.40 0.37 0.62 0.59 0.15 1.00 0.51 0.85 0.32 0.48 0.15 0.37 0.50 0.42 0.96 0.73 0.72 0.65 0.54 0.06 0.39 0.00 0.00
30 lossb4ip 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.10 -0.16 -0.03 -0.11 0.20 -0.20 0.12 0.26 -0.16 0.13 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 0.20 -0.19 -0.17 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.33 -0.31 -0.22 1.00
0.95 0.24 0.31 0.05 0.00 0.61 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.27 0.86 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.45 0.34 0.65 0.65 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix (continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
31 foreign -0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.06 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 -0.08 0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.10 -0.01 -0.11 -0.08 0.10 1.00
0.24 0.31 0.93 0.31 0.92 0.27 0.57 0.33 0.34 0.11 0.49 0.66 0.04 0.55 0.83 0.46 0.58 0.32 0.48 0.87 0.56 0.33 0.62 0.39 0.90 0.04 0.81 0.03 0.17 0.05
32 segment -0.27 -0.22 -0.13 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.12 0.34 0.22 -0.18 -0.10 0.13 -0.21 -0.11 -0.07 -0.04 0.29 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.10 0.03 -0.36 0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 0.19 0.08 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.68 0.85 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.18 0.40 0.00 0.91 0.23 0.41 0.34 0.25 0.05 0.60 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.11
33 logmarcap 0.24 0.29 0.17 0.11 -0.06 0.04 -0.18 -0.10 -0.21 0.20 0.17 -0.19 0.31 -0.04 0.09 0.02 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.39 -0.11 -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 0.06 0.00 -0.57 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.47 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.09 0.77 0.86 0.07 0.97 0.09 0.10 0.21 0.08 0.74 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.22 0.99 0.00
34 logfirmage -0.09 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.26 -0.29 0.17 -0.07 -0.13 0.18 -0.09 0.24 -0.24 -0.22 -0.21 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 0.10 0.11 0.08 -0.29 0.03 -0.23 -0.01 1.00
0.08 0.99 0.47 0.96 0.82 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.65 0.20 0.12 0.81 0.68 0.65 0.55 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.87
35 logdirs 0.25 0.22 0.10 0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.23 -0.09 -0.32 0.17 0.19 -0.30 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.03 -0.06 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.20 0.06 0.29 -0.07 -0.11 -0.06 -0.05 0.10 0.09 -0.35 0.46 0.01 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.05 0.40 0.30 0.51 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.05 0.56 0.26 0.03 0.94 0.62 0.43 0.06 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.23 0.40 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.88
36 lognexdirs 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.14 -0.05 -0.09 -0.27 0.02 -0.36 0.25 0.27 -0.33 0.59 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.05 -0.09 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.22 0.06 0.28 0.03 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 0.15 0.13 -0.33 0.44 -0.10 0.67 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.08 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.23 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.56 0.06 0.27 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00
37 marketvodw -0.08 -0.04 -0.08 0.02 -0.08 -0.11 -0.04 0.14 0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 0.13 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.01 -0.16 -0.12 -0.08 0.27 0.01 0.10 0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 1.00
0.13 0.46 0.11 0.68 0.12 0.04 0.39 0.01 0.42 0.29 0.58 0.15 0.40 0.28 0.88 0.14 0.01 0.63 0.86 0.35 0.37 0.29 0.66 0.05 0.82 0.82 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.84 0.04 0.25 0.10 0.34 0.66
38 marketreturn -0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.29 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.29 1.00
0.87 0.28 0.43 0.88 0.84 0.13 0.75 0.29 0.30 0.91 0.23 0.21 0.83 0.81 0.44 0.57 0.42 0.31 0.53 0.70 0.80 0.09 0.11 0.37 0.96 0.00 0.53 0.93 0.44 0.18 0.22 0.91 0.09 0.71 0.34 0.70 0.00
39 prestund 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.12 -0.16 0.18 0.09 -0.17 0.17 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.23 -0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.39 0.47 0.02 0.28 0.29 -0.08 0.08 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.76 0.88 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.45 0.87 0.14 0.77 0.71 0.57 0.63 0.19 0.04 0.69 0.00 0.52 0.58 0.27 0.55 0.48 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.12
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Appendix 3 Underpricing (OLS) 
Table 35: Underpricing (full sample period; OLS) 
up mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6   mod7
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se   b/se
vc 0.016   0.026   
(0.026)   (0.028)   
retfoude 0.072 0.054                               
(0.063) (0.061)                               
foundceo 0.023 0.015 0.020 0.018   0.018   
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)   (0.026)   
pcoutsiders 0.055 0.144° 0.083 0.080   0.088   0.114
(0.098) (0.087) (0.079) (0.080)   (0.082)   (0.080)
pcaccdout -0.070* -0.070* -0.060° -0.064*  -0.064*  -0.074*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031)   (0.031)   (0.031)
pcoutsiders* -0.516* -0.522*  -0.527*  -0.534*
pcaccdout (0.222) (0.219)   (0.223)   (0.213)
ceoprceo 0.008 0.004                               
(0.025) (0.025)                               
prestaud -0.030 -0.030 -0.040 -0.042°  -0.042°  -0.039°
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)   (0.025)   (0.023)
pcpreste -0.084 -0.089                               -0.128°
(0.074) (0.081)                               (0.077)
pcsumhon -0.073* -0.080*                               -0.084*
(0.032) (0.034)                               (0.033)
prestund*vc                -0.041   
               (0.056)   
prestund 0.001 0.003 0.019 0.017 -0.001 -0.001   0.024   
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)   (0.046)   
marketvol 6.288 5.952 7.185° 6.934° 6.161 6.304 6.387 4.898
(-4.186) (-4.179) (-3.998) (-4.005) (-4.226) (-4.252) (-4.287) (-3.800)
marketreturn 2.957*** 2.948*** 2.549*** 2.528*** 2.780*** 2.776*** 2.778*** 2.447***
(0.573) (0.578) (0.560) (0.560) (0.556) (0.559)   (0.561)   (0.522)
foreign -0.109* -0.118** -0.121** -0.136** -0.122** -0.120** -0.118** -0.148**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046)   (0.045)   (0.046)
segment -0.012 -0.017 -0.030 -0.034 -0.017 -0.014   -0.016   
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)   (0.031)   
logmarcap -0.043 -0.048° -0.038 -0.047 -0.029 -0.029   -0.031   
(0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)   (0.030)   
logfirmage -0.047 -0.055 -0.023 -0.025 -0.003 0.001   -0.001   
(0.038) (0.042) (0.035) (0.039) (0.033) (0.034)   (0.034)   
logdirs -0.006 0.017 -0.054 -0.014 -0.037 -0.049   -0.045   
(0.104) (0.102) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112)   (0.113)   
_cons -2.479*** -2.462*** -2.077*** -2.027*** -2.409*** -2.404*** -2.394*** -2.295***
(0.583) (0.585) (0.567) (0.563) (0.577) (0.579)   (0.577)   (0.527)
N 386 382 335 332 368 368 368 332
F 4.798 3.956 2.769 2.461 3.578 3.476 3.217 4.705
p 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000   
R2 0.108 0.113 0.123 0.131 0.123 0.124   0.126   0.130
adj.R2 0.090 0.089 0.084 0.087 0.091 0.090   0.088   0.106
AIC -19.092 -13.990 -53.929 -50.379 -44.240 -42.671 -41.208 -64.055
BIC 16.510 29.409 3.283 14.308 10.473 15.950 21.321 -26.004
Wald(p) 0.260 0.283 0.383 0.417 0.477 0.480 0.483 -
Jarque-Bera(p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
OLS (full sample period)
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Table 36: Underpricing (normal IPO period; OLS) 
up mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6   mod7
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se   b/se
vc 0.014   0.005   
(0.021)   (0.024)   
retfoude 0.044 0.084                               0.073
(0.057) (0.056)                               (0.049)
foundceo 0.039° 0.036° 0.033° 0.033   0.033   0.038°
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)   (0.020)   (0.021)
pcoutsiders -0.071 0.038 -0.000 -0.010   -0.012   
(0.114) (0.083) (0.075) (0.078)   (0.078)   
pcaccdout -0.039 -0.040 -0.038 -0.041   -0.041   
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)   (0.026)   
pcoutsiders* -0.443* -0.445*  -0.430*  
pcaccdout (0.214) (0.215)   (0.213)   
ceoprceo -0.005 -0.005                               
(0.023) (0.023)                               
prestaud -0.039° -0.033 -0.040* -0.041*  -0.039*  -0.034°
(0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019)   (0.019)   (0.020)
pcpreste -0.056 -0.043                               
(0.073) (0.076)                               
pcsumhon 0.008 0.009                               
(0.032) (0.033)                               
prestund*vc                0.047   
               (0.041)   
prestund 0.033 0.036 0.038 0.038 0.036 0.035   0.002   0.030
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023)   (0.032)   (0.023)
marketvol 0.125 -0.153 1.450 1.491 -0.304 -0.214   -0.418   
(-3.134) (-3.134) (-3.109) (-3.093) (-3.182) (-3.207) (-3.150)
marketreturn 1.542*** 1.544*** 1.649*** 1.686*** 1.515*** 1.506*** 1.500*** 1.703***
(0.407) (0.405) (0.404) (0.408) (0.363) (0.362)   (0.361)   (0.338)
foreign -0.129** -0.128** -0.137** -0.145** -0.139** -0.134** -0.137** -0.150***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047)   (0.047)   (0.042)
segment -0.011 -0.017 -0.009 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014   -0.012   
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023)   (0.023)   
logmarcap -0.027 -0.024 -0.010 -0.020 -0.010 -0.010   -0.009   
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024)   (0.024)   
logfirmage -0.065 -0.073 -0.013 -0.021 -0.011 -0.009   -0.007   
(0.042) (0.045) (0.034) (0.037) (0.029) (0.029)   (0.029)   
logdirs -0.120 -0.114 -0.129 -0.086 -0.123 -0.136   -0.141   
(0.091) (0.099) (0.098) (0.103) (0.093) (0.095)   (0.096)   
_cons -1.079** -1.116** -1.356** -1.373** -1.215** -1.211** -1.207** -1.622***
(0.390) (0.394) (0.414) (0.415) (0.381) (0.381)   (0.381)   (0.338)
N 252 250 218 217 237 237 237 217
F 3.797 3.382 2.726 2.524 3.245 3.046 2.841 6.348
p 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000   
R2 0.127 0.135 0.170 0.178 0.172 0.173   0.177   0.161
adj.R2 0.098 0.099 0.113 0.112 0.123 0.121   0.121   0.137
AIC -200.240 -196.117 -210.726 -207.280 -247.676 -246.175 -245.229 -222.887
BIC -168.475 -157.381 -159.958 -149.821 -199.123 -194.154 -189.740 -199.228
Wald(p) 0.814 0.863 0.874 887 0.862 0.865 0.894 -
Jarque-Bera(p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
OLS (normal IPO period)
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Table 37: Underpricing (hot IPO period; OLS) 
up mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6   mod7
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se   b/se   
vc 0.063   0.138                  
(0.068)   (0.084)                  
retfoude 0.067 -0.044                                              
(0.123) (0.129)                                              
foundceo -0.018 -0.021 -0.037 -0.046   -0.060                  
(0.060) (0.062) (0.057) (0.056)   (0.055)                  
pcoutsiders 0.125 0.318° 0.082 0.099   0.236   0.373°  
(0.196) (0.176) (0.179) (0.178)   (0.205)   (0.198)   
pcaccdout -0.176° -0.176* -0.149° -0.162°  -0.171*  -0.145°  
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.086)   (0.085)   (0.079)   
pcoutsiders* -0.550 -0.549   -0.428                  
pcaccdout (0.672) (0.669)   (0.673)                  
ceoprceo 0.036 0.029                                              
(0.062) (0.062)                                              
prestaud 0.011 -0.007 -0.022 -0.021   -0.021                  
(0.071) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066)   (0.066)                  
pcpreste -0.150 -0.148                                              
(0.237) (0.243)                                              
pcsumhon -0.214** -0.264**                               -0.269***
(0.068) (0.081)                               (0.079)   
prestund*vc                -0.262°                 
               (0.136)                  
prestund -0.053 -0.051 -0.014 -0.017 -0.071 -0.063   0.066                  
(0.061) (0.062) (0.066) (0.067) (0.058) (0.056)   (0.089)                  
marketvol 11.736 10.950 12.429 10.280 10.273 9.921 10.390                
(-8.903) (-9.119) (-8.321) (-8.250) (-9.015) (-9.222) (-9.225)                
marketreturn 4.938*** 4.878*** 4.399*** 4.418*** 4.822*** 4.837*** 5.012*** 3.520***
-1.223 -1.229 -1.198 -1.196 -1.208 -1.227 -1.280 -1.006
foreign -0.105 -0.119 -0.153 -0.183 -0.113 -0.127   -0.131   -0.191*  
(0.087) (0.090) (0.106) (0.116) (0.108) (0.108)   (0.100)   (0.097)   
segment -0.074 -0.072 -0.094 -0.080 -0.063 -0.054   -0.058                  
(0.093) (0.094) (0.101) (0.098) (0.096) (0.095)   (0.093)                  
logmarcap -0.139* -0.139* -0.150° -0.143° -0.114 -0.130   -0.148°  -0.083°  
(0.068) (0.069) (0.081) (0.082) (0.079) (0.082)   (0.085)   (0.048)   
logfirmage -0.007 -0.026 -0.041 -0.062 0.007 0.022   -0.008                  
(0.077) (0.086) (0.079) (0.087) (0.082) (0.087)   (0.085)                  
logdirs 0.291 0.295 0.229 0.186 0.172 0.137   0.131                  
(0.269) (0.265) (0.285) (0.279) (0.276) (0.275)   (0.282)                  
_cons -3.951*** -3.902*** -3.244** -3.238** -3.911*** -3.812*** -3.848*** -2.717** 
-1.114 -1.138 -1.053 -1.079 -1.072 -1.084 -1.112 (0.972)   
N 134 132 117 115 131 131 131 115
F 2.537 2.215 1.913 1.799 1.875 1.689 1.591 3.255
p 0.014 0.021 0.033 0.042 0.040 0.067   0.087   0.006   
R2 0.153 0.157 0.181 0.200 0.159 0.165   0.191   0.173   
adj.R2 0.099 0.087 0.069 0.070 0.065 0.064   0.085   0.127   
AIC 87.333 91.339 72.573 74.641 89.214 90.167 88.075 58.457
BIC 113.414 123.050 114.005 121.304 129.467 133.295 134.079 77.671
Wald(p) 0.028 0.162 0.135 0.148 0.155 0.187 0.261 -
Jarque-Bera(p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
OLS (hot IPO period)
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Appendix 4 Long-run performance (OLS) 
Table 38: Long-run performance (12 months following flotation; OLS) 
LBHAR12 mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6 mod7 mod8
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se b/se b/se
vc                0.030
               (0.032)
retfoude 0.043 -0.010                
(0.084) (0.083)                
retceoeq 0.123   0.064 0.083
(0.086)   (0.094) (0.096)
foundceo 0.037 0.034                
(0.032) (0.033)                
pcoutsiders -0.117 -0.068                
(0.142) (0.118)                
pcaccdout -0.027 -0.027                
(0.048) (0.048)                
ceoprceo -0.005 -0.002 0.009 0.011   0.014 0.009
(0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035)   (0.035) (0.036)
retceoeq*                0.165 0.148
ceoprceo                (0.166) (0.168)
prestaud 0.024 0.027 0.019 0.019   0.017 0.015
(0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.038)   (0.038) (0.038)
pcpreste -0.039 -0.030                
(0.122) (0.123)                
pcsumhon -0.017 -0.011                
(0.052) (0.053)                
prestund 0.069° 0.068° 0.086* 0.085* 0.082* 0.083*  0.085* 0.083* 0.078°
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041)   (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
up -0.002 -0.003 -0.074 -0.070 0.013 0.010   0.003 0.006 -0.071°
(0.073) (0.071) (0.050) (0.050) (0.081) (0.080)   (0.080) (0.079) (0.038)
foreign 0.059 0.066 0.043 0.050 0.041 0.041   0.039 0.044
(0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.065) (0.063) (0.062)   (0.062) (0.062)
segment -0.082* -0.094** -0.063 -0.065° -0.060 -0.065°  -0.069° -0.064° -0.063°
(0.033) (0.034) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037)   (0.037) (0.037) (0.035)
logmarcap -0.117*** -0.120** -0.111** -0.116** -0.122*** -0.127*** -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.128***
(0.034) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)   (0.037) (0.037) (0.034)
logfirmage -0.008 -0.011 -0.002 0.002 -0.018 -0.027   -0.022 -0.018
(0.037) (0.041) (0.045) (0.046) (0.038) (0.041)   (0.040) (0.041)
logdirs -0.134 -0.102 -0.195 -0.203 -0.163 -0.110   -0.105 -0.116
(0.134) (0.138) (0.141) (0.148) (0.148) (0.151)   (0.152) (0.152)
lossb4ip -0.177*** -0.172*** -0.186*** -0.188*** -0.165*** -0.159*** -0.159*** -0.159*** -0.194***
(0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037)   (0.037) (0.037) (0.032)
_cons 1.008*** 0.993*** 0.966*** 1.008*** 1.041*** 1.045*** 1.026*** 1.017*** 0.976***
(0.253) (0.266) (0.280) (0.283) (0.271) (0.273)   (0.275) (0.275) (0.261)
N 374 371 324 322 342 340 340 340 322
F 8.782 7.930 5.233 4.713 6.316 6.197 5.767 5.564 15.387
R2 0.140 0.149 0.192 0.198 0.125 0.135   0.137 0.139 0.187
adj.R2 0.121 0.125 0.155 0.156 0.099 0.106   0.105 0.105 0.174
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 129.002 130.036 46.837 48.841 130.757 129.326 130.397 131.646 31.490
BIC 164.320 173.114 103.548 113.008 172.940 175.273 180.173 185.252 54.138
Wald(p) 0.187 0.235 0.426 0.449 0.542 0.528 0.526 0.555 -
Jarque-Bera(p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.000
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance




Table 39: Long-run performance (24 months following flotation; OLS) 
LBAHR24 mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6 mod7 mod8
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se b/se b/se
vc                0.052 0.065
               (0.047) (0.043)
retfoude -0.079 -0.041                
(0.112) (0.127)                
retceoeq 0.020   -0.101 -0.066
(0.119)   (0.147) (0.150)
foundceo -0.001 -0.006                
(0.049) (0.050)                
pcoutsiders 0.154 0.150                
(0.146) (0.180)                
pcaccdout -0.027 -0.026                
(0.072) (0.073)                
ceoprceo 0.017 0.011 0.015 0.013   0.017 0.007
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)   (0.045) (0.046)
retceoeq*                0.327 0.292
ceoprceo                (0.234) (0.236)
prestaud 0.111* 0.108* 0.115* 0.117*  0.114* 0.109* 0.117*
(0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049)   (0.049) (0.049) (0.046)
pcpreste 0.107 0.081                
(0.186) (0.188)                
pcsumhon 0.015 0.002                
(0.078) (0.079)                
prestund 0.099° 0.100° 0.100° 0.097 0.099° 0.103°  0.105° 0.103° 0.105
(0.060) (0.054) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058)   (0.058) (0.058) (0.065)
up -0.070 -0.066 -0.111 -0.114 -0.082 -0.083   -0.096 -0.091 -0.104°
(0.054) (0.069) (0.076) (0.077) (0.073) (0.073)   (0.074) (0.074) (0.062)
foreign -0.123° -0.131 -0.165° -0.175° -0.166° -0.166°  -0.171° -0.162° -0.165**
(0.073) (0.091) (0.094) (0.096) (0.093) (0.093)   (0.093) (0.094) (0.059)
segment -0.106° -0.099° -0.079 -0.075 -0.066 -0.071   -0.080 -0.070
(0.056) (0.055) (0.058) (0.060) (0.057) (0.058)   (0.058) (0.058)
logmarcap -0.172*** -0.180*** -0.219*** -0.222*** -0.198*** -0.200*** -0.196*** -0.197*** -0.187***
(0.052) (0.051) (0.055) (0.057) (0.053) (0.053)   (0.053) (0.053) (0.044)
logfirmage -0.001 0.004 -0.026 -0.018 -0.010 -0.022   -0.012 -0.006
(0.060) (0.063) (0.069) (0.070) (0.067) (0.068)   (0.068) (0.068)
logdirs 0.041 0.025 0.005 0.009 0.015 0.049   0.063 0.046
(0.189) (0.196) (0.214) (0.226) (0.202) (0.208)   (0.207) (0.208)
lossb4ip -0.213*** -0.222*** -0.212*** -0.219*** -0.203*** -0.198*** -0.200*** -0.199*** -0.217***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051) (0.047) (0.048)   (0.048) (0.048) (0.046)
_cons 1.223** 1.319*** 1.522*** 1.560*** 1.340** 1.339** 1.299** 1.288** 1.206***
(0.376) (0.388) (0.426) (0.433) (0.407) (0.408)   (0.409) (0.409) (0.305)
N 347 344 299 297 317 315 315 315 297
F 8.756 5.581 3.899 3.411 5.422 4.823 4.598 4.341 12.847
R2 0.139 0.144 0.161 0.163 0.151 0.149   0.154 0.158 0.158
adj.R2 0.119 0.118 0.120 0.115 0.123 0.118   0.121 0.122 0.138
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 304.283 304.355 272.385 274.606 284.015 284.154 284.118 284.849 258.435
BIC 338.927 346.602 327.892 337.400 325.363 329.185 332.901 337.385 287.985
Wald(p) 0.401 0.429 0.587 0.544 0.831 0.878 0.894 0.899 -
Jarque-B.(p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance





Table 40: Long-run performance (36 months following flotation; OLS) 
LBAHR36 mod0 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5   mod6 mod7 mod8 mod9
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   b/se b/se b/se   b/se   
vc                 0.038 0.041                  
                (0.061) (0.059)                  
retfoude -0.127 -0.090                                               
(0.164) (0.188)                                               
retceoeq 0.111   0.097 0.123                               
(0.208)   (0.290) (0.288)                               
foundceo 0.050 0.049                                               
(0.061) (0.062)                                               
pcoutsiders 0.115 -0.093                                               
(0.201) (0.270)                                               
pcaccdout -0.016 -0.009                                               
(0.083) (0.082)                                               
ceoprceo 0.035 0.028 0.025 0.023   0.023 0.014                               
(0.065) (0.065) (0.062) (0.063)   (0.064) (0.065)                               
retceoeq*                 0.037 0.013                               
ceoprceo                 (0.380) (0.383)                               
prestaud 0.142* 0.149* 0.160* 0.164*  0.163* 0.160* 0.137*  0.159*  
(0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.064)   (0.065) (0.066) (0.061)   (0.064)   
pcpreste 0.175 0.153                                               
(0.213) (0.206)                                               
pcsumhon -0.007 -0.007                                               
(0.098) (0.098)                                               
prestund 0.066 0.063 0.055 0.057 0.037 0.047   0.047 0.047 0.061                  
(0.079) (0.078) (0.089) (0.089) (0.084) (0.083)   (0.083) (0.083) (0.079)                  
up -0.132* -0.126* -0.166* -0.164* -0.155* -0.159*  -0.161* -0.158* -0.126*  -0.162*  
(0.061) (0.061) (0.072) (0.072) (0.067) (0.063)   (0.066) (0.067) (0.058)   (0.071)   
foreign -0.122 -0.126 -0.185° -0.169 -0.191° -0.189°  -0.190° -0.182° -0.119   -0.193*  
(0.105) (0.109) (0.104) (0.106) (0.099) (0.100)   (0.100) (0.103) (0.105)   (0.096)   
segment -0.146° -0.143° -0.150° -0.152° -0.128 -0.142   -0.142° -0.136 -0.113   -0.163*  
(0.075) (0.079) (0.083) (0.090) (0.082) (0.086)   (0.084) (0.085) (0.078)   (0.079)   
logmarcap -0.184** -0.197** -0.234*** -0.235*** -0.212** -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.219*** -0.208*** -0.225***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.068) (0.070) (0.064) (0.064)   (0.065) (0.064) (0.061)   (0.058)   
logfirmage -0.027 -0.019 -0.041 -0.032 -0.015 -0.040   -0.039 -0.037 -0.011                  
(0.071) (0.075) (0.079) (0.084) (0.078) (0.086)   (0.090) (0.090) (0.072)                  
logdirs 0.039 0.032 -0.008 -0.066 0.016 0.104   0.106 0.092 -0.057                  
(0.270) (0.261) (0.318) (0.307) (0.296) (0.281)   (0.287) (0.289) (0.271)                  
lossb4ip -0.181** -0.193*** -0.152* -0.156* -0.163** -0.151*  -0.151* -0.151* -0.188*** -0.149*  
(0.056) (0.057) (0.063) (0.065) (0.061) (0.062)   (0.062) (0.062) (0.055)   (0.058)   
_cons 1.372** 1.512** 1.642** 1.721*** 1.475** 1.472** 1.467** 1.468** 1.496*** 1.608***
(0.444) (0.462) (0.499) (0.505) (0.482) (0.477)   (0.490) (0.490) (0.450)   (0.463)   
N 316 313 269 267 287 285 285 285 316 267
F 5.009 4.082 3.190 2.877 4.474 4.053 3.724 3.756 5.290 6.637
R2 0.084 0.090 0.106 0.109 0.101 0.104   0.104 0.105 0.102   0.102   
adj.R2 0.060 0.059 0.057 0.052 0.069 0.067   0.064 0.062 0.072   0.082   
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000   
AIC 428.476 426.317 383.632 385.227 401.058 398.583 400.568 402.203 426.225 367.342
BIC 462.278 467.525 437.552 446.210 441.312 442.413 448.050 453.338 467.538 392.452
Wald(p) 0.616 0.764 0.545 0.615 0.669 0.689 0.699 0.722 0.813 -
Jarque-B.(p) 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors are reported based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance
significant ° at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level, *** at 0.1% level
OLS
